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April 18, 2014 
Mr. Patrick J. Maley, Inspector General  
South Carolina Office of the Inspector General  
The Enoree Building, 111 Executive Center Drive, Suite 204  
Columbia, South Carolina 29210-8416 
Dear Mr. Maley: 
Please find attached our final report on the Fiduciary Performance Audit of the South Carolina 
Retirement System Investment Commission (RSIC).  We wish to thank the Commission and its staff, the 
Public Employee Benefits Authority (PEBA) and the State Treasurer’s Office (STO) for their cooperation 
and participation in this review.  Especially for RSIC, the timely accumulation and production of 
numerous documents, interviews and requests for clarification has been an enormously time consuming 
process. They are to be commended for their extraordinary responsiveness. We also wish to express our 
appreciation for the professionalism and cooperation of the Office of the State Inspector General (SIG) 
for its assistance in coordinating this review. 
Recognizing that this review is the first in a series of annual fiduciary performance reviews and that this 
review contains over 120 recommendations for improvement targeted at the Commission, the STO and 
the Legislature, it will take some time and resources for the timely implementation of those 
recommendations which are accepted.  Accordingly, we suggest that the scope of such reviews for the 
next several years be more focused on the status of implementation and a review of priority areas.  Also 
included as an Appendix are our recommendations ranked in order of priority, primary responsibility 
and estimated degree of difficulty, as well as key stakeholders.  This has been developed with input from 
the RSIC.  
We also note that prior to the finalization of this report, the Commission has already taken a number of 
steps to implement our recommendations.  For example, the Commission has approved a Planning 
Committee to review the FAS report and develop a strategic plan in collaboration with RSIC staff and has 
developed a charter and selected a chairperson.  Appropriate staff members have been identified for 
each finding (subject to Planning Committee approval) and the Planning Committee has begun work 
with staff to develop plans to address findings identified by the committee as key focus areas. The 
Planning Committee intends to make recommendations regarding key recommendation areas during 
the May 1st Commission meeting.  
The Compensation Committee has also met and will be recommending modifications to its charter to 
include: the addition of HR oversight as a committee responsibility; the addition of required annual 
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review of RSIC’s implementation of the Compensation Policy; the addition of required procurement of a 
new peer compensation study at least every three years to assess RSIC staff compensation; and they 
have already developed and posted a new HR Director position description.  They have also created the 
Director of ERM Position.  
The Commission’s enthusiastic and early embrace of our recommendations is most encouraging as a 
demonstration of its commitment to continue to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities, develop its 
capabilities and move forward.   We sincerely hope this report is of value to the RSIC, the beneficiaries 
of the fund and its key stakeholders as the Commission continues to develop its capabilities and fulfil its 
fiduciary responsibilities as it continues to move forward. 
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Executive Summary 
 
In December 2013, the South Carolina Office of the State Inspector General (SIG) engaged Funston 
Advisory Services LLC (FAS) to conduct a fiduciary performance audit of the Retirement System 
Investment Commission (RSIC).  The purpose of this audit was to critically evaluate the fiduciary roles 
and responsibilities of the RSIC Commissioners and staff, the relationship with other fiduciaries of the 
Retirement System, and the operational policies and practices of RSIC.  The goal of the review was to 
identify areas of strengths and weaknesses, provide comparison with leading practices of other public 
pension plans, and make improvement recommendations. 
Because RSIC is a relatively new state agency, the review was designed to be broad in nature, spanning 
all key functions.  The review of these functions was organized into six categories:  
1. Governance;  
2. Policy Review and Development;  
3. Organizational Structure;  
4. Investment Administration;  
5. Legal Compliance; and  
6. Information Technology.  
 
The review of each category required that specific items identified in the Request for Proposal must be 
addressed; however, those items were not intended to limit our creativity in assessing each category.  
We were authorized to review any policy, process, or procedure typically reviewed when completing 
this type of project.  We were also asked to use our judgment, experience and creativity in conducting 
the fiduciary performance audit.   
 
Context 
The Retirement System Investment Commission is currently less than ten years old and continues to 
develop its capabilities.  When the RSIC was launched in 2005, there were six commissioners and an 
Administrative Director/ General Counsel.  A new Chief Investment Officer (CIO) came on board in April 
2006, roughly six months later, and three full-time employees joined him in January 2007.  The new 
Commission was charged with investing and managing $25 billion in retirement assets.  A key feature of 
the new statute was to mandate the Commission with diversifying the fund’s assets unless “the 
Commission determines that, because of special circumstances, it is clearly not prudent to do so”.   
Accordingly, the initial strategy adopted by the Commissioners, in consultation with their general 
investment consultant, CIO and external managers, was to diversify a traditional stocks and bonds 
portfolio to improve long-term returns and better manage total fund risk.  They also chose to do so 
rapidly.  
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Numerous past practices were examined in this fiduciary performance audit to better understand the 
context, evolution and maturation of the RSIC.  Unfortunately, infrastructure did not keep pace with 
investment strategies (e.g., private equity, strategic partnerships, etc.) as initial back office and risk 
management procedures and support systems were often weak, manual and ad hoc.  Due to limited 
resources, the Commissioners also became very involved in investment operations such as due 
diligence.  Many of these legacy weaknesses have since been identified and have been or are being 
addressed by the Commission.  During the past two years, RSIC’s processes have evolved to become 
much more robust and systematic. 
  
Overall Conclusions 
1. There are no red flag indicators of malfeasance or misfeasance regarding the Commission’s current 
policies and practices.  This is consistent with the findings of the SIG July 2013 report.1 
2. Investment fee transparency, policies and controls have improved significantly; disclosure of total 
external management fees is the most complete in the industry.   
3. Recent RSIC manager selection and due diligence processes are consistent and thorough, although 
sometimes slower than industry norms. 
4. RSIC has been implementing a number of strategies which should result in lower external manager 
costs.  These include: 
• Shifting out of “funds of funds” structures into direct investments in hedge funds. 
• Reducing the number of managers thereby increasing the average size of individual mandates. 
• Renegotiating manager contracts to reduce fees. 
• Adopting more passive investing for publicly traded assets. 
5. The lagging development of infrastructure results in growing operational risks, and ultimately 
financial risk. There are several contributing factors including:  
• The need for the Commission to develop a new long-term strategic plan, including an 
infrastructure plan; 
• The annual legislative budget approval process; 
• Existing state procurement laws and policies relating to acquisition of investment systems and 
support; 
                                                     
1 The Office of the State Inspector General. Review of “Red Flag” Indicators of Potential Wrongdoing 
At the Retirement System Investment Commission. July 2013. 
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• RSIC’s consistent under-spending of allocated funds; and,  
• The indirect relationship RSIC has with the custodial bank. 
6. A new independent investment cost effectiveness study by CEM Benchmarking was also 
commissioned as part of this audit.   The intent was to gather facts that would enable more of an 
“apples to apples” comparison of RSIC’s performance and fees to those of other funds.  Descriptions 
of the CEM methodology, quality control and the contracting process are contained in Appendix F 
together with an Executive Summary of the results. While the results are discussed in more detail in 
4. Investment Administration, the CEM study concluded: 
• RSIC’s portfolio strategy has underperformed its peers over the five year period ending December 
31, 2012. This was also true for other funds with asset allocation strategies similar to RSIC, i.e., 
larger allocation to alternative investments.   
• RSIC staff has been able to add value above the asset allocation policy through its management of 
the investment portfolio. 
• RSIC’s management costs for CY2012 were 103.0 bps, compared to the peer average of 61.1 bps.  
RSIC’s management costs were highest in the peer group, largely due to the heavy weighting to 
alternatives and their associated higher costs.  
• When compared to other funds with similar asset allocations, RSIC’s external management fees 
are normal and not excessive. 
7. RSIC has already implemented many improvement initiatives over the past two years. These include, 
for example:  
• Improved focus on investment management costs, consolidation of managers, and fee reduction.  
• Improved due diligence and contract review processes, including creation of an operational due 
diligence function. 
• Increased information flow to the Commissioners. 
• Improved Commission meeting agenda development process. 
• Implemented a technology solution to provide for document sharing with the Treasurer’s staff and 
Commissioners. 
• Improved fee validation procedures and data collection process by moving to a quarterly process. 
• Provided a formal management representation letter to PEBA and the external auditor annually.  
• Adopted formal Joint Valuation policies between PEBA and RSIC.  
• Completed a comprehensive review and update of the Governance Policy Manual. 
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• Established the Internal Audit and Compliance function and formalized policies and processes. 
• Purchased and implemented a research management/contact management database program. 
• Improved attention to operational and risk management needs. 
• Improved ethics compliance and disclosures, including employee Code of Ethics 
Acknowledgement, Personal Trading Policy, Gifts and Conflict of Interest Policy, and 
Whistleblower Policy. 
Additional recommendations for improvement are summarized at the end of this section and 
throughout the body of this report according to each of the six areas of scope.    
 
Pervasive Themes 
Five improvement themes have emerged which cut across all areas of scope: 
1. Improve assurance and independent reassurance to build trust and confidence. 
2. Build capabilities across the organization (including HR, IT, Accounting, etc.). 
3. Reset Commissioners’ focus on strategy and oversight. 
4. Align fiduciary duties and responsibilities. 
5. Improve the custodian relationships. 
Like the SIG review, we are deeply concerned about the continuing dysfunctional relationship between 
the Commission and the Treasurer’s Office.  According to the SIG review, while these dysfunctions may 
have been triggered by “actual process shortcomings in management fee accounting, due diligence, and 
the investment contract approval, and RSIC seemed to not prioritize, until recently, addressing 
infrastructure process issues…“The genesis of the dysfunctional communication likely has its origins in 
RSIC’s process of disseminating confidential information. Initially, the RSIC implemented cumbersome 
informational access logistics for the Treasurer, as well as the larger issue of completely excluding his 
staff’s access to confidential information. RSIC’s initial restrictive approach was likely the result of a 
conservative legal analysis. This, in turn, only ramped up the Treasurer’s information requests to RSIC 
staff in both volume and tone, which further strained the relationship.”2 
The SIG report concludes, “This intense RSIC and STO relationship, despite the increasing negativity and 
dysfunction, did have a ‘silver lining’ benefit. Over the past two years, this conflict has encouraged RSIC 
introspection on both operational infrastructure and AI (Alternative Investments) portfolio, in terms of 
portfolio concentration and fee structure, which have yielded some benefits. However, this conflict has 
clearly entered into a counter-productive cycle where information exchange or presentations tend to be 
                                                     
2
 Ibid. OSIG 2013  
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skeptically viewed as slanted, self-serving, and having a bias towards fault finding, thus limiting common 
ground to move forward. In short, the workplace atmospherics are increasingly toxic and are 
undermining RSIC’s energy and focus on its core mission.”   
The Treasurer recently vehemently reiterated his view about his right to information in a memo to FAS 
and SIG. 
“With the most serious sentiment I can muster, please know that I believe the genesis of the 
problematic relationship between the RSIC and STO is the intentional withholding of information 
that is due to me as a fiduciary. Even though you (FAS and SIG) both have opined on this I want 
to state as plainly as possible that to this very day I am routinely denied access to important, and 
in fact necessary information, that I need to perform my duties. I have outstanding requests that 
have been ignored, or dismissed for over 6 months. Most of these requests (sic) would take a few 
moments of a junior staffer’s time to forward the information, yet, they regularly breech their 
fiduciary responsibility and deny me the access I am due by law and custom. 
Regardless of the other issues you are detailing in the fiduciary audit, this is headline one, page 
one, chapter one. The RSIC refuses to provide relevant important information to its fiduciaries 
and until that happens there will be disharmony regardless of any governance or statutory 
provision that may be in place.”3 
There is no question the Treasurer, as a fiduciary, has the right to any and all information from RSIC and 
it should be provided on a timely basis.  However, trust is a two-way street.  It appears that where the 
parties stand on an issue depends on where they sit.  Unfortunately, from the perspective of RSIC it 
would appear that the Treasurer’s purpose in obtaining such information goes beyond reasonable 
oversight.  While requests for detailed information in selected instances could certainly be an 
appropriate exercise of oversight, as noted in Section 4 - Investment Administration, the SIG report 
found that in a three month period in 2012, the Treasurer’s Office made over ninety information 
requests (97% of all requests made by Commissioners).  This is despite the fact RSIC has an on-line 
portal to give all Commissioners access to the same data all at the same time.  Apparently, many of the 
Treasurer’s requests were made directly to staff bypassing appropriate lines of authority.  This matter is 
further addressed under Recommendation I19: Commissioner Access to Information.  
Beyond seeking reasonable assurance, given the level of criticism by the Treasurer of RSIC, RSIC came to 
believe that the primary purpose of the Treasurer was to find fault.  As noted by the SIG and as we have 
found, the pattern continues.  RSIC, perceiving itself to be under constant attack and threat of pending 
litigation, took and continues to take considerable care and caution in responding to such requests.  This 
has created delays in responding to what might otherwise be simple information matters. 
The Treasurer concluded his memo with the following statement: “Trust cannot be earned under these 
circumstances, and it is unreasonable to believe that good can come out of the willful and premeditated 
RSIC policies that are illegal and unethical.” 
                                                     
3
 Email from C. Loftis to R. Funston (FAS) and P. Maley (SIG) April 17, 2014. 
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However, like the SIG, the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and the State Ethics Commission 
investigations (while the fiduciary performance audit was not a forensic investigation), FAS found no 
evidence of criminal wrong-doing.  Nor did we find any evidence of unethical or illegal policies. Quite the 
contrary, we found that the Commission has made and continues to make considerable strides in 
improving the robustness of its policies and procedures to prevent and detect any such occurrences. 
While FAS found RSIC’s fee disclosures are the most transparent in the nation, the Treasurer agrees they 
are among the most transparent.  Thus, the continued use of such hyperbole by the Treasurer cannot 
possibly have a positive effect on restoring an effective working relationship between the co-fiduciaries. 
Unfortunately, the fragmented and ambiguous allocation of fiduciary authority contained in the law of 
South Carolina creates multiple areas for inherent conflict between the various Retirement System 
fiduciaries, due to overlapping fiduciary powers.  There has been a great deal of hyperbole and ad 
hominem attacks from both the Commission and the Treasurer’s Office.  Recently, it seems these 
hostilities have even escalated.  Personal attacks undermine the credibility and validity of points made 
by each party and can be too easily dismissed as either personally or politically motivated.  These attacks 
must stop if there is to be any hope of progress and restoration of trust.  The dysfunctional relationship 
between co-fiduciaries has become what we believe is one of the most significant risks faced by 
Retirement System participants and stakeholders today. 
Once these attacks are stripped away, a fundamental source of disagreement seems to emerge.  The 
Treasurer appears to prefer a more simple and less costly approach to investment management while 
the Commission has opted for a strategy that is more complex and, therefore, more costly to execute 
and more difficult to explain. 
However, the vote on who has the authority to make such decisions has already been cast by the 
Legislature when in 2005 it transferred full authority for investment decisions to the RSIC.  Thus the 
appropriate time and place to discuss strategy and asset allocation is within Commission meetings and 
the cadence of its planning calendar and not in the media.  Neither individual Commissioners nor the 
Treasurer have the authority to make those decisions; the Legislature has assigned that responsibility 
solely to the full Commission. 
The Commission is comprised of one of, if not, the most highly credentialed public pension Boards or 
Commissions in the country.  It has made deliberate decisions in terms of its strategy and related costs 
that are likely difficult for the layperson to understand.  As a public entity, the Commission should 
recognize that it has a responsibility to proactively communicate that strategy in ways that are 
understandable to its key stakeholders to avoid potential confusion and conflict. 
For the past three years, the Treasurer has raised legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of the 
strategy and its costs as well as the lack of infrastructure to support such a strategy.  He has also raised 
legitimate questions about RSIC’s sense of urgency in improving staffing, systems and controls, and RSIC 
has responded with many improvements, especially in the last two years as noted above.  See also 
Appendix B RSIC Improvements Timeline. 
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In each of the last five years, between 19% and 37% of RSIC’s appropriated dollars were unspent and 
returned to the trust funds (remembering these are retirement fund dollars, not the State’s General 
Fund).  This somewhat undermines the strength of RSIC’s arguments for greater budget autonomy even 
while there are valid reasons for the Legislature to grant such autonomy, and while the trend nationally 
is to provide greater budget autonomy to pension funds and investment boards.  We do note that there 
are several factors that constrain the RSIC’s ability to spend its allocation within the fiscal year including 
State procurement and civil service requirements.  This issue is discussed further under Section 1 
Governance.  Accordingly, RSIC could and should do a better job of budget planning and management to 
take advantage of its existing allocations. 
In the past three years, there have also been two allegations of conflicts of interest involving current 
commissioners.  As our fiduciary performance audit is not a forensic investigation, we will not comment 
other than to say both allegations were investigated by the State Law Enforcement Division and, in one 
case, also by the State Ethics Commission.  Neither found evidence of wrong-doing, although the Ethics 
Commission stated “an appearance of impropriety does exist.” Such allegations, in addition to the spate 
of continuing public confrontations, only serve to erode RSIC’s reputation.  In February, 2013 RSIC 
revised its “Standards of Conduct for Commission Members: Conflicts of Interest” policy to provide 
greater clarity of expectations.  We have also made a recommendation to further strengthen those 
policies.  Henceforth, it is essential in the future that all Commissioners avoid even the perception of a 
conflict of interest or impropriety. 
Lack of progress in improving the relationship between the Commission and STO may also be related to 
a number of legacy governance and structural issues which confound clear fiduciary decision-making 
authority and reflect a highly fragmented system.  For example, there are currently several fracture lines 
related to issues such as segregation of duties, securities lending, custodial authorities, signatures 
required, contract reviews, and authorization processes for movement of money.  The result is a 
continuing process of friction and abrasion that often erupts into open conflict between competing 
authorities.  Lack of clear authority also equates to a lack of clear accountability.  There are at least five 
state entities which exercise some fiduciary authority with regard to the five defined benefit plans.  
Another four provide some type of oversight function to the RSIC.  While the current dysfunctions have 
largely been between the Treasurer’s Office and the Commission, it is foreseeable such conflicts could 
arise between any of the many fiduciaries and oversight bodies.  
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Overarching Recommendations 
The following overarching recommendations attempt to provide a constructive means to improve the 
relationship and the effectiveness and efficiency of the Commission.  The first three of the five major 
recommendations are largely within the control of the RSIC to plan and implement. 
1. Improve assurance and independent reassurance to build trust and confidence. 
As noted earlier, providing reasonable assurance to the Commission is the responsibility of RSIC 
executives.  Typically, such executive assurances include assertions that the organization’s people, 
processes and systems are capable and risks are managed within the agreed upon exposure limits.  
Independent reassurance should also be obtained that management’s report are reliable.  Independent 
reassurance must come from those independent of management, such as external financial audits 
conducted under the auspices of the State Auditor  who selects the external auditor for PEBA and thus 
for RSIC. 
Independent reassurance can also come from consultants retained directly by the Commission, for 
example, Hewitt EnnisKnupp (HEK), the general investment management consultant.  It also includes 
Internal Audit and Compliance, which reports directly to the Audit Committee.  The accounts payable 
and payroll procedures audit conducted by the Comptroller General as well as fiduciary performance 
audits under the auspices of the State Inspector General are yet other sources.  As noted earlier, while 
offering reasonable assurance and reassurance, no audit can provide an absolute guarantee of 
compliance or the absence of misconduct.  Nonetheless, reasonable assurance is still a high standard. 
There are additional reassurance steps that can and should be taken.  For example, as discussed in 
Section 1. Governance, the Commission can directly retain an external firm to assess valuations of 
underlying investments and/or internal controls.  RSIC should also institute a system of Enterprise Risk 
Management (note: the establishment of a new Enterprise Risk Management function and program was 
approved at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting, to take effect as of July 1, 2014).  The mandate 
and investment recommendation responsibilities of the Internal Investment Committee should be 
clarified to enhance assurance.  The Commission should retain the services of an independent expert to 
perform annual benchmarks of fund returns and management fees. 
2. Build capabilities across the organization (including HR, IT, Accounting, etc.). 
The Commission relies on certain key personnel for its successful operation.  The loss of key personnel 
would severely jeopardize its operations, and in the current environment, it would be difficult to recruit 
their replacements.  The Commission also needs to build its HR capabilities and IT systems, the 
continued absence of which will contribute to operational risk.  These include needed improvements in 
infrastructure planning, procurement and governance, and developing an investment accounting 
capability.  We recognize that budgetary approval necessary to build these capabilities is required from 
the Legislature.  This is discussed further below under 4. Align fiduciary duties and responsibilities. 
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3. Reset Commissioners’ focus on strategy and oversight. 
When RSIC was launched in 2005, there were six commissioners and an Administrative Director/ General 
Counsel with an Administrative Coordinator.  The new CIO started in April 2006, and three additional 
full-time investment staff joined in January 2007.  They were all charged with investing and managing 
$25 billion.  Due to limited resources, the Commissioners became very involved in investment 
operations such as due diligence.  Initial back office and risk management procedures were often 
manual and ad hoc if they existed at all.  As noted above, during the past two years RSIC’s processes 
have evolved to become much more robust and systematic.  
RSIC has reached a point in its capability development where the Commissioners now need to reset 
their focus to strategic issues such as asset allocation.  They should also develop a statement of 
investment beliefs to guide the asset allocation and oversee the development of asset class plans.  The 
Commission should also expand the charters of its two standing committees to become Human 
Resources and Compensation and Audit and Enterprise Risk respectively.  RSIC also should improve the 
Commissioner’s self-assessment and self-development processes. 
Other improvements, perhaps many of the most significant factors affecting performance, are not 
within the control of the Commission.  There are a number of legacy issues caused by statutory 
inconsistencies in fiduciary responsibilities and authorities that need to be addressed by either the 
Legislature or the Budget and Control Board (BCB) and its successors. 
4. Align fiduciary duties and responsibilities. 
In answer to our earlier questions: “Who are the fiduciaries? What are their authorities? Do their 
authorities match their duties? Are these duties in conflict with other roles played by the various 
Commissioners?” we find that the Retirement System has one of the most complex governance 
structures among state investment boards, with five separate entities that exercise fiduciary powers 
with overlapping authority for exercising fiduciary functions: the BCB, the Legislature, PEBA, Treasurer as 
Custodian, and RSIC.  The authorities of the Commissioners do not match their responsibilities and 
duties, there are inherent conflicts in the roles played by the Treasurer as Custodian, and 
accountabilities are muddled. 
The role of the Budget and Control Board (the future Department of Administration and the State Fiscal 
Accountability Authority), as a Named Trustee and a fiduciary, is unclear with respect to RSIC oversight.  
Meanwhile, the Legislature has retained authority to approve budgets and staffing for RSIC and also sets 
the assumed rate of return on retirement system investments.  
Retirement system management and administrative responsibilities are divided between PEBA and RSIC; 
for example, RSIC and PEBA have agreed to assign responsibility for the accounting and audit functions 
of the retirement fund to PEBA, and PEBA is responsible for the “book of record” for the retirement 
funds.   The State Treasurer, a member of the BCB and a Commissioner, is also the Custodian of the 
retirement funds, yet RSIC is vested with exclusive investment authority for the retirement system 
funds.  
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Conflicts between fiduciaries have arguably added to retirement system costs, resulted in foregone 
investment opportunities, and added to enterprise-level risk exposures.  Review and rationalization of 
the statutory structure for allocation of fiduciary authority and responsibilities is needed to address 
these and other issues.  
To address these conclusions, we recommend to the Legislature:  
1. Clarify fiduciary responsibilities, if any, which remain with the BCB and, subsequently, with 
the new Department of Administration and the State Fiscal Accountability Authority. 
2. In setting the expected rate of return, regularly review the process and underlying 
assumptions, or delegate the function to PEBA or RSIC, and establish a 5-year cycle for the 
review. 
3. Enable the Commission to create the position of CEO/Executive Director as a single direct 
report to the Commission with the CIO reporting to the CEO. 
4. Delegate selection of outside counsel to RSIC. 
5. Delegate authority to the Commission for operational budgetary control and the setting of 
staff compensation and performance incentives. 
6. Provide an exemption to the State procurement policy for investment management systems 
(this could also be accomplished through the BCB). 
7. Expand the qualification criteria for Commissioners to recognize relevant experience and to 
allow for Commissioners with expertise in managing large, complex pension funds and 
investment operations. 
8. Increase the number of voting Commissioners by one or three so as to establish an odd 
number of voting Commissioners.  This could include consideration of making the PEBA 
representative a voting member, recognizing this would require an exemption for a state 
employee. 
 
5. Improve the custodian relationships. 
RSIC describes the custodial relationship with the Treasurer and BNY Mellon as cumbersome, strained 
and inefficient, and that difficulty has resulted in RSIC looking elsewhere for needed services.  This may 
be due to several factors.  First, it should be understood the role of the custodial bank has significantly 
changed over time, much as has the role of the Treasurer in other jurisdictions.  Custody has increased 
from just safekeeping to include many services which are essential to the smooth and effective 
functioning of today’s public funds.  Today’s effective custodian is at least as much a technology and 
data management facility as a lockbox. 
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Second, with very few other states as exceptions, it is industry practice to have the fund contract 
directly with the custodial bank.4  The role of the Custodian is discussed further in Section 4 - Investment 
Administration. 
Third, there may be conflicts in the role of the Treasurer as a Commissioner and as Custodian.  In 
interpreting the role of the Custodian, the Treasurer may be able to exercise a veto over the 
Commission’s investment decisions.  This has already resulted in a lawsuit between the Commission and 
the Treasurer’s office.  This is discussed further in Section 1 - Governance. 
In Section 4 –Investment Administration, we present several options and the associated pros and cons to 
resolve these difficulties with the Custodial bank’s role, the Treasurer’s role as Custodian and custodial 
bank contracting, ranging from the status quo, improvements to the status quo, giving RSIC authority to 
contract with its own custodial bank with the Treasurer remaining as custodian of record, making PEBA 
custodian of record with RSIC having custodial contracting authority, to transferring full custodial 
authority to RSIC (the most common model at other public pension funds in the U.S.) 
 
Summary of Recommendations  
The following is a summary of recommendations according to each of the six areas of scope. In Appendix 
Q, we provide our perspective on the priority of implementation, degree of difficulty and suggested 
responsibility.  Note: The numbering of our recommendations is based on the numbering of our 
conclusions.  In some cases, we do not make a recommendation based on the conclusion.  For this 
reason, it may appear that we skipped a recommendation. 
 
1. GOVERNANCE 
G1:  The Legislature should better align Retirement System governance authority with assignment of 
obligations and clarify what fiduciary responsibilities, if any, still reside with the BCB and, subsequently, 
the Department of Administration and the State Fiscal Accountability Authority.  
G2:  The Legislature should resolve the Treasurer’s conflicting fiduciary duties (alternatives are discussed 
in I17). 
G3:  The Legislature should delegate selection of the custodial bank and management of the relationship 
to the RSIC (alternatives are further discussed in I17). 
G4:  The Legislature should revise legislation to allow the Commission to designate a single direct 
operating report with the title of either Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Executive Director, and not 
require that the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) report directly to the Commission. 
                                                     
4
 FAS Public Pension Benchmark Database, Funston Advisory Services LLC. 
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G5.1:  The Legislature should delegate authority for operating budget, staffing and all compensation 
approval to the Commission. 
G5.2:  RSIC should review its annual budget planning process to ensure that it is using existing 
allocations to full advantage and that requests for increased resources are based on a realistic 
assessment of staff and systems the organization can assimilate during the next budget period.  The 
Commission should conduct a mid-year review of year-to-date and projected expenses compared to 
budgeted amounts. 
G6:  The Commission should have an annual external financial audit or an agreed upon procedures 
review of fund valuations, procedures and/or controls, consistent with other investment boards; either 
the Commission or a state agency (e.g., the State Auditor) could select the external firm. 
G7:  Decision-making within strategic partnerships should be assessed in the context of how all RSIC 
investment decisions are made and adjusted accordingly, if appropriate (see Recommendation I12.1). 
G8.1:  The Legislature should revise the Commissioner’s qualification requirements to achieve a more 
diverse composition of members, including some Commissioners with a broader business experience 
beyond investments which is not as reliant on professional certifications when there is significant 
practical experience. 
G8.2:  The Legislature should consider adding one or three additional voting members to the 
Commission to increase diversity, increase beneficiary representation and reduce the potential for tie 
votes (making the PEBA representative a voting Commissioner could be an option, but would require an 
exemption from the prohibition for a state employee). 
G9:  The Legislature should consider imposing term limits for Commissioners. 
G10.1:  The Commission should work with its general investment consultant and develop a set of 
investment beliefs to provide a basis for strategic management of the investment portfolio. 
G10.2:  In addition to an annual review of the asset allocation, throughout the year the Commission 
should review and discuss asset class strategies with the investment staff and provide oversight. 
G10.3:  The Commission should shift its emphasis from a focus on advising on specific investments and 
participating in due diligence to providing oversight and strategic guidance to staff.  This would include 
eliminating the assignment of asset classes to individual Commissioners and, as a general rule, preclude 
Commissioner’s involvement in investment due diligence except as observers for either overseeing staff 
processes or for Commissioners’ education and training purposes. 
G12.1:  The Commission should plan more frequent meetings, at least bi-monthly, and develop standing 
agenda items annually and for each meeting (e.g., asset allocation, investment beliefs, specific asset 
class reviews, infrastructure business plan review, etc.) (see also Recommendation I6.1). 
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G12.2: The revised protocol for the agenda setting process should be formally adopted by the 
Commission and incorporated into the Governance Manual. 
G12.3:  Improve the effectiveness of Commission self-assessments by providing evaluations of individual 
Commissioners, utilizing peer-to-peer and upward evaluations (from RSIC staff), and providing 
individualized feedback and personalized improvement goals. 
G12.4:  Develop an overall continuing education plan for Commissioners, including an on-going 
education budget for the Commission and plans for individual Commissioners. 
G13.1: The Audit Committee should review and approve the Internal Audit Charter. 
G13.2:  Develop and implement an Enterprise Risk Program, as called for in the Governance Policy 
Manual and approved at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting, and ensure the necessary tools are 
acquired to support effective risk management and oversight. 
G13.3:  Add responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management to the Audit Committee charter; consider 
changing the name to the Audit and Enterprise Risk Committee. 
G13.4:  An independent third party expert firm should regularly benchmark fund returns and costs (see 
Recommendations G18.4 and I11.2). 
G14:  The Commission should adopt a mid-year review process for its direct reports to provide guidance 
and interim feedback. 
G15.1:  As part of a shift in emphasis by the Commission to enterprise oversight, the Compensation 
Committee charter should be expanded to include oversight of human resources and infrastructure and 
to provide guidance to staff on human resources and capability development. 
G15.2:  The Compensation Committee should change its name to Human Resources and Compensation 
to reflect the new focus. 
G16.1:  The role of the Internal Investment Committee (IIC) should be clarified. 
G16.2:  If the named member of the IIC is not available (due either to being out of the office, on 
vacation, or the position being vacant), the next ranking staffer with similar responsibilities should 
attend IIC meetings to ensure appropriate participation. 
G16.3:  The CIO should routinely invite other investment, operations and legal staff to attend IIC 
meetings as visitors so as to facilitate dissemination of information across functional silos. 
G16.4: The CIO should consider whether to mandate annual plans by asset class and/or functional area.  
If so, the plans should be presented to the IIC to facilitate dissemination and cross-silo knowledge 
sharing. 
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G18.1:  RSIC’s communications policy should be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to address who is 
responsible for proactively speaking out on behalf of the RSIC and any policies which might be necessary 
to develop key messages. 
G18.2:  RSIC should develop a communications plan which identifies each key stakeholder group, 
considers what information is important for each stakeholder to know, and identifies responsibility for 
maintaining stakeholder communications. 
G18.3:   In the communications plan, RSIC should consider an initiative to draw greater national 
attention to the need for all public pension funds to disclose costs in a consistent way and for 
investment managers to provide the level of reporting necessary to accomplish that objective. 
G18.4:   RSIC should conduct a periodic benchmarking of its returns and costs by an independent expert 
to provide added assurance to stakeholders about the facts of its performance compared to peers (see 
Recommendation G13.4). 
G19:  RISC should confer with PEBA to determine whether legislative action is needed to ensure that a 
funding mechanism is in place for the State's indemnity and defense obligations that are not covered by 
insurance.  
 
2. POLICY REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT 
P1.1: The Commission should, as a general rule, preclude Commissioners’ involvement in investment 
due diligence except as an observer for occasional educational purposes (see also Recommendations 
G10.3 and I5.1). 
P1.2:  When the Commission’s investment beliefs have been articulated, they should be included in the 
Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies (see Recommendation G10.1). 
P1.3:  The Governance Policy Manual should be revised to describe the potential role of a Commissioner 
in due diligence activities as an observer for educational and quality assurance purposes only, and that 
as a general rule Commissioners are not involved in due diligence activities (see also Recommendations 
G10.3 and I5.1). 
P2.1:  A counterparty acceptance and monitoring policy should be developed and implemented. 
P2.2:  The broker selection policy should be strengthened and require periodic reaffirmation by the fixed 
income team. 
P2.3:  RSIC should finalize the proxy voting process rules  that are in development, require that 
investment managers vote in the best interests of plan participants,  monitor how managers are voting 
proxies and include a field to track voting in Tamale. 
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P2.4:  Policies which describe responsibilities for securities litigation activities should be refined to clarify 
approval roles of RSIC Legal, the Commission and Attorney General. 
P2.5:  The staff conflict of interest policies should be modified to include more guidance on what is 
covered by the statutory standards of conduct. 
P2.6:  RSIC should consider developing and implementing a policy which requires Commissioners and 
senior investment staff to disclose personal financial or legal distress. 
P2.7:  The Sudan divestment policy should be finalized (see Recommendation L4.2). 
P2.8:  RSIC should consider developing a flowchart which describes the investment review and approval 
process, including responsibilities and timelines. 
P2.9: RSIC should develop a referral tracking and reporting mechanism, like the sourcing and conflict 
disclosure process used for investments, to cover service provider referrals. 
P3.1:  Continue to allow standing instructions for the custodial bank to receive incoming funds and allow 
sweeping of cash to maximize income. 
P3.2:  Review the positions required to sign to release cash transfers with the custodial bank and revise 
the requirements to allow two appropriate RSIC signatories, one from investments and the other from 
operations. 
P3.3:  Instruct the custodial bank to accept signatory changes based upon a letter from the Commission 
Chair or the RSIC COO and CIO (or CEO if a CEO position is created). 
P3.4:  STO should revise its policies to allow electronic payment authorization for release of funds to 
cover capital calls using the existing technology offered by BNY Mellon. 
P4.1:  The Compensation Committee should conduct an annual review of RSIC’s implementation of the 
Compensation Policy. 
P4.2:  The Commission should engage an independent expert to conduct a new peer compensation 
study at least every three years to assess the current level of RSIC staff compensation and make 
revisions to the target ranges, as appropriate. 
P5:  To facilitate timely acquisition and implementation of information systems, RSIC should develop a 
proposed modified procurement process for approval by the BCB or the Legislature which would allow 
acceptable transparency and objectivity, improve the ability to evaluate, select and implement new 
systems, as needed, and include documentation to allow oversight on a post-purchase audit basis 
(rather than imposing pre-purchase restrictions). 
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3. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
O1.1:  RSIC should consider creating the position of chief executive officer who would be accountable to 
the Commissioners for managing the entire organization. 
O1.2:  Given the delay in the migration to internal management, the CIO (hopefully in conjunction with 
the new senior HR professional) ought to examine the way the investment team is organized today to 
determine if staffing is aligned with AUM, complexity and risk. 
O2:  The RSIC should develop an enterprise-wide capabilities and resources assessment and determine:  
1) What are the overall support needs and priorities? 
2) Where are the major resource gaps? 
3) Should the gaps be filled through internal and/or external resources? 
 
O3.1:  A senior human resources professional position should be created and filled to lead development 
of an overall HR strategy to support the organization’s business plan. 
O3.2:  Policies and processes should be developed which ensure that the HR implications of proposed 
new initiatives are recognized and addressed before launch. 
O3.3:  RSIC should implement more thorough compensation planning and evaluations to enable 
recruitment and retention of highly skilled and experienced staff (see Recommendation P4.1). 
O3.4:  More formalized staff training and development plans and programs should be developed. 
O3.5:  RSIC should utilize succession planning, including cross-training and other actions, to develop staff 
for broader responsibilities. 
O3.6:  The Human Resources function should provide leadership for development of a multi-year (3-5 
year time horizon) infrastructure business plan which considers the needs and priorities of the 
organization. 
O3.7:  RSIC should develop an internal governance process to plan and manage capability and 
infrastructure development. 
O4:  RSIC should adopt a standard process for documenting, approving and updating operational 
procedures and should continue its effort to provide on-line access to them as they are completed. 
 
4. INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION 
I1:  If the Legislature continues to set the expected rate of return, it should regularly review the process 
and its assumptions on a periodic basis. Ideally, that cycle should be set to take advantage of the 
information available from the every five year PEBA experience study and RSIC’s asset liability study. 
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I2:  The Commission should spend more time discussing its underlying investment beliefs and ensure 
that the asset allocation strategy remains consistent with those beliefs (see Recommendation G10.1). 
I3.1:  As part of an overall infrastructure development plan, the RSIC should continue to prioritize a new 
risk management system and capability as a top priority. 
I3.2:   RSIC should create a Risk Management/Investment working group to design the functionality of 
risk reporting. 
I3.3: Investment risk management should be a participating member at all IIC meetings.  
I3.4:  Risk Management should produce an annual plan which is reviewed and approved at the IIC; this 
should improve risk discipline, provide a benchmark for performance evaluation, create an opportunity 
for other investment officers to understand Risk Management capabilities, and improve communication. 
I3.5: The RSIC should explore whether the secondary market in LP interests could help it rationalize its 
private equity portfolio, while keeping in mind the variable inefficiencies of that secondary market.  
I4.1:  The overall RSIC infrastructure development plan should fully consider and incorporate the 
staffing, systems and policy requirements to significantly increase internal asset management and 
manage risk prior to significantly expanding the current limited amount and types of assets managed 
internally. 
I4.2: RSIC should adopt a formal counterparty risk policy (see Recommendation P2.1). 
I4.3: RSIC should review its broker/dealer selection policy with an eye towards increasing its robustness 
by creating objective measures for acceptability and setting a time period for reaffirmation of the 
acceptable broker/dealers (see Recommendation P2.2). 
I5.1:  The policy of Commissioner Involvement in due diligence should be changed to limit participation 
to no more than occasional involvement as an observer for educational or reassurance purposes only; 
Commissioners could be invited to all manager meetings held in Columbia (see Recommendations G10.3 
and P1.3). 
I5.2:  Ideally operations should perform on-site reviews of all potential new managers. If staffing makes 
that impractical, the RSIC should adopt a formal operational due diligence calendar so as to a) minimize 
the number of managers hired without such an on-site visit, and b) prioritize an on-site operational visit 
as soon as possible following selection. 
I5.3:  Operational due diligence to the IIC should require a sign off from the head of RSIC operations.  
I5.4:  RSIC should clarify the level of authority operations has on manager hiring and retention.  Two 
potential options would be to give a veto to operations or,  alternately, to mandate that should the CIO 
decide to recommend an investment despite operational concerns, an operations memorandum should 
go to the Commission along with the CIO’s recommendation explaining why the investment should be 
made notwithstanding operation’s concerns. 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
18 
Funston Advisory Services LLC   
I6.1:  RSIC should re-assess its due diligence practices towards identifying opportunities to streamline 
and reduce the cycle time of activities without impacting the thoroughness or effectiveness of the 
overall process.  Among the possible improvements would be: weekly management report of due 
diligence progress at the IIC, addition of a paralegal to co-ordinate legal reviews and with outside 
counsel (see also Recommendation L1.2), and more frequent Commission meetings (see 
Recommendation G12.1).  
I6.2:  RSIC legal staff should work with outside counsel to standardize contracting practices where 
possible.  This should reduce delays in the contracting process (see Recommendation L2.1). 
I6.3:  The Commission should seek alternate means of assuring and reassuring itself as to the quality of 
the legal review, thereby enabling it to eliminate the 30-day review period before funding.  
I7.1:  RSIC should consider establishing a formal policy for frequency of site visits to external managers 
as part of the monitoring process.  Leading practice is to make the periodicity annual, but given staff 
constraints and the existing semi-annual contact requirement, a biannual periodicity could be 
considered.  
I7.2: RSIC should consider how it wants to gain assurance that managerial trading is efficient.  It could 
suggest that its external managers trading in public securities provide independent trade execution 
measurements, or engage a trade execution management vendor itself to “spot check” external 
managers. 
I9.1:  RSIC staff should update the 2012 plan for expanded internal management and include a full 
business plan which considers all requirements (see Recommendation I4.1). 
I9.2:  RSIC should continue to pursue reductions in fees where it pays greater costs than its peers, taking 
into account potential net return and risk. 
I9.3: RSIC should consider whether the use of a pool of asset-class specialist consultants to perform due 
diligence on co-investment opportunities would be beneficial and consistent with current asset 
allocation plans. 
I10.1:  RSIC fee reporting for alternative investments should be restructured to improve transparency 
and comparability with peer funds; management fees should be broken down into invoiced and non-
invoiced management fees, performance fees and carried interest, and pass-through fees. 
I10.2:  Investments in strategic partnerships should be allocated to the appropriate asset classes for 
performance and fee reporting in the PEBA CAFR. 
I11.1: Given the controversy the decision to disclose all external manager fees has engendered, the 
Commission should more clearly articulate its policy decision. 
I11.2:  The RSIC should contract with CEM, or a similar service from another provider, on an annual basis 
to develop a source of “apples-to-apples” benchmarks of investment management costs for each asset 
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class and for the entire fund, as well as to provide an additional source for returns performance 
benchmarking (see Recommendations G13.4 and G18.4). 
I12.1:  The RSIC should formalize its policies with respect to oversight of the strategic partnerships and 
controls over underlying investments within RSIC, e.g., use of the IIC to vet investments, two RSIC staff 
participating in meetings, etc. (see Recommendation G7). 
I12.2:  RSIC should develop a guideline, rather than current situational decision making, for when and 
how much long-only, traditional assets should be in strategic partnerships. 
I12.3:  RSIC should develop a guideline regarding the appropriate level of cash to remain within strategic 
partnerships and for the return of any cash in excess of partnership needs. 
I12.4: The Commission should take increased advantage of the information, insights and experience 
resident in the RSIC’s strategic partners.  In-person education programs in Columbia would be one 
possibility, either in conjunction with regularly scheduled Commission meetings or, as in the past, at 
special educational or strategic planning retreats in-state.  
I13:  Rebalancing policies should be revised to require a quarterly rebalancing review to be scheduled on 
the annual meeting calendar of the IIC or Wednesday markets meeting to ensure compliance with SIOP; 
in the event the CIO and staff review balancing in the interim due to market movements or otherwise, 
that should be reflected in the IIC minutes to demonstrate compliance. 
I14.1:  RSIC should explore alternate transition management programs, such as manager-to-manager 
transitions (cherry picking) with the remaining securities sold, or principal bids.  RSIC should educate 
itself about when each technique is most appropriate. 
I14.2:  RSIC should determine if it wants to independently measure transition management costs, at 
least on a spot check basis. 
I16:  RSIC should complete development of an annual assessment process for the Commission to 
evaluate the performance of its general investment consultant and the Commission should adopt and 
implement the process. 
I17:  The Legislature should consider four potential options to significantly improve the ability of the 
RSIC to obtain services from and work with its custodial bank (see Recommendations G2 and G3). 
I18.1:   The Commission should determine the future of securities lending based on assessment of the 
potential investment benefits and risks of different approaches to participating in the lending market. 
I18.2:  RSIC will need to develop new policies and practices if it chooses to continue securities lending 
through BNYM or another third party; a new policy should include a statement of lending objectives, risk 
tolerance and guidelines approved by the Commission. 
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I18.3:  The RSIC securities lending agent should be required to provide quarterly reporting to 
management and the Commission regarding program activity, including amounts on loan, borrower 
concentration, return and risk. 
I18.4:  RSIC should obtain an annual benchmarking of its activities against lending activity across the 
industry. 
I18.5:  If RSIC decides to significantly grow securities lending, it should implement enhanced and more 
automated compliance functions, including compliance reporting from the lender(s) and periodic review 
by RSIC's compliance officer. 
I19:  RSIC should ensure that its policy pertaining to Commissioner requests for information from the 
RSIC staff is followed.  This would include timely fulfillment of routine requests, a transparent process 
for determining the priority of requests which require approval at Commission meetings, and all 
responses being made available to all Commissioners through the portal. 
5. LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
L1.1: RSIC's procedure for use of legal counsel should be revised to  assign inside or outside counsel to 
each investment transaction during the final due diligence process prior to approval of the 
Commissioners, as needed.   
L1.2:  RSIC should add a paralegal to the legal staff to provide administrative support and assist in 
document control (see Recommendation I6.1). 
L2.1:  RSIC should establish a standard side letter and contract clauses to improve bargaining leverage 
and increase contract consistency, and internal counsel should work with investment staff and outside 
lawyers on prioritization of the “asks” (see Recommendation I6.2). 
L.2.2:  RSIC should identify investment terms that are deal-breakers and provide those terms to 
investment counterparties early in the investment due diligence process. 
L3.1:  RSIC should consider eliminating the 30-day review period and instead rely on an appropriately 
documented Legal Sufficiency Certificate to confirm that all legal compliance and due diligence is 
complete.   Alternatively, RSIC could shorten the Commission review period and add a provision to the 
Governance Policy Manual clarifying the purpose for this review period and confirming that it does not 
delegate Commission authority to individual Commissioners or revoke authority otherwise delegated to 
the CIO or COO. 
L3.2:  RSIC could require more frequent Commission meetings to consider investments.  (See also 
Recommendation G12.1).  Alternatively, the Commission could consider delegating greater authority for 
approval of alternative investments to the CIO or Internal Investment Committee.   
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L3.3:  The Legal Sufficiency Certificate should include confirmation that documentation for each 
investment is consistent with material terms approved by the Commission and with authority delegated 
to staff by the Commissioners in the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies. 
L4.1:  The Audit Committee should approach the State Ethics Commission and establish an independent 
audit process for regular confirmation that RSIC Statements of Economic Interests have been reviewed.  
L4.2:  Consideration should be given to extending coverage of the Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure Form 
to Commission approval of consultants and professional service providers exempted from State 
procurement processes. 
L4.3:  The Sudan divestment policy should be completed and approved by the Commission (See also 
Recommendation P2.7). 
L4.4:  The Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program planning should be completed and the new 
function launched as soon as practical.  (See also Recommendation G13.2.) 
L5.1:  Outside counsel should be refreshed, since it has been more than six years since the last RFP 
market test. 
L5.2:  The process for approval of outside counsel by the Attorney General could be streamlined through 
development of a pre-approved pool of qualified investment counsel, with agreed engagement contract 
form and budget standards, and requirements for regular reporting to the Attorney General and 
Commissioners. 
L5.3:  Consideration should be given to engagement of qualified, independent fiduciary counsel. 
 
6. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
IT1.1: Guided by an overall business and IT plan, RSIC should complete the acquisition of systems to: 
 Track commitments and provide return calculations for private market investments  
 Provide security-based risk management that includes position level transparency and risk and 
performance analytics 
 Monitor compliance of investments with investment policies and contracts 
 Automate trade order management 
 Warehouse data for the whole investment portfolio in order to seamlessly feed other systems 
for analysis 
IT1.2: The QED internal accounting system provided by vendor contract with the State Treasurer’s Office 
should be upgraded or replaced. 
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IT2:    Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should seek the number and types of 
additional IT staff needed to adequately support its expanding systems infrastructure (See 
Recommendation O3.6). 
IT3.1:  Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should develop a strategic IT plan with 
clearly defined objectives, a full assessment of the current state of its systems and a timetable for 
completing needed improvements (See Recommendation O3.6).    
IT3.2:  RSIC should establish a project governance process with representation from across the 
organization to determine IT priorities and monitor progress of initiatives, and to assure resources are 
appropriately targeted and that issues are addressed promptly. 
IT4.1:  RSIC should be authorized to procure investment systems under a modified procurement process 
that includes appropriate accountability (see Recommendation P5). 
IT4.2:  RSIC should continue to pursue the eventual move of IT support from PEBA to RSIC. 
 
NOTE TO THE READER: The remainder of this document is organized by each area of scope according 
to the following structure: 
 Scope and Standard for Comparison 
 Summary of Conclusions 
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Background 
 
The Retirement System Investment Commission (RSIC) was created by the South Carolina Legislature on 
October 1, 2005 with the exclusive authority to manage and invest all assets held in trust for the 
participants and beneficiaries of five governmental defined benefit plans: South Carolina Retirement 
System, South Carolina Police Officers Retirement System, Retirement System for Judges and Solicitors 
of the State of South Carolina, Retirement System for Members of the General Assembly of the State of 
South Carolina, and the National Guard Retirement System, collectively referred to hereinafter as the 
“Retirement System.”  
The Retirement System had investments totaling approximately $26.8 billion as of June 30, 2013 for 
more than 550,000 active and inactive participants, beneficiaries and dependents.  While RSIC, as a 
fiduciary, has exclusive authority to manage and invest the assets held in trust for the Retirement 
System’s participants and beneficiaries, other fiduciaries and trustees also exercise authority and 
direction over the Retirement System.  These are: the State Budget and Control Board (BCB); the Public 
Employee Benefit Authority (PEBA); the State Treasurer’s Office (STO); and the Legislature.  In addition, 
the South Carolina Attorney General, Comptroller General, Inspector General, the State Ethics 
Commission and State Auditor each have selected oversight roles with respect to RSIC. 
Particular to South Carolina and a minority of states is the separation of duties between the investment 
of the Retirement System’s assets and the administration of benefits for beneficiaries and participants.  
Among the largest 55 U.S. state pension funds (all those with assets over $10 billion), there are four 
basic governance models, with variations on each.  The South Carolina RSIC is an example of one of the 
eleven funds utilizing the Investment Board Model (although it is unique with both COO and CIO direct 
reports). See Appendix C Fund Governance Models. 
The key benefit administration functions of the Retirement System are managed by PEBA.  Additionally, 
PEBA is responsible for the administration of other non-retirement, state-wide employee benefit 
programs.  
The RSIC is governed by a seven-member Investment Commission (“the Commission”), six of whom have 
voting privileges.  The six voting commissioners include four appointed members, one elected member, 
and the State Treasurer as an ex officio member; the seventh, non-voting commissioner is the Executive 
Director of PEBA as an ex officio member.  By statute, the Governor, State Comptroller General, Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman, and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman each appoint one 
member of the Commission.  The elected member represents the state retirees and must be 
unanimously approved by the voting Commissioners.  All appointed members and the elected member 
must have specific expertise and investment credentials and serve five-year terms.  The State Treasurer 
serves as a commissioner for the length of the term of office.  The Treasurer may also designate a 
qualified person to serve as his representative coterminous with the Treasurer’s term in office. The 
statutes governing the RSIC are found in the 1976 South Carolina Code of Laws, as amended, Title 9, 
Chapter 16. 
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At the time of this review, the RSIC organization includes 42 approved full-time positions, with a Chief 
Investment Officer and a Chief Operating Officer both reporting directly to the Commission.  This staff is 
supplemented by 8 part-time interns, and there are 5 vacant full-time investment staff positions and 1 
vacant administrative staff position. 
Purpose of the Fiduciary Performance Audit 
This is the first annual fiduciary performance audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
(RSIC) as required by South Carolina statute under the auspices of the Office of the State Inspector 
General (SIG).  The purpose of this fiduciary performance audit is to focus on the current state of RSIC to 
critically assess and evaluate:  
• The fiduciary roles and responsibilities of RSIC commissioners and staff; 
• The relationships with other fiduciaries of the Retirement System; and 
• The operational policies and practices of the RSIC. 
The SIG led a process to gain the unanimous agreement of key stakeholders on priorities to be 
addressed within the scope of the review prior to finalizing the RFP.  Key stakeholders included RSIC 
Staff, Commission Chair and Audit Committee Chair, PEBA Staff, and the State Treasurer’s Office.   
Since RSIC is a relatively new state agency, the review was to be broad in nature spanning all key 
functions and included six major areas: Governance; Policy Review and Development; Organizational 
Structure; Key Investment Administration Functions; Legal Compliance; and Information Technology 
Systems.  The RFP also required that specific items identified be addressed within each category; 
however, these items were not intended to limit creativity in assessing each category.  
After a competitive process, the contract was awarded to Funston Advisory Services LLC (FAS), a 
Michigan firm.  Work began on December 4, 2013 and was to be completed by no later than April 30, 
2014.  Our firm was authorized to review any policy, process, or procedure typically reviewed when 
completing this type of project.  Our recommendations are articulated and prioritized according to 
significance and urgency and, where feasible, include an analysis of potential pros and cons associated 
with implementation. 
A fiduciary performance audit is intended to provide independent reassurance on the suitability and 
robustness of governance structures, policies and processes across the six areas of scope.  It attempts to 
answer several key questions given the duties of a fiduciary:  
1. Who are the fiduciaries? 
2. What are their authorities? 
3. Do their authorities match their duties?  
4. Are these duties in conflict with other roles played by the various commissioners? 
5. How are they performing? 
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Reasonable Assurance and Independent Reassurance 
It is the responsibility of executive management to provide reasonable assurance to the Commission 
that there are capable people, processes and systems to invest and manage the fund and the related 
risks.  Third parties independent of management can offer reasonable reassurance that executives’ 
reports are reliable.  While no audit can provide an absolute guarantee of compliance or the absence of 
misconduct, reasonable assurance is still a high standard of assurance. 
A fiduciary performance audit is separate and distinct from a forensic investigation, a compliance audit 
or an audit of the financial statements.  Accordingly, we have relied on the reports of others such as the 
Office of the State Inspector General (SIG), Deloitte & Touche, Hewitt EnnisKnupp (HEK), and 
CliftonLarsonAllen, the external auditor of the Public Employees Benefit Authority (PEBA), regarding the 
appropriateness of past practices and the integrity of the financial statements.  
 
Process 
Our fiduciary performance audit compared RSIC’s current practices with leading practices to understand 
fiduciary strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities for improvement.  A number of prior 
weaknesses have been recognized and are being addressed by the Commission.  Past practices were 
only examined by us to understand the context for the evolution and maturation of RSIC to its present 
state. 
There were three phases to our audit: Initiation, Assessment and Final Report.  The review began on 
December 4, 2013 following the awarding of the contract.  We reviewed nearly 800 documents (see 
Appendix D List of Documents Reviewed) and conducted interviews with nearly fifty individuals, many 
with follow-up interviews including: all seven current and one former Commissioner; nineteen 
Retirement System Investment Commission (RSIC) staff; three Public Employees Benefit Authority 
(PEBA) staff; two State Treasurer’s Office (STO) staff; fifteen current and two terminated external 
investment managers; two partners from Hewitt EnnisKnupp (HEK), the RSIC’s general investment 
consultant; the Retirement System’s external auditor (CliftonLarsonAllen), the actuary (Gabriel Roeder 
Smith, and the custodial bank, Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM).   See Appendix E Interviews Conducted 
by FAS for Fiduciary Performance Audit. 
FAS also designed, conducted and analyzed a custom survey with six peer investment boards.  In 
addition, the RSIC completed three public pension benchmark surveys which FAS had previously 
conducted with other public pension funds.  A new 2014 Investment Cost Effectiveness Analysis was also 
conducted by the independent firm, CEM Benchmarking Inc. (CEM), as part of this fiduciary performance 
audit.  See Appendix F CEM Report Executive Summary. 
FAS submitted a Status Report to the SIG on March 3, 2014 with preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations and provided ten days for written responses from RSIC, PEBA and STO.  We then held 
conference calls with RSIC, PEBA and STO to follow-up and to ensure we understood their feedback.  On 
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March 28, 2014 FAS submitted a Draft Final Report.  Another ten day period was provided for further 
written feedback.  During this time, we continued to respond to questions and comments and complete 
additional interviews. The written responses of RSIC, STO and PEBA to the Draft Final Report have been 
included as Appendices N, O and P to this report.  The Final RSIC Fiduciary Performance Audit Report 
was submitted to SIG on April 18, 2014.  We plan to meet with the Commission to make our final 
presentation in Columbia at their May 1, 2014 regular meeting. 
 
The Duties of a Fiduciary 
For this review, we use the fiduciary standard found in the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 9 - 
Retirement Systems, Chapter 16, Retirement System Funds, Article 1, Duties of the Trustee, Fiduciaries, 
Agents.  According to SECTION 9-16-40. Standards for discharge of duty.  A trustee, commission 
member, or other fiduciary shall discharge duties with respect to a retirement system: 
1) solely in the interest of the retirement systems, participants, and beneficiaries; 
2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying 
reasonable expenses of administering the system; 
3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing which a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the conduct of an activity 
of like character and purpose; 
4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests of participants and beneficiaries; 
5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and 
6) in accordance with a good faith interpretation of this chapter.  
 
Historical Context 
Management of the trust fund’s investments has gone through several phases over almost 70 years.  
From 1945 until 1996, the fiduciary trustee was the state Budget and Control Board (BCB).  Investments 
were limited to fixed income (federal and state bonds, investment grade domestic corporate bonds, 
certificates of deposit, and collateralized repurchase agreements).  The State Treasurer was the 
custodian and investment decisions were delegated to the Treasurer.  Starting in the 1980s, it became 
more and more common for pension funds in other states to invest in public equities as Legislatures 
began to relax investment restrictions. 
In 1997, the Legislature created the Retirement Systems Investment Panel, an advisory board to the BCB 
and the Treasurer.  In 1998, the panel was appointed and the Treasurer was made Investment Agent of 
the BCB.  At the same time, legislation was passed allowing the fund to invest in domestic public 
equities. 
In 2005, legislation replaced the Investment Panel with the Retirement System Investment Commission 
(RSIC).  The Commission was formed and launched in 2005 and consisted of five voting members (four 
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appointees and the State Treasurer, ex officio) and one non-voting retiree member who was elected by 
the voting commissioners.  All investment authorities were transferred from the BCB and the Treasurer 
to RSIC.  The Treasurer remained custodian of the funds, in addition to being an ex officio commissioner, 
with an option to appoint a qualified representative.  More asset classes were allowed for investments, 
including real estate, private equity, funds of funds, and investment trusts.  In 2006 and 2007, the 
allowable investments were further broadened and clarified to the current policy. 
The Commission is currently less than ten years old and is continuing to develop its capabilities.  When 
RSIC was launched in 2005, there were six commissioners and an Administrative Director/ General 
Counsel and an Administrative Coordinator.  A new CIO joined in April 2006, and three additional full-
time investment staff members started in January 2007.  They were all charged with investing and 
managing $25 billion in retirement assets.  By statute, the Commission has an obligation to diversify 
unless “the Commission determines that, because of special circumstances, it is clearly not prudent to 
do so”.  The actions taken by the Commission to diversify the assets reflect this statutory requirement.  
The initial strategy adopted by the commissioners, in consultation with their general investment 
consultant, CIO and external managers, was to rapidly diversify what had been a traditional stocks and 
bonds portfolio to improve long-term returns.  Due to limited resources, the Commissioners became 
very involved in investment operations such as due diligence. 
Infrastructure did not keep pace with investment strategies as initial back office and risk management 
procedures were often manual and ad hoc.  During the past two years, RSIC’s processes have evolved to 
become much more robust and systematic.  A number of legacy weaknesses have been recognized and 
have been or are being addressed by the Commission.  Past practices were examined in this audit to 
better understand the context, as well as the evolution and maturation of the RSIC.   
South Carolina was a late adopter of diversification for its pension trust funds, and in both 1998 and 
2006 it appears that there was a desire to diversify rapidly.  However, as indicated in the chart below, 
the diversification timing proved to be unfortunate after both the 1998 and 2005 legislative changes. 
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The first diversification strategy into public equities was a deliberate effort to rapidly address the 
Commission’s diversification mandate.  However, the timing proved most unfortunate given the market 
declines in 2008 when the market value of the Fund's assets fell 28.7% while its peers dropped an 
average of 27%.  
Subsequently, the Commission decided to reduce its exposure to stocks and broaden its asset allocation 
to include alternative investments in order to reduce exposure to catastrophic loss.  Again, this was a 
deliberate strategy which recognized the high costs of these alternative investments, and was done to 
dampen the volatility of the portfolio and reduce the potential downside.  The reduction of equity 
holdings meant the Fund was not well positioned to take advantage of the ensuing stock market 
recovery.  
Decline in the funded status has been ongoing since 1999 and was impacted by a combination of 
increases in benefits and adverse market conditions.  As indicated in the chart below, changes in 
benefits from 1999-2001 and in 2008 all contributed to funded status declines.  The funding status 
impacts of market downturns in 2001 and 2008 were phased in due to 5-year smoothing.  Note: Funding 
status indicated in the chart reflects the actuarial value basis for the SCRS fund, which represents about 
86 percent of total retirement system assets. 
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Based upon numerous discussions with the Commissioners, investment staff, and the general 
investment consultant, we identified several critical underlying assumptions which appear to have 
driven the current asset allocation strategy.  The Legislature sets the expected rate of return which 
currently stands at 7.5%.  RSIC assumes the risk-free of rate of return plus the equity premium is about 
5-6%; thus hitting the 7.5% return target means the fund must take on additional risk. 
RSIC is determined to avoid a “big drawdown” (i.e., major capital loss) which would trigger a special 
increase in employer and employee contributions, which is perceived as catastrophic for employees, 
employers, and taxpayers.  The ongoing relatively high allocation to hedge funds and other private asset 
classes by RSIC is based on a belief that these asset classes are less volatile than public markets. 
If the retirement plans were 70% funded instead of the current 56% (on a market value basis), RSIC 
would be comfortable with taking on more public equity risk; however, at the current funded level RSIC 
believes it must avoid another drawdown similar to 2008-2009. 
The Commission states it is taking a long-term view on maintaining the current asset allocation, which 
they believe best serves all stakeholders, and is not trying to time the market by making changes 
perceived as advantageous in today’s market environment. 
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1. Governance 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
The governance assessment reviewed the roles of the Commission, staff, and other relevant state 
agencies in the oversight and management of the retirement fund assets.  The assessment evaluated the 
legal and statutory framework and how this is translated into authorities, roles, responsibilities, 
accountabilities, policies, and procedures.   
We utilized our Powers Reserved Framework of sixty six specific authorities included in nine relevant 
powers (see Appendix G Powers Reserved Analysis).  This allowed comparison of the current South 
Carolina governance structure to other state investment board peers.  We also utilized our public 
pension state regulation, policies and practices database to identify where South Carolina is consistent 
with or different from other state public pension fund governance structures and policies. 
We used the fiduciary standard found in the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 9 - Retirement Systems, 
Chapter 16, Retirement System Funds, Article 1, Duties of the Trustee, Fiduciaries, Agents, for this 
review. 
SECTION 9-16-40. Standards for discharge of duty.  A trustee, commission member, or other fiduciary 
shall discharge duties with respect to a retirement system: 
(1) solely in the interest of the retirement systems, participants, and beneficiaries; 
(2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying 
reasonable expenses of administering the system; 
(3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing which a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the conduct of an activity 
of like character and purpose; 
(4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests of participants and beneficiaries; 
(5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and 
(6) in accordance with a good faith interpretation of this chapter.  
The scope of our activities included: 
 Review applicable laws, policies and procedures (to include Commission governance manuals, 
policies and procedures) and compare to other state funds, with an emphasis on other state 
investment boards, for example: 
o Board composition and member qualifications 
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o Board meeting procedures and legal responsibilities 
o Travel and expense reimbursement  
o Ethics and conflict of interest standards and related training 
o Transparency requirements (e.g., open meeting laws, FOIA requirements, availability of 
RSIC meeting agendas and minutes, etc.) 
o Chief Investment Officer duties 
o Oversight of the board 
o Custody of funds and legal representation 
o Staffing and compensation 
 Review the Investment Commission charter and compare to other state funds, with an emphasis 
on other state investment boards 
o Roles and responsibilities of commissioners and powers reserved for the RSIC 
o Identification of fiduciaries and/or the existence of “de facto” fiduciaries 
o Fiduciary and other board education 
o Meeting protocols, transparency, and commissioner time commitments 
o Strategic planning and implementation process, including balance of RSIC oversight vs. 
operational management 
 Review the RSIC self-assessment process and practices and compare to leading and prevailing 
practices 
 Review adequacy of RSIC independent reassurance and compare to leading practices 
o Role of the internal audit department and adequacy of audit plans 
o Role of Audit Committee in policy compliance, and scope of Audit Committee charter  
o Role of the Investment Commission in the annual external financial audit for the 
Retirement System  
 Review RSIC indemnification/use of fiduciary liability insurance and compare to other state 
funds 
 Review the Board, COO, and CIO evaluation processes and criteria and compare to leading 
practices 
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 Review delegations of authority to the COO and CIO (roles and responsibilities) and compare to 
leading practices 
 Review the Investment Commission communication policy and compare to other funds 
 Review the investment decision-making process and compare to leading practices 
o Role of the Internal Investment Committee 
o Role of the Investment Commission 
o Role of investment consultants 
 Evaluate the alignment of authority and responsibility, with consideration for where expertise 
resides, and compare to other investment boards 
 
Summary of Governance Conclusions 
G1: The statutory allocation of fiduciary authority and responsibilities amongst designated trustees 
and other entities with fiduciary duties is duplicative and confusing. 
G2: The potential for inherent conflicts is demonstrated most acutely by the multiple statutory roles 
assigned to the South Carolina State Treasurer. 
G3: Selection of the custodial bank by the Treasurer is highly unusual among state public pension 
funds and investment boards. 
G4: The dual direct operating executive reporting structure, with both the COO and CIO reporting 
directly to the Commission, is not leading practice and could result in unclear authority and conflicts. 
G5:  Legislative control of RSIC’s budget and headcount is a misalignment of legal authorities and 
presents inherent implementation challenges, adding to retirement system costs and increasing 
enterprise-level risk exposures. 
G6: Although the external audit process of PEBA includes RSIC activities, RSIC does not have a direct 
relationship with the external auditor. 
G7: Although significant improvements have been made, investment decision-making in strategic 
partnerships can still be further improved. 
G8: The selection criteria and composition of the Commission rely heavily on certifications and 
educational credentials, are focused primarily on the “front office” aspect of investing, and do not 
allow appropriate levels of experience to be recognized as qualifying criteria. 
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G9: RSIC has had a number of Commissioners who have served multiple terms, and two current 
Commissioners have served since inception of the RSIC. 
G10: Although the amount of time spent by commissioners on RSIC business is consistent with that of 
other leading funds, their time should be spent more effectively and focus on higher-value topics. 
G11: The Commission committee structure is similar to peer investment boards. 
G12: Commission operations are consistent with policies but could be improved in several areas. 
G13: Although there have been improvements, reporting and reassurance capabilities still need to be 
strengthened and have contributed to lack of trust and confidence in RSIC staff and performance. 
G14: Delegations from the Commission are generally clear and comprehensive. 
G15: The Commission, as well as the Compensation Committee, provides limited, if any, guidance to 
the RSIC staff in developing human resource capabilities. 
G16: RSIC has improved its investment decision making processes with the creation of the Internal 
Investment Committee, but further enhancements are possible. 
G17: The transparency of Commission meetings is leading practice. 
G18: The communications policy and practices should be improved. 
G19: Most investment boards indemnify their trustees in the case of legal action; RSIC’s level of 
fiduciary liability insurance appears to be consistent with amounts carried at other investment boards 
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Findings and Recommendations for each Governance Conclusion 
 
Fiduciary Responsibilities and Authorities 
There are a variety of entities with fiduciary responsibilities for the retirement trust fund as well as other 
oversight responsibilities for the RSIC.  The following chart indicates the eight entities outside the RSIC 
which have a role in RSIC governance. 
Table 1 Overlapping Responsibilities 
(RSIC has exclusive authority to invest and manage investments but has other fiduciary 
responsibilities without having many of the corresponding authorities) 
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Conclusion G1: The statutory allocation of fiduciary authority and responsibilities amongst designated 
trustees and other entities with fiduciary duties is duplicative and confusing. 
Table 1 above describes the overlapping fiduciary responsibilities of RSIC with those of the BCB, the 
Treasurer, and PEBA. Under Section 9-1-1310, the Investment Commission has the authority to invest 
and reinvest the funds of the retirement systems, subject to all the terms, conditions, limitations, and 
restrictions imposed by Section 16, Article X of the South Carolina Constitution, subsection (B) of Section 
9-1-1310, and Chapter 16 of Title 9. 
Further, Section 9-16-20 gives the Investment Commission the exclusive authority, subject to Chapter 16 
of Title 9 and Section 9-1-1310, to invest and manage the retirement systems’ assets; and, Section 9-16-
315(G) provides that all of the powers and duties of the State Budget and Control Board as investor in 
equity securities and the State Treasurer’s function of investing in fixed income instruments are 
transferred to and devolved upon the Investment Commission.  
By statute, the BCB members appoint four of the six voting members of the Commission.  The elected 
member represents the state retirees and is approved by the voting Commissioners.  The BCB (and after 
July 1, 2015, the State Fiscal Accountability Authority or Department of Administration) is a Named 
Trustee and a fiduciary, but its role is unclear with respect to RSIC oversight.  
Arguably, the BCB may be subject to fiduciary obligations in exercising the powers relating to the RSIC 
which are listed in Table 1.  This is especially important in regard to the effect of BCB decisions on RSIC 
purchasing policy and on the ability of RSIC to prudently implement its investment management 
obligations.  Where the BCB has fiduciary obligations as a Named Trustee for the Retirement System, it 
must act in the interest of System beneficiaries.  The BCB might also have general fiduciary duties to 
exercise oversight and monitoring responsibilities in regard to administration and management of the 
Retirement System by other co-fiduciaries.   
In addition, the Treasurer is assigned multiple fiduciary roles, authorities and responsibilities which place 
the Treasurer in a position where he exercises inherently inconsistent and overlapping functions.  As is 
discussed further on the following pages, the Treasurer is expected, in one fiduciary role, to oversee his 
performance of fiduciary duties in another role, while also being separately responsible for monitoring 
his management of both sets of obligations. 
The result of differences between the RSIC’s fiduciary duties and its actual authorities is a confusing lack 
of clarity about Retirement System governance, decision-making and accountability.  In other words, the 
Retirement System's current governance design fundamentally encourages conflicts between 
fiduciaries, dilutes accountability and fosters sub-optimal decision-making, even when all parties are 
acting in good faith.   
Further analysis of the uniquely duplicative and confusing fiduciary governance structure for the 
Retirement System is included in Appendix H Fiduciary Duty and Governance Structure Analysis. 
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Recommendation G1:  The Legislature should better align Retirement System governance authority 
with assignment of obligations and clarify what fiduciary responsibilities, if any, still reside with the 
BCB and, subsequently, the Department of Administration and the State Fiscal Accountability 
Authority. 
 
Potential for Conflicts 
Conclusion G2: The potential for inherent conflicts is demonstrated most acutely by the multiple 
statutory roles assigned to the South Carolina State Treasurer. 
There are a number of legacy governance and structural issues which confound clear fiduciary decision-
making authority and reflect a highly fragmented system.  There are, for example, currently several 
fracture lines related to issues such as segregation of duties, custodial authorities, and securities 
lending.  The result is a continuing process of friction and abrasion that often erupts into open conflict 
between competing authorities.  As noted above, lack of clear authority also equates to a lack of clear 
accountability.  While the current dysfunctions have been largely been between the Treasurer’s Office 
and the Commission, it is foreseeable that similar conflicts could arise between any of the many 
fiduciaries with overlapping and inconsistent roles.  
The multiple fiduciary roles, authorities and responsibilities of the Treasurer illustrate these inherent 
conflicts.  The Treasurer's three roles are: 
1. Member of Budget and Control Board (BCB). The State Treasurer is one of five standing 
members of the BCB. 
2. Commissioner on Retirement System Investment Council (RSIC).  The State Treasurer serves as 
the only ex officio voting Commissioner. 
3. Custodian of the funds.   The State Treasurer is an "Other fiduciary" in the designated role as 
custodian.  Nevertheless, the custodian has a ministerial role only, with no investment authority. 
First, as a member of the BCB, the Treasurer is in the position of having oversight of himself as a 
Commissioner.  The Commission, in turn, must objectively evaluate the custody services it receives from 
a fellow Commissioner, who is also an overseer on the BCB.   
Second, the Treasurer is also a Commissioner of RSIC and, as such, shares investment authority over the 
Retirement System funds with the other commissioners.  As a Commissioner, the Treasurer is subject to 
the standards of care described in section 9-16-40 of the South Carolina Code.  Consequently, the 
Treasurer is faced with the challenge of resolving potentially conflicting fiduciary duties between his role 
as one of several commissioners on the RSIC and his separate obligations as Custodian.  
Third, when the statutes vested exclusive investment authority in RSIC, it seemed to preclude 
subsequent exercise of a de facto veto by one of the commissioners, regardless of the role (in this case 
as Custodian) in which that fiduciary is acting. 
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The Attorney General's opinion (S.C. AG Op. November 16, 2011) muddies the waters by advising that 
the Treasurer, as custodian of the retirement funds, is also an "other fiduciary," with respect to the 
fiduciary duties appertaining thereto.  The duplicative fiduciary roles of the Treasurer are confusing and 
problematic.  Exactly how the Treasurer's custodial fiduciary duty interacts with RSIC's exclusive 
authority to make investment decisions (and the Treasurer's fiduciary role as a Commissioner) is unclear.  
By having the apparent ability to refuse to fund investments the Treasurer objects to (in good faith) in 
his role as custodian, the Treasurer could be seen as exercising veto power over investment decisions 
already made with his participation as a fiduciary Commissioner at the RSIC.  The existence of such veto 
authority is inherently inconsistent with the statutory grant of exclusive investment authority to the 
RSIC.    
Use of such a veto could create the risk that the Treasurer might be found to be in breach of his duties 
as a fiduciary at the RSIC, if losses were incurred as a result of his good faith exercise of separate 
fiduciary duties as custodian.  Increased liability risk is the natural result of these inconsistent and 
ambiguous fiduciary roles.  
The South Carolina Treasurer is the designated custodian of retirement funds by statute.  South Carolina 
Code Ann. Section 9-1-1320, Custody and disbursement of funds, provides that "the Treasurer shall be 
the custodian of the funds of the System.  All payments from such funds shall be made by him only upon 
vouchers signed by two persons designated by the Board."  (Here, "Board" means the Board of Directors 
of the South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority.)  Aside from the responsibility to make 
payments from the trust fund, the Treasurer’s custodial duties are not defined by statute; policies, 
authorities and processes are subject to definition and interpretation by whoever is serving as State 
Treasurer. 
Since RSIC’s creation in 2005, there have been five different Treasurers; several previous Treasurers 
have made significantly greater delegations of authority to RSIC than is currently the case. This 
ambiguity in authority of the Treasurer as custodian, and how the custodian's powers interact with 
fiduciary responsibilities of RSIC, will expose RSIC to a potential roller coaster of interpretations by 
different Treasurers.  The Legislature should resolve this ambiguity.  Further legal analysis of the 
fiduciary duty inconsistencies and potential conflicts is set forth in Appendix H Fiduciary Duty and 
Governance Structure Analysis.  
The State Treasurer does not agree with the above conclusions and has stated: “Funston has concluded 
that the State Treasurer has conflicting fiduciary roles.  This is a false assumption.  First, the State 
Treasurer is a fiduciary in three roles.  In two of those roles – a member of RSIC and a member of the 
Budget & Control Board – he is one of numerous voting members.  He has no control over these two 
fiduciary boards and possesses only one vote on each board.  Such an arrangement does not create a 
conflict among his fiduciary roles.  In fact, his overall perspective of SCRS by looking at it from three 
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different perspectives makes him more valuable to SCRS and its plan participants and beneficiaries.  
Most importantly, he is the people’s elected representation in these positions.”5   
The Treasurer continues: “Finally, changing the fiduciary structure by giving RSIC or PEBA custodial 
duties violates the principles of segregation of duties and greatly increases the risk to the State, and its 
taxpayers who may be forced to make up any shortfall or losses and the plan’s participants and 
beneficiaries.   Proper segregation of duties entails separating the following three functions: authorizing 
investments and cash disbursements (performed by RSIC and to some degree PEBA), performing the 
accounting for SCRS (done by PEBA), and having custody of the assets of SCRS (done by STO).  The 
Treasurer’s fiduciary duties are entrusted to him as an elected representative of the people, including 
retirees.  This representation explains his triple fiduciary responsibilities.  The people’s presence, in the 
person of the State Treasurer, creates no conflict.”6 With respect to the latter, we agree the Treasurer’s 
presence as the Treasurer creates no conflict. 
We also agree that segregation of duties (SOD) is one of many important forms of internal control. 
“Segregation of duties is critical to effective internal control; it reduces the risk of both erroneous and 
inappropriate actions.  In general, the approval function, the accounting/reconciling function, and the 
asset custody function should be separated among employees.  When these functions cannot be 
separated, a detailed supervisory review of related activities is required as a compensating control 
activity.  Segregation of duties is a deterrent to fraud because it requires collusion with another person 
to perpetrate a fraudulent act.”7 
However, we strongly disagree that it is necessary for separate external entities to fill these different 
roles, as this reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of these processes.  It dilutes accountability by 
fragmenting responsibility and authority.  No other state pension fund operates in the same manner as 
South Carolina for this reason. 
Furthermore, Section 5 of the Uniform Management of Employee Retirement Systems Act of 1997 
(UMPERSA) recommends granting public pension trustees "exclusive authority" to "establish an 
administrative budget sufficient to perform the Trustee's duties and, as appropriate and reasonable, 
draw upon assets of the retirement system to fund the budget" and also to "obtain by [employment or] 
contract the services necessary to exercise the trustee's powers and perform the trustee's duties, 
including actuarial, auditing, custodial, investment, and legal services."   
It should be noted that UMPERSA is particularly relevant for South Carolina because the legislation 
which created the primary statutory fiduciary duty provisions applicable to RSIC and the other 
retirement system trustees and fiduciaries in SC Code Ann. Sections 9-16-30 and 9-16-40 was taken 
directly from UMPERSA (which had recently been approved).   
                                                     
5
 The State Treasurer’s Office response to the FAS Midpoint Draft Report March 3, 2014 
6
 Ibid. State Treasurer’s Office response 
7
 http://www.yale.edu/auditing/balancing/segregation_duties.html 
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Recommendation G2:  The Legislature should resolve the Treasurer’s conflicting fiduciary duties 
(alternatives are discussed in I17). 
 
Custodial Bank Selection 
Conclusion G3:  Selection of the custodial bank by the Treasurer is highly unusual among state public 
pension funds and investment boards.   
Selection of the custodial bank by the Treasurer has created significant delays, costs, and duplication of 
effort.  Lack of direct management of the custodial bank relationship by RSIC staff has contributed to 
delays in building infrastructure and in obtaining performance data.  Although there are several other 
states where the trustee board of a fund does not contract with and manage the relationship with the 
custodial bank, it is an unusual practice among public pension funds and often is a source of dysfunction 
in one state (Ohio) where it is the practice. 
Among the six peer investment boards surveyed, the selection of the custodial bank is the responsibility 
of the investment board and its staff at all of them.  No other peer investment boards, even those where 
the Treasurer is custodian of record, allow for the State Treasurer to select the custodial bank. The State 
Treasurer is the custodian of record for the Illinois State Investment Board (ISBI), but the responsibility 
for selecting the custodial bank is given to the Board of Trustees by statute.  At the Washington State 
Investment Board (WSIB), the Treasurer signs the custodial bank contract; however, the WSIB staff 
prepares the RFP, conducts the selection process and manages the contract and relationship as these 
responsibilities are delegated.  See Appendix C Fund Governance Models. 
At the two peer investment board funds where the Treasurer is the custodian of legal record (ISBI and 
WSIB), the Treasurer’s Office has nothing to do with the management of investment funds beyond the 
Treasurer being a member of the trustee board. 
Table 2 Selecting the Custodial Bank 
Note:  Responses exclude RSIC 
Responses from the Investment Board Peer Group (N=6) 
Investment Board of 
Trustees 
Pension 
Administration Board State Treasurer 
Custodian of legal record 3 1 2 
Responsibility for approving the 
selection of the custodial bank 6 0 0 
 
FAS conducted research in 2013 on the custodial relationship with a peer group of 13 integrated state 
public pension funds (funds where the trustee board is responsible for both investments and pension 
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administration), ranging in size from $7 billion to $14 billion of assets under management.  In this study, 
11 of the 13 funds contract directly with their custodian. 
The only two exceptions among this peer group were both Ohio funds, where the Ohio State Treasurer 
manages the custodian relationship.  Over the past two decades, most fiduciary audits of the five Ohio 
pension funds have identified dysfunctions in the custodial relationship and recommended that the 
legislature consider allowing the funds to manage their own custodial bank relationships.  We have 
recently been told by the Ohio Retirement Study Council that transferring the custodial bank selection 
and relationship to the funds is again being debated. 
One of the funds, the New Mexico Educational Retirement Board (ERB), has a split responsibility similar 
to ISBI.  In 2011, Senate Bill 269 was passed which “amends the Educational Retirement Act to allow the 
New Mexico ERB to contract for one or more custodial banks for the purpose of control and collection of 
ERB investment fund assets.”  The State Treasurer, however, remains the custodian of the ERB fund. 
The State Treasurer has also cited Federal rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and 
segregation of duties principles as supportive of the current custodial structure as a fraud prevention 
tool and as an argument as to why the Treasurer should be the custodian and RSIC should not.  
However, in regard to the Investment Advisors Act, public pension funds are specifically exempted by 
Rule 202(b), which excludes state agencies, instrumentalities, officers and employees from its coverage. 
RSIC is a trustee and not an investment advisor. 
While not applicable to RSIC, Rule 206(4)-2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, also known as 
the "custody rule," explicitly authorizes investment advisors to engage qualified custodians for their 
client accounts.  However, it is applicable to "qualified custodians" and requires custodian delivery of 
account statements directly to clients, use of independent audits (including surprise examinations) and 
internal controls audits to protect clients from fraud.  The custody rule also applies to commingled 
funds.   
RSIC obtains confirmations from its managers that they comply with the custody rule.  BNYM is also a 
qualified custodian.  Thus, fraud protections of the custody rule can be obtained regardless of whether 
the Treasurer serves as RSIC's custodian or the custodian is selected and contracted directly by RSIC.  As 
is noted above, this is standard practice at other public pension funds and is recommended by 
UMPERSA.   
Recommendation G3:  The Legislature should delegate selection of the custodial bank and 
management of the relationship to the RSIC (alternatives are further discussed in I17). 
 
Direct Operating Reports to the Commission   
Conclusion G4:  The dual direct operating executive reporting structure, with both the COO and CIO 
reporting directly to the Commission, is not leading practice and could result in unclear authority and 
conflicts. 
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Having both the COO and CIO as direct reports to the Commission is a lagging practice for investment 
board organizations.  All other similar investment boards have a single operating executive reporting to 
the board, typically with the title CEO or Executive Director.  Typically, the CIO reports to the CEO or 
Executive Director (in two of six cases the CEO and CIO roles are combined). 
Table 3 Direct Reports 
Which executives report directly to the Board? Please 
check all that apply.  (N=6) Direct Report RSIC 
Chief Executive Officer or Executive Director 6 
 
Chief Operating Officer or Deputy Director 0 X 
Chief Investment Officer (if not also the CEO/ED) 0 X 
Director of Internal Audit 3 X 
 
Although there have not been significant issues with the current structure and personalities, there could 
be confusion regarding authority and accountability for administrative decisions between the COO and 
CIO.  Having a single direct operating report to the Commission could improve executive accountability 
and clarity of roles and provide a single point of coordination for Commissioner requests, resulting in 
more effective and efficient Commission and executive decision making.  The CEO can also be a buffer 
between the Commission and investment staff, helping reduce the appearance of undue influence by 
the Commission.  We also believe that, in the current state of duress, it is important that be a single, 
executive as leader of the staff. 
Recommendation G4:  The Legislature should revise legislation to allow the Commission to designate 
a single direct operating report with the title of either Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Executive 
Director, and not require that the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) report directly to the Commission. 
 
Budget, Staffing and Compensation Authorities 
Conclusion G5: Legislative control of RSIC’s budget and headcount is a misalignment of legal 
authorities and presents inherent implementation challenges, adding to retirement system costs and 
increasing enterprise-level risk exposures. 
When the Commission was formed in 2005, it was given full and exclusive investment authority, 
discretion and flexibility to invest approximately $27 billion.  At the same time, it was not given authority 
to create the necessary staffing and infrastructure to manage those investments, even though the 
funding comes from the retirement fund itself and not the State General Fund.   
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Funds for staff compensation, information systems, research services, consultants, legal services and 
overhead are appropriated from the Retirement Fund by the Legislature.  In FY 2013, RSIC spent $7.8 
million for the appropriated services, which represented less than 2% of its $427.5 million in total 
expenses for the year.  Nonetheless, in each of the last five years, between 19% and 37% of RSIC’s 
appropriated dollars were unspent and returned to the trust funds. 
Table 4 Appropriations and Expenditures 2009-2013 
RSIC Appropriations and Expenditures 
FY 2009 through FY 2013 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Authorized Budget $4,774,900 $4,774,900 $5,810,700 $10,152,700 $10,152,700 
Actual Expenses 3,850,100 3,432,300 4,712,400 6,406,100 7,810,100 
Remaining Authorization 924,800 1,342,600 1,098,300 3,746,500 2,342,600 
% Unspent Funds 19% 28% 19% 37% 23% 
 
RSIC cites several reasons for the persistently high level of unspent authority.  Its authorized staff 
positions increased from 19 to 35 over this period.   Newly created or vacated positions can take six or 
more months to fill, resulting in unspent salary, fringe benefit and support funds.   Additionally, in some 
years, staff may not qualify, or only partially qualify, for performance incentive compensation, resulting 
in appropriately unspent authorized budget. 
In FY 2012, the year in which RSIC had the largest amount of unspent authority during this five-year 
period, twelve additional positions were authorized.  Although they were funded for the entire fiscal 
year, six positions were filled for only a portion of the year and six had not been filled by fiscal-year end.   
PIC funds are budgeted for new employees although they are not eligible for an award if they are not on 
staff for the entire fiscal year; that has resulted in additional unused budget authority. 
State budgeting processes that assume new positions will be filled for the entire year in which they are 
first authorized, (and that they will be awarded performance compensation in that year) seem 
questionable and blur accountability for the resulting underspending.   As a result, a significant portion 
of RSIC’s compensation appropriation has gone unspent, and can leave the impression that RSIC is 
“overfunded”.  In fact, the Commission has unmet staffing needs now and its staffing needs will grow in 
order to expand internal management.  RSIC is also well short of the overall goal of its compensation 
plan.   
In three of the last four fiscal years, RSIC has not used $725,000 or more of funds appropriated for other 
operating expenses, such as information systems and contractual services.   RSIC indicates that in fiscal 
years 2012 and 2013 it anticipated using some of these funds to acquire new systems through the 
custodial bank.  However, RSIC states that the protracted process for signing a new custody contract 
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precluded the Commission from acquiring the services from BNY Mellon on the schedule assumed in its 
budget plan.   
RSIC decided in fiscal year 2014 to acquire those services from another vendor, and that procurement 
process has just been completed.   With an annual cost of $1.2 million, RSIC anticipates that this 
initiative will require more budget authority than it is currently appropriated for such expenses; the 
Commission is seeking additional spending authority in the FY 2015 budget that is currently before the 
Legislature.   
Like other units of South Carolina state government, RSIC has limited flexibility to move funds between 
budget categories and cannot carry forward unspent funds from one fiscal year to the next. Those 
limitations have been challenging for an organization like RSIC that has been going through a period of 
rapid staff growth and expanding needs for systems.   
It is not clear to FAS that the Commission has maximized the use of its budget appropriations to the 
fullest extent in the past.   However, now or through several evolutionary steps, RSIC needs to attain the 
statutory authority other state investment boards have to fully determine and manage its operating 
budget, headcount and compensation plan.  It would better enable RSIC to make timely, cost-effective 
choices between internal and external management based upon the option that is expected to achieve 
the best risk adjusted net return for a particular investment type.  This would better align the 
Commission’s management authority with its fiduciary responsibility and clarify accountability. 
This need for such alignment was recognized in the Uniform Management of Public Employee 
Retirements Systems Act (UMPERSA), established by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, and upon which the fiduciary duty standards for South Carolina retirement system 
trustees and fiduciaries (SC Code Ann. Sections 9-16-30 and 9-16-40) were explicitly based.   UMPERSA 
recommends granting public pension trustees "exclusive authority" to "establish an administrative 
budget sufficient to perform the Trustee's duties and, as appropriate and reasonable, draw upon assets 
of the retirement system to fund the budget" and also to "obtain by [employment or] contract the 
services necessary to exercise the trustee's powers and perform the trustee's duties, including actuarial, 
auditing, custodial, investment, and legal services." 
The official Comments to Section 5 of UMPERSA explain why public pension fund fiduciaries need 
independent operating budget authority (as well as procurement authority for actuarial, auditing, 
custodial, investment and legal services).  "This section is intended to ensure that retirement system 
trustees have a level of independence sufficient to permit them to perform their duties and to do so 
effectively and efficiently.  Trustees are different from other state actors because they are subject to an 
extensive and stringent set of fiduciary obligations to retirement system participants and beneficiaries.  
These obligations both require and justify some level of trustee independence.  Independence is 
required because it permits trustees to perform their duties in the face of pressure from others who 
may not be subject to such obligations."   
The South Carolina Legislature’s control over the fund operating budget and headcount is unique among 
peer investment funds.  Similarly, the requirement for the Legislature to approve major purchases of 
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investment-related purchases is a lagging practice.  The results of the investment board peer survey are 
shown below. 
Table 5 Authorities 
Do the fund trustees have the final 
authority to approve: 
Investment Board Responses (N=6) 
Yes No RSIC 
The overall fund operating budget 6 0 No 
The fund headcount 6 0 No 
Investment staff base compensation 4 2 Yes 
Investment staff bonus pool 5 1 No* 
Major purchases of investment-
related services (e.g., systems, 
administrative services) 
4 2 No* 
* RSIC has authority to recommend only. 
Recommendations  
G5.1:  The Legislature should delegate authority for operating budget, staffing and all compensation 
approval to the Commission. 
G5.2:  RSIC should review its annual budget planning process to ensure that it is using existing 
allocations to full advantage and that requests for increased resources are based on a realistic 
assessment of staff and systems the organization can assimilate during the next budget period.  The 
Commission should conduct a mid-year review of year-to-date and projected expenses compared to 
budgeted amounts. 
 
External Audit Responsibility   
Conclusion G6:  Although the external audit process of PEBA includes RSIC activities, RSIC does not 
have a direct relationship with the external auditor. 
The external auditor is retained by the State Auditor and the direct day-to-day contact with the auditor 
is through PEBA, not RSIC, which limits the depth of the external audit and the level of reassurance for 
the Commission.  There is no external audit directed by the Commission and no independent audit of 
RSIC alone. 
The financial statements of PEBA, which are required annually, have always included the activity of the 
Investment Commission.  The financial statements are prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted 
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Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the financial statements are reviewed by an external audit firm.  
Those audit firms have always provided an unqualified audit opinion.  
Concerns have been raised by the State Treasurer about the reliability of valuations contained in the 
PEBA Consolidated Annual Financial Report (CAFR).   The valuations of private equity, real estate, and 
private debt investments are determined by the investment managers based upon documented 
valuation policies.  As part of receiving an unqualified external audit, managers must value the assets at 
fair value according to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting guidance.  
Additionally, some managers have their assets valued by independent third party valuation agents or 
appraisers on a regular basis.  Staff at both RSIC and PEBA review the external audits of the managers 
and ensure they have unqualified audit opinions and are conducted by reputable firms.   
The financial statements issued by PEBA are audited annually by CliftonLarsonAllen, and the valuation of 
the private equity and other alternative asset class investments is a subject of review during those 
audits.  Additionally, a joint valuation team (including staff members of both RSIC and PEBA) meets at 
least quarterly to review valuation topics. The approach used by PEBA, RSIC and CliftonLarsonAllen to 
review the fund valuations is standard industry practice.  However, based upon our investment board 
benchmarking, all the peer funds have their own separate external audit performed.  
Table 6 External Audit 
Does the investment board contract directly with an independent 
external auditor for an audit of your investment fund accounts, 
valuations and reporting controls? 
Responses 
(N=6) RSIC 
Yes, with an independent auditing firm 3 
 
Yes, with a state auditing agency 2 
 
Yes, an independent auditing firm is retained by Auditor General, paid 
for by the fund 
1 
 
No, we do not contract with an auditor 0 X 
 
There are issues with coordinating an RSIC financial audit to be included in the RSIC Annual Report.  RSIC 
relies on PEBA to perform the investment accounting services.  PEBA has a hard deadline for financial 
reporting and completing their audit because that organization is a part of the State Comprehensive 
Annual Report.  This early deadline is often before some investment information, such as fees, is 
finalized.  The RSIC Annual Report is issued later after such information is available.  The timing of the 
PEBA audit, state deadline, and lack of investment accounting personnel at the RSIC currently precludes 
a coordinated audit that would benefit both PEBA and RSIC. 
However, having an independent external financial audit or review of RSIC could increase reassurance 
by focusing on the funds managed by RSIC, rather than relying on a by-product of another entity's audit.  
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Establishing a client/auditor relationship would allow the Commission to provide inputs and concerns 
directly to the auditor before the audit begins and could be a mechanism for the auditor to feed back to 
the Commission substantive discoveries that do not reach the critical or material level. 
In lieu of a financial audit, the RSIC might consider an “agreed upon procedures” contract with an 
external firm for a valuation, procedures analysis or internal controls review.  A similar contract might 
provide an opinion or assurance of the content (or a portion of the content) of the RSIC Annual 
Investment Report.  If RSIC intends to pursue its strategy of increasing the internal management of 
assets in the future, then a financial, valuation, and/or control audit becomes even more critical. 
Recommendation G6:  The Commission should have an annual external financial audit or an agreed 
upon procedures review of fund valuations, procedures and/or controls, consistent with other 
investment boards; either the Commission or a state agency (e.g., the State Auditor) could select the 
external firm. 
 
Investment Decision-Making within Strategic Partnerships  
Conclusion G7:  Although significant improvements have been made, investment decision-making in 
strategic partnerships can still be further improved. 
Although the Commissioners approve all external investment manager (EIM) hires, major investment 
decisions occur within the strategic partnerships which require only CIO approval.  RSIC now has two 
investment officers attend quarterly partnership meetings.  All new investments within the strategic 
partnerships are reviewed by the Internal Investment Committee.  A review by HEK of each new 
investment was recently added to the decision-making process.  The CIO still has sole authority for RSIC 
decisions to participate in an investment.  Further institutionalization of the review process for 
investments within strategic partnerships to prevent “single point of failure” types of risks should be 
encouraged. 
There are examples of other funds where investment decision authorities vary by asset class and size of 
investment.  For example, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) investment 
policies give its investment staff authority to commit up to $300 million in infrastructure investments, 
$500 million in private equity, and up to $1 billion in real estate, without board approval. 
Recommendation G7:  Decision-making within strategic partnerships should be assessed in the 
context of how all RSIC investment decisions are made and adjusted accordingly, if appropriate (see 
Recommendation I12.1). 
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Commissioner Qualification and Selection Criteria 
Conclusion G8: The selection criteria and composition of the Commission rely heavily on certifications 
and educational credentials, are focused primarily on the “front office” aspect of investing, and do not 
allow appropriate levels of experience to be recognized as qualifying criteria. 
All appointed Commission members and the elected member must have specific expertise and 
investment credentials and serve five-year terms.  RSIC has the most specific, difficult-to-meet 
qualifications of any investment board or pension fund the FAS team has encountered, which appears to 
limit the pool of potential Commissioners and also limit the diversity of Commissioner experience.  “A 
person may not be appointed to the commission unless the person  possesses at least one of the 
following qualifications: (1) the Chartered Financial  Analyst credential of the CFA Institute; (2) the 
Certified Financial Planner  credential of the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards; (3) reserved; 
(4)  at least twenty years professional actuarial experience, including at least ten as  an Enrolled Actuary 
licensed by a Joint Board of the Department of the Treasury  and the Department of Labor, to perform a 
variety of actuarial tasks required of  pension plans in the United States by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security  Act of 1974; (5) at least twenty years professional teaching experience in  economics or 
finance, ten of which must have occurred at a doctorate-granting  university, master's granting college 
or university, or a baccalaureate college as  classified by the Carnegie Foundation; (6) an earned Ph.D. in 
economics or  finance from a doctorate-granting institution as classified by the Carnegie  Foundation; or 
(7) the Certified Internal Auditor credential of The Institute of  Internal Auditors.” 
Table 7 Minimum Qualifications 
Do the appointed members have minimum 




Responses of the Investment Board peer group 2 3 1 
Comments:  
Very general.  “Experience in pension management, institutional management or financial markets." 
“10 years of investment or financial experience.” 
 
Current RSIC criteria emphasize investment certification and qualifications or academic credentials but 
do not recognize equivalent experience, and also strongly prefer front-office expertise and experience 
over general management and back office operations experience.  The criteria also limit the potential 
Commissioner pool of candidates; some current commissioners no longer meet the new criteria and had 
to be grandfathered. 
The composition of the Commission is not consistent with peer investment board funds; most boards 
have a more diverse mix of experience with less focus on investments per se.  Although FAS regards 
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having a Commission with a high level of expertise as desirable, we believe the current criteria are not 
optimal.  We have identified two governance models employed by peer investment boards: 
1. Ex Officio Lay Board with Expert Advisory Board:  An ex officio lay board comprised of elected 
state officials who are advised by an appointed, non-voting expert advisory board. 
2. Lay Oversight Board:  A board with a combination of several appointed expert members, often 
several ex officio members, and active member and retiree representation. 
The current RSIC model is somewhat unique in that it is more of an Expert Oversight Board.  See 
Appendix C Fund Governance Models.  Beneficiaries are under-represented on the Commission 
compared to some other investment boards. Examples of each type of investment board governance 
model are included in the following chart. 










Ex Officio Lay Board with Expert Advisory Board 
State Board of Administration of 
Florida (SBA) 
3 Yes 0 
Minnesota State Board of Investment 
(SBI) 
4 Yes 0 
Lay Oversight Board 
Illinois State Board of Investment (ISBI) 9 No 2 
Massachusetts Pension Reserves 
Investment Mgmt. Board (PRIM) 
9 Yes 5 
Washington State Investment Board 
(WSIB) 
15 
No, but 5 non-
voting  expert 
board members 
2 
West Virginia Investment Management 
Board (WVIMB) 
13 No 0 
State of Wisconsin Investment Board 
(SWIB) 
9 No 2 
Expert Oversight Board 
South Carolina Retirement System 
Investment Commission (RSIC) 
7 No 1 
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There is a wide range in the number of trustees (i.e., Commissioners) at the peer investment boards, 
ranging from 3 (Florida) to 15 (Washington).  However, all those smaller than the Commission utilize at 
least one advisory board to provide advice and counsel. 
The current situation with the Commission having six voting members is not leading or prevailing 
practice, as it can contribute to tie votes (and has on one occasion recently). While tie votes can occur 
even when there is an odd  number of Commission members (if members are absent or recused from 
voting on a matter) and tie votes merely result in failure to approve the pending motion, prevailing 
practice seeks to reduce tie votes, as they can contribute to deadlock and exacerbate conflicts.   
Otherwise, the RSIC policies are consistent with prevailing practices with respect to standard trustee 
terms, staggered terms, no term limits, and public reporting of attendance.  
Recommendations  
G8.1:  The Legislature should revise the Commissioner qualification requirements to achieve a more 
diverse composition of members, including a broader business experience beyond investments which 
is not as reliant on professional certifications when there is significant practical experience. 
G8.2:  The Legislature should consider adding one or three additional voting members to the 
Commission to increase diversity, increase beneficiary representation and reduce the potential for tie 
votes (making the PEBA representative a voting Commissioner could be an option, but would require 
an exemption from the prohibition for a state employee). 
 
Term Limits 
Conclusion G9:  RSIC has had a number of Commissioners who have served multiple terms, and two 
current Commissioners have served since inception of the RSIC. 
Currently there are no limits on the number of terms a Commissioner may serve.  The State Treasurer 
serves as a commissioner for the length of the term of office.  There are arguments both for and against 
term limits.  The primary advantage of term limits is to provide fresh energy, ideas and expertise to the 
board.  The most commonly cited disadvantage is loss of valuable experience and continuity, particularly 
as it may take up to a year for many board members to be fully up-to-speed. 
In the absence of term limits, leading practice is to have rigorous procedures for evaluating board 
members and removing those who are not able to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities effectively.  RSIC 
already has in place a staggered term process which is considered a leading practice.  Term limits would 
provide a continual flow of new participants while retaining a cadre of more experienced members. 
Recommendation G9:  The Legislature should consider imposing term limits for Commissioners. 
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Commission Focus 
Conclusion G10: Although the amount of time spent by commissioners on RSIC business is consistent 
with that of other leading funds, their time should be spent more effectively and focus on higher-
value topics. 
The amount of time spent by the Commissioners on investment commission business is appropriate and 
consistent with benchmarks from other leading public pension funds as indicated below. 
Table 9 Commission Focus 
On a full time equivalent (FTE) basis, how much time do board members dedicate to your board, by 
category? (Source: CalPERS Governance Survey) 
 
However, in recent years the Commission has been more focused on operations and fire-fighting than 
on strategy, oversight, governance and accountability.  Due to the current Commission dysfunctions, the 
Commissioners are reluctant to interact as a group and a number of Commissioners have stated that 
they can no longer have a meaningful discussion during a Commission meeting. 
Greater emphasis is needed on long-term strategic planning and asset allocation.  The last strategic plan 
was developed in 2009, and there is currently little, if any, focus on longer-term strategy beyond the 
asset allocation.  Strategic retreats have been suspended, although it appears there may be a strategic 
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Although the Commissioners are involved in setting the asset allocation and approving individual 
investments, there are two gaps in setting the long-term investment direction: 
1. They have not articulated their investment beliefs; this would typically include actively 
discussing and debating topics such as active vs. passive management, risk appetite, the role of 
internal management, investment costs, long term investing, and impact of the liability structure 
on investment strategies.  The investment beliefs could help shape the asset allocation, facilitate 
constructive debate, and help develop a more informed view about key assumptions underlying 
inter-related decisions affecting the portfolio.  In addition, they could help guide organizational 
priorities and ensure alignment between the Commissioners and staff. 
2. Asset class strategies (within each asset class) have not been developed and discussed with 
significant Commission input.  Although the investment staff and general investment consultant 
have developed strategies within each asset class, it appears that there is not typically 
significant discussion about the asset class and oversight of asset class strategies by the 
Commission.  Leading practice at other public funds is to discuss each asset class once annually 
to review the role of the asset class in the overall fund portfolio and the specific strategies to be 
employed within the asset class. 
The RSIC is unique in assigning individual Commissioners responsibility for specific asset classes; this is a 
lagging practice and presents potential conflicts (e.g., potential “majority of one”) and opportunity for 
undue influence, although we found no evidence of that at the RSIC.  
The RSIC is also unique in assigning Commissioners to participate on due diligence teams.  Although 
occasional participation as an observer for training and reassurance purposes may be appropriate, the 
Commissioners should be providing oversight for the entire investment management process and 
should not be active participants in day-to-day management.  Oversight should be at the enterprise 
level, not just the investment portfolio, and consider organizational capabilities and risks. 
Table 10 Due Diligence 
Who typically participates in 
due diligence of prospective 










Trustees/Commissioners 0 0 X 
 
Investment Staff 6 6 X 
 
Operations Staff 1 4 
 
X 
General Investment Consultant 2 1 X X 
Asset Class Consultant 3 2 
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Recommendations  
G10.1:  The Commission should work with its general investment consultant and develop a set of 
investment beliefs to provide a basis for strategic management of the investment portfolio. 
G10.2:  In addition to an annual review of the asset allocation, throughout the year the Commission 
should review and discuss asset class strategies with the investment staff and provide oversight. 
G10.3:  The Commission should shift its emphasis from a focus on advising on specific investments and 
participating in due diligence to providing oversight and strategic guidance to staff.  This would 
include eliminating the assignment of asset classes to individual Commissioners and, as a general rule, 
preclude Commissioner’s involvement in investment due diligence except as observers for either 
overseeing staff processes or for Commissioner education and training purposes. 
 
Commission Structure 
Conclusion G11: The Commission committee structure is similar to peer investment boards. 
The standing Audit and Compensation Committees of RSIC are prevailing practice for similar investment 
boards (see chart below).  The number of meetings annually is typical for the Audit Committee and less 
than average for the Compensation Committee. 
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Table 11 Commission Structure & Meetings 
Source: NYS Common Fund Survey 
What types of voting, standing board 













ed N=7  Average RSIC 
Audit 10 
 
3 7 4 2-5 
Personnel and Compensation 9 
 
2 7 3 1-2 


















1 2 5 
 
Corporate Governance/ESG 3 
 
1 2 4 
 
Strategic Planning 3 
 























































   
An Ad Hoc Governance Committee, which is also prevailing practice, was disbanded in May 2013 
following the most recent review and update to the Governance Policy Manual.  Committee 
assignments are made by the Commission Chair and confirmed by Commission vote.  Committee 
meetings are typically held several weeks in advance of full Commission meetings to allow time to 
prepare committee findings and recommendations, which is a leading practice. 
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The Audit Committee includes the PEBA representative on the Commission (due to PEBA’s reliance on 
investment information from the RSIC), the immediate past Commission Chair, and the current 
Commission Vice-Chair.  Quarterly meetings of the Audit Committee are a prevailing practice. 
The Compensation Committee meets once or twice per year, as required.  This is less than the typical 
three times annually at the peer funds.  A new Compensation Committee charter is under development. 
 
Commission Operations 
Conclusion G12:  Commission operations are consistent with policies but could be improved in several 
areas. 
The Commission charter calls for quarterly meetings, but approval of investments often requires 
meeting more frequently than quarterly.  The Commission has met 7-8 times per year for the past two 
years with numerous special meetings.  Initially, the Commission met monthly when it was first formed, 
then moved to bi-monthly, and finally to a minimum quarterly schedule.  Given that the Commission 
must approve all investments (other than those in strategic partnerships or those managed internally), 
the quarterly schedule creates an unintended hurdle in timely approvals. 
A revised protocol for the agenda setting process was presented by the Chairman at the September 
2013 meeting to ensure opportunity for input by all Commissioners in development of the agenda. 
However, the minutes do not indicate that the amended protocol was adopted by the Commission.  
While the Chairman indicated he would follow the new protocol, the amendment should be formally 
adopted by the Commission and incorporated into the Governance Manual. 
The Commission currently utilizes a self-assessment process which is prevailing practice.  The 
Commission conducts self-assessments of the entire commission and the committees, but individual 
member, peer-to-peer, and upward (staff) evaluations are not used.  The Commission chair coordinates 
the self-assessments using a questionnaire and open discussion.  There are no individualized feedback or 
personalized improvement goals. 
Although the Commission’s self-development policies are prevailing practice, there are opportunities for 
improvement.  Commissioner training is mandatory and the type of training is consistent with the peer 
group.  While there is a training plan for new commissioners, there is no overall plan or budget for the 
Commission or individual members. 
Recommendations  
G12.1:  The Commission should plan more frequent meetings, at least bi-monthly, and develop 
standing agenda items annually and for each meeting (e.g., asset allocation, investment beliefs, 
specific asset class reviews, infrastructure business plan review, etc.) (see also Recommendation I6.1). 
G12.2: The revised protocol for the agenda setting process should be formally adopted by the 
Commission and incorporated into the Governance Manual. 
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G12.3:  Improve the effectiveness of Commission self-assessments by providing evaluations of 
individual Commissioners, utilizing peer-to-peer and upward evaluations (from RSIC staff), and 
providing individualized feedback and personalized improvement goals. 
G12.4:  Develop an overall continuing education plan for Commissioners, including an on-going 
education budget for the Commission and plans for individual Commissioners. 
 
Independent Reassurance 
Conclusion G13: Although there have been improvements, reporting and reassurance capabilities still 
need to be strengthened and have contributed to lack of trust and confidence in RSIC staff and 
performance. 
Prior to 2012, the Commission did not have an Internal Audit and Compliance Department (IACD).  The 
effective functioning of this group has been a significant improvement.  Internal Audit and Compliance 
has made significant contributions in policy and procedural development and independent reassurance; 
considerable effort has been expended in getting to a state where policies and procedures can now be 
audited.  Internal audit plans are adequate and staffing shortages are being addressed through 
outsourcing.  A draft Internal Audit charter has been developed but has not yet been approved. 
Consistent with leading practices, the Commission has also established an Audit Committee to oversee 
the Internal Audit and Compliance functions, the internal control environment, and any engagements 
with external audit firms; approve internal audit plans, review the findings, and approve and monitor 
follow-up items; and oversee the process for monitoring compliance with RSIC policies and applicable 
laws. 
Independent reassurance that management reports are reliable, controls are robust and that RSIC staff 
is capable is still underdeveloped in several key areas: 
1. Although the Governance Policy Manual requires an enterprise risk management (ERM) 
program, it does not yet exist.  We do note that at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting, 
approval was given to establish an Enterprise Risk Management function with operational 
reporting responsibility to the Audit Committee, effective July 1, 2014. 
2. The Commission does not engage its own external auditor to review the fund valuations and 
controls (see Recommendation G6). 
3. There is not an independent third party expert benchmark of returns and costs (see 
Recommendations G18.4 and I11.2). 
4. The Audit Committee mandate and charter do not include oversight for enterprise risk 
management (ERM), although we assume this will change based upon the approved direction 
for the ERM program at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting. 
5. Internal Audit and Compliance capabilities, while very competent, are still evolving. 
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Creation of the Internal Investment Committee (IIC) is a leading practice and, as it evolves, the IIC could 
become an effective reassurance mechanism and an important vehicle for channeling staff input to the 
Commissioners.  External investment reporting for the strategic partnerships is not broken out by asset 
classes, which limits transparency and comparability. 
Recommendations  
G13.1: The Audit Committee should review and approve the Internal Audit Charter. 
G13.2:  Develop and implement an Enterprise Risk Program, as called for in the Governance Policy 
Manual and approved at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting, and ensure the necessary tools are 
acquired to support effective risk management and oversight. 
G13.3:  Add responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management to the Audit Committee charter; consider 
changing the name to the Audit and Enterprise Risk Committee. 
G13.4:  An independent third party expert firm should regularly benchmark fund returns and costs 
(see Recommendations G18.4 and I11.2). 
 
Powers Reserved and Delegation of Authority 
Conclusion G14: Delegations from the Commission are generally clear and comprehensive. 
The Governance Policy Manual contains thorough delegations to the CIO and COO.  All the information 
is in one place.  The document was approved by the Commission and cannot be changed without 
Commission approval. The Governance Policy Manual also covers executive evaluation and is fairly 
comprehensive. 
Executive evaluations occur annually.  Executives complete a self-evaluation which is then reviewed by 
the Commissioners.  The robustness of the process for Commissioner’s input into the process can be 
improved, as there is no formal feedback process in between annual reviews. 
Recommendation G14:  The Commission should adopt a mid-year review process for its direct reports 
to provide guidance and interim feedback. 
 
Compensation Committee 
Conclusion G15: The Commission, as well as the Compensation Committee, provides limited, if any, 
guidance to the RSIC staff in developing human resource capabilities. 
Given the human resource challenges faced by RSIC such as morale and reputation, recruitment and 
retention, key person risk, and succession planning, the Commission does not provide sufficient 
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leadership in developing organizational capabilities, particularly in the back office and risk management 
areas.   
The Compensation Committee charter does not include oversight of the adequacy of human resources 
recruitment, selection and management.  The charter defines the Committee’s responsibilities as 
“reviewing and making recommendations related to the RSIC’s Compensation Policy, including sections 
related to Performance Incentive Compensation (“PIC”) to ensure the RSIC can recruit and retain 
superior talent to satisfy the core mission of the Commission.” 
Recommendations  
G15.1:  As part of a shift in emphasis by the Commission to enterprise oversight, the Compensation 
Committee charter should be expanded to include oversight of human resources and infrastructure 
and to provide guidance to staff on human resources and capability development. 
G15.2:  The Compensation Committee should change its name to Human Resources and 
Compensation to reflect the new focus. 
 
Role of the IIC 
Conclusion G16: The RSIC has improved its investment decision making processes with the creation of 
the Internal Investment Committee, but further enhancements are possible. 
The development of the Internal Investment Committee (IIC) has been a positive step, but its role and 
processes are still evolving.  Indeed, during this fiduciary review, the IIC meeting was bifurcated to allow 
one meeting to focus on implementation issues and another to focus on markets and opportunities.  
Right now, the IIC is effectively an advisory committee to the CIO, who has sole authority to recommend 
investments to the Commission.  As the IIC evolves, the RSIC should consider its role and function.  For 
example, should the IIC remain an advisory body or should it become a decision making body with the 
CIO’s role that of an executive Chair?  How much detail of IIC deliberations should be provided to the 
Commission so that the Commission receives notice of major issues but is not drowned in operational 
detail?  
The IIC could also improve internal investment staff information sharing and become a management 
tool for creating annual asset class or functional investment-area plans, as well as for better managing 
due diligence. 
Although the Director of Risk Management is a mandated member of the IIC, Risk Management attends 
only sporadically and is listed as “other attendees”.  Broader participation in IIC meetings (e.g., other 
investment, operations and legal staff) could help facilitate dissemination of information across 
functional silos.  
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Recommendations  
G16.1:  The role of the Internal Investment Committee (IIC) should be clarified. 
G16.2:  If the named member of the IIC is not available (due either to being out of the office, on 
vacation, or the position being vacant), the next ranking staffer with similar responsibilities should 
attend IIC meetings to ensure appropriate participation. 
G16.3:  The CIO should routinely invite other investment, operations and legal staff to attend IIC 
meetings as visitors so as to facilitate dissemination of information across functional silos. 
G16.4: The CIO should consider whether to mandate annual plans by asset class and/or functional 




Conclusion G17: The transparency of Commission meetings is leading practice. 
Commission meetings are broadcast live via the RSIC website, and archived video recordings are 
available for viewing on the website several days after meetings have concluded.  RSIC is the only one of 
the peer investment boards to have this level of transparency with meetings. 
Table 12 Transparency 
Are your board meetings: (N=6) Yes No RSIC 
Broadcast with live audio only 1 5 
 
Broadcast with live video 0 6 X 
Audio recording available on your website 0 6 
 
Video recording available on your website 0 6 X 
 
In addition, RSIC appears to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws Title 30 - Public Records, Chapter 4, Freedom of Information Act.  This includes notification 
of Commission meetings, holding public meetings, publication of minutes, and availability of public 
records. 
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Communications 
Conclusion G18: The communications policy and practices should be improved. 
State investment organizations often have policies regarding their external communications. They vary 
considerably in approach and scope; however, generally their intent is to ensure that communications 
are coordinated and responsive to the information needs of stakeholders, the public and the media.  Such 
policies seek to safeguard the organization’s reputation by providing information that is accurate, consistent 
and timely. 
The Commission’s communications policy, and related staff policy in the Employee Handbook, is focused 
primarily on who may speak on its behalf.   It permits the Chair, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO), Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), or their designee to be spokesperson depending upon the situation.  The COO 
is responsible for written press releases, in consultation with the CIO and Chair, and subject to the 
approval of Chair and Vice Chair prior to their release.  A Chief Executive Officer could provide a central 
point of accountability for communications and is the leading practice at peer funds. 
The communications policy does not proactively address what the Commission believes stakeholders 
and the public need to know about how the Fund is managed.   In 2012, RSIC hired a Public Information 
Officer (PIO) to be responsible for “the creation and organization of the public message of RSIC”.  
Although the PIO is not mentioned in the communications policy, he is to be the first point of contact for 
the media and public who have questions or comments.  The PIO is also the chief liaison with the 
General Assembly and other public officials.  The PIO coordinates freedom of information requests and 
is also responsible for RSIC outreach to stakeholders. 
It is not clear who is actually speaking for the Commission, given the multiple and conflicting messages 
communicated by Commissioners and staff for much of the past two years.    What does seem clear is 
that there is no practical way to enforce a policy on public comments made by individual Commissioners 
when there is open strife within the Commission.   
The Commission’s 2009 strategic plan included a goal to enhance external communications through 
three initiatives: 
 Develop a plan for managing key stakeholder relationships 
 Enhance the RSIC website 
 Evaluate and refine external reports 
 
Although overshadowed by controversy, RSIC has made progress in these areas.  There has recently 
been a more proactive outreach to beneficiaries, which RSIC indicates has been well received.   The PIO 
holds quarterly meetings with retiree associations and the CIO participates on occasion. 
Improvements have also been made to the website, which includes links to a one page quarterly 
investment performance update, the annual investment report and minutes of Commission meetings.  
The Commission’s use of live video streaming, and availability of video recordings on its website, is a 
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leading practice (and is not practiced by any of the peer investment boards in our survey). The PIO 
stated the main message he tries to communicate is that RSIC is seeking the best returns with the least 
risk.  Apparently that message is not being heard because of competing views expressed by the 
Treasurer and some reports and media articles that the Commission’s costs are high and its returns low 
compared to its peers.   The matter of RSIC’s performance and fees is addressed separately in Section 4 - 
Investment Administration of this report. 
RSIC’s communications could benefit from a periodic benchmarking of its returns and costs by an 
independent expert to provide added assurance to stakeholders about the facts of its performance 
compared to peers (see Recommendations G13.4, G 18.4 and I11.2).  RSIC is actually the leader among 
public pension funds in the level of disclosure of costs, and the 2014 report from CEM Benchmarking 
indicates that in an “apples to apples” comparison, its costs are “normal”’ for a fund of its size and asset 
mix. 
The CAFR and annual investment report disclose RSIC’s management and performance fees, whether 
invoiced or netted from returns.  However, relatively little explanation was provided in the most recent 
annual investment report as to why those expenses increased significantly in 2013.  The reporting of 
strategic partnership costs in the CAFR does not provide insight into what is driving the costs of 
underlying assets. 
RSIC needs a formal communications plan that could include an initiative to draw national attention to 
the need for all public pension funds to more consistently disclose costs and for investment managers to 
provide the level of reporting necessary to accomplish that objective.  This could improve the quality of 
peer group comparison data, strengthen public disclosure and perhaps lead to better informed contract 
negotiations with external managers.  RSIC has written to the Government Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) about this issue but may want to expand its efforts through such national organizations as those 
that represent State Treasurers, public retirement funds, auditors and public investment officers. 
Many state retirement funds find their increasingly complex investment programs challenging to explain 
to stakeholders.  For RSIC, the stakes are especially high.  The additional management authority and 
resources it requires to fulfill its responsibilities depends upon the Commission’s ability to effectively 
explain its activities and to engender public trust.  The Commission is comprised of one of, if not the 
most, highly credentialed Boards or Commissions in the country.  It has made deliberate decisions in 
terms of its strategy and related costs that are likely difficult for the layperson to understand.  As a 
public entity, the Commission should recognize that it has a responsibility to proactively and consistently 
communicate that strategy in ways that are understandable to its key stakeholders to avoid potential 
confusion and conflict. 
Recommendations  
G18.1:  RSIC’s communications policy should be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to address who 
is responsible for proactively speaking out on behalf of the RSIC and any policies which might be 
necessary to develop key messages. 
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G18.2:  RSIC should develop a communications plan which identifies each key stakeholder group, 
considers what information is important for each stakeholder to know, and identifies responsibility 
for maintaining stakeholder communications. 
G18.3:   In the communications plan, RSIC should consider an initiative to draw greater national 
attention to the need for all public pension funds to disclose costs in a consistent way and for 
investment managers to provide the level of reporting necessary to accomplish that objective. 
G18.4:   RSIC should conduct a periodic benchmarking of its returns and costs by an independent 
expert to provide added assurance to stakeholders about the facts of its performance compared to 
peers (see Recommendation G13.4). 
 
Indemnification 
Conclusion G19:  Most investment boards indemnify their trustees in the case of legal action; RSIC’s 
level of fiduciary liability insurance appears to be consistent with amounts carried at other investment 
boards with similar asset allocations. 
RSIC Commissioners are indemnified for damages and lawsuits arising out of fund business based upon 
the South Carolina Code Ann. Section 9-16-370.  Commercial fiduciary liability insurance is purchased by 
PEBA for the Commission and other Retirement System fiduciaries.  The current amount of coverage is 
$25 million.  Similar to South Carolina, in all but one of the six peer investment boards, the state 
indemnifies the trustees by statute.  Three of the five purchase commercial insurance and the other two 
self-insure. 
Table 13 Indemnification 
Are your trustees indemnified for damages and 
lawsuits arising from fund business? (N=6) Yes No RSIC 
Through purchased commercial insurance 3 3 Yes 
By statute 5 1 Yes 
Comments: 
We are in the process of investigating the extent to which we are covered by insurance and how we 
might rectify any gaps. 
As long as Trustees are acting in the "scope of employment" they are indemnified by statute.  Errors 
and Omissions insurance is purchased through the State self-funded risk pool.  Employee 
Dishonesty Bond (financial institution bond) is commercially purchased by the fund. 
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PEBA purchases and pays for the RSIC indemnification insurance.  In the case of the three peer funds 
which purchase commercial insurance, the fund pays directly for the insurance in two cases and the 
state risk management agency purchases it in one instance.  The pension administration agency does 
not appear to have a role in indemnification insurance at any of the peer investment boards. 
Table 14 Insurance Purchase and Payment 
Who purchases and pays for the fiduciary liability 
insurance? (N=3) Purchases Pays RSIC 
The fund 2 3 
 




The attorney general 
   
State Risk Manager/Administrative Services Office 1 
  
Not applicable - the state self-insures 3 3 
 
Comments: 
Purchased through Board of Risk and Insurance Management, but have authority to purchase on 
the open market as well. 
There are statutory protections in place.  Do not have a commercial fiduciary policy. 
South Carolina: The pension administration board purchases and pays for fiduciary liability 
insurance. 
It appears that the RSIC indemnification coverage, at $25 million, is somewhat higher than the other two 
investment boards which responded.  However, fiduciary liability insurance coverage often varies 
significantly depending on portfolio holdings and premium costs.  Funds with substantial exposure to 
alternative investments often opt for higher coverage amounts.  According to proprietary fiduciary 
liability coverage survey data made available to us by The Segal Group (a national fiduciary liability 
insurance underwriter), RSIC's coverage amount is consistent with levels purchased by other public 
pension funds that have similar asset allocations.   
Table 15 Coverage 
What is the amount of coverage, if applicable? (N=2) 
$15 million 
Supposedly $10 million 
RSIC: $25M in aggregate 
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There does not appear to be any discernable consistent approach to the level of deductible among the 
peer group.  Since RSIC's insurance is arranged by PEBA, we did not further evaluate policy terms, given 
the RSIC scope of our review.   
 
Table 16 Amount of Deductible 
What is the amount of self-insured retention (deductible), if applicable? (N=2) 
$250K 
The first $5 million is essentially self-insured by Board of Risk and Insurance Management 
RSIC: No response. 
With three of the peer investment boards, the state is required to provide legal defense if a claim is filed 
against a trustee or the entire board.  Since RSIC falls within the group where defense and indemnity 
must be provided by the State (under South Carolina Code Ann. Section 9-16-370), regardless of 
insurance coverage, RSIC should confer with PEBA about whether a specific sum sufficient budget 
appropriation is in place to fund the State's obligations.  If not, consideration should be given to seeking 
legislation that addresses the issue. 
Table 17 Legal Defense 
 
Yes No RSIC 
Is the attorney general required to provide defense 
if a claim is filed? (N=5) 
3 2 Yes 
Comments: 
It is up to us. 
The Department of Justice is required to provide defense. 
South Carolina: There is a statutory provision requiring "the State" to agree to defend claims 
brought. 
 
Recommendation G19:  RSIC should confer with PEBA to determine whether legislative action is 
needed to ensure that a funding mechanism is in place for the State's indemnity and defense 
obligations that are not covered by insurance.  
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2. Policy Review and Development 
 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
The policy assessment included an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of the RSIC’s existing 
policies and the process of policy development to determine whether RSIC’s policies, procedures, 
practices and functionalities are properly documented, implemented, and reflective of the Investment 
Commission’s established investment goals, risk tolerances and governance.  We utilized document 
reviews, our review team experience, and the FAS public pension fund policy database to compare 
RSIC’s policies, procedures and practices to other funds. 
The review addressed the following specific issues:  
 Assess investment policy as included in: 
o Annual Investment Plan 
o Statement of Investment Objectives and Policy (including Risk Management) 
 Assess the Ethics Policy, including the enforcement process for identifying, disclosing, reporting, 
and mitigating conflicts of interest and compare to leading practices 
o Travel/gift policy 
o Expense reimbursement policy 
o Personal trading and prohibited transactions policies 
 Assess policies contained in the Governance Policy Manual and compare to leading and 
prevailing practices 
 Assess other key policies and compare to leading and prevailing practices, such as: 
o Staff compensation 
o Securities litigation 
o Whistleblower 
o Procurement 
 Assess the effectiveness of the investment funding process  and compare to leading and 
prevailing practices 
o Identification of funding requirements 
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o Approvals required and timing 
o Mechanics of transferring funds 
 
Summary of Policy Review and Development Conclusions 
P1: The Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies (SIOP), Annual investment Plan (AIP) and 
Governance Policy Manual (GPM) are adequate but should be improved. 
P2: Although RSIC’s policies are generally complete, there are opportunities for improvement.  
P3: The funding policies and processes are generally consistent with industry practices, with one big 
exception: the STO controls are far beyond normal ministerial controls for a custodian. 
P4: The Commission revised its staff compensation plan in 2012; there has not been further discussion 
about reaching the overall goal of the plan, which is constrained by the Legislature’s approval of 
RSIC’s budget and incentive plan. 
P5: The state procurement policy is a barrier to the RSIC developing its investment infrastructure 
capabilities in a timely manner. 
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Findings and Recommendations for each Policy Conclusion 
 
Investment Objectives, Annual Investment Plan and Policy Manual 
Conclusion P1: The Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies (SIOP), Annual investment Plan 
(AIP) and Governance Policy Manual (GPM) are adequate but should be improved. 
In a February 2013 letter from Hewitt EnnisKnupp (HEK), RSIC’s general investment consultant, a 
number of recommendations were made to improve the Statement of Investment Objectives and 
Policies and Governance Policy Manual.  The recommendations included better coordination between 
the two documents, edits to reflect changes in asset allocation and benchmarks, and seventeen other 
specific suggestions.  The incorporation of these HEK recommendations into the SIOP and GPM was an 
improvement. 
The Commission has not articulated a set of investment beliefs to facilitate discussion of investment 
philosophy and provide guidance during the asset allocation process – this is a leading practice (see 
recommendation G10.1).  Once the Commission’s investment beliefs are documented they can be 
included in the SIOP as further explanation for the rationale of the selected asset allocation. 
In the Governance Policy Manual, Policy IV Commission Operations, (D) Education (1) Overview and 
Continuing Education (a), the policy explicitly states that a Commissioner “may perform due diligence 
regarding issues such as investment manager selection and custodial bank selection.”  However, the 
Commissioners' role in due diligence is not explicitly described or limited, e.g., their relationship to 
advisors and staff or reporting to Commissioners while engaged in due diligence.  As referenced in 
Recommendation G10.3, FAS believes the Commission should, as a general rule, preclude 
Commissioners’ involvement in investment due diligence except as an observer for occasional 
educational purposes. 
Recommendations  
P1.1: The Commission should, as a general rule, preclude Commissioners’ involvement in investment 
due diligence except as an observer for occasional educational purposes (see Recommendations G10.3 
and I5.1). 
P1.2:  When the Commission’s investment beliefs have been articulated, they should be included in 
the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies (see Recommendation G10.1). 
P1.3:  The Governance Policy Manual should be revised to describe the potential role of a 
Commissioner in due diligence activities as an observer for educational and quality assurance 
purposes only, and that as a general rule Commissioners are not involved in due diligence activities 
(see Recommendations G10.3 and I5.1). 
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Policies 
Conclusion P2: Although RSIC’s policies are generally complete, there are opportunities for 
improvement. 
The Governance Policy Manual and the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies are generally 
complete and well-articulated.  Most already demonstrate leading practices.  Accordingly, we are not 
making specific comments on those policies.  However, they include the Travel Policy, Personal Trading 
Policy, Whistleblower Policy, Placement Agent Policy, and general provisions of the Committee Charters.  
The Placement Agent Policy was adopted in September 2012, and the Employee Compliance policies, 
with component policies including the Code of Ethics acknowledgement, Personal Trading Policy, 
Whistleblower Policy, Gifts and Conflicts of Interest Policy, were adopted in December 2013. 
In addition, with the few exceptions noted below, policies in the Governance Manual, a revised version 
of which was adopted in May 2013, are consistent with statutory requirements.  Appendix I Policy 
Review contains a sample from the results of our policy review.  It compares RSIC's Securities Litigation, 
Placement Agent, Board and Employee Ethics, Personal Trading, Whistleblower and general Committee 
Charter policies with those in place at benchmark funds.  (The appendix includes only RSIC policies for 
which benchmark funds had similar stand-alone policies.)     
Based upon this review, there are several issues which could be addressed to improve the RSIC’s 
policies. 
 There is no counterparty acceptance and monitoring policy (e.g., RSIC has not provided a list of 
approved counterparties to Russell, though Russell has talked to RSIC about how it selects 
counterparties). 
 The broker selection policy relies on a fixed income team decision without specific 
requirements. 
 Voting of proxies is delegated to managers by provisions in their investment management 
agreements but is not regularly monitored. We understand that since our initial discussions took 
place, the proxy voting records for SMA managers for CY2013 have been collected. 
There are currently no RSIC proxy voting guidelines in place.  Our understanding is that RSIC is in 
the process of developing an amendment to the SIOP clarifying that separate account managers 
are authorized to vote proxies in keeping with their fiduciary obligations and setting forth the 
reporting process managers will be required to follow. The timely reporting of proxy voting 
records should be regularly monitored. 
Under fiduciary law, proxy votes are considered plan assets that must be exercised in 
accordance with the interests of fund beneficiaries.  Peer funds typically have their own proxy 
voting guidelines, either as stand-alone policies or within their investment policy statements.  
Out of the twelve benchmark funds referenced in developing Appendix I Policy Review, eleven 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
68 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
have adopted their own custom proxy voting guidelines.  At some point in the future, the RSIC 
should consider developing its own proxy voting guidelines. 
 The securities litigation policy details the process used to identify potential securities litigation 
claims related to fund investments.  The initial review of identified claims is completed by RSIC's 
internal legal counsel.  Potential claims are then generally referred to outside securities litigation 
counsel for further evaluation.  However, the policy lacks clarity as to whether and to what 
extent the Commission or RSIC Legal has final approval in pursuing a claim.   
In addition, the policy is unclear regarding the role (if any) of the Attorney General in approving 
litigation and outside litigation counsel.  The statutory standards of conduct in SC Code Ann. 
Section 9-16-360 are not as fully incorporated into the staff conflicts of interest policy as they 
are in the Governance Policy Manual for Commissioners, even though the statute covers both 
employees and Commissioners.  The standards include general fiduciary practices and conflicts 
of interest, such as not taking action to purchase or acquire services or property for the RSIC 
where an employee has a financial interest in the services or property.   
RSIC's Governance Manual Policy section on Commission Roles and Responsibilities describes 
and applies these standards to Commissioners.  However, the same standards are not similarly 
described in the employee policy.  For example, the Conflict of Interest and Receipt of Gifts 
Policy for employees cites SC Code Ann. Section 9-16-360, but it does not specifically identify the 
actions which are prohibited.  Some, but not all, of these standards are discussed in other RSIC 
employee policies, such as the Personal Trading policy.  However, ethics policies at benchmark 
funds consistently provide a more robust description of the applicable conflict provisions.  
Incorporation of similar RSIC descriptions would help to ensure that staff has a clear 
understanding of the standards with which they must comply.   
 Although RSIC requires disclosure of conflicts of interests and a regular confirmation of 
compliance from both Commissioners and senior staff, there is no requirement for disclosure to 
the Commission of personal distress (e.g., financial, litigation, health) from commissioners or 
staff.  Disclosures might be accorded confidential treatment.  Other funds recognize personal 
distress as a potential indicator of risk and mandate disclosure.  For example, the California 
Public Employees' Retirement System Board Governance Manual provides: "Board members 
must disclose to the Board, within ninety (90) days of first taking the office, all past personal 
financial hardships that occurred within five (5) years of taking office. If a Board member 
experiences a personal financial hardship while in the office, the member shall report the event 
to the Board within forty-five (45) days. Individuals who are Board members at the time of the 
adoption of this provision must disclose, within ninety (90) days of adoption, all personal 
financial hardships that have occurred within five (5) years of adoption of this provision. For 
purposes of this provision, “financial hardships” are the following: bankruptcy filings, 
insolvencies, assignments for the benefit of creditors, monetary judgments, liens and 
attachments, wage garnishments, and notices of foreclosure (judicial and non-judicial).  Upon 
disclosure of a personal financial hardship, the Board may, in its discretion, take the following 
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actions: 1) require the member to attend additional training, 2) make changes in the member’s 
committee assignment(s), or 3) suspend or terminate the member’s position, if any, as President 
or Vice President of the Board or chair or vice-chair of any committee or sub-committee." 
 SC Code Ann. Section 9-16-55 restricts certain RSIC investments in companies that do business 
in Sudan.  However, the statutory requirement does not apply to all investments in Sudan. It 
exempts from coverage "indirect beneficial ownership through index funds, commingled funds, 
limited partnerships, derivative investments or the like."  Consequently, it appears that the 
Sudan investment limits currently apply to only two managers that manage dedicated RSIC 
separate accounts.   
We understand that RSIC has recently begun to develop, but has not yet finalized, a Sudan 
divestment compliance policy. 
 Current RSIC policies require that staff and Commissioners who have participated in due 
diligence or sourced an investment opportunity complete a sourcing and conflict disclosure form 
which is made available to all Commissioners prior to final approval of the investment.  In 
addition, RSIC policies require that Commissioner's referral of proposals or communications 
regarding potential or existing service providers be directed to the CIO or COO, as appropriate.  
However, there is no official RSIC mechanism for tracking and reporting service provider 
sourcing referrals like the sourcing and conflict disclosure form used for investments.  Some 
peer funds use referral tracking and reporting requirements for all investment and service 
provider sourcing.   
 
 There is no flow chart or time line describing required steps in the RSIC investment review and 
approval process.  Because the RSIC investment process varies between asset classes and is 
complex, a flow chart or time line could help to prevent inadvertent oversights or potential 
errors.  This might also be helpful to Commissioners and independent auditors or reviewers in 
becoming familiar with RSIC processes. 
 
Recommendations  
P2.1:  A counterparty acceptance and monitoring policy should be developed and implemented. 
P2.2:  The broker selection policy should be strengthened and require periodic reaffirmation by the 
fixed income team. 
P2.3:  RSIC should finalize the proxy voting process rules guidelines that are in development, require 
that investment managers vote in the best interests of plan participants, follow the guidelines, 
monitor how managers are voting proxies and include a field to track voting in Tamale. 
P2.4:  Policies which describe responsibilities for securities litigation activities should be refined to 
clarify approval roles of RSIC Legal, the Commission and Attorney General. 
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P2.5:  The staff conflict of interest policies should be modified to include more guidance on what is 
covered by the statutory standards of conduct. 
P2.6:  RSIC should consider developing and implementing a policy which requires Commissioners and 
senior investment staff to disclose personal financial or legal distress. 
P2.7:  The Sudan divestment policy should be finalized. 
P2.8:  RSIC should consider developing a flowchart which describes the investment review and 
approval process, including responsibilities and timelines. 
P2.9: RSIC should develop a referral tracking and reporting mechanism, like the sourcing and conflict 
disclosure process used for investments, to cover service provider referrals. 
 
Funding Policies and Practices 
Conclusion P3: The funding policies and processes are generally consistent with industry practices, 
with one big exception: the State Treasury Office controls are far beyond normal ministerial controls 
for a custodian. 
Until early February, 2014, multiple signatures were required to receive payments; now standing 
instructions are used to accept funds and sweep the accounts daily.  Other investment board peer funds 
also use standing instructions.  While delays from the prior process were rare, RSIC reports its staff was 
on high alert and had to make many last minute efforts to prevent delays, as they were aware that such 
delays could cost RSIC interest earnings.  We are not aware that any interest earnings were lost but any 
future losses would be increased in a normalized interest rate environment. 
Table 18 Signatures Required 
Do you require signatures for receiving distributions from partnerships 




Signatures are required 0  
Standing instructions 5 X 
South Carolina requires four signatures to release funds, two from the Investment Commission and two 
from the State Treasurer’s Office.  This is more than any of the peer funds require.  Leading practice is 
two signatures, one from an investment officer and one from an operations executive such as a Chief 
Financial Officer or Director of Operations.  Approvals for disbursements from outside the fund staff 
(e.g., Treasurer’s Office) are not found at peer funds. The RSIC COO is not required to provide an 
operational approval for investment transactions. 
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Table 19 Number of Signatures Required 









4 0 X 
 
Table 20 Signatories 




Fund CEO 1 
 
Fund CFO 1 
 
Director of Operations 1 
 





The RSIC states that the State Treasurer’s Office has not accepted requested changes to RSIC signature 
authorities to move money from the RSIC account to external manager accounts, which is highly 
unusual. RSIC further states that STO has also refused to allow requested changes to authorization levels 
and refused to accept requested changes to authorized signatories.  STO, on the other hand, states that 
it has established a protocol for adding authorized signatures, and that RSIC did not follow the protocol 
when it requested the addition of the COO for signature authority.  STO states that it has drafted the 
letter for RSIC following the format outlined in the protocol, and is waiting for the letter to be signed 
and submitted to STO. 
As indicated from the investment board peer survey, all of the other funds authorize signature changes 
based upon a letter to the custodial bank from the fund CEO, with the exception of one fund which 
provides a board resolution.  At none of the peer funds does the State Treasurer have a role in this 
process. 
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Table 21 Signatory Changes  
How often do you review/revise the list of authorized signatures? 
Responses 
(N=6) RSIC 




As required due to changes in responsibilities 5 X 
What does your custodian require to process a signature change? 
Responses 
(N=6) RSIC 
Board resolution 1 
 
Letter from the CEO 5 
 
Letter signed and approved by State Treasurer 0 X 
STO has required written and faxed signatures.  This has created problems when key RSIC staffers are 
away from the office (e.g., on due diligence trips).  The practice has added to staff work burden and 
administrative costs; RSIC states that it has one operations staff person primarily assigned to 
coordinating capital call funding.  Although not all peer funds utilize electronic signatures to release 
funds, it is leading practice and becoming more commonplace.  BNY Mellon has stated that its 
technology which allows electronic payment authorization has been available for 8-9 years and is 
currently used by RSIC to pay external manager fees.  The Treasurer could approve the additional use of 
this technology to release funds for capital calls. 
Table 22 Method of Authorization 
How do you obtain the authorizations? Some have multiple responses. 
Responses 
(N=6) RSIC 
Physical signatures (via fax or paper) 5 X 




P3.1:  Continue to allow standing instructions for the custodial bank to receive incoming funds and 
allow sweeping of cash to maximize income. 
P3.2:  Review the positions required to sign to release cash transfers with the custodial bank and 
revise the requirements to allow two appropriate RSIC signatories, one from investments and the 
other from operations. 
P3.3:  Instruct the custodial bank to accept signatory changes based upon a letter from the 
Commission Chair or the RSIC COO and CIO (or CEO if a CEO position is created). 
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P3.4:  STO should revise its policies to allow electronic payment authorization for release of funds to 
cover capital calls using the existing technology offered by BNY Mellon. 
 
Staff Compensation Plan 
Conclusion P4:  The Commission revised its staff compensation plan in 2012; there has not been 
further discussion about reaching the overall goal of the plan, which is constrained by the Legislature’s 
approval of RSIC’s budget and incentive plan. 
South Carolina statutes authorize the Commission to establish compensation for all employees.    The 
Commission’s Compensation Policy defines the purpose, goals and method for establishing salaries for 
all staff and performance incentive compensation (PIC) for investment staff.   
RSIC’s compensation consultant is a widely recognized expert in compensation plans for investment 
organizations.   The consultant advised the Commission on the design of the current compensation 
policy and provides peer benchmarking data.  
The compensation policy was last amended in May 2012.  The Commission adopted a goal to “target 
total compensation at the 90th percentile of a select group of comparably sized U.S. public pension 
funds.”   Note: “A percentile is a measure used in statistics indicating the value below which a given 
percentage of observations in a group of observations fall. For example, the 20th percentile is the value 
(or score) below which 20 percent of the observations may be found. The term percentile and the 
related term percentile rank are often used in the reporting of scores from norm-referenced tests.  For 
example, if a score is in the 86th percentile, it is higher than 86% of the other scores.”8 
 
RSIC’s goal reflects the view that RSIC compensation needs to be near the top of its public fund peers in 
order to attract the experience and skills needed to manage a portfolio with a large allocation to 
alternative investments.    The Commission has not taken the next step to define how this goal should be 
reached and over what time period. 
 
When the current compensation goals were adopted, the consultant reported that, on an aggregate 
basis, RSIC’s salaries were competitive with a select peer group of 20 other public pension funds; six of 
the peers had significant (approximately 25 percent) allocations to alternative investments. 
However, the consultant also reported that approximately 48% of RSIC staff base salaries and total cash 
compensation levels were in the bottom quartile of the public fund peer group.  Based on 2010 and 
2011 peer data, RSIC’s actual and maximum potential compensation appear to have been well short of 
the 90th percentile goal in most cases.   The consultant further reported that RSIC’s compensation levels 
were “uncompetitive” with a group of 250 private sector firms “with skill sets similar to those of RSIC 
staff.”    
                                                     
8
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentile 
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Recently, the consultant compared RSIC ‘s 2012 actual total cash compensation and 2013 salaries to a 
broader group of 55 public pension funds, including smaller and significantly larger funds.   RSIC staff is 
still reviewing this information with the consultant, but it appears that RSIC’s median total cash 
compensation in 2012 for most position types was below the median of this peer group, as were 2013 
salaries.  Commissioners have not yet had the opportunity to review this information with management 
or the consultant. 
In 2011, McLagan reported that seven of 25 public funds (26%) in its data base with assets between $10 
billion and $40 billion included some or all of their investment staff in an incentive compensation plan.    
It has been challenging for RSIC and other public funds to gain and sustain legislative and public support 
for incentive compensation, even though the alternative is often to pay the higher cost of relying more 
on external management. RSIC’s plan to increase the use of less expensive internal management is not 
likely to succeed without a strong overall compensation program that includes incentive pay for 
performance.    
 
The PIC plan includes basic elements often found in those of other public investment organizations: 
 Awards are based on the net returns of the total fund and quantitative performance targets. 
 Longer term performance (five years) is emphasized over more recent performance (one year 
and three years). 
 Awards gradually scale up in size as the level of outperformance increases. 
 Awards are deferred or not made if the total fund has a negative return. 
 
RSIC could benefit by from:  1) an annual review by the Compensation Committee of RSIC’s 
implementation of the compensation policy and goals; 2) updated peer benchmarking data at least 
every three years; and 3) the addition of a senior level human resources manager (see Recommendation 
O3.1). 
 
A larger issue is that RSIC determines compensation levels, but compensation funding is controlled by 
the Legislature.  The Legislature effectively sets compensation levels, despite the intent for this to be 
delegated to the Commission.  Senate and House committees must also annually approve the PIC plan.  
There have been problems, such as securing the last appropriation for the PIC, which raises uncertainty 
and potential retention and recruitment issues (see Recommendation G5.1). 
 
Recommendations  
P4.1:  The Compensation Committee should conduct an annual review of RSIC’s implementation of 
the Compensation Policy. 
P4.2:  The Commission should engage and independent consultation to conduct a new peer 
compensation study at least every three years to assess the current level of RSIC staff compensation 
and make revisions to the target ranges, as appropriate. 
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Procurement Policy 
Conclusion P5:  The requirement for RSIC to utilize standard State purchasing processes to acquire 
investment-related services and systems has contributed to delays in building infrastructure and is not 
leading practice. 
Although RSIC is exempt (by BCB policy) from the standard State procurement process for brokerage, 
investment management and advisory services, it is not exempt for investment support systems.  RSIC 
cites multiple examples of systems procurements that have taken a year or more to complete.  State 
procurement processes limit RSIC’s ability to do the same kind of expert due diligence on complex 
investment system purchases as they do to hire investment managers.  For more information see 
Section 6 – Information Technology. 
Moreover, since the purpose of those systems is to more efficiently manage the investments (for 
example, by measuring risk or by performing “what if analyses” on how a managerial change would 
affect the overall portfolio), the State procurement policies recognize the uniqueness and importance of 
investment purchases on the one hand, but constrain the RSIC’s ability to robustly analyze and manage 
them on the other.  
In 2012, RSIC unsuccessfully sought an exemption from state process for investment operational and 
support systems. This would have maintained a competitive selection process with oversight by the IIC, 
Commission and external auditors. Most peer investment boards either have modified state 
procurement rules or are not subject to state procurement rules for investment support systems.  
Due to procurement delays, funds for new systems often aren’t spent by fiscal year-end.  The inability to 
move funds across budget categories or fiscal years limits flexibility.  RSIC has been unable to acquire 
critical investment management systems on a timely basis, which contributes to operational (and 
ultimately financial) risk. 
The State procurement policy is a barrier to RSIC developing its investment infrastructure capabilities in 
a timely manner.  In 2011, Deloitte & Touche concluded that the lack of adequate investment systems 
and support services was a high risk for the Commission.  To address the situation, RSIC unsuccessfully 
sought authority from BCB in 2012 to exempt investment operational and support systems from the 
state process, which would have maintained a competitive selection process with oversight by the IIC, 
Commission and external auditors. 
RSIC has been unable to complete the acquisition of key systems that were identified as high priority in 
the Deloitte & Touche report two and a half years ago, and cumbersome procurement policies and 
procedures appear to be a major factor.   The recently completed procurement of an Investment 
Administrator seems to be an exception because it bundled the acquisition of multiple systems into a 
single procurement and proceeded on a schedule that was given priority and was processed more 
quickly.  However, that process still limited the Commission’s ability to directly engage with bidders.   
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The State Treasurer disagrees with this and states instead:  
“Funston should not recommend that RSIC should be exempted from procurement and 
budgetary restraints, given that the fund oversight is critical and that RSIC lacks investment 
“back office” professionals with procurement experience in specialized systems. RSIC should not 
be exempted from procurement and budgetary requirements...All expenditures by RSIC come 
out of the SCRS Trust and therefore reduce funds available to pay beneficiaries and ultimately 
increase the unfunded liability. The procurement code of the State is structured to instill 
transparency and accountability to the spending of public funds, as is appropriate with trust 
funds... 
RSIC is already exempt from portions of the S.C. procurement code when engaging investment 
managers through the exemption provided by the Budget and Control Board related to the 
hiring of investment managers. RSIC had the ability to hire staff and purchase systems but chose 
not to use available resources. RSIC has a five or more year history of not using its full annual 
appropriation by an average of approximately $1,000,000 per year.  Legislative approval played 
no part in the shortfall of staffing or insufficient systems. The deliberate decision not to make 
use of available funds when services and staffing were crucial is a critical issue and should be 
added to the report.  Additionally, services RSIC expressed interest in are readily available 
through the custodial bank agreement without procurement delays.  RSIC instead has chosen to 
take a delayed approach for important services by issuing an RFP and the results of the RFP may 
lack the synergistic effect that would occur if the same or similar tools were purchased form the 
custodial bank.  PEBA (formally under the B&CB) has successfully managed with the same 
legislative budget oversight for years.”9 
In contrast to the State Treasurer’s position, and as indicated in the chart below, most peer investment 
boards either have modified state procurement rules or are not subject to state procurement rules for 
investment support systems.  This prevailing practice is also endorsed by UMPERSA. 
  
                                                     
9
 Ibid. State Treasurer’s Office response to FAS Midpoint draft report. 
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Table 23 Procurement Authority 
Which goods/services are 
subject to standard state 
















Investment services (e.g., 
investment manager 
contracts) 
3 0 3 
Not subject to State 
purchasing 
requirements 
Investment consultants 3 1 2 
Not subject to State 
purchasing 
requirements 
Other direct investment 
support services (e.g., 
trading systems, portfolio 
accounting, risk 
management) 
3 1 2 
Subject to standard 
State purchasing 
requirements 
Routine goods and services 
(e.g., furniture, computers, 
non-investment services) 
2 3 1 




While not specifically subject to state purchasing requirements, we use state purchasing requirements 
as a guide.  Responded:   “Subject to modified State purchasing requirements”. 
 
Recommendation P5:  To facilitate timely acquisition and implementation of information systems, 
RSIC should develop a proposed modified procurement process for approval by the BCB or the 
Legislature which would allow acceptable transparency and objectivity, improve the ability to 
evaluate, select and implement new systems, as needed, and include documentation to allow 
oversight on a post-purchase audit basis (rather than imposing pre-purchase restrictions). 
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3. Organizational Structure 
 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
 
The organization structure assessment included an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of 
RSIC’s current organizational structure as it relates to roles of the commissioners, staff and other 
fiduciaries over the investments and operations of RSIC’s responsibility to the Retirement System.  The 
assessment also focused on ascertaining whether there is a need for clarification and/or additional 
specification of the respective roles and responsibilities of the Investment Commission and RSIC staff.  
We utilized internal interviews, review of key documents, review team experience, and the FAS public 
pension database for a comparison of RSIC practices with peer funds. 
The assessment addressed the following specific issues:  
 Assess the roles and responsibilities of key staff, including the PEBA investment accounting 
relationship for the investment portfolio and any other significant outside services 
 Assess organizational reporting relationships, spans of control, and segregation of duties, 
including cash movement procedures  
 Assess RSIC staff capabilities and deployment compared to other funds 
o Number of staff by functional area 
o Position descriptions 
o Level of experience, skill sets, and credentials 
o Training and education policies  
 Assess the standard operating procedures manual  and compare to leading and prevailing 
industry practices 
 Assess the adequacy of reporting and disclosure from staff to IC and other stakeholders to 
facilitate oversight  
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Summary of Organization Conclusions 
 
O1: The organizational structure has changed to place greater emphasis on operational support and 
due diligence; RSIC staff is generally of high quality with strong credentials and significant industry 
experience. 
O2:  Despite recent staffing increases, however, RSIC support capabilities are heavily reliant on 
outside parties and continue to lag behind peers and leading practices. 
O3: Lack of a dedicated internal Human Resources function has contributed to a deficit of HR policies 
and procedures and lack of a strong focus on organizational development. 
O4: RSIC has made progress in documenting its most critical operating procedures, but has not yet 
adopted a standard process for recording, approving and updating them. 
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Findings and Recommendations for each Organization Conclusion 
 
Quality of Operations and Support Staff 
Conclusion O1: The organizational structure has changed to place greater emphasis on operational 
support and due diligence; RSIC staff is generally of high quality with strong credentials and significant 
industry experience. 
RSIC is still adjusting to the significant changes in leadership, duties and organizational structure that 
have occurred over the last several years.  Until January 2012, the organization was led by a CEO who 
was also CIO and who had been in that role since RSIC was created.   Then, for a short period, there was 
an acting CEO before the Commission eliminated the CEO position and adopted the current structure 
under which the CIO and COO both report to the Commissioners.  The COO was designated by the 
Commission as “agency head” solely for the purpose of discharging certain functions required by state 
law. The practice among state investment boards FAS surveyed is to have a chief executive officer who 
reports to the Board, rather than a dual reporting structure, in order to focus authority and 
accountability for managing the organization. 
Since 2010, the number of full-time positions has grown from 19 to 42 as RSIC has sought to implement 
improvements in management and due diligence practices.   The number of temporary employees has 
grown from three to ten.  In 2010, investment staff and some operations staff reported to the Deputy 
CIO, while the COO oversaw more limited areas with four staff.   Under the current structure, 
operations, operations due diligence and legal functions have enlarged to include 17 staff who report to 
the COO.   
The span of supervisory responsibility for senior managers is more balanced between the CIO and COO 
under the current structure than it was.   The number of direct reports to the deputy CIO (five) and to 
the COO (six) seems to be approaching the maximum level for a senior manager to provide effective 
oversight.   
Public retirement funds have traditionally organized and supervised investment staff according to asset 
class (e.g., stocks, bonds, real estate, and private equity).  The Commission’s investment staff is not 
organized strictly along asset class lines and their titles in some cases do not seem to reflect their 
current responsibilities.  Investment staff was reorganized in anticipation that more investments would 
be managed internally.  The internal management initiative has been slowed but the CIO concluded that 
the reorganized structure will still provide improvements in research and analysis capabilities that are 
needed now and will be even more necessary if and when internal management is expanded. 
Investment reporting, performance analysis and operational due diligence functions are performed by 
staff who report to the COO.  The reporting of performance and management fees are produced by staff 
that is not part of the investment team.  This provides a form of independent reassurance since this 
information is used in the calculation of performance incentive compensation for investment staff.  
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RSIC’s separate operational due diligence team is a leading practice among public pension funds based 
on our observations. 
In 2011, Deloitte & Touche told the Commission that RSIC should ideally have 53 total staff to mitigate 
operational and investment risk factors.  At a minimum, Deloitte recommended an additional 14 staff.  
That number did not include additional staff for expanded internal management which staff proposed in 
2012.  Also, in 2011 RSIC was just beginning to implement a more extensive process for verifying and 
reporting external management performance fees.  The equivalent of two full-time employees is 
currently required to perform that function which is not typically found at other funds.  
At the time Deloitte made its recommendation, RSIC had 35 authorized positions.  In its state budget 
requests for each of the next three fiscal years, RSIC sought 47 total positions, slightly less than the 
minimum number recommended by Deloitte.  To date, the Legislature has authorized 42 positions.  The 
five positions not approved include one for IT and four for the investment team.  For FY 2015, The 
Commission requested the 47 FTE positions.  The Senate Sub-Committee has approved RSIC’s budget 
request but the House subcommittee has not.  RSIC is unable to predict what will happen in conference 
between the two. However, RSIC anticipates receiving no additional positions in the FY 2015 budget that 
is currently before the Legislature.  RSIC has supplemented its workforce by adding more temporary 
employees over the last several years. 
Based upon our interviews and comparison to other public funds which rely almost entirely on external 
management, the authorized number of RSIC staff positions appears to be at a reasonable overall level 
for investment management.  However, RSIC has a larger allocation than its peers to alternative 
investments that are more labor intensive to manage.  Vacancies and turnover add to its staffing issues.  
More investment staff would likely be required to expand certain strategies, such as co-investments.  
Additional investment staff will be required to expand active internal management.  In aggregate, the 
headcount of the operations support staff, as compared to the investment staff, is about the size of a 
typical fund.   However, due to the lack of systems, the requirements on the operations and support 
staff often exceeds its capacity, particularly in IT, and places greater reliance on outside resources. 
Current staff is generally of high quality with strong credentials and levels of experience.  The six 
investment staff in lead positions had five or more years of experience at other public or private 
investment organizations before coming to RSIC and three of them had more than ten years prior 
experience.  All have master’s degrees in business administration, and most have completed the 
chartered financial analyst (CFA) designation.  The eight staff in lead positions in operations, legal and 
audit also have solid professional credentials and all had ten or more years of relevant experience 
before coming to RSIC.  They consistently received high marks from external managers (including 
terminated ones). The quality of staff is at least equal to other public funds.     
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Recommendations  
O1.1:  RSIC should consider creating the position of chief executive officer who would be accountable 
to the Commissioners for managing the entire organization. 
O1.2:  Given the delay in the migration to internal management, the CIO (hopefully in conjunction 
with the new senior HR professional) ought to examine the way the investment team is organized 
today to determine if staffing is aligned with AUM, complexity and risk. 
 
Reliance on Outside Parties 
Conclusion O2: Despite recent staffing increases, RSIC support capabilities are heavily reliant upon 
outside parties and continue to lag behind peers and leading practices. 
Despite the growth in internal staff, the RSIC remains more heavily reliant on services from outside its 
own organization than other investment boards.  RSIC and the PEBA have agreed to assign responsibility 
for the investment accounting and audit functions of the retirement fund, as well as various 
administrative and information technology services, to the PEBA.  PEBA performs investment accounting 
and also supplies most IT support for RSIC.  This has been governed through a documented agreement 
(Memorandum of Understanding) with PEBA, which was most recently updated in January 2014, and 
appears to work well. 
In addition to investment accounting, peer investment boards typically have other key internal functions 
such as Human Resources, Procurement and Information Technology (often supplemented with third 
parties).  Even where these functions are performed internally by RSIC, staffing is minimal, with the 
exception of Legal. 
Most peer investment boards have a chief financial officer responsible for accounting and financial 
reporting.  If RSIC were to develop its own investment accounting staff, it could consider appointing a 
Chief Financial Officer. 
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Table 24 Functions Performed 
Who performs the 
following functions 
for your fund? 






technology Procurement Legal 




0 0 0 0 0 
Another sister state 
agency 
0 0 0 0  0 
A private third party 
outsourcing firm 
0 0 2 0 0 
State Attorney 
General's Office 
0 0 0 0 3 




















0 1 1 0 4 
 
Recommendation O2:  The RSIC should develop an enterprise-wide capabilities and resources 
assessment and determine:  
1) What are the overall support needs and priorities? 
2) Where are the major resource gaps? 
3) Should the gaps be filled through internal and/or external resources? 
 
Internal Human Resource Function 
Conclusion O3:  Lack of a dedicated internal Human Resources function has contributed to a deficit of 
HR policies and procedures and lack of a strong focus on organizational development. 
Primary HR functions are currently handled by senior executives and detract from their core duties and 
make consistent focus on HR difficult.  Although position descriptions exist for each staff position, there 
is not a standard content template and the level of detail is inconsistent.  Staff have received 
inconsistent messages regarding education; while policies are supportive of education, at least some 
staff were told that they should not go to industry conferences for cost or workload reasons. 
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There have been significant changes in senior managers (CEO, CIO and COO) and their duties in recent 
years, and there have been frequent changes in responsibilities at all levels of the organization to fill 
gaps.   Due to recruitment difficulties resulting from recent negative publicity for RSIC, sometimes the 
“best available” candidate is hired with less regard to the specific skill set; this may result in the new hire 
not being in the most appropriate position.  Some staff have commented that these human resources 
processes could “be better managed.” 
RSIC has had ongoing requirements for recruiting and, while a number of qualified professionals have 
been hired, the permanent staff is supplemented by 8 part-time interns, and there are 5 vacant full-time 
investment staff positions and 1 vacant administrative staff position.  The lack of a senior Human 
Resources professional focused on filling these positions requires investment and support function 
executives to lead the search and recruiting process. 
There are a number of potential changes which have been under consideration (e.g., expansion of 
internal investment management, further development of risk management) which will require careful 
planning for staffing, technology and budgetary requirements.  In order to effectively develop RSIC’s 
capabilities, it will be necessary to have a longer-term plan which incorporates human resources, 
systems, training, and third party resources. 
A number of investment, operations and management staff had worked for public investment 
organizations before joining RSIC.  In general, staff seems to appreciate that public and private 
organizations have different types of accountability.  However, several described the negative effect on 
staff morale of the ongoing controversies of the last several years.  One described the current 
environment as “toxic”, while another mentioned a “fear of political risk”.  Another observed that the 
two ethics investigations had been very distracting for staff and had a “deleterious effect on morale”.  
One manager expressed particular concern about the effect on morale and retention among more 
recently hired, less senior employees. 
RSIC has had three different chief operating officers in less than two years.  The supervisor of the IT 
Director has changed four times in the 28 months he has been with RSIC.  The Commission would be 
especially affected by the further loss of a number of key individuals at this time as it seeks to complete 
fundamental improvements in investment strategy, operational practices and systems support.    
Due to gaps in structure and staffing, several managers appear to have an unusually wide range of 
current responsibilities.  For example, the Research Managing Director is also responsible for workouts 
of illiquid assets, serving as the lead on private debt and equity investments, oversight of the Tamale 
database and managing any other issues having to do with external managers.   The Director of 
Operations and Due Diligence conducts and oversees operational due diligence for new investments, is 
responsible for RSIC’s financial and performance reporting, coordinates strategic and budget planning 
and is currently overseeing the procurement and management of a major, multi-component systems 
initiative.     
The absence of a single executive who is responsible for the entire organization means that 
accountability for planning, priority setting, employee development, external communications and 
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response to crises is diffused and unclear.  That poses multiple risks for the organization in the 
management of its staff, interactions with stakeholders and in the implementation of investment 
strategies and systems. 
Recommendations  
O3.1:  A senior human resources professional position should be created and filled to lead 
development of an overall HR strategy to support the organization’s business plan. 
O3.2:  Policies and processes should be developed which ensure that the HR implications of proposed 
new initiatives are recognized and addressed before launch. 
O3.3:  RSIC should implement more thorough compensation planning and evaluations to enable 
recruitment and retention of highly skilled and experienced staff (see Recommendations P4.1 and 
P4.2). 
O3.4:  More formalized staff training and development plans and programs should be developed. 
O3.5:  RSIC should utilize succession planning, including cross-training and other actions, to develop 
staff for broader responsibilities. 
O3.6:  The Human Resources function should provide leadership for development of a multi-year (3-5 
year time horizon) infrastructure business plan which considers the needs and priorities of the 
organization. 




Conclusion O4:  RSIC has made progress in documenting its most critical operating procedures, but has 
not yet adopted a standard process for recording, approving and updating them. 
In its 2011 Strategic Assessment, Deloitte & Touche found no documentation for operational workflows. 
This was identified as a high risk area for RSIC, particularly because staff responsibilities were changing 
in significant ways.  The assessment recommended that RSIC “consider documenting formal operating 
procedures across the organization.”   Among the steps Deloitte suggested: 
a. Create a cross-functional review work group to review, edit, and approve the documented 
policies and procedures. 
b. Define a management review and approval process for the consolidated policies and procedures 
manual. 
c. Store the completed policies and procedures manual in a centralized and easily accessible 
location. 
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d. Create a review schedule to ensure policies and procedures manual stay current. 
e. Update policies and procedures manual as needed. 
If anything, the pace of organizational change has accelerated since the 2011 assessment and so has the 
need for well documented procedures.  Since the 2011 report, RSIC has made progress in documenting 
its most critical operating procedures, such as daily cash management, manager fee reporting and 
validation, and information technology services.   In 2014, RSIC is focusing on other priority procedures, 
including the on-boarding of new investment managers, procedures for collecting return information 
from strategic partnerships, preparation of various investment reports and a business continuity plan.   
RSIC’s first priority is to create standard procedures where they do not yet exist with less focus for now 
on documenting procedures that are currently in place and working effectively. 
RSIC has not yet adopted a standard process for reviewing, documenting and approving procedures, 
including criteria for determining whose approval are required and in what form.   It has also not 
adopted a review schedule to ensure that procedures remain up-to-date.  These are steps which RSIC 
recognizes as needed but which have been delayed due to more urgent workload.   
Like many peers, RSIC does not have a standard operating procedures manual that covers all aspects of 
its investment and operations functions in one location.   Its procedures are established in several 
different ways:  1) the South Carolina statutes and associated state directives, such as those related to 
budget, procurement and travel; 2) the Governance Policy Manual, which includes procedures for the 
selection of service providers;  3) an MOU that establishes procedures for accounting and IT services 
provided by PEBA; and 4) the Employee Handbook, which includes procedures for matters such as 
applying for educational expense reimbursement and responding to freedom of information requests. 
It is the documentation of workflow procedures to ensure consistent and accurate execution that was of 
concern in 2011 and is still in progress.   RSIC has created an on-line index and access to workflow 
procedures it has documented but more need to be completed. 
Recommendation O4:  RSIC should adopt a standard process for documenting, approving and 
updating operational procedures and should continue its effort to provide on-line access to them as 
they are completed. 
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4. Investment Administration  
 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
 
We assessed the reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s key investment administrative functions.  In 
addition to a review of written documentation (including  the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 
Deloitte due diligence assessment report, NEPC review of strategic partnerships, the report of the State 
Inspector General, Commission minutes, HEK reviews, the Statement of Investment Objectives and 
Policies, annual investment reports,  investment contracts, investment files, internal investment 
committee(IIC) minutes,  and scores of other documents), we utilized a combination of interviews with 
the internal staff and external service providers (seventeen external managers across the asset classes, 
the investment consultants, and the actuary), commissioners,  review team experience, results from the 
CEM benchmarking process, and the FAS leading practices database to perform the assessment.  The 
custodial bank initially declined to be interviewed by FAS and, in lieu of direct interviews, supplied 
answers to written questions.  Ultimately, the custodial bank relationship executive did agree to discuss 
the banking services provided, the relationships, and communications in two interviews and was very 
helpful. 
The assessment addressed the following specific issues:  
 Assess the process for setting asset allocation and methodology for determining acceptable 
level of risk 
o Setting the asset allocation in light of plan liabilities and resources used, including 
coordination with the actuary 
o Use of various asset classes, sub-asset classes, and use of alternative investments in the 
portfolio 
o Consideration of risk tolerance and methodology used to determine acceptable level of 
risk, portfolio risk and risk budgeting  
 Assess implementation strategies (active versus passive, internal versus external management) 
and compare to peer funds, including historical performance by asset class and style (from CEM 
and HEK benchmarking data) 
 Assess the process for portfolio rebalancing and compare to leading and prevailing practices 
 Assess the external manager selection and management process and compare to leading and 
prevailing practices; this included a compliance audit of RSIC’s due diligence process conducted 
for Alternative Investments from January 1, 2013 to the beginning of the review, as described in 
the answers to RFP questions. 
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o Due diligence process used to select investment managers 
o Frequency and quality of manager monitoring 
o Manager termination process 
o Investment manager contracts (general terms and conditions) 
 Assess the process used to ensure adherence to the defined investment decision making process  
 Assess the internal control structure for investments, with emphasis on those identified as less 
than adequate in prior audits  
 Assess RSIC investment cost management strategies and practices and compare to other public 
funds 
o RSIC investment costs by asset class and investment style compared to peer group (from 
CEM benchmarking data) 
o Use of specific cost management strategies (e.g., decreasing the number of external 
managers, increasing internal management, increasing passive management, forming 
external strategic partnerships, use of performance-based fees) 
o Process for reviewing reasonableness of investment manager fees by asset class, 
individual investment, and/or peer comparisons (e.g., use of an independent measuring 
service) 
 Assess the use and effectiveness of investment consultants (general consultant, asset class 
consultants, specialty consultants) and compare to other funds 
o Role of consultants vis-à-vis internal staff 
o Services provided by consultants 
o Level of spending on consultant fees 
o Effectiveness of investment consultant reports (usefulness, timeliness, accuracy, etc.) 
o Process and criteria to evaluate the investment consultant’s effectiveness  
 Assess the use of performance benchmarks and compare to leading and prevailing practices 
o Process to establish performance metrics 
o Selection of benchmarks for each asset class/style 
o Use of peer comparisons  
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o Independence, accuracy, and usefulness of return calculations and reporting  
 Assess the custodian relationship and compare to leading and prevailing practices 
o Role of the state treasurer 
o Services obtained from custodian bank 
o Custodian bank contract provisions (service levels, fees, fiduciary provisions, etc.)  
o Custodian bank securities lending capabilities and programs, including fee splits, 
adequacy of collateral in lending programs, and third party securities lending agents  
o Reasonableness of custodian bank fees  
o Methods for monitoring and evaluating custodian bank services  
 Assess the commissioners’ access to information and the adequacy of supporting tools and 
resources 
 
Overview and Context 
The RSIC is in the midst of a major cultural evolution.  It has largely moved from a “get money out the 
door” deal culture designed to rapidly diversify asset classes and risk exposures which existed from the 
creation of the modern RSIC until roughly 2011-12 to a more strategic, risk-controlled portfolio culture.  
Coincident with that timeline has been maturation in the RSIC’s focus on operational systems and 
procedures.  Where operations were a sporadic focus of the Commission and staff in the past, resulting 
in systems that lagged the sophistication of the investment program, the need for systems and 
procedures sufficient for the complex investment program is now recognized.   
Other major contextual factors affecting the investment program are 
 The evolution in staffing, from a mere handful plus Commissioners to a professionally staffed 
investment office. 
 The legislatively mandated 7.5% assumed return. 
 The 30-year amortization rule.  
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Summary of Key Investment Administration Conclusions 
I1: The asset/liability matching process is disjointed and requires careful and systematic coordination. 
I2: The asset allocation appears to be driven by the interactions of the funded status, the legislatively 
set assumed rate, and the desire to remain within the 30-year amortization band. 
I3: RSIC has been simplifying the portfolio and focusing more on risk but needs to develop better 
capabilities and tools. 
I4: RSIC had intended to move to more internal management but decided to delay the decision and 
build adequate infrastructure first. 
I5: Based upon manager interviews and review of documents, the RSIC manager selection and due 
diligence processes are consistent and thorough. Documentation is thorough and appropriate. 
I6:  Although the RSIC manager selection and due diligence processes have significantly improved and 
are robust, they are slow by industry standards. 
I7:  The current level of reporting and monitoring is consistently noted as “top quartile”, “highest 
level”, or the “most” by managers. 
I8:  It appears there has been a “cultural change” with more emphasis on fees following the CIO 
change and the focus on fees from the State Treasurer. 
I9:  The asset allocation is a relatively high cost strategy.  RSIC is pursuing several investment 
strategies to reduce costs. 
I10:  RSIC investment reporting has significantly improved over the past two years; however, some 
further refinements are indicated. 
I11:  Although disclosure of overall investment management costs by RSIC is the most complete 
among U.S. public pension funds, there has been limited benchmarking of external and internal 
investment management costs, which has led to lack of understanding about the appropriateness of 
RSIC costs. 
I12:  The role and use of strategic partnerships has significantly evolved from the earlier era, but there 
are still areas which could be improved. 
I13:  Rebalancing is consistent with the HEK and RSIC philosophy, but could use better documentation 
to provide assurance that it conforms to the SIOP. 
I14:  RSIC has handled transition management appropriately and professionally; however, there are 
other tools which could be examined to see if they would improve efficiency. 
I15:  The selection of benchmarks is appropriate and consistent with prevailing industry practice. 
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I16:  RSIC appears to be using its general investment consultant effectively. 
I17:  The RSIC custodial relationship with the Treasurer and BNY Mellon is diffused, strained and 
inefficient, with uncertain authorities. 
I18:  The current level of securities lending revenue is minimal and the future direction for securities 
lending is unclear. 
I19:  The Commissioners appear to have adequate access to information required to perform their 
duties; however, adherence to the policy for managing Commissioners’ requests for information may 
need to be improved. 
I20:  RSIC has detailed procedures for validating management fees and pass-through expenses that 
provide reasonable assurance that reported fees are accurate.  
I21:  The RSIC/PEBA process of valuing investment assets at fiscal year-end is prevailing practice in the 
public pension industry. 
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Findings, Recommendations for Each Investment Administration Conclusion 
 
Asset-Liability Matching Process 
Conclusion I1: The asset-liability matching process is disjointed and requires careful and systematic 
coordination. 
The division of responsibilities between Legislature, RSIC and PEBA is complex, with the legislature 
setting the assumed rate of return, PEBA being responsible for benefits administration, and the RSIC 
setting the asset allocation and running the investment program. 
The assumed rate of return for the fund, the asset allocation strategy, amortization of unfunded 
liabilities, and employer and employee contribution rates are all interrelated.  The setting of the 7.5% 
return assumption by the Legislature was done considering actuary and investment consultant input.  
The process by which the asset allocation strategy was developed and updated was consistent with 
industry practice and the assumptions and outcomes were reasonable.   
However, separately PEBA engages an actuary to review assumptions, and it is required by law to do a 
full experience study (designed to predict the cost of benefits) every five years. Those actuarial findings 
must be approved by both the PEBA Board and the Budget and Control Board to become effective. 
Similarly, the SIOP requires the RSIC to perform an asset liability study at least every five years.  
Table 25 Asset-Liability Matching Process 
 
 
Asset-Liability Matching Process 




 Funded status 
 Unfunded liability 
amortization 






 Risk appetite 
 Market forecast 





 Asset allocation 
 Market forecast 
Legislature sets 
assumed rate of 
return for fund 
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There is no requirement for the Legislature to consider various inputs – including the PEBA experience 
study and the RSIC’s asset liability study -- when setting the assumed rate of return, though we note that 
the Legislature engaged its own actuarial and investment expert consultants when it last set the rate.   
Recommendation I1:  If the Legislature continues to set the expected rate of return, it should regularly 
review the process and its assumptions on a periodic basis. Ideally, that cycle should be set to take 
advantage of the information available from the every five year PEBA experience study and RSIC’s 
asset liability study. 
 
Asset Allocation 
Conclusion I2: The asset allocation appears to be driven by the interactions of the funded status, the 
legislatively set assumed rate, and the desire to remain within the 30-year amortization band. 
Based upon numerous discussions with the Commissioners, investment staff, and the general 
investment consultant, we identified several critical underlying assumptions which appear to have 
driven the current asset allocation strategy.  The risk appetite appears to be dominated by a desire to 
avoid significant drawdowns so as to avoid lengthening the amortization period for the unfunded 
liability to more than 30 years. Such a lengthening would automatically increase both the employee and 
employer (the State of South Carolina) contribution rate.    
RSIC believes the current risk-free of rate of return plus the historical equity premium is about 5-6%; 
thus hitting the 7.5% return target means the fund must take on different risks and be opportunistic.  
RSIC is determined to avoid a “big drawdown” (i.e., major capital loss) which would trigger the special 
increase in employer and employee contributions, which is perceived as catastrophic for employees, 
employers, and taxpayers. 
The ongoing relatively high allocation to hedge funds and other private asset classes by RSIC is based on 
a belief that these asset classes are less volatile than public markets and so less likely to experience such 
a drawdown.  If the retirement plans were 70% funded instead of the current 56% (at market valuation), 
investment staff at RSIC would be comfortable with taking on more public equity risk; however, at the 
current funded level RSIC believes it must avoid another drawdown similar to 2008-2009. 
Based upon the 2014 CEM analysis, over the five years ending December 31, 2012, the RSIC asset 
allocation – without considering the actual managers selected (the “policy mix”) – resulted in a total 
return at the bottom of the peer group of 20 funds.  CEM calculated the 5-year policy return for RSIC at 
1.3% (the return RSIC would have earned had it passively implemented its asset allocation through 
benchmark portfolios), compared to 2.6% for all U.S. public funds and 2.8% for the CEM RSIC peer 
group.  However, RSIC’s investment management actually added 1.2% of net return over the theoretical 
passive alternative, resulting in a 2.5% return.  This return was higher than 7 of the 20 peer funds.  We 
note that those five years largely corresponded to a bull market in U.S. equities, so funds which took 
more public equity exposure and risk tended to have higher total returns.  
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The Commission has decided to take a long-term view and maintain the current asset allocation, which it 
believes has the best chance to amortize the unfunded liability over time and without major 
drawdowns.  It states it is not trying to time the market by making changes perceived as advantageous 
in today’s market environment but which may not be sustainable.  An HEK liability study in 2013 
basically supported that conclusion, and resulted in changes to the asset allocation that are more in the 
nature of minor tweaks rather than a major change in direction. 
The Commission adopts both a Statement of Investment Objectives and Policy (SIOP) and an Annual 
Investment Plan (AIP), which is consistent with prevailing practice.  Adopting a high level statement of 
investment beliefs would be a leading practice.  Such a statement is a guide to inform the context for 
making investment decisions.  Such a statement might include the Commission’s beliefs about what 
types of risk are acceptable and where they should be taken; the relative value of strategic allocation, 
active management and implementation; the importance of costs; what type of culture and resources 
are necessary to achieve the desired results; public accountability; and time frame.  
Recommendation I2:  The Commission should spend more time discussing its underlying investment 
beliefs and ensure that the asset allocation strategy remains consistent with those beliefs (see 
Recommendation G10.1). 
 
Capabilities and Tools 
Conclusion I3: RSIC has been simplifying the portfolio and focusing more on risk, but needs to develop 
better capabilities and tools. 
Portfolio streamlining over the past two years has simplified the portfolio and begun to reduce costs: 
 Individual mandates have been reduced from more than 500 to about 200; the CIO says 
consolidation is about 90% complete. 
 The hedge fund strategy is moving away from funds of funds to direct investing. 
 Strategic partnerships have been reduced from 14 to 8. 
 A significant amount of the public asset allocation is being moved to passive investing. 
 
However, lack of a security-based risk management system and a portfolio management system for 
private investments hampers RSIC’s ability to more deeply understand risk exposures.  Technology 
constraints limit the ability to do systemic risk analysis on a manager-by-manager basis and there is 
limited visibility into security level holdings.  Risk management estimates it has real time information on 
25-30% of the portfolio on a security-level basis.  An RFP for a new risk management system has been 
developed and responses from potential vendors are being received and will be evaluated later this 
year. 
In addition to the technology, the Risk Management function could improve its effectiveness, as there is 
currently less than optimal interaction and communication between Risk Management and other 
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investment staff.  For example, while Risk Management is supposed to be part of the Internal 
Investment Committee, it only attends sporadically and is listed in the minutes under “other 
participants”.  We do note that Risk Management reports to the Deputy CIO and that he attends all IIC 
meetings, but do not believe that is a full substitute for staff-to-staff interaction.  We also note that a 
previously hired Director of Risk Management resigned, creating a temporary setback in the progress of 
the Risk Management program.     
Planning and coordination with staff could help in developing a new risk management framework and 
reporting.  For example, although the RFP for a new risk management system is well under way, and 
although Risk Management envisions a future state where it will be able to do scenario analyses and 
back tests, among other reports, to date Risk Management has not coordinated with the other 
investment officers as to what should be included in the risk reports, how they should be formatted, or 
how frequent they should be. 
With reference to the portfolio consolidation, one area with which many funds struggle is how to 
consolidate private equity and/or real estate funds, since they often have contractual terms of ten years 
plus various extensions.  Some funds have found that they can sell interests in the secondary market. 
However, the secondary market for private equity fund limited partnership (LP) interests is not fully 
developed; some interests can be sold for close to current value, while selling others requires the 
acceptance of a material mark-to-value loss.  A similar secondary market exists with regard to hedge 
fund partnership interests, though that may be of less interest, since the lock-up periods are relatively 
shorter. To date, the RSIC has not participated in the secondary market for LP interests. 
Recommendations  
I3.1:  As part of an overall infrastructure development plan, the RSIC should continue to prioritize a 
new risk management system and capability as a top priority. 
I3.2:   RSIC should create a Risk Management/Investment working group to design the functionality of 
risk reporting. 
I3.3: Investment risk management should be a participating member at all IIC meetings.  
I3.4:  Risk Management should produce an annual plan which is reviewed and approved at the IIC; this 
should improve risk discipline, provide a benchmark for performance evaluation, create an 
opportunity for other investment officers to understand Risk Management capabilities, and improve 
communication. 
I3.5: The RSIC should explore whether the secondary market in LP interests could help it rationalize its 
private equity portfolio, while keeping in mind the variable inefficiencies of that secondary market.  
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Infrastructure 
Conclusion I4: RSIC had intended to move to more internal management but decided to delay the 
decision and build an adequate infrastructure first. 
A well-developed strategy to bring appropriate asset classes and management styles in-house has the 
potential to significantly reduce overall investment management fees.  Although RSIC has contemplated 
this strategy, the decision to move forward has been delayed due to limitations in building the 
operational capabilities required to effectively manage additional assets internally. 
Systems are needed prior to increasing internal management, including a better order management 
system, improved risk capabilities, an updated portfolio accounting system, a valuation system, and a 
performance calculation system.  Additionally, new policies will need to be in place to support increased 
internal management, including: 
 Adapting the compensation policies; 
 Developing a counterparty risk policy; and 
 Developing a more robust broker/dealer selection policy. 
To ensure that RSIC is not underestimating the resources necessary to move to a robust internal 
management program, a detailed business plan should be developed.  Additionally, we note that some 
of the policy needs highlighted by the delayed plan to increase internal management of assets would be 
beneficial to address whether or not the plan proceeds.  For example, RSIC does not have a formal 
counterparty exposure policy.  It does monitor monthly counterparty exposure reports produced by 
Russell, which manages the overlay portfolio and provides transition services, but has no formal policy 
either to inform Russell or to use as a guideline against which to judge the counterparty risk reports 
produced by Russell.  In addition, while there is a broker/dealer selection policy, it relies primarily on the 
judgment of the fixed income team and does not require any periodic review or affirmation.   
Recommendations  
I4.1:  The overall RSIC infrastructure development plan should fully consider and incorporate the 
staffing, systems and policy requirements to significantly increase internal asset management and 
manage risk prior to significantly expanding the current limited amount and types of assets managed 
internally. 
I4.2: RSIC should adopt a formal counterparty risk policy (see Recommendation P2.1). 
I4.3: RSIC should review its broker/dealer selection policy with an eye towards increasing its 
robustness by creating objective measures for acceptability and setting a time period for reaffirmation 
of the acceptable broker/dealers (see Recommendation P2.2). 
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Manager Selection and Due Diligence 
Conclusion I5:  Based upon manager interviews and review of documents, the RSIC manager selection 
and due diligence processes are consistent and thorough.  
RSIC has been evolving from deal-oriented investment manager sourcing and inconsistent due diligence 
to being more consistently focused on strategic allocation following the Deloitte review.  Recent 
manager selection has been driven by both a desire to streamline the number of individual mandates, 
including reducing the number of funds of funds and strategic partnerships and searches for managers 
to fill out the HEK asset allocation, as well as routine opportunistic sourcing of limited partnership 
opportunities which typically are open for investment only during a specified fund-raising time period.  
RSIC has appropriately used RFPs, consultant searches and staff searches/due diligence to source 
investments, tailoring the methodology to the need and marketplace for the relevant investment 
product.   
Recent RSIC due diligence is highly praised by external managers, with comments such as “right at the 
top”, “top quartile,” “excellent”, and “the most thorough.” That was not always the case.  A few years 
ago the diligences appear to have been inconsistent, with some excellent due diligence reviews and 
some of which were cursory at best.  One manager, who had been selected to manage funds for the 
RSIC both before and after the Deloitte report, described the difference in his experience as “night and 
day”.  Also, following the Deloitte report, the RSIC has made a major effort to institute a robust 
operational due diligence program for new managers. The best RSIC operational due diligences, utilizing 
a separate team and process, is a leading practice.  However, on site operational due diligence is not 
always done by dedicated operational  staff due to staffing constraints, though internal operations staff 
does review operational due diligence documents and the investment staff generally asks operational 
questions in its on-site review.   HEK performs operational due diligence for all potential managers, even 
when internal staff does perform an onsite inspection.  A new position of Operational Due Diligence 
Officer has been created and a person has been hired to fill the position. 
Table 26 Due Diligence 






Our due diligence team performs operational due diligence as part 
of their due diligence process 
5 
 
We have a separate operational due diligence team which operates 
independently of the investment due diligence team 
1 X 
Our consultant performs operational due diligence on our behalf 3 
 
We typically do not perform operational due diligence 0 
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Although staff believes Operations can veto investments based upon concerns identified during 
operational due diligence, including underlying investments in strategic partnerships, there is no formal 
policy yet approved and there has not yet been a situation where there have been significant 
operational concerns on a new investment since the new operational due diligence policies and 
practices were put in place.  
As discussed in Conclusion I3 above, risk management is a rapidly evolving capability at the RSIC.  While 
quantitative screens and analyses generally are done during the selection process (particularly in the 
public asset classes) to judge the managers both on a stand-alone basis and generally to understand 
investment style and portfolio fit, the planned risk management system, if purchased, should allow the 
RSIC to perform more targeted and precise quantitative “what if” scenarios, which would be more useful 
in screening potential managers for portfolio fit. 
HEK also performs due diligence and provides recommendations to RSIC, a prevailing practice.  RSIC 
utilizes HEK, which has a broad set of capabilities, to perform due diligence across all asset classes.  
Some funds utilize investment class specialist consultants for assistance in due diligence.  The HEK 
memorandum, as well as the investment staff memorandum and operations staff recommendation, is 
presented to the IIC.  
RSIC assigns Commissioners to work with staff on due diligence and to accompany staff on due diligence 
trips.  Commissioner involvement in initial due diligence is unusual; very few managers have ever seen 
other funds involve trustees routinely in due diligence.  Only one of the peer investment boards includes 
trustees in due diligence, described as “Occasionally a Trustee or Investment Committee member joins 
in an investment due diligence.” 









The routine use of Commissioners to perform due diligence is potentially problematic for a number of 
reasons. It focuses the Commissioners on routine day-to-day operational functions, rather than higher-
value strategic issues.  It also creates potential conflicts in a number of ways.  First, it puts the 
Who typically participates in 
due diligence of prospective 














Trustees 0 0 X 
 
Investment Staff 6 6 X 
 
Operations Staff 1 4 
 
X 
General Investment Consultant 2 1 X X 
Asset Class Consultant 3 2 
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Commission in the position of making a final hiring decision on a manager which it was part of 
recommending.  (We note that some investment staff saw that as a positive, remarking that it creates an 
advocate on the Commission for the hiring.)  Second, it gives an individual Commissioner effective veto 
power over a hiring, as many staff said they would not make a recommendation to the CIO to 
recommend a manager to the Commission if they knew the Commissioner assigned to due diligence 
opposed it, probably correctly assuming that the Commission would give deference to that 
Commissioner’s opinion, even if the staff person thought that manager was qualified.  That said, it 
should be reported that all managers who experienced due diligence reviews by a team which included 
a Commissioner found them skilled and reported that they acted professionally. 
In addition to a process review, the SIG requested a compliance audit of the due diligence process 
conducted for alternative investments with the period of review from January 1, 2013 to the present.   
The Commission formalized new due diligence guidelines in November 2012.  The format requires the 
RSIC staff to complete a Due Diligence Report for each new investment manager.  The components of 
the Report are: 
• SC Due Diligence Team  
• Historical Motions 
• Key Investment Rationale 
• Investment Considerations 
• Portfolio and Asset Class Fit 
• Strategy Description 
• Firm Overview 
• Ownership and Personnel Compensation 
• Key Personnel 
• Succession Plans 
• Employee Turnover 
• Products Managed, AUM, Investor Base 
• Market Overview 
• Performance and Risk Analytics 
• Investment Process 
• Investment Risk Management 
• Portfolio Guidelines 
• Allowable Investments and Liquidity 
• Leverage 
• Economic Terms 
• Reference Checks 
• Back Office Staffing and Systems 
• Legal and Compliance 
• Infrastructure 
• Transparency and Reporting 
• Insurance Coverage 
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• Service Providers 
• Trade Life Cycle Process 
• Valuation Policies and Procedures 
• Cash Management and Control 
• Counterparty Risk Management  
The Due Diligence Report also contains a checklist of the documents that were requested from the 
manager, a checklist of additional documents and actions that are required (New Investment Procedural 
Checklist,) and a checklist of items provided to the State Treasurer’s Office.  As a part of this 
examination, new investment mandates initiated during this period, plus one previously-approved  
investment which was funded during this period, were reviewed.  Each manager’s due diligence report 
was examined for thoroughness as was the documentation and checklists denoted in the report.  Each 
manager has a properly completed Due Diligence Report with validating documentation, plus the 
documents associated with the New Investment Procedural Checklist, and documents directed to and 
requested by the Treasurer of State.  
The investment mandates and associated documentation viewed for this examination included an 
opportunistic credit investment (35 documents), two secondary venture capital fund investments (45 
documents), a real estate fund investment (48 documents), a private equity investment (59 documents), 
and a strategic real estate fund investment (54 documents). 
Recommendations  
I5.1:  The policy of Commissioner Involvement in due diligence should be changed to limit 
participation to no more than occasional involvement as an observer for educational or reassurance 
purposes only (see Recommendation G10.3 and P1.3); Commissioners could be invited to all manager 
meetings held in Columbia. 
I5.2:  Ideally operations should perform on-site reviews of all potential new managers. If staffing 
makes that impractical, the RSIC should adopt a formal operational due diligence calendar so as to a) 
minimize the number of managers hired without such an on-site visit, and b) prioritize an on-site 
operational visit as soon as possible following selection. 
I5.3:  Operational due diligence recommendations to the IIC should require a sign off from the head of 
RSIC operations.  
I5.4:  RSIC should clarify the level of authority operations has on manager hiring and retention.  Two 
potential options would be to give a veto to operations or,  alternately, to mandate that should the 
CIO decide to recommend an investment despite operational concerns, an operations memorandum 
should go to the Commission along with the CIO’s recommendation explaining why the investment 
should be made notwithstanding operation’s concerns. 
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Speed of Due Diligence 
Conclusion I6:  Although the RSIC manager selection and due diligence processes have significantly 
improved and are robust, they are slow by industry standards. 
A number of managers hired by RSIC since January 2013 stated that its due diligence process is slower 
than virtually all other investors; in one case the entire process took two years to complete.  RSIC missed 
the close window for one side-by-side overage (co-investment) fund that offered improved economic 
terms compared to the main fund (in which RSIC is invested). 
Slow due diligence makes it virtually impossible to be an “anchor” investor in a partnership, which often 
increases the leverage to negotiate terms and conditions to a greater extent than investors who commit 
later in the process. The ability to perform adequate, robust due diligence in a timely manner is also key 
to making co-investments. Co-investments, in which the RSIC would participate in individual deals 
alongside a partnership in which it is already invested, are used by many investors to lower fees (co-
investments generally have lower fees than the core partnerships) and to fine-tune risk exposures.  
However, co-investment opportunities generally have only 2-3 months available for due diligence 
No one feature of the RSIC process consistently caused the delays in due diligence.  Staff turnover, the 
change in consultants from NEPC to HEK, a process that seemed unfocused from the outside as diligence 
contacts went dormant for a time only to begin again, significant time in legal review and contracting, 
the 30-day rule (RSIC requires Commissioners be allowed 30-days to review final contract language 
before funding can be made), and the fact that agreements must be approved at Commission meetings 
which are only held quarterly and so create timing windows, were all cited.  In most situations, multiple 
causes interacted to create the long time frame. 
In several instances, the contracting process was one source of delay in completing a close, with a few 
managers, while citing the expertise and professionalism of outside legal counsel, also suggested that 
the legal process was slow because legal needed to get up to speed about the specific investments and 
the implications thereof, sometimes resulting in a start and stop contracting process.   
The 30-day review rule is, in our experience, unique.  Consistent with other findings in this report, it puts 
the Commission in an operational role, rather than relying on staff (in this case RSIC legal department 
and outside counsel) for operations and assurance, and on internal audit and any needed extraordinary 
post review by the Commission for reassurance.  In addition, it amplifies the delays. 
Recommendations  
I6.1:  RSIC should re-assess its due diligence practices towards identifying opportunities to streamline 
and reduce the cycle time of activities without impacting the thoroughness or effectiveness of the 
overall process.  Among the possible improvements would be: weekly management report of due 
diligence progress at the IIC, addition of a paralegal to co-ordinate legal reviews and with outside 
counsel (see Recommendation L1.2), and more frequent Commission meetings (se Recommendation 
G12.1).  
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
102 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
I6.2:  RSIC legal staff should work with outside counsel to standardize contracting practices where 
possible.  This should reduce delays in the contracting process (see Recommendation L2.1). 
I6.3:  The Commission should seek alternate means of assuring and reassuring itself as to the quality 
of the legal review, thereby enabling it to eliminate the 30-day review period before funding.  
 
Reporting and Monitoring 
Conclusion I7:  The current level of reporting and monitoring is consistently noted as “top quartile”, 
“highest level”, or the “most” by managers. 
Since the Deloitte study and the implementation of the Tamale data base, external manager reporting 
has evolved and become more precise and detailed.  It typically includes monthly, quarterly and annual 
reporting.  Compliance and monitoring templates and checklists are consistently used.  There is frequent 
communication between managers and RSIC investment staff.  Notably, despite extensive requests for 
information from RSIC investment staff, managers remark that it is not just a “data dump,” and that they 
receive logical follow up questions from staff.  Managers now are asked to provide detailed fee 
information.   To quote one external manager: “They ask for more detail.  Not a lot of our clients ask for 
(details) down to the penny on every fee: custodial, administration, auditor, etc.”   
In addition to the written reports and checklists, there is a requirement for semi-annual personal 
contact, which may be on-site, in Columbia or by telephone.  Such contact must be documented.  
Although there are discussions with most managers semi-annually, there is no policy requirement for 
on-site visits.  Managers do make frequent in-person visits to Columbia.    
The Tamale research management system is in place and being used effectively. One area of monitoring 
that could be improved is in the area of trading.  The SIOP mentions trading efficiency but the RSIC does 
not engage any independent external trade execution measurement system or vendor. 
Recommendations  
I7.1:  RSIC should consider establishing a formal policy for frequency of site visits to external managers 
as part of the monitoring process.  Leading practice is to make the periodicity annual, but given staff 
constraints and the existing semi-annual contact requirement, a biannual periodicity could be 
considered.  
I7.2: RSIC should consider how it wants to gain assurance that managerial trading is efficient.  It could 
suggest that its external managers trading in public securities provide independent trade execution 
measurements, or engage a trade execution management vendor itself to “spot check” external 
managers. 
 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
103 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
Emphasis on Fees and Negotiations 
Conclusion I8:  It appears there has been a “cultural change” with more emphasis on fees following 
the CIO change and the focus on fees from the State Treasurer. 
There is now more focus on fee negotiations than under the previous CIO.  RSIC staff is slowly reviewing 
all previous managers selected, including terms and conditions, and has renegotiated some contracts, as 
appropriate, to reduce fees.  Interviews with external managers and review of documents indicate there 
is consistent evidence of both negotiations and fee breaks in recent mandates.   
CEM’s benchmarking analysis tends to confirm the conclusions in a 2013 HEK report that the 
management fees RSIC pays are competitive.   In fact, CEM concluded that overall, RSIC pays lower 
external management fees than its peers, (excluding performance fees such as carried interest which 
peers  do not report).  Nonetheless, there are several asset types for which RSIC’s management fees 
were noticeably more the median of the CEM peer group in 2012: high yield fixed income, international 
(EAFE) stocks and hedge funds which were not fund of funds.    
In addition to the overall level of fees, alignment of fee philosophy with the overall investment 
philosophy is improving.  Negotiations are now underway with at least one strategic partner to 
emphasize “everyday low fees” rather than a “high/low” structure of full fees on primary investments 
with low or no fees on co-investments.  That better aligns with the current emphasis on strategic asset 
allocation as opposed to the previous deal-making emphasis.  
Recent investment agreements appear to have been reasonably well negotiated.  Multiple managers 
said the RSIC “beat us up” or that they had given more to the RSIC than to others.  One said that it had 
given so much that it would not give the same terms ever again. 
 
Cost of Asset Allocation Strategy 
Conclusion I9:  The asset allocation is a relatively high cost strategy. The RSIC is pursuing several 
investment strategies to reduce costs. 
In FY 2006, the year RSIC began operations, the retirement funds were invested only in publicly traded 
stocks and bonds, and half of its stock investments were managed passively.  This was a relatively low 
cost asset allocation and management strategy.  RSIC’s reported costs have grown from $29.8 million in 
2006 to $427.5 million in 2013.  The increase reflects major changes in asset allocation, from no 
investments in alternative markets in 2006 to 38% in 2013, as the Commission has sought to diversify 
the portfolio and protect against the risk of a major market downturn.  
Alternative investments are high-cost strategies.  Additionally, part of the reported increase may be 
because RSIC has made a determined effort over the last several years to gain even more transparency 
into performance fees and pass through costs.  These expenses, which certainly have an effect on the 
net return to the RSIC, are often not reported as fees by other pension funds and investors, because of 
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the significant amount of manual effort involved in collecting the information and because a number of 
pension funds consider these costs to be a form of profit sharing that is not comparable to a fixed 
management fee.  Other funds report their returns for these investments on a “net of fees” basis, which 
is considered an acceptable approach under GAAP and GASB standards.  Comparisons of net 
performance from one fund to another are identical under either fee reporting scenario. 
After three years of relatively flat total costs, expenses increased by $123.4 million in FY 2013, which 
RSIC attributes to an increase in performance by managers paid through performance fee structures. 
Over 60% of the increase was to three of the strategic partnerships that invest in alternative assets. 
Table 28 Cost of Asset Allocation Strategy 
 
 
RSIC began investing in alternative markets in 2007, later than many U.S. public pension funds.   As 
measured by CEM Benchmarking, RSIC’s allocation to hedge funds, commodities, private equity and 
other real assets represented 28% of its assets compared to an average 22% for its peers in 2012.   RSIC 
uses a broader definition of alternative assets that includes other structured assets, which adds to a 
total alternatives allocation of 38%.  The actual asset allocation as of June 30, 2013, as reflected in the 
2013 annual investment report, had 38% of its assets allocated in markets other than equities, fixed 
income and cash/short duration. 
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Table 29 Asset Allocation as of June 30, 2013 
 
In 2006, RSIC hired CEM to perform an analysis of the expected impact on returns and fees of the 
proposed new target asset allocation (at the time this target was 30 percent in alternative asset classes) 
which had been developed; among their assumptions: 
 “We are incurring additional costs to achieve additional returns. 
 The after-fee returns associated with our targeted asset classes is expected to be greater. 
 We also expect to realize additional returns through alpha. 
 Management fees are expected to increase from $27.4 million actual costs or $28.0 million 
policy costs, to approximately $204.8 million, an increase of $176.9 million.” 
 
The Commissioners and investment staff appear to have been fully aware of the expected increase in 
management fees, accepting that fact for the trade-off expectation that the increase in net returns 
would be greater than the increase in costs.  Commissioners and staff have explained that they believe 
this asset allocation reduces downside risk. 
The actual management fees paid for its 38% allocation to assets other than fixed allocations to stocks, 
bonds and cash in calendar year 2012, as measured using CEM’s methodology, was $219.6 million.  As 
noted in the next section, RSIC’s management costs were the highest in its peer group in 2012, but 
normalized for the asset allocation (that is, compared to peers if they were to manage a similar mix of 
assets), CEM considers RSIC’s costs to be average.  Still, there are a number of potential ways that the 
costs of managing the current asset allocation could be reduced.     
As RSIC’s asset allocation has changed over the last five years, less of its investments have been 
managed internally or using passive strategies, which tend to be lower cost, and more have been in 
external active strategies, which tend to be higher cost.  RSIC has reduced its reliance on funds of funds 
in favor of direct investments in hedge funds.  However, RSIC still had more reliance on these higher cost 
fund of funds strategies than its peers in 2012, according to the CEM survey.    
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Based upon prior research, FAS has identified the following as the most effective strategies employed by 
other public funds to reduce fees paid to external managers: 
1. Forming strategic partnerships that concentrate business with fewer suppliers; 
2. Increasing internal management /reducing external management; 
3. Increasing passive management / reducing active management; 
4. Reducing the number of external manager relationships; and 
5. Greater use of separate accounts or co-investments in private markets. 
RSIC has been pursuing three of these strategies and would like to pursue the other two if the 
infrastructure were capable of effectively supporting those strategies.  Since its early days, RSIC has 
utilized strategic partnerships to diversify the portfolio, though there may not have been adequate focus 
on the use of such partnerships to minimize fees.  Initially, RSIC’s strategy was to use strategic 
partnerships to deploy assets quickly, to overcome limitations of internal staff, and to take advantage of 
the unique knowledge of partners.  Recently, in reducing the number of strategic partnerships from 14 
to 8, the RSIC has focused on retaining two types of partners: 
1. Opportunistic, cross asset class strategic partners; and 
2. Platform strategic partners. 
In addition, RSIC has used the process of reducing the number of strategic partners to renegotiate fees 
in some cases and to increase fee transparency.  One strategic partnership was terminated primarily 
because of the high fee levels.  Bringing additional selected asset classes and investment styles in-house 
under internal management was recently planned by RSIC.  RSIC currently manages only cash and short 
duration fixed income internally.  A proposed program to move additional asset classes to internal 
management was suggested in 2012.  The intent was to move from fixed income to indexed equities, 
then to enhanced indexing.  The plan did not anticipate active management.  The focus was on fees, 
improving staff motivation, and alignment with a philosophy of being opportunistic and close to the 
market.  The program projected that an annual additional internal cost of $5 million, including 11 
additional staff positions, was needed to result in fee savings of $20-30 million annually.  However, as 
discussed in I4, above, the implementation of the plan has been delayed due to the need to more fully 
develop the infrastructure, policies and procedures to support more complex internal management.   
RSIC Management of Assets 
CY 2008 to 2012 
 
Peers 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 
Fund of Funds 17% 17% 12% 16% 13% 4% 
External Active 55% 67% 70% 74% 76% 65% 
Internal Active 21% 6% 6% 4% 6% 19% 
External Passive 7% 10% 11% 5% 5% 8% 
Internal Passive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:   CEM 2012 Investment Cost Effectiveness  Analysis completed March 2014 
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RSIC has plans to increase passive management and reduce active management by investing over $4 
billion in global equity index funds; these new investments are expected to close in the near future. 
While this is expected to have little impact on management fees, it should have tax benefits and reduce 
counterparty risk.  There may be potential for some additional savings through further use of passive 
strategies.  For example, in 2012 RSIC invested $2.4 billion in U.S. fixed income investments with 
external active management while half of its peer group managed a portion of similar investments 
passively at an average fee savings of 11.5 bps (basis points). 
Reduction in the number of RSIC managers and mandates over the past two years is nearly completed 
and has resulted in approximately doubling of the average mandate size in U.S. stocks, EAFE stocks, and 
emerging market fixed income.  This is notable regarding fees because fee structures for those asset 
classes generally feature “break points” which result in reduced fees for incremental assets.  Across 
eight asset types, RSIC’s average mandates are now more comparable in size to the average of its CEM 
peers (larger in three and smaller in five). There may be more opportunity for consolidation.  By 
decreasing the number of managers and increasing assets with those that remain, RSIC should be in a 
better position in fee negotiations, in addition to the benefits it receives in executing its investment 
strategy.     
RSIC currently utilizes separate accounts for some private investments.  Co-investments in private asset 
classes (e.g. private equity, real estate) are of interest to RSIC investment staff, but require additional 
resources to adequately support the strategy.  As an interim step, RSIC might consider whether having a 
ready pool of asset-class specific consultants to perform underwriting due diligence on co-investments 
would be cost effective.  That is possible, but not guaranteed, as there is a staff management cost in 
addition to the explicit cost of the consultants.  
One methodology used successfully by peers such as the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) is to maintain a “spring-fed pool” of consultants.  Those firms have been selected through an 
RFP process and have established contracts and pricing, but CalPERS is under no obligation to ever use 
them, and only chooses to use one of them if it believes such an engagement would be beneficial.  Thus, 
the only up-front cost is the management time of conducting the proposal and contracting process. Also, 
as noted in I7, for public equity markets there is currently no measurement of trade execution 
efficiency, which may be a further opportunity to reduce net costs. 
Recommendations  
I9.1:  RSIC staff should update the 2012 plan for expanded internal management and include a full 
business plan which considers all requirements (see Recommendation I4.1). 
I9.2:  RSIC should continue to pursue reductions in fees where it pays greater costs than its peers, 
taking into account potential net return and risk. 
I9.3: RSIC should consider whether the use of a pool of asset-class specialist consultants to perform 
due diligence on co-investment opportunities would be beneficial and consistent with current asset 
allocation plans. 
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Investment Reporting  
Conclusion I10:  RSIC investment reporting has significantly improved over the past two years; 
however, some further refinements are indicated. 
For alternative investment asset classes, RSIC reports management fees, performance and incentive 
fees, carried interest, and limited partnership pass-through costs (such as set up organizational costs, 
legal costs, taxes, audit, accounting).  No other U.S. public pension funds disclose all of these fees, and 
some do not report any, simply netting out all costs and reporting net returns.  Among the investment 
board peer group, the most categories of fees reported by any of the funds amounts to less than half of 
the fees reported by RSIC. The RSIC Annual Investment Report has always included all fees, but the CAFR 
has not.  In FY2012, the CAFR listed all fees in the investment section.  In FY2013, all fees were included 
in the financial statement and the investment section of the CAFR. 
Table 31 Types of Fees Disclosed 
For alternative asset class investments, which of the 
following are included in external management fees that 
are separately broken out and reported in your audited 
Statement of Changes in Plan/Fiduciary Net 












(% of Fees) 
Invoiced fees 3 $42 10% 
Non-invoiced asset-based management fees that are 
netted out of account 4 
1/
 $154 37% 
Performance/incentive fees and carried interest for 
alternative assets 1 
2/
 $182 44% 
Pass-through expenses (e.g., set up organizational costs, 
legal costs, taxes, audit, accounting) 
0 $39 9% 
1/  
Non-invoiced private equity and real estate management fees are included for one fund. 
2/
 One peer fund has started to report incentive fees for hedge funds, but not private equity or real estate. 
 
The current level of manager fee disclosure by RSIC is the highest in the industry; we have identified only 
two other public funds in the U.S. (see chart below) which disclose performance and incentive fees for 
alternative investments, and none which report pass-through expenses. 
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Table 32 Fee Disclosure 
All as of June 30, 2013 South Carolina RSIC Missouri SERS (MOSERS) Missouri PSRS/PEERS 
 
Assets Alloc. Fees bps Assets Alloc. Fees bps Assets Alloc. Fees bps 
 
($Bils) (%) ($Mils) pbs ($Bils) (%) ($Mils) pbs ($Bils) (%) ($Mils) pbs 
Global Public Equity 3.5 13.2% 22.7 65 2.0 25.0% 17.6 87 16.1 48.0% 83.4 52 
Fixed Income 8.8 32.9% 9.8 11 0.8 9.5% 5.9 76 2.7 8.2% 8.0 30 
Cash and Short 
Duration 2.5 9.5% 2.2 9 0.0 0.1% 0.0 0 4.1 12.3% 3.0 7 
Commingled Funds 1.8 6.6% 13.5 77   
  




Private Assets 1.7 6.2% 28.5 172 0.9 11.1% 26.1 292 2.3 7.0% 96.8 414 
Private Debt and 
Opportunistic Credit 0.9 3.4% 33.8 378   
  
  0.4 1.2% 19.1 490 
Hedge Funds/Alpha 
Pool 1.4 5.3% 37.5 265 3.0 36.7% 59.4 200 4.7 14.1% 113.4 240 
Real Estate 0.6 2.2% 29.8 498 1.1 13.0% 24.9 236 2.6 7.7% 43.6 169 
Inflation Indexed 
Bonds   
  
  0.4 4.6% 0.0 0 0.5 1.5% 0.4 8 
Strategic 
Partnerships 5.6 21.2% 233.6 415   
  
    
  
  
Other -0.1 -0.4% 8.3 -714   
  
    
  
  
Total 26.6 100% 419.7 158 8.1 100% 133.9 166 33.4 100% 367.7 110 
Source:  FAS analysis 
The reporting of “Strategic Partnerships” as an asset class in the PEBA CAFR, however, is inconsistent 
and reduces transparency.  It is our understanding that for internal reporting purposes, the mapping of 
investments in the strategic partnerships into asset classes has been completed.  However, the strategic 
partnership investments are not reported externally within the appropriate asset classes for 
performance or fee reporting purposes. 
Reporting management fees, incentive fees, carried interest, and pass-through fees as one total cost for 
each asset class (as opposed to breaking out each category) also makes it more difficult for stakeholders 
to understand how RSIC costs might compare to other funds.  
The level of fee reporting undertaken by RSIC requires significant manpower due to the highly manual 
nature of RSIC’s reporting processes.  RSIC has estimated that two full-time equivalent employees are 
involved in identifying, calculating and reporting alternative investment costs.  The Investment 
Accounting Controller at a peer investment fund which reports only invoiced management fees for 
alternative investments told us that if her fund chose to report all the fee categories which RSIC reports 
she would need to hire six additional staff.  In an environment of staffing limitations, RSIC fee reporting 
resources could potentially be utilized in other roles, such as risk management.  Because RSIC is the only 
fund with this level of fee disclosure, it opens up RSIC to charges of being significantly higher cost 
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relative to other funds.  It is also possible that an overemphasis on reducing fees could result in 
decisions which lower overall fund returns if the balance is lost among risk, returns, and costs. 
Recommendations  
I10.1:  RSIC fee reporting for alternative investments should be restructured to improve transparency 
and comparability with peer funds; management fees should be broken down into invoiced and non-
invoiced management fees, performance fees and carried interest, and pass-through fees. 
I10.2:  Investments in strategic partnerships should be allocated to the appropriate asset classes for 
performance and fee reporting in the PEBA CAFR. 
 
Disclosure of Management Costs 
Conclusion I11:  Although disclosure of overall investment management costs by RSIC is the most 
complete that FAS has identified among U.S. public pension funds, there has been limited 
benchmarking of external and internal investment management costs, which has led to lack of 
understanding about the appropriateness of RSIC’s costs. 
In this section we attempt to address and calibrate a controversial issue which has embroiled the 
Commission and contributed to dysfunctions and threaten the future ability of the Commission to 
perform its fiduciary duties.  This is the matter of fund performance and external investment manager 
fees. 
Since its inception, RSIC has disclosed all management fees in its Annual Investment Report (AIR) and 
the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) now published by the Public Employee Benefits 
Authority (PEBA).  Management fees are those paid by an investment fund to the fund's investment 
managers for investment and portfolio management services as well as administrative services.  Usually, 
the fee is calculated as a percentage of assets under management.  Other public funds also disclose 
management fees. 
However, the RSIC also discloses another set of fees for its alternative asset classes which are not 
reported by almost every other fund.  These are performance fees.   A performance fee is a fee that an 
investment fund may be charged by the investment manager that manages its assets and may be 
calculated many ways.  For separate accounts, it often is based on the change in net realized and 
unrealized gains, and it can also be based on other measures, such as net income generated.10  
For hedge funds and other investment funds, performance fees are generally calculated based on the 
increase in the fund's net asset value (or "NAV").  Performance fees are widely used by the investment 
managers of hedge funds, which typically charge a performance fee of 20% of the increase in the NAV of 
the fund in addition to the base management fee.  In private equity, carried interest, or carry, is a share 
of the profits of an investment or investment fund that is paid to the investment manager in excess of 
                                                     
10
 Lemke and Lins, Regulation of Investment Advisers, §2:10 (Thomson West, 2013 ed.) 
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the amount that the manager contributes to the partnership.  It is a form of performance fee that 
rewards the manager for enhancing performance.11 
RSIC and PEBA expend considerable effort to identify and calculate these performance fees, as well as 
non-invoiced pass-through expenses (i.e., expenses incurred within the limited partnerships such as set-
up organizational costs, legal costs, taxes, audit fees, and administrator fees).  In FY2013, these two 
categories of costs for hedge funds and private equity funds represented 53 percent of the total fees 
reported by RSIC across all asset classes. 
We have found no other public pension funds in the U.S. which report non-invoiced pass-through 
expenses for their hedge fund or private equity investments, and only two which report hedge fund and 
private equity performance fees in their CAFRs.  The combined effect over the past several years of the 
long-term RSIC strategy selected, which is more heavily weighted toward hedge funds, private equity, 
and other alternative assets than the average fund, and the expanded disclosure of manager fees, was 
to double the amount of fees disclosed.  This has led to heated public controversy regarding RSIC’s 
performance and fees.  
To attempt to resolve these controversies, in 2014, a new investment cost effectiveness analysis study 
was commissioned by SIG as part of this fiduciary performance audit to gather facts that would enable 
an “apples to apples” comparison of RSIC’s performance and fees to those of other funds.  The study 
was conducted by CEM Benchmarking, Inc. (CEM), a global benchmarking company based in Toronto, 
Canada.  CEM is the leading independent provider of objective and actionable benchmarking 
information for large pools of capital including pension funds, endowments/foundations and sovereign 
wealth funds.  CEM created a custom peer group for RSIC which includes 21 U.S. state public pension 
funds ranging from $13.8 billion to $58.0 billion in AUM (10 larger and 10 smaller) with an average AUM 
of $28.8 billion.  See Appendix F CEM Report Executive Summary. 
At the time when  it began to plan for a shift into alternative assets in 2006, the Commission made the 
decision to fully disclose all external manager fees, including management fees, performance and 
incentive fees, carried interest, and limited partnership pass-through costs (such as set up organizational 
costs, legal costs, taxes, audit, accounting).  However, this decision has not been documented or 
reflected in the Commission minutes.  Given the controversy this has engendered, the Commission 
should more clearly articulate its policy decision.  These fees go beyond those which were included in 
the CEM report, as no other funds report all performance and incentive fees and pass-through costs for 
alternative asset classes.   
In 2013, the Commission asked HEK to prepare and present an analysis of RSIC’s external management 
fees.  This one-time HEK analysis indicated that on an asset class-by-asset class basis, the fees paid to 
external managers by RSIC was about average and comparable to other public funds. 
According to the 2014 CEM report just completed, RSIC 5-year net return of 2.5% as of December 31, 
2012 was equal to the U.S. public fund median and to the custom RSIC peer group median return of 
                                                     
11
 Lemke, Lins, Hoenig and Rube, Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds: Regulation and Compliance, §13:20 (Thomson West, 
2013-2014 ed.). 
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2.5%.  The RSIC asset allocation would have returned 1.3% if invested in passive benchmark funds, as 
the RSIC asset allocation (the “policy mix”) has been at the bottom of the peer group of 20 funds over 
that 5-year period.  However, through RSIC’s management, the fund achieved a 2.5% return, or 1.2% net 
value added, to equal median industry returns. 
CEM also compared the fees which are consistently reported by peer U.S. funds (as mentioned earlier, 
RSIC reports significantly more fees than all other public funds).  On this basis, RSIC’s management costs 
for CY2012 were 103.0 bps, compared to the peer average of 61.1 bps.  RSIC’s management costs were 
highest in peer group, largely due to the heavy weighting to alternatives with their associated higher 
costs.  However, after adjusting for fund size and asset mix, CEM found that RSIC was normal cost in 
2012 (0.5 bps below the median). 
CEM’s analysis determined that RSIC’s normalized management costs were the result of two largely 
offsetting factors.   Its heavier reliance on active, external fund of funds management and overlays led to 
greater costs, while the overall lower fees it pays for external management, oversight and custody, and 
lower costs for the assets it does manage  internally produced compensating savings. 
Table 33 RSIC Management Fee Savings and Added Costs Compared to Peers 2012 
RSIC Management Fee Savings and Added Costs Compared to Peers 2012 
  Added Cost / -Savings 
  $000s bps 
RSIC Added Costs: 
 
  
     Greater use of fund of funds $4,719 1.8 
     More external management and less lower cost passive and   
         Internal management 79 0.0 
     Higher use of overlays 2,000 0.8 





   Lower external management fees -$6,068 -2.4 
   Lower internal management costs -1,120 -0.4 
   Lower costs for oversight, custody and other  -894 -0.3 




Net total savings $1,274 -0.5 
Source:  CEM 2012 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis completed March 2014 
 
The CEM report results for RSIC’s calendar year 2012 investment management costs were very 
consistent with the analysis completed in 2013 by HEK, and are also consistent with the comments FAS 
received from external managers during our interviews. 
At the present time, RSIC does not have an ongoing source of fee benchmarking which is refreshed on a 
regular basis.  Many leading public pension funds participate in the CEM investment cost effectiveness 
benchmarking on an annual basis.  While the primary use of the report is to ensure external fee levels 
are not excessive, many funds have also found the reports useful in supporting fee negotiations and in 
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evaluating the potential impact of changes in strategy, such as moving from active to passive 
management or bringing specific asset classes in-house, on costs. 
Recommendations  
I11.1: Given the controversy the decision to disclose all external manager fees has engendered, the 
Commission should more clearly articulate its policy decision. 
I11.2:  The RSIC should contract with CEM, or a similar service from another provider, on an annual 
basis to develop a source of “apples-to-apples” benchmarks of investment management costs for each 
asset class and for the entire fund, as well as to provide an additional source for returns performance 
benchmarking (see Recommendations G13.4 and G18.4). 
 
Use of Strategic Partnerships 
Conclusion I12:  The role and use of strategic partnerships has significantly evolved, but there are still 
areas which could be improved. 
Although the Commission approves all individual investments with new and existing managers, once a 
strategic partnership is approved the strategic partnership investment committee approves all 
investments made by the partnership itself.  The RSIC CIO sits on the investment committees and has 
veto authority. The Commission is not involved in investment decision-making within the strategic 
partnerships, but does receive a transparency report detailing the investments within each strategic 
partnership. 
Several changes have recently been instituted for RSIC governance of new investments made within 
strategic partnerships.  The RSIC IIC and HEK now review every potential new underlying investment, 
which is a positive step.  In addition, RSIC now has two investment officers attend quarterly partnership 
meetings; these institutionalizations of the review process for investments within strategic partnerships 
to prevent “single point of failure” types of risks are salutary.  Formalizing these actions into a 
partnership governance document approved by the Commission would insure institutionalization 
beyond the current RSIC personnel.  
While the vast majority of assets in the strategic partnerships are private assets or alternative strategies, 
there are currently traditional assets (e.g., emerging markets equities) in some of the strategic 
partnerships, which may not be optimal.  Similarly, some partnerships hold significant amounts of cash 
which RSIC could sweep if it so chose.  There are no guidelines for when and how much long-only, 
traditional assets should be in the strategic partnerships.   
One rationale for the initiation of the partnership program was to enable information sharing from 
leading investment organizations to the RSIC.  One key to that program was to inform the 
Commissioners of leading developments in the asset management industry and in the theory of how to 
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manage assets in general and the pension fund specifically.  While there have been some such programs 
in the past, they have not happened as frequently recently. 
Recommendations  
I12.1:  The RSIC should formalize its policies with respect to oversight of the strategic partnerships and 
controls over underlying investments within RSIC, e.g., use of the IIC to vet investments, two RSIC 
staff participating in meetings, etc. 
I12.2:  RSIC should develop a guideline, rather than current situational decision making, for when and 
how much long-only, traditional assets should be in strategic partnerships. 
I12.3:  RSIC should develop a guideline regarding the appropriate level of cash to remain within 
strategic partnerships and for the return of any cash in excess of partnership needs. 
I12.4: The Commission should take increased advantage of the information, insights and experience 
resident in the RSIC’s strategic partners.  In-person education programs in Columbia would be one 
possibility, either in conjunction with regularly scheduled Commission meetings or, as in the past, at 
special educational or strategic planning retreats in-state.  
 
Rebalancing 
Conclusion I13:  Rebalancing is consistent with the HEK and RSIC philosophy, but better 
documentation could ensure that it conforms to the SIOP. 
The SIOP says staff shall “review” rebalancing at least quarterly.  In practice it is reviewed more 
frequently than quarterly; however, there is no formal process to guarantee or document that practice. 
Currently rebalancing is an iterative process driven by CIO and Deputy CIO.  They first look at whether or 
not the asset mix is in compliance (in or out of bounds with the approved asset class ranges).  The 
second step considers markets and trends and determines if there are opportunities for more favorable 
asset deployments.  The third consideration is cash flow and liquidity requirements.  Finally, transaction 
costs related to potential changes are then considered.  The external transition manager uses an overlay 
to rebalance or express a slight tilt. 
Recommendation I13:  Rebalancing policies should be revised to require a quarterly rebalancing 
review to be scheduled on the annual meeting calendar of the IIC or Wednesday markets meeting to 
ensure compliance with SIOP; in the event the CIO and staff review balancing in the interim due to 
market movements or otherwise, that should be reflected in the IIC minutes to demonstrate 
compliance. 
 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
115 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
Manager Termination and Transition Management 
Conclusion I14:  RSIC has handled manager terminations and transition management appropriately 
and professionally; however, there are other tools available for transition management which could 
be examined to see if they would improve efficiency. 
FAS interviewed two terminated managers and identified no issues with the termination process, which 
were handled appropriately and professionally.  All transitions use Russell as the transition manager; 
Russell is also used as the overlay manager to maintain appropriate exposures.  The normal transition 
policy is for managers to go to cash while terminating the manager.  RSIC coordinates with Russell to use 
derivatives to maintain exposure.  Russell acts only in an agency capacity and gives a transition report to 
RSIC. 
RSIC does not independently measure transition management costs. 
Recommendations  
I14.1:  RSIC should explore alternate transition management programs, such as manager-to-manager 
transitions (cherry picking) with the remaining securities sold, or principal bids.  RSIC should educate 
itself about when each technique is most appropriate. 
I14.2:  RSIC should determine if it wants to independently measure transition management costs, at 
least on a spot check basis. 
 
Use of Benchmarks 
Conclusion I15:  The selection of benchmarks is appropriate and consistent with prevailing industry 
practice. 
Benchmarks in use by RSIC are largely standard indices, or combinations of indices, calculated by 
outside, respected entities (e.g., MSCI, S&P, Dow Jones-UBS).  The rationale for selection of the 
benchmarks is logical. The benchmarks are communicated to the external managers and they generally 
think them appropriate. 
HEK devoted an entire section of its February 2013 asset allocation study to benchmarks and selection 
criteria.  The benchmarks were subsequently explicitly adopted by the Commission in the SIOP, with 
reference to the CFA criteria for benchmark selection.  Returns vs. benchmarks are independently 
calculated and HEK also reports on performance vs. benchmark. 
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Use of the General Management Consultant 
Conclusion I16:  RSIC appears to be using its general investment consultant effectively. 
Hewitt EnnisKnupp (HEK) is being used appropriately and thoroughly for asset allocation, benchmark 
selection, investment advice, due diligence, monitoring, reporting, and special projects, as appropriate. 
HEK states clearly that it reports to the Commission and views the Commission as its client, and its 
actions are consistent with appropriate independence: 
 HEK reviews independent calculates and reviews Plan returns. 
 HEK consults with the Commission on setting of benchmarks. 
 
RSIC staff is developing a consultant evaluation process which will be conducted and reported to the 
Commission annually.  Both RSIC and HEK perform due diligence on new investment opportunities, with 
RSIC in the lead, which is appropriate and prevailing practice.  HEK has adequate expertise, capability 
and capacity across asset classes, and RSIC relies upon HEK for a full range of investment consulting 
services.  This minimizes the need for additional specialty consultants.  However, if RSIC pursues co-
investments in the future, it may want to consider specialty consultants to assist in due diligence (see 
Recommendation I9.3). 
 
Although RSIC spends somewhat more on their general consultant than most peers due to HEK’s broad 
role, RSIC spends less on consultants overall because it does not use other firms such as asset class 
specialists. 
 
Recommendation I16:  RSIC should complete development of an annual assessment process for the 
Commission to evaluate the performance of its general investment consultant and the Commission 
should adopt and implement the process. 
 
Custodial Relationship 
Conclusion I17:  The RSIC custodial relationship with the Treasurer and BNY Mellon is diffused, 
strained and inefficient, with uncertain authorities. 
The practice of the Treasurer serving as custodian for retirement fund assets dates from when 
Treasurers physically held all of a state’s negotiable securities in a vault for safekeeping and collected 
the income stream from those securities;  those securities often tended to be predominantly or only 
bonds. 
Because retirement system investments became more complex and physical securities were transferred 
to book entry form, Treasurers had to acquire the services of a custody bank to serve as a sub custodian 
to fulfill their assigned duties of custodians.  In this type of arrangement, the Treasurer may serve in an 
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oversight role but often adds complexity and complications to the interaction between the retirement 
system and the custodian bank. 
While safekeeping remains at the core of the custody relationship, the role of a global custodial bank 
has evolved over time to include much more than safeguarding of assets and income collection.  As is 
the case at other retirement funds, the custodial bank is integral to most aspects of RSIC’s daily 
investment activities, including trade settlement, performance and compliance reporting, foreign 
exchange, portfolio analytics, class actions claims processing, and tax support.  A direct and effective 
relationship between the RSIC and custodial bank is essential for efficient operations and oversight. 
South Carolina’s relationship with BNYM and its predecessor Bank of New York dates back to prior to the 
creation of the Commission.    
When the Bank of New York and Mellon merged in 2007, the Treasurer signed a new custody agreement 
which remained in effect until a new contract was signed in December 2013.  Approximately 60 percent 
of RSIC’s total assets under management are considered “not-in-bank” assets, meaning they are not 
actually custodied at BNYM.  RSIC’s comparatively large not-in-bank share reflects greater allocation to 
limited partnerships, as well as an historical preference for commingled over separate accounts in public 
markets to simplify accounting for PEBA.  Commingled funds may be custodied at managers’ banks 
other than BNYM; in those cases, data for not-in-bank assets is provided to BNYM to provide a total fund 
picture, which is standard industry practice for not-in-bank reporting. 
In December 2012, FAS conducted a survey of 15 state public retirement systems with assets of over $50 
billion.   Although those systems have more assets under management than RSIC, their average (25.1%) 
allocation to “high touch” private market and opportunistic assets was smaller than RSIC’s (35.1%).   The 
custody services used by RSIC are similar in type, but somewhat fewer in number than is the case for 
these public funds.   The Commission’s cost for BNYM’s custody services in 2012 was $254,000 (the 
bank’s share of securities lending revenue) which was in the lowest quartile of the CEM peer group. 
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Table 34 Services Offered by Custodial Institution 
Source: New York State Common Fund Survey 
Which of the following services offered by your custodial 
institution do you use? 
 
RSIC Response 
Number of Responses 
(N=15) 
Portfolio performance reporting and analysis 12 
Fund accounting 12 
Standing instruction foreign exchange trades 10 
Directly-negotiated foreign exchange trades 9 
Compliance monitoring 9 
Daily fund valuation 8 
Class action claims processing 8 
Derivatives services (trading, valuation, reporting) 7 
Tax support 7 
Fund exposure and structural analysis 5 
Management fee calculations 3 
Proxy voting  1 
Asset servicing 1 
Cash management 1 
Transition management 1 
Data management 1 
Document safekeeping 1 
 
The RSIC operations staff indicates that BNYM generally performs current functions acceptably; 
however, RSIC says it has not been able to get BNYM to respond satisfactorily to its need for additional 
services in several areas, such as compliance monitoring and private markets tracking systems, which 
has been a source of “great frustration”. 
BNYM states it “has responded to RSIC’s request for additional services by way of RFP response and 
discussions held regarding specific products/services.  BNYM quoted pricing in line with scope of work 
for services to be performed.”  
Involvement of the State Treasurer’s Office and PEBA in the custody relationship adds complexity and 
uncertainty about the boundaries of authority.  The current structure is unique among the state 
investment boards FAS surveyed and limits RSIC's ability to obtain and manage the increased level of 
services it needs from its custodian to support a complex portfolio.  Lack of control over the custodial 
bank relationship appears to be a major factor in RSIC's decision to contract for a data administrator 
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(which RSIC will manage) rather than utilize the custodial bank’s services (which the Treasurer 
manages). 
BNYM believes it “is and has been ready and available to service RSIC … and has been able to service a 
number of the most sophisticated public investment commissions in the country regardless of 
interactions with other state agencies.”   
The recent custodial bank selection process started in December 2011 with the issuance of an RFP.  An 
expert consultant was involved in the process.  RSIC participated in developing the requirements for the 
RFP and was a member of selection committee (which also included PEBA and STO).  The committee 
recommended in the summer of 2012 that BNYM be retained as custodian.  RSIC indicates that BNYM’s 
cost proposal was significantly lower than the closest competitor and the selection of BNYM avoided the 
added transition cost to move to another bank. 
However, the process was ultimately complicated by the contentious litigation between the State and 
BNYM over securities lending losses in the retirement funds and state funds and protracted settlement 
negotiations.  The final terms of the custody contract were negotiated by STO without RSIC involvement 
beyond legal staff review of contract language; the contract between STO and BNYM was not signed 
until December 2013.  The contract also includes other state funds for which STO is custodian; all the 
funds may benefit from economies of scale.  The new contract results in no fundamental changes to the 
respective roles of STO, PEBA and RSIC in custody.  
Although the Treasurer asserts that the STO was in contact with RSIC attorneys throughout the 
negotiating process, the RSIC Chief Legal Officer identified only two rather minor issues where STO's 
General Counsel contacted RSIC Legal during the period May 2013 - December 2013 and asked for input 
regarding the new custody contract.  It appears that RSIC was consulted on minor issues of legal 
language and terms in the contract, but not on substantive questions of potential changes to services or 
products to be obtained from BNY Mellon. 
Although the RFP requested a proposal for a five- year contract, the final contract is for ten years.  
(BNYM indicates that it has other clients with ten-year contracts as well as contracts that include no 
fixed termination date.)  In the RFP, the State could terminate the contract in whole or in part “for 
convenience” at any time but the custodial bank would have been required to provide a one-year 
notice.   The contract provides that either party may terminate for convenience, subject to a pre-
termination resolution process extending up to 90 days and a process for determining compensation the 
bank may be owed.   
The new contract includes a split between base price services BNYM will provide and “a la carte” 
ancillary services RSIC can purchase at added cost from BNYM or another provider.  The base price of 
$260,000 is essentially what BNYM was paid by the retirement funds for custody in CY 2012.  This 
amount is low compared to what CEM peers paid in 2012 and is less than the fee quote in BNYM’s initial 
RFP response.  The base price includes domestic assets but only up to $200 million in global assets and 
the first 1,000 transactions in global developed markets, after which additional amounts will be charged 
depending upon the country and trade volume.   RSIC has not reached those limits but states it is 
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concerned about potential additional costs to the retirement funds in the future as it expands its global 
holdings.  This concern could lead RSIC to rely more on commingled accounts that are not custodied at 
BNYM for global assets. 
BYNM states “customers’ reliance on commingled funds versus separately managed global accounts to 
minimize global custody fees, transaction fees, registration costs, stamp duties, appointment of local 
market representation, etc. is commonplace amongst institutional investors.”   
BNYM’s share of securities lending revenue was its sole source of compensation for 2012 custody costs.  
The revenue BNYM receives from lending has dropped considerably since 2008, as has RSIC’s.  If RSIC 
lends securities through BNYM in the future, BNYM would receive 10% of that revenue in addition to the 
base custody fee and other ancillary fees. 
The base price includes an annual credit of $150,000 which the STO may use to acquire training from 
BNYM for employees of the STO, RSIC or PEBA.  It also includes provisions for credits against the base 
fee and ancillary services should RSIC decide to pay an additional cost to use a platform affiliated with 
BNYM to provide pricing, compliance and position-level risk monitoring for hedge fund investments.    
RSIC is not inclined to use that platform for several reasons, including the fact that the vendor is not 
willing to be a fiduciary for the managed account platform. 
Under the new BNYM sub-custody contract, additional services such as compliance monitoring, daily 
fund valuation, fund exposure and structural analysis and managed funds platform are available to the 
RSIC at a pre-negotiated contract rate.  The cost of the entire list of those services exceeds $1.5 million 
annually, excluding the costs of the managed funds platform which would depend on the amount of 
assets RSIC put on the platform.  RSIC did not have the ability to directly negotiate with the custodial 
bank regarding the services it would receive under the contract, the service standards to be met, or the 
costs it would incur. 
The new contract contains no provision for a service level agreement between BNYM and RSIC, nor is 
there a defined process for managing the relationship between BNYM and RSIC which includes 
performance evaluation and feedback.  BNY Mellon states “There is nothing preventing RSIC from 
monitoring the service they receive from BNY Mellon.  BNY Mellon has governance tools in place to set 
expectations and to monitor service levels.  It is common practice for the servicing teams to meet with 
our clients with regular frequency to discuss operational matters and strategic goals.”    
However, the STO has recently hired a Custody Officer to facilitate communications and service delivery.  
The Treasurer has stated that: 
“The Custody Officer will act as the STO’s liaison to the custodial bank in order to ensure that 
RSIC, PEBA, and STO are provided the quality of services.   
The Custody Officer’s duties include, but are not limited to, developing and maintaining 
effective relationships with all internal and external stakeholders, with focused coordination of 
functions among the State Treasurer, RSIC, PEBA, and the custodial bank; overseeing service 
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provider relationships and holding service providers accountable for agreed upon service levels; 
and ensuring that proper internal controls are created and maintained and that all applicable 
parties comply with applicable state and federal regulations and contractual obligations.   
The addition of a Custody Officer further demonstrates the STO’s commitment to improve the 
custodial relationship for RSIC, PEBA, and STO.” 
While it may improve communication, this approach still seems to leave BNYM ultimately accountable 
to the STO rather than to the RSIC for the services RSIC receives. 
Primarily due to dissatisfaction with the protracted  custody contracting process and its perceived 
inability to participate in the process, in December 2013 RSIC issued an Administrator RFP for new 
systems which includes performance, data support and compliance services, some of which could have 
been obtained from BNYM (although a trade order management system is not offered by BNYM).   
The administrator contract was concluded in March 2014 and is between RSIC and the selected turnkey 
vendor.  The contract was concluded by RSIC and gives control over the relationship to RSIC.  This course 
of action will likely eventually shrink BNYM’s role to “custody only” (i.e., no general ledger or 
performance reporting).  The RFP capped the cost of these services at $1.2 million, which is roughly 
equivalent to the cost of all the ancillary services available under the new BNYM contract, though there 
are differences between the two in services included and providers. 
BNYM recently assigned a new relationship executive to the STO contract in October 2013.  STO states it 
had been dissatisfied with the prior relationship executive and requested a change in fall 2013.  The new 
relationship executive has not been able to successfully develop a relationship with senior RSIC staff due 
to lack of interest on the part of RSIC. 
The Treasurer has a difference of opinion in a number of areas regarding the relationship with BNY 
Mellon and the contracting process.  His response to the Midpoint FAS report included the following: 
“RSIC is incorrect in stating the agreement did not meet its needs.  RSIC and PEBA named 
representatives to serve on the procurement advisory panel.  In fact, after the panel was set, 
RSIC’s CIO, Hershel Harper, asked also to be included on the panel, and STO agreed.  
Representatives from RSIC and PEBA who served on the procurement advisory panel 
participated in the “Request for Proposal,” “Reviewing of Proposal Responses,” “Selection of 
Firms for Site Visits,” “Site Visits,” and the “Scoring of Selected Firms.”  
RSIC and PEBA were both involved in the drafting of STO’s RFP for custodial and securities 
lending services which outlined services and needs for all parties.  RSIC and PEBA 
representatives served on the procurement advisory panel and both had access to all of the 
bank’s responses to the STO’s RFP.  Clearly, both RSIC and PEBA were deeply involved in the 
choice of a custodial bank as well as services needed.  In the summer of 2012, the procurement 
advisory panel recommended that STO retain the BNY as the State’s custodial bank.   
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Throughout the negotiating process, the STO contacted RSIC attorneys for specific items and 
corresponding language in the agreement.   The custodian agreement was finalized and signed 
December 30, 2013.  Communication with RSIC was inclusive during the entire BNYM agreement 
negotiation process. 
The report states that because of dissatisfaction with the contracting process, RSIC was forced 
to issue an RFP.  This statement is incorrect as RSIC chose to ignore available funds for over five 
years that should have been used to implement critical services.  In September/October 2013, 
two years after the STO issued an RFP for custodial services, RSIC created a RFP for an 
Administrator.  The Administrator RFP was published during the same time period the custodian 
agreement was finalized, but years after RSIC could have taken action.   The contracting process 
had nothing to do with services RSIC neglected to seek, leaving the system at risk for many, 
many years.” 
In summary, while there was a joint STO-RSIC-PEBA evaluation of the proposals submitted in response 
to the custody/securities lending RFP, RSIC states that the record is quite clear that both (a) the March 
2013 settlement and (b) the apparent, multi-month negotiation of the new custody agreement were 
handled by STO without any meaningful involvement by RSIC.  Based upon both interviews and emails 
provided by RSIC, this appears to be an accurate statement.  
Recommendation I17:  The Legislature should consider four potential options to significantly improve 
the ability of the RSIC to obtain services from and work with its custodial bank; each option is 
described in Table 35 below, and the associated pros and cons are described in Table 36. 
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Table 35 Custodial Options 
Option Description 
Status Quo: 
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: Treasurer 
• No significant changes 
• The Treasurer remains the custodian 
• STO implements its new Custody Officer role 
• RSIC proceeds to implement its investment administrator role 
• This structure is unique to South Carolina among U.S. state 
investment boards with an independent investment staff 
Option 1: Improved Status 
Quo 
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: RSIC 
• The Treasurer remains the custodian 
• The Treasurer delegates authority to RSIC to conduct custodial 
bank selection, negotiate the contract, and manage the contract 
and relationship for the retirement funds 
• Authorization processes are streamlined to not require STO 
signatures and utilize electronic payment authorization 
• Service level agreement and performance feedback are 
implemented by RSIC 
• The internal accounting system is updated (not related to 
custodian) 
• Similar to Washington State Investment Board (WSIB) structure 
Option 2: RSIC Custody 
Relationship  
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: RSIC 
• The Treasurer retains the title of Custodian 
• Legislative change provides for delegation of authority to RSIC to 
conduct custodial bank selection, negotiate the contract, and 
manage the contract and relationship for the retirement funds 
• Similar to the Illinois State Board of Investments (ISBI) and New 
Mexico ERB structure 




• Legislative change provides for: 
─ PEBA to become the custodian of record 
─ RSIC to contract with its own custodial bank and manage the 
custodial bank relationship for the retirement funds 
• Similar to the Minnesota State Board of Investments (SBI) structure 




• Legislative change provides for RSIC to become the custodian of 
record and to contract with its own custodial bank and manage the 
custodial bank relationship for the retirement funds 
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Table 36 Pros and Cons of Custodial Options 
 Option Pros Cons 
Status Quo: 
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: Treasurer 
  
• Treasurer provides another 
layer of assurance 
• Custody Officer might improve 
bank responsiveness to RSIC 
• Economies of scale for custodial 
bank contract 
• Remaining conflicts with 
Treasurer’s multiple roles 
• Continued operational 
inefficiencies and costs 
• Dysfunction could continue 
• May not improve 
responsiveness of custodial 
bank to RSIC 
Option 1: Improved 
Status Quo 
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: RSIC 
• Treasurer provides another 
layer of assurance 
• Improved responsiveness to 
RSIC’s needs 
• Remaining conflicts with 
Treasurer’s multiple roles 
• If STO does not fully delegate 
authorities to RSIC, dysfunction 
could continue 
Option 2: RSIC Custody 
Relationship  
Custodian: Treasurer  
Relationship: RSIC 
• Custodial bank would be 
accountable to RSIC for services 
it provides RSIC 
• Continues to provide another 
layer of assurance  
• Remaining conflicts with 
Treasurer’s multiple roles 
• Potential loss of economies of 
scale with separate contract 
• Potential costs to change 
contract 




• Custodial bank would be 
accountable to RSIC for services 
it provides RSIC 
• Continues to provides another 
layer of assurance  
• Removes conflict of Treasurer’s 
multiple roles  
• Potential loss of economies of 
scale with separate contract 
• Potential costs to change 
contract 




• Custodial bank would be 
accountable to RSIC for services 
it provides RSIC 
• Resolves conflict of Treasurer’s 
multiple roles  
• Loss of a second layer of 
assurance 
• Potential loss of economies of 
scale with separate contract 
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Securities Lending 
Conclusion I18:  The current level of securities lending revenue is minimal and the future direction for 
securities lending is unclear. 
RSIC and 86% of its CEM peers lend securities to generate additional income.  A principal reason 
securities are borrowed is to cover short positions.  Borrowers are required to pledge cash or approved 
securities as collateral for loaned securities.  Income is generated from the investment of the pledged 
cash or, if securities are pledged, fees the borrowers pay for the use of the loaned securities. 
RSIC’s lending program is managed under an agreement between the Treasurer and BNYM, the sole 
lending agent for the Fund.  The 85%/15% split of lending income between RSIC and BNYM in 2012 was 
near the 86%/14% average for its CEM peer group.  The Treasurer announced in January, 2014 that 
RSIC’s split would increase to 90%/10% if it chooses to continue to lend under a new agreement with 
BNYM.  However, that agreement has not been signed yet and RSIC has not seen it.   As they add new 
managers in separate accounts custodied at BNYM, RSIC is not currently permitting them to be lent 
because of “the complete lack of clarity” in what’s happening with the lending agreement and lack of 
RSIC control of the relationship. 
Pension funds are typically indemnified by the lender in case of borrower default, but not for losses in 
cash collateral reinvestments.  Many pension funds experienced lack of liquidity and the majority of 
funds in a FAS 2012 survey suffered losses in their cash collateral pool as credit markets collapsed in 
2008. 
Following over $223 million of unrealized lending losses in 2008-09, RSIC substantially curtailed lending 
and limited collateral reinvestment to overnight repurchase agreements.  The losses led to protracted 
and recently settled litigation between the State and BNYM.  RSIC was not a party to the lawsuit or 
settlement negotiations.  After legal settlement and other recoveries, RSIC had $165 million in realized 
losses, of which all but $50 million has been distributed. 
Much more conservative collateral reinvestments and less favorable market conditions have resulted in 
a significant reduction in RSIC’s lending revenues.  The losses now realized from 2008-09 are more than 
double the income which the Fund realized over this nine-year period.  
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Table 37 Securities Lending Revenues 
 
 







Average lending income as a percent of stock and bond holdings fell in the CEM peer group after 2008.  
However, RSIC’s (1.2%) was the lowest in the CEM peer group in 2012 and well below the average 
(4.9%).  To increase lending revenue, the RSIC states it has sought STO approval to somewhat widen 
collateral reinvestment guidelines to a still conservative 2A-7 money market type constraint, but has not 
received a response from the STO.  The Treasurer’s Office states that it did not receive such a request 
and has not been unresponsive.  The Treasurer further states that, “STO considers the establishment of 
collateral reinvestment guidelines to be an investment decision that is RSIC’s alone to make.  Securities 
lending is an investment decision.  If at any time, STO receives a request from RSIC to change the 
collateral reinvestment guidelines, including under the new securities lending contract being finalized 
now, STO would review the request and work with the custodial bank to effectuate RSIC’s investment 
decision.” 
Seven of 15 participants in a 2012 FAS survey of public funds with assets over $50 billion bundled their 
custody costs with the custodian’s role in lending.  That was also the case for South Carolina prior to the 
new custody contract negotiated and signed by the Treasurer in December 2013.  The cost of RSIC’S 
custody services is now determined independently of whether RSIC continues to lend through BNYM.     
Although lending has been traditionally seen as a way to pay for custody services, the losses incurred in 
2008-09 suggest that the decision about whether and how to lend is fundamentally an investment 
decision.  During the Commission’s discussion of the custody RFP in 2012, the CIO expressed 
reservations about continuing participation in lending based on rewards and risk,  but stated that a key 
factor was who should be the contracting party for lending.   
In February 2013, HEK provided an analysis to the Commission of potential future risks and benefits of 
lending as well as different ways to participate in the lending market.   Later in 2013, the CIO outlined a 
plan to determine the future direction of the program.   
Securities Lending Revenues 
Fiscal Years 2005 -2013 
Fiscal Year Total RSIC BNYM 
2013 2,512,800 2,195,400 317,400 
2012 1,387,000 1,179,000 208,000 
2011 1,344,700 1,143,100 201,600 
2010 4,349,300 3,697,000 652,300 
2009 22,761,900 19,870,000 2,891,900 
2008 29,441,500 24,492,500 4,948,900 
2007 10,576,000 8,991,100 1,584,900 
2006 9,040,600 7,688,400 1,352,200 
2005 5,075,600 4,060,700 1,014,900 
Source:  September 26, 2013 report from the CIO to the Commission.   
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An option discussed in HEK and CIO comments to the Commission would be to lend through one or 
more parties other than BNYM.  In a 2013 FAS survey of 13 public funds with assets between $7 and $14 
billion, three of the ten who lend do so through a third party.  Based on information provided in 
response to the custody RFP, RSIC anticipates that it could achieve the program control it desires and 
increase its share of lending revenue through a third party lending arrangement.    
The Treasurer’s position is that RSIC lacks the authority to enter into securities lending arrangements, 
citing SC Code Section 11-9-660(B) which he asserts gives that authority solely to the 
Treasurer.  However, that section only applies to the Treasurer's investment authority for "funds of the 
State."    SC Code Ann. Section 16-315(G) grants exclusive authority for investment of retirement fund 
assets to RSIC, which appears to include the lending of those assets.  In addition, the Legislature 
explicitly moved the BCB's and Treasurer's authority to invest retirement system funds to the RSIC when 
it was established. (S.C. Code Ann. s. 9-16-315(G) provides, "The RSIC is established to invest the funds 
of the retirement system.  All of the powers and duties of the State Budget and Control Board as 
investor in equity securities and the State Treasurer's function of investing in fixed income securities are 
transferred to and devolved upon the RSIC.")  Since the BCB had been engaged in securities lending of 
retirement system assets prior to the transfer, it appears that "all" of those powers and duties were 
moved to RSIC. 
The future of the securities lending market is likely to be affected by a number of federal and 
international regulatory changes that are in process to reduce the risk of systemic failure in global 
banking.  They include provisions to reduce counterparty credit risk and increase capital ratios and 
liquidity.  Some observers anticipate that they could result in a contraction in the lending market. 
The Commission needs to complete its review of lending and determine its future direction.  If lending 
continues, it should be guided by a policy approved by the Commissioners which defines objectives and 
risk tolerance and establishes guidelines for the program.   It should be accompanied by robust 
compliance monitoring by the lender and RSIC as well as benchmarking against the broader lending 
market.  A periodic report should be provided to management and the Commissioners that includes key 
measures of program activity and risk. 
Recommendations  
I18.1:   The Commission should determine the future of securities lending based on assessment of the 
potential investment benefits and risks of different approaches to participating in the lending market. 
I18.2:  RSIC will need to develop new policies and practices if it chooses to continue securities lending 
through BNYM or another third party; a new policy should include a statement of lending objectives, 
risk tolerance and guidelines approved by the Commission. 
I18.3:  The RSIC securities lending agent should be required to provide quarterly reporting to 
management and the Commission regarding program activity, including amounts on loan, borrower 
concentration, return and risk. 
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I18.4:  RSIC should obtain an annual benchmarking of its activities against lending activity across the 
industry. 
I18.5:  If RSIC decides to significantly grow securities lending, it should implement enhanced and more 
automated compliance functions, including compliance reporting from the lender(s) and periodic 
review by RSIC's compliance officer. 
 
Commissioners Access to Information 
Conclusion I19:  The Commissioners appear to have adequate access to information required to 
perform their duties; however, adherence to the policy for managing Commissioners’ requests for 
information may need to be improved. 
The percentage of time spent by executives and staff supporting the Commission is consistent with the 
peer group.  Similarly, the number of pages of material provided to the Commission for each meeting is 
also consistent with the peer group. (Source: CalPERS Governance Survey). 
Table 38 Access to Information 
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The use of an on-line portal, which is used by RSIC to provide information to the Commissioners, has 
become prevailing practice among public pension funds.  An important feature of a commission portal is 
that all Commissioners have immediate access to the same data at all times.  RSIC provides access to all 
transaction-related documents on the portal, which is much more than most other funds provide to 
their trustees. 
Although most Commissioners have expressed satisfaction with the information they are provided by 
RSIC, the Treasurer has indicated a desire to receive several additional reports, such as monthly reports 
from Russell and risk reports from Goldman Sachs.  RSIC has responded that, “the Goldman Sachs risk 
reports have been recently provided to all Commissioners via Watchdox. Additionally, it was our 
understanding that Russell had provided the Treasurer his request directly. If this isn’t the case, we are 
happy to provide them to all Commissioners going forward.” 
In addition, as stated earlier the Treasurer continues to believe “the genesis of the problematic 
relationship between the RSIC and STO is the intentional withholding of information that is due to me as 
a fiduciary. Even though you both (FAS and SIG) have opined on this I want to state as plainly as possible 
that to this very day I am routinely denied access to important, and in fact necessary information, that I 
need to perform my duties. I have outstanding requests that have been ignored, or dismissed for over 6 
months. Most of these requests would take a few moments of a junior staffer’s time to forward the 
information, yet, they regularly breech their fiduciary responsibility and deny me the access I am due by 
law and custom.  
Trust cannot be earned under these circumstances, and it is unreasonable to believe that good can come 
out of the willful and premeditated RSIC policies that are illegal and unethical.”12 
This comment is further evidence of the ongoing nature of the dysfunctional relationship.  It reinforces 
the earlier finding by SIG that such requests from the Treasurer may be “slanted, self-serving, and 
having a bias towards fault finding”13 rather than a desire to improve the investment program or to 
provide oversight.  As a result, every such request to the RSIC is treated by them as a potentially litigious 
situation which causes delays in coordinating the RSIC response since it cannot be handled routinely by 
a junior staffer. 
Most other funds FAS has worked with have developed a protocol and process for formally handling any 
request by a trustee for additional information from the fund staff.  There are several reasons this is a 
leading practice: 
 Direct interactions by an individual trustee with investment staff can provide an opportunity for 
undue influence and, at a minimum, the appearance of impropriety 
 Requests made directly to staff members may not be addressed to the appropriate person with 
the best expertise, or even with the correct answer 
                                                     
12
 Ibid. Email from Curtis Loftis, April 17, 2014 to R. Funston (FAS) and P. Maley (SIG). 
13
 Ibid. Review of “Red Flag” Indicators of Potential Wrongdoing at the Retirement System Investment Commission. 
July 2013 p. 4.  
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 If unchecked, some trustees can unwittingly submit requests which require significant staff 
workload and present conflicts with other important duties 
 It may at times be necessary to prioritize information requests to manage staff workload 
Typically, an effective trustee request-handling process has the following characteristics: 
1. A single person or office who receives the information requests 
2. As opportunity for discussion among the trustees about the request and its priority 
3. A transparent list of all requests which is made available to all trustees 
4. A single person or office who assigns follow-up responsibility to fund staff and is responsible for 
ensuring all response commitments are honored 
5. Distribution of responses to all requests to all trustees 
The current RSIC policy on Commissioner-to-Management communications is contained in the 
Governance Policy Manual in Policy VII: Communications, which states: 
(C) Commission Member Communication with the Management  
(1) Commission members should direct questions regarding any aspect of the South Carolina 
Retirement System Investment Commission (“RSIC”) operations to the Chief Investment Officer 
(“CIO”), COO, or the appropriate designated staff member.  
(2) Requests for information that require significant expenditure of RSIC staff time or use of 
external resources should be: 
(a) Directed to the CIO or COO;  
(b) Consistent with the role of the Commission (See Commission Roles and Responsibilities 
Policy); and  
(c) Formally requested and approved at a Commission or committee meeting.  
(3) Individual Commission members will share information pertinent to the RSIC with the CIO and/or 
COO in a timely manner. The CIO and COO will similarly share information with the Commission 
pertinent to the Commission in a timely manner.  
(4) The CIO and COO will ensure that information that has been requested by the Commission or a 
Commission member is made available to the Commission members as appropriate, and in a 
timely and complete manner.  
The policy as stated appears consistent with leading practice and, if followed, should result in an 
effective process for Commissioners to submit requests and receive responses and for RSIC executives 
and staff to manage the process and be responsive to Commissioners’ requests.  Regarding (2)(c), the  
policy should be implemented with a presumption that all requests will be fulfilled unless, on an 
exception basis, the COO or CIO reasonably determines that the request is inappropriate due to 
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workload or other reasons, brings it to the Commission’s attention, and proposes the request be 
considered by the Commission. 
Commissioner access to relevant information is important to implementation of their fiduciary 
responsibilities.  However, fiduciaries must also be cognizant of the impact that overbroad, excessive or 
inappropriate information requests can have on the ability of the organization to efficiently and 
effectively perform its primary responsibilities, especially when extra staff resources are not available.   
Recommendation I19:  RSIC should ensure that its policy pertaining to Commissioner requests for 
information from the RSIC staff is followed.  This would include timely fulfillment of routine requests, 
a transparent process for determining the priority of requests which require approval at Commission 
meetings, and all responses being made available to all Commissioners through the portal. 
 
Validation of Management Fees and Pass-Through Expenses 
Conclusion I20:  The RSIC has detailed procedures for validating management fees and pass-through 
expenses that provide reasonable assurance that reported fees are accurate.  
Within the RSIC, the Operations section is responsible for collecting, validating and aggregating fees and 
expense information to the contract.  The investment team is responsible for analyzing the fee and 
expense information to determine if the amount paid is reasonable for the value received.  The RSIC 
reports management fees and pass-through expenses.  The RSIC also reports performance fees/carried 
interest as of the financial reporting date.  Performance fees and carried interest are earned to date by 
the general manager, but can be affected by future events and are usually not paid until a future date. 
Management fees may be directly invoiced to the Fund and are paid by PEBA after validation of the 
amount. Alternatively, private investment managers may make capital calls of investors and deduct fees 
and expenses from the proceeds or may make net distributions to investors after deducting fees and 
expenses.  The alternative manager may also take the fees and expenses directly from the investment 
funds and report the net asset value (NAV) to investors. There is not a standard process to report any of 
these fees collections to investors.   
The RSIC requests management expense fees from the investment managers through a template.  
Managers do not always use the template and may choose to report in their own format.  The RSIC 
requests much more information than most investors and some managers have difficulty in 
understanding and complying with the RSIC request. 
RSIC has created a detailed Fee Validation Procedure for management fees (and a separate Fee 
Validation Procedure for managers whose fees are being calculated for the first time) that includes the 
invoiced fees; non-invoiced management fees (deducted from capital calls or distributions, or a 
reduction of NAV); performance fees/carried interest; and additional expenses.   A multiple page 
spreadsheet is used to gather the information from the manager for each mandate, recalculate the 
manager fees according to the contractual agreement, and then compare and reconcile the RSIC 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
132 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
calculation with the information from the manager.  Changes in various types of fees that are outside of 
set parameters are reviewed.  Annotations are made to document resolutions of issues and provide 
guidance for the next reconciliation. Multiple calculations for a manager must then be aggregated and 
reported. 
The current process is complex and time-consuming.  RISC staff described the time and work involved in 
management fee validation to involve the following: 
“The fee validation and aggregation process has required that we hire at least three dedicated 
resources to manage the process.  We have typically staffed the process with a combination of 
full time and temporary resources.  This creates difficulty as well because private equity and 
hedge fund contracts are not simple and staffing the validation project with resources that do 
not have experience in such contracts can create a significant learning curve.  
With improvements in the fee reviews, the average time for completion per fund now requires 
approximately 13 hours each.  This is because the review of many private market investments 
involves email exchanges and calls with the manager which can take days or weeks to finally 
resolve.  With approximately 200 non-invoiced funds, 227 in all last fiscal year, this means that a 
four person team needs about five months to complete a full review. “ 
The 2013 manager fees and expenses were validated at the end of the fiscal year.  Fees and expenses 
are now being reconciled and validated quarterly.  
We also reviewed the procedures for validating management fees and expenses and found them to be 
thorough.  The completed June 30, 2013 templates from a sample fourteen managers, some of who had 
multiple mandates, were reviewed.  
The flow of information, calculations and reconciliations was tracked through each spreadsheet.  The 
manager fees and expenses reviewed matched to the fees reported in the Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report. 
Valuation of Investment Assets 
Conclusion I21:  The RSIC/PEBA process of valuing investment assets at fiscal year-end is prevailing 
practice in the public pension industry. 
Valuation of investment is a joint responsibility between PEBA and the RSIC.  A memorandum of 
understanding between PEBA and RSIC, most recently revised as of January 2014, provides that the 
PEBA staff will provide investment accounting and financial reporting services for the RSIC investments.    
A Valuation Team comprised of both PEBA and RISC representatives meets quarterly to discuss any 
changes or issues with the values of Fund investments.  Minutes of the quarterly meeting are recorded 
were reviewed for FY2013. 
Manager statements, custodian-manager reconciliations, and reports are received monthly by PEBA 
which is responsible for ensuring that the PEBA general ledger and custodial bank are in agreement and 
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any reconciling differences are resolved.  Since PEBA receives the monthly statements, they also review 
the reported asset values during the year for substantive value changes and work with RSIC to confirm 
the values. 
RSIC is responsible for on-going due diligence over investment managers and for compliance monitoring.  
The on-going monitoring of investment managers is discussed elsewhere in this report.  We note that 
RSIC did not have an automatic compliance monitoring system as of June 30, 2013, but did require 
managers to self-report compliance for FY2013.  There was a 100% return rate by the managers and the 
compliance reports were discussed by the Valuation Team.  Compliance reports are now being 
requested quarterly. 
The valuation policy for investments is stated on page 44 in the 2013 PEBA CAFR and is in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States.   Securities traded on public 
exchanges are priced at fair value by the custodial bank.  Alternative investments are valued based on 
the most recent financial information available for the underlying companies and reported by the 
investment managers at their fiscal year end, which is adjusted for subsequent cash flow movements 
through the end of the fiscal year for PEBA. 
Audited financial statements are received from managers who have assets not held by the custodian.  
Last year all 86 financial statements were received. Both PEBA and RSIC staff review these audited 
statements. 
RSIC does a semi-annual review of the not-in-bank managers’ statements.  The year-end review includes 
reconciliation with each manager’s audited financial statements.  Any differences outside of a tolerance 
of ±.5% are researched and reconciled. 
PEBA rolls forward the balances from the not-in-bank manager’s fiscal year-end report (usually Dec. 31) 
to the PEBA fiscal year end of June 30. This entails taking cash movements (distributions and 
contributions) into consideration for the ending balance. The resulting value is compared to the 
manager’s June 30 statement, the custodial bank values and the PEBA general ledger system. Any 
differences are reviewed and reconciled. 
Both RSIC and PEBA perform a detailed review of the information on the values of alternative 
investments held in the portfolio at year end.  A meeting of the Valuation Team is held at the point that 
PEBA must start the process of finalizing the financial statements.  Each alternative investment mandate 
has the June 30 value documented.  Any outstanding issues are discussed and resolved. 
Auditing practices require that management (PEBA and RSIC) take responsibility for the investment 
values reported in the financial statements.  Management is expected to have sufficient oversight of the 
investment process so as to have a basis on which to base an opinion on the investment values.  Both 
management at RSIC and PEBA sign a representation letter taking responsibility for the investment 
values, activities and information provided to the auditor. 
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The auditor performs testing, analysis, and reviews on the information in management’s financial 
statements in order to opine on whether those statements fairly present, in all material respects, the 
status of the Fund on the measurement day and the activities that occurred during the year.  The 
auditor’s opinion on PEBA’s FY2013 was unqualified. 
The process is rigorous and extensive.  Sufficient information is received to have assurance that the 
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5. Legal Compliance 
 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
The legal compliance assessment included an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s 
legal compliance with existing laws and statutes governing the RSIC and the Retirement System.  This 
was linked to many of the activities in Category 1: Governance, which reviewed applicable laws and 
regulations and also utilized internal interviews and document reviews. 
The review addressed the following specific issues:  
 Review the use of internal legal counsel and compare to other funds 
o Role of internal counsel 
o Level of staffing 
 Review the use of outside legal counsel 
o Role of external counsel in investment and due diligence processes 
o Other roles for external counsel 
o Use of fiduciary counsel 
o Cost and contracting approaches for external counsel 
 Assess board and staff compliance with plan documents, for example: 
o Commission and committee operations 
o Roles, delegations and decision making 
o Transparency 
o Ethics and conflict of interest 
o Contracts 
o Trust and custody 
o Risk reporting 
o Compensation 
o Internal audits 
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o Documentation management 
o Other RSIC policies 
 Assess compliance with “prohibited transactions” requirement  
 
Summary of Legal Compliance Conclusions 
L1:  Internal legal staff and outside counsel are both qualified and capable, but there are opportunities 
to improve efficiency. 
L2:  Development of standard clauses could improve consistency of investment agreements and 
enhance the bargaining position of legal counsel in negotiating contract terms. 
L3:  The contracting process has resulted in investment agreements with generally reasonable and 
appropriate terms; however, procedures for obtaining Commission approvals are cumbersome and 
could be streamlined to avoid delay in closing transactions. 
L4:  Compliance with RSIC policies appears to be satisfactory, with several areas for potential 
improvement. 
L5:  The outside counsel pool is due to be refreshed through an RFP, once the legal counsel selection 
and contracting process has been streamlined. 
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Findings and Recommendations for each Legal Compliance Conclusion 
 
Qualifications and Capabilities 
Conclusion L1:  Internal legal staff and outside counsel are both qualified and capable, but there are 
opportunities to improve efficiency. 
Based on our experience in working with other public pension funds, the size and qualifications of RSIC's 
legal staff are appropriate for the workload, which reflects RSIC's commitments to privately negotiated 
investment transactions and use of outside counsel.  Because legal staffing requirements are highly 
dependent upon the complexity of investment transactions and amount of other legal services needed 
at a particular fund, comparisons across peers based solely on asset size are less relevant.  Qualifications 
and experience of RSIC's outside legal counsel are also appropriate for the investment work they are 
handling. 
Comments from external investment counterparties indicate that responsiveness in the documentation 
process has generally been adequate.  Nevertheless, on a few occasions, delays were cited as 
frustrating.   
Internal legal staff and outside counsel first become involved in the diligence process after the 
transaction is approved by Commissioners.  In addition, further delay in legal diligence can result from 
the need to obtain deal-by-deal approval of outside counsel from the Attorney General.  While this is 
not unusual at public pension funds, it discourages development of a team approach to due diligence 
that takes full advantage of available legal expertise.  Earlier involvement of internal or outside legal 
counsel could enhance efficiency by ensuring up front that transaction counterparties are aware of and 
will agree to comply with RSIC's legal requirements.  To the extent that questions with respect to legal 
terms or investment structure arise in the investment due diligence process, internal or outside legal 
counsel should be assigned to address those questions immediately rather than waiting until the 
investment is approved.   
Addition of a paralegal would be consistent with peer practices and would help to improve tracking and 
timeliness of the document negotiation process. 
Recommendations  
L1.1: RSIC's procedure for use of legal counsel should be revised to  assign inside or outside counsel to 
each investment transaction during the final due diligence process prior to approval of the 
Commissioners, as needed.   
L1.2:  RSIC should add a paralegal to the legal staff to provide administrative support and assist in 
document control. 
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Investment Agreements 
Conclusion L2:  Development of standard clauses could improve consistency of investment 
agreements and enhance the bargaining position of outside legal counsel in negotiating contract 
terms. 
The quality and experience of outside counsel firms utilized by the RSIC is appropriate.  However, 
outside counsel firms have each developed their own RSIC contract clauses.  A review of a sample of 
RSIC's recent investment contracts indicates that statutorily-required terms are addressed in the 
relevant legal documents.  Legal documents also generally include provisions addressing RSIC preferred 
terms.  However, there is some variation in the standard contract clauses used by different outside 
counsel firms and in the extent to which negotiations over different provisions is prioritized.   
The following examples are illustrative of cases in which a consistent process with outside counsel using 
standard contract clauses could help ensure that all priority items are covered and assist in generating 
more consistent language in RSIC's investment contracts. 
 RSIC typically requests a representation that no personnel of the General Partner or Manager 
have made prohibited political contributions in South Carolina.  We found significant variation in 
the language through which this issue was addressed.  In certain instances, assurance was 
obtained only indirectly via reference to compliance with the Federal Investment Advisers Act, 
while in other agreements reference was made directly to the applicable South Carolina statute.  
We consider the latter approach as more likely to convey clear compliance expectations to the 
counterparty. 
 RSIC requires specialized fee reporting for operational purposes.  In the majority of cases, RSIC's 
required fee reporting was addressed via an exhibit to an agreement side letter setting forth 
general reporting requirements.  In one instance, however, we were advised that fee reporting 
obligations were indirectly obtained through reliance on another investor's negotiated side 
letter, as part of the Most Favored Nations ("MFN") process, rather than directly through a 
standard provision in RSIC's side letter.   Preferred practice is that any required special reporting 
should be addressed directly via RSIC's standard side letter, and the MFN election to bootstrap 
on another investor's side letter should not be relied upon to obtain required terms.  
 General Partners are considered fiduciaries to the funds they serve under Delaware law (the 
state of formation for most private funds).  However, Delaware law permits the General 
Partner's fiduciary duties to be reduced by provisions in the partnership agreement.  Leading 
practice includes negotiation to obtain an affirmative recognition by General Partners of their 
status as a fiduciary under a public pension fund's state law standards or negotiation of 
acceptable terms for any modification of that duty in the fund's legal documents.  In one older 
transaction that we reviewed, an explicit reference to RSIC's state law fiduciary duty standard 
was not included, leaving RSIC to rely by default on Delaware partnership law. 
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The results of our investment documentation review are summarized in Appendix G Investment 
Manager Agreement Compliance Summary. 
Development and consistent use of standard contract clause requests in side letters, along with delivery 
of those standard contract clauses to transaction counterparties as early in the process as practical, 
would facilitate negotiation of more consistent and favorable contract terms.  Early identification of 
required terms for transaction counterparties should also lead to improved efficiencies.   The 
investment due diligence process could be halted early if the counterparty is unable or not willing to 
agree to RSIC's required terms.   For example, deal-breaker terms may include statutorily-required 
provisions, such as public records disclosures and limitations on indemnification.  
Recommendations  
L2.1:  RSIC should establish a standard side letter and contract clauses to improve bargaining leverage 
and increase contract consistency, and internal counsel should work with investment staff and outside 
lawyers on prioritization of the “asks.” 
L.2.2:  RSIC should identify investment terms that are deal-breakers and provide those terms to 
investment counterparties early in the investment due diligence process. 
 
Commission Approvals 
Conclusion L3:  The contracting process has resulted in investment agreements with generally 
reasonable and appropriate terms; however, procedures for obtaining Commission post-approval 
closing authorizations are cumbersome and could be streamlined to avoid delay in closing 
transactions. 
Our document reviews and counterparty interviews confirmed that RSIC’s investment due diligence and 
document negotiation procedures are reasonable and consistent with peer practices.  However, a few 
transaction counterparties indicated that RSIC has been slower in closing on investments than other 
investors.  In one instance involving an older investment, the entire process took more than a year to 
complete.   In another instance, RSIC missed the close window for a side-by-side overage (co-
investment) fund that offered favorable economic terms compared to the main fund (in which RSIC 
invested). 
Slow due diligence makes it virtually impossible for RSIC to be an “anchor” investor and to have the 
leverage enjoyed by early investors to negotiate terms and conditions to a greater extent than investors 
who commit later in the process. None of RSIC's peers require a 30-day post-approval document review 
period.  This requirement appears unique to RSIC and, in some cases, may add delays or result in RSIC 
having to pass up investment opportunities.    
We also note that RSIC's use of Watchdox for posting relevant investment materials for review by 
Commissioners prior to closing is a leading practice.  However, while this added transparency for 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
140 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
Commissioners is appropriate, it runs the risk of interjecting individual Commissioners into negotiation 
of the legal documents.  Active participation in transaction legal diligence by individual Commissioners is 
also, in our experience, unique and could be seen as undermining the full Commission's ability to serve 
its independent fiduciary oversight role, raising potential co-fiduciary liability concerns if undue 
influence were involved. 
Quarterly meetings of the Commissioners, since the Commission retains final approval authority over 
alternative investment transactions, may also result in delays to investment transactions—if an 
investment is not ready to be presented at a meeting, it will have to wait until the next quarterly 
meeting.  This may affect RSIC's ability to take advantage of otherwise favorable investment 
opportunities in instances where opportunities are time-sensitive.  
The Legal Sufficiency Certificate, implemented in June 2013, is provided by internal legal counsel at the 
conclusion of the contract negotiation process and start of the 30-day Commissioner review period.  It 
provides confirmation that legal compliance and due diligence items have been completed and the 
investment documentation is ready for closing in accordance with material terms that were presented 
to and approved by the Commission. 
The Legal Sufficiency Certificate should confirm that the final negotiated documents are consistent with 
delegated authority under the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies, as well as all material 
terms of the Commission's approval.  It does not appear that the current form of Legal Sufficiency 
Certificate fully covers all of these items.   The form of the Certificate should be reviewed to ensure it 
offers comfort on all material closing conditions, is specific as to what items should be included and that 
the Commissioners are satisfied they can rely on it.  (One of the Commissioners expressed reservations 
that the Certificate was insufficient in the scope of its coverage and level of assurance.)   
Some peer funds assign responsibility to outside counsel for confirming and documenting that final 
documentation complies with all material requirements. It might also be that staff signatories in 
addition to legal counsel should be added to the Certificate, if Commissioners want assurance on 
material investment terms.  However, in considering revisions to the Certificate, Commissioners should 
recognize that deal terms may change (typically for the better and often in non-material ways) during 
final document negotiations.  It is unrealistic to expect otherwise and adoption of a no-changes rule 
could undermine ability to negotiate improved terms. 
Recommendations  
L3.1:  RSIC should consider eliminating the 30-day review period and instead rely on an appropriately 
documented Legal Sufficiency Certificate to confirm that all legal compliance and due diligence is 
complete.   Alternatively, RSIC could shorten the Commission review period and add a provision to the 
Governance Policy Manual clarifying the purpose for this review period and confirming that it does 
not delegate Commission authority to individual Commissioners or revoke authority otherwise 
delegated to the CIO or COO. 
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L3.2:  RSIC could require more frequent Commission meetings to consider investments.  (See also 
Recommendation G12.1.) Alternatively, the Commission could consider delegating greater authority 
for approval of alternative investments to the CIO or Internal Investment Committee.   
L3.3:  The Legal Sufficiency Certificate should include confirmation that documentation for each 
investment is consistent with material terms approved by the Commission and with authority 
delegated to staff by the Commissioners in the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies. 
 
Policy Compliance 
Conclusion L4:  Compliance with RSIC policies appears to be satisfactory, with several areas for 
potential improvement. 
The Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure Form, adopted in November 2012 and now required of 
Commissioners and staff for new investment approvals, as well as the Annual Manager Compliance 
Certificate (adopted July 2013), Code of Ethics, Annual Code of Ethics Acknowledgment and Personal 
Trading Policy (adopted December 2013), are consistent with leading peer policies and appropriately 
implement prohibited transaction requirements.  
 Compliance review procedures are in place and appear to be functioning well. 
 Annual compliance questionnaires and certifications, implemented in July 2013, were received 
from all staff, managers and the RSIC consultant for 2013. 
 No violations were identified during 2013. 
One area where greater compliance coordination could be considered is in regard to 
seeking periodic confirmation from the State Ethics Commission, or through an independent 
audit, that RSIC Statements of Economic Interests has have been audited and cross-checked with RSIC 
investment transactions and Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure Forms to proactively identify potential 
code of conduct compliance issues.  In particular, external reassurance could be sought that staff and 
Commissioners have not obtained a benefit for themselves, their family members or their business 
associates from sourcing investments or otherwise acting on RSIC matters.  This practice has been 
adopted by a number of public pension funds. Sourcing information is relevant to implementation of co-
fiduciary monitoring obligations, so timely disclosure to all Commissioners is important. 
In addition, RSIC should consider extending coverage of the Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure Form to 
Commission approval of consultants and professional service providers exempted from State 
procurement processes (referred to as Named Service Providers), as the same compliance issues are 
present as for Commission investment approvals.  An explicit statement could also be added to the 
Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure Form advising that certifications contained in the form are subject to 
external audit for compliance with Ethics Code, Standards of Conduct and other legal requirements.  
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While RSIC has initiated development of a Sudan divestment policy, it has not yet been adopted and 
should be finalized. (See Section 2 Policy Review and Development for further discussion of this 
Conclusion.)  
Although the governance policy manual directs the RSIC to implement an enterprise risk management 
program (ERM), the ERM program and Director of ERM position were only recently approved by the 
Commission at its March 13, 2014 meeting, and implementation is targeted for July 1, 2014. (See Section 
1 Governance for further discussion of this Conclusion.) 
Recommendations 
L4.1:  The Audit Committee should approach the State Ethics Commission and establish an 
independent audit process for regular confirmation that RSIC Statements of Economic Interests have 
been reviewed.  
L4.2:  Consideration should be given to extending coverage of the Sourcing and Conflict Disclosure 
Form to Commission approval of consultants and professional service providers exempted from State 
procurement processes. 
L4.3:  The Sudan divestment policy should be completed and approved by the Commission (See also 
Recommendation P2.7). 
L4.4:  The Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program planning should be completed and the new 
function launched as soon as practical.  (See also Recommendation G13.2.) 
 
Use of Outside Counsel 
Conclusion L5:  The outside counsel pool is due to be refreshed through an RFP, once the contracting 
legal counsel selection and contracting process has been streamlined. 
The outside counsel approval process used by the Attorney General is cumbersome and falls short of 
leading practices at benchmark peers.  As illustrated in the table below, most benchmark peers do not 
require approval of the Attorney General for each engagement of outside counsel.  The current approval 
process can add to delays in completing RSIC legal due diligence. 
Given the level of experience and expertise with institutional investment transactions that RSIC's 
internal legal staff has demonstrated, we believe it is fully capable of prudently selecting, contracting, 
monitoring and evaluating outside counsel on RSIC investment matters.  RSIC's legal fees and use of 
outside counsel were found to be consistent with peer practices.  Periodic approval by the Attorney 
General of a pool of qualified law firms, with use of a pre-approved form of engagement contract and 
billing procedures and regular reporting on firm retentions and billings, would meet peer standards and 
achieve an equivalent level of Attorney General oversight without unnecessarily delaying transaction 
closings.   
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Table 39 Approval of Outside Counsel 
Who must approve engagement 




For a pool of 
approved law 
firms RSIC 
Fund Chief Legal Counsel 1 1 
 
Fund CEO 
   
Board 1 1 
 
Attorney General 2 1 X 
 
Table 40 Approval of Legal Fees 
Does the Attorney General or other outside approval 
authority require approval of legal fees? 
Responses 
(N=6) RSIC 
Yes 3 X 
No Outside Approvals Required 3 
 
Comments: 
Just for contingent fee agreements.  Responded: “Yes”. 
There is a preapproved list of law firms approved by the Department of Justice/Attorney 
General.  We can use firms from the list as necessary. 
The outside counsel service provider relationship has not been refreshed in more than six years (since 
the last RFP market test).  In our experience, most peers refresh their pool of outside counsel at least 
every five years. 
It is important to recognize that negotiation of institutional investment transaction legal documents 
requires outside counsel that is experienced in such sophisticated transactions, including expertise with 
international transactions.  In any revision of the RSIC outside counsel approval process, the standards 
applied for selection and compensation of law firms should ensure that RSIC can retain counsel with 
appropriate experience that will match the qualifications of counsel used by peer funds and contract 
counterparties.  RSIC would be put at a bargaining disadvantage and exposed to increased fiduciary 
liability risk if it were not able to engage the same caliber of investment legal counsel as its investment 
peers. 
As is shown in the below table, a majority of RSIC's benchmark peers engage outside fiduciary counsel.  
The RSIC does not currently utilize independent fiduciary counsel but regularly encounters issues on 
which independent fiduciary advice would be beneficial.  We understand that RSIC recently attempted 
to engage fiduciary counsel but could not obtain approval from the Attorney General to pay competitive 
rates.   As with investment legal counsel, public pension fund fiduciary law is a specialized field and 
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requires familiarity with peer practices.  The process for selection and approval of RSIC fiduciary counsel 
should ensure that counsel with appropriate experience and independence, comparable to fiduciary 
counsel used by peer funds, can be retained. 
Table 41 Use of Outside Counsel 
Source: New York State Common Fund Survey 





No 5 X 
Sometimes 2  
Comments: 
No standing contract for external fiduciary counsel.  Retention of counsel would require 
approval of the South Carolina Attorney General. 
 
Recommendations  
L5.1:  Outside counsel should be refreshed, since it has been more than six years since the last RFP 
market test. 
L5.2:  The process for approval of outside counsel by the Attorney General could be streamlined 
through development of a pre-approved pool of qualified investment counsel, with agreed 
engagement contract form and budget standards, and requirements for regular reporting to the 
Attorney General and Commissioners. 
L5.3:  Consideration should be given to engagement of qualified, independent fiduciary counsel. 
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6. Information Technology 
 
Scope and Standard for Comparison 
 
The review included an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s information technology 
systems and availability of tools and resources for RSIC commissioners, staff and fiduciaries to effectively 
administer the assets and funds of the Retirement System. The review addressed the following specific 
issues:  
 Adequacy of investment, risk management, accounting and compliance systems, tools and 
resources 
 Investment systems 
 Risk management systems 
 Accounting systems 
 Compliance systems 
 Other tools and resources 
 
Summary of information Technology Conclusions 
IT1:  Critical investment support systems are missing or inadequate. 
IT2:  RSIC has insufficient internal IT staff to support its requirements. 
IT3:  RSIC lacks a project governance process, guided by an overall business plan and IT strategy. 
IT4:  RSIC needs greater autonomy in selecting and managing its systems. 
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Findings and Recommendations for each Information Technology Conclusion 
 
Investment Support Systems 
Conclusion IT1:  Critical investment support systems are missing or inadequate. 
The shift from investing only in publicly traded stocks and bonds to a portfolio with substantial exposure 
to private markets and structured investments greatly increased RSIC’s need for robust and integrated 
information systems.  However, RSIC continues to lack critical systems necessary to support 
management of trading, risk, performance and compliance.  A lagging systems infrastructure poses 
major operational risks and prevents RSIC from increasing internal management of assets – a step that 
could expand RSIC’s investment capabilities and reduce costs.  
RSIC’s 2009 Strategic Plan identified strengthening information technology (IT) as a major goal but did 
not provide a blueprint for identifying and addressing systems needs.   In its 2011 Strategic Assessment, 
Deloitte & Touche identified data management, reporting and technology as a high risk area for the 
Commission.  Among other findings, the report raised concern about systems limitations for private 
markets and assets held within strategic partnerships (which together are approximately 40% of total 
assets).   These are still areas which need to be addressed, which RSIC anticipates will be resolved 
through a recently signed contract with an investment systems administrator. 
To a great extent, RSIC relies on information and tools accessible through its custodial bank (BNY 
Mellon).   Over 60% of its assets are actually custodied at other banks.  BNYM gathers and reports 
certain information about “not-in-bank” assets.  However, RSIC does not have systems that provide a 
fully integrated view of the whole portfolio down to the individual security level.   That is a major 
obstacle in managing performance, risk and compliance.    
Commissioners, management and staff expressed concerns about the weaknesses in RSIC’s information 
systems.    One manager remarked that “not having the systems we need is crippling.”   Another 
summed up the situation in alternative investments this way:  “Any system would be better than what 
we have now.”   
RSIC has made some improvements, recently implementing the Tamale system for document storage 
and contract management.  This system is adding value in due diligence and monitoring investment 
managers.   A staff member is assigned full time to managing the system, an indication of the resource 
challenges RSIC will face as it seeks to implement other major systems improvements in the near future. 
RSIC has pursued other IT improvements but states that progress has been slowed by a strained 
relationship with the custodial bank, state procurement processes and the constraints of the state 
budget process.  The lack of internal staff to manage and implement new initiatives will continue to be a 
major obstacle, even if RSIC relies on off-the-shelf applications installed and managed by vendors.   
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Based on our interviews with staff and Commissioners, these appear to be the most critical system 
needs: 
 Private equity markets.  An asset management system for private equity investments that 
provides historical information on partnerships, has general partner information available, looks 
at vintage years, provides IRRs from inception, provides net of fees and other expenses as well 
as performance fees/carried interest,  and tracks commitments. 
 Hedge Fund oversight.  A system to provide oversight and risk monitoring of hedge fund 
investments including position-level risk and performance analytics and performance 
attribution. 
 Risk management.  A security-based risk management system which would provide position 
level transparency as well as risk and performance analytics across the total portfolio.  In 
September 2013, RSIC issued an RFP for a risk management system. 
 Compliance.  An automated system for monitoring on a daily basis the compliance of internal 
investments and external managers with investment policies and manager contracts and to 
ensure that the total portfolio is in compliance with Commission policies and directives.  To 
date, RSIC has been unsuccessful in its effort to procure such a system through BNYM. 
 Trade order management.  A system which provides timely, efficient and transparent trade 
execution, has real-time market information, allows management of broker commissions, and 
provides audit and control mechanisms. 
 Data warehouse.  A system which contains essential information about the whole investment 
portfolio, down to the security level, that can seamlessly feed other systems for analysis. 
Internal accounting.  The current system (QED) is provided through a contract between the Treasurer 
and the vendor and PEBA provides connectivity.   The current version is outdated, requiring 
workarounds according to PEBA and RSIC.  However, the STO had not been made aware of concerns 
about the current system.  
A properly functioning internal accounting system is required before substantial internal investing can 
be implemented.  Primarily due to dissatisfaction with BNYM’s responsiveness to its system needs, and 
because the custody contract is not managed by the Commission, RSIC issued an Investment 
Administrator RFP in December 2013 to meet its system needs through a “turnkey” vendor and include 
these components:   
 Order Management System 
 General Ledger feeds 
 Data Warehouse for all assets (including look through to underlying holdings of commingled 
funds whenever possible) 
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 Automated data feeds to a risk system (RSIC intends to complete the risk system procurement 
shortly) 
 Private markets system to provide look through to private market assets 
 Compliance functionality 
 Performance reporting, including daily performance estimates 
 Fee Validation 
RSIC also wants the Investment Administrator to eventually provide accounting information to PEBA, 
which will further shrink the role of the custodian. 
In March 2014, an agreement was reached with a vendor to provide all of the services specified in the 
RFP within the $1.2 million annual budget for the initiative.  RSIC will be its largest client.  RSIC is seeking 
an increased budget appropriation from the Legislature to ensure it has sufficient funds to pay the costs 
in the next fiscal year and thereafter. 
Management considers implementation of the Investment Administrator capabilities to be the 
Commission’s highest priority initiative.  Implementation discussions were beginning with the vendor at 
the time we were completing our review.  If successful, this initiative could greatly enhance system 
capabilities; however, the scope and complexity will require a substantial initial and ongoing 
commitment of vendor resources and internal resources that will make it challenging to implement.   
Recommendations  
IT1.1: Guided by an overall business and IT plan, RSIC should complete the acquisition of systems to: 
 Track commitments and provide return calculations for private market investments  
 Provide security-based risk management that includes position level transparency and risk 
and performance analytics 
 Monitor compliance of investments with investment policies and contracts 
 Automate trade order management 
 Warehouse data for the whole investment portfolio in order to seamlessly feed other systems 
for analysis 
IT1.2: The QED internal accounting system provided by vendor contract with the State Treasurer’s 
Office should be upgraded or replaced. 
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IT Staffing 
Conclusion IT2:  RSIC has insufficient internal IT staff to support its requirements. 
The insufficient number of IT staff is a substantial risk to the organization.  Information technology has 
only one full-time employee—the IT Director—and two interns.  At this minimal level, no one is 
dedicated to project planning, prioritization and management.   The help desk is staffed by the interns, 
which creates continuity problems when they leave. Vacation coverage is an issue.    
Investment staff relies primarily on the custodian’s systems, Bloomberg, internet services and Excel 
worksheets to track and manage internal and external portfolios.  IT does not have the staff to develop 
applications to support the investment process. 
Through an MOU that was modified and renewed in January, 2014, PEBA continues to host RSIC’s 
servers and provide email, other office applications, internet access and help desk services.  However, 
PEBA staff is not sufficient in number or trained to support specialized investment systems.   
Until the director was hired in 2012, RSIC had no permanent IT staff.  In its 2011 assessment, Deloitte & 
Touche recommended that RSIC consider creating an internal IT function, beginning with the hiring of a 
director, followed by an applications manager and an infrastructure specialist.  These would be the first 
steps toward providing all IT services internally.   
RSIC concluded that moving IT support over from PEBA is too big an undertaking at present.  If the 
number of PEBA IT staff which move to RSIC is sufficient only to continue the services PEBA currently 
provides, overall management of IT services may improve but the resource gap in IT may not decrease 
much. 
RSIC plans to implement major systems enhancements through the Investment Administrator RFP.  
While this initiative is to be vendor led and supplied, it is unlikely to be successful without substantial 
ongoing involvement from IT, operations and investment staff.   The current lack of adequate IT staff is a 
significant risk to the project. 
Further, as RSIC seeks to acquire the infrastructure to expand internal management of assets, it may 
need additional portfolio management tools and specialized investment applications.  The expansion is 
planned to begin with internal passive management, which would have less systems requirements.  
However, subsequent extension into more active internal management is likely to further increase the 
need for IT staff and the need for expertise in investment trading and management systems. 
RSIC recognizes that IT staffing is inadequate but must look to the state budget process for authorization 
and funding to improve the situation.   Its FY 2015 budget request that is currently before the 
Legislature includes one additional IT position which has not been approved. A longer-term IT staffing 
plan to more fully address IT needs is necessary.  Additional authority and management flexibility to 
implement a staffing plan also seems desirable. 
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Recommendation IT2:    Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should seek the 
number and types of additional IT staff needed to adequately support its expanding systems 
infrastructure (see Recommendation O3.6). 
 
IT Governance 
Conclusion IT3:  RSIC lacks a project governance process, guided by an overall business plan and IT 
strategy. 
The Commission’s most recent strategic plan, adopted in 2009, included a goal to strengthen 
information technology resources with six initiatives:  
 Establish internal control of information technology infrastructure and systems 
 Create system redundancy and stability  
 Establish internal control of information technology infrastructure and systems 
 Formalize disaster recovery and business continuity plan 
 Assess and improve system security 
 Hire internal information technology staff 
While some progress has been made, for the most part, the initiatives have not been completed.   The 
2009 plan did not define IT’s role in supporting RSIC’s evolving investment strategy and due diligence 
processes.  In its 2011 Strategic Assessment, Deloitte & Touche recommended that the Commission 
consider: 
 “….undergoing an in-depth assessment of its technology platforms and data 
management framework. This assessment should include a current state inventory 
of the applications and Excel spreadsheets used across the business, the definition 
of firm wide technology requirements, and determination of a plan for addressing 
the Commission’s needs from a technology perspective going forward.” 
The Investment Administrator contract signed in March 2014 reflects management’s goal to address 
critical systems needs in a swift and comprehensive way.   The components reflect input from work 
teams across the organization.   However, the full in-depth assessment recommended in 2011 still 
seems prudent.  RSIC might benefit from the advice of a firm which specializes in evaluations of IT and 
operations systems for investment organizations. 
The role and resource needs for IT should be guided by an overall business plan for the organization. 
Among other things, it should address which investment and support functions are best performed 
internally and which are better outsourced.  That choice is heavily influenced now by state budget and 
procurement constraints.   By providing more management and budget authority to RSIC, the State 
could enable the Commission to make more optimal and timely IT decisions that could improve services 
and reduce risk.  
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
151 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
As RSIC seeks to make major systems enhancements through the Investment Administrator, it lacks a 
formal, ongoing governance process that includes investment, operations and IT staff to set priorities, 
monitor progress and ensure coordination of effort across the organization.  A formal project 
management team with wide representation that meets on a regular basis to address those topics is 
something RSIC should consider.  
Recommendations  
IT3.1:  Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should develop a strategic IT plan 
with clearly defined objectives, a full assessment of the current state of its systems and a timetable 
for completing needed improvements (see Recommendation O3.6).    
IT3.2:  RSIC should establish a project governance process with representation from across the 
organization to determine IT priorities and monitor progress of initiatives, and to assure resources are 
appropriately targeted and that issues are addressed promptly. 
 
Systems Procurement 
Conclusion IT4:  RSIC needs greater autonomy in selecting and managing its systems. 
RSIC identified several recent cases in which the state procurement process or other contracting 
constraints have contributed to delays and other issues in acquiring critical systems: 
 Client relationship management system:  It took over 16 months to obtain this system due to a 
protest by a losing bidder. 
 Risk system:   RSIC started working with the state procurement process in February 2013 and is 
just now getting close to selection. 
 Private market system:  RSIC attempted to obtain this system through the custodian for over a 
year.  However, the custody contract is with the Treasurer, not RSIC.  The Commission then 
issued an RFP in September, 2013. 
 Investment administrator:  In March 2014, the procurement process was completed for a 
systems administrator RFP issued in December 2013.  RSIC indicates that due diligence for this 
complex initiative was inhibited by its lack of authority to have follow-up visits or direct calls 
with respondent(s) to ask questions (steps RSIC typically takes in selecting investment 
managers). 
RSIC and the retirement funds would benefit from the authority to use a modified procurement process 
to select investment systems that includes appropriate accountability.  Options are discussed in Section 
2 Policy Review and Development of this report. 
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In our survey of other state investment boards, RSIC is unusual in the extent to which it relies on 
another agency (PEBA) for IT services.  RSIC has taken steps to better define and facilitate coordination 
with PEBA’s information technology team.  It is understandable that RSIC concluded that it is dealing 
with too many other issues to pursue a move of PEBA’s staff to RSIC management now.   
However, as the organization continues to grow and seeks to add more internal management, RSIC 
should continue to assess whether it would be better served by having all IT support under its direct 
management.  PEBA and RSIC have different systems priorities due to the different nature of their 
respective businesses.  Portfolio management and trading organizations necessarily have much lower 
tolerance for system outages and have need for much lower time to recovery than non-financial 
entities.  For example, the current MOU includes a two-hour response time to a high priority, mission-
critical IT problem, which could be inadequate for RSIC in some situations. 
Recommendations  
IT4.1:  RSIC should be authorized to procure investment systems under a modified procurement 
process that includes appropriate accountability (See Recommendation P5). 
IT4.2:  RSIC should continue to pursue the eventual move of IT support from PEBA to RSIC. 
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Appendix B RSIC Improvements Timeline 
 
Since the issuance of the Deloitte report (September 2011), the following is a list of 
improvements that have been implemented: 
• Recruited additional employees in positions that previously did not exist such as; Director of 
Reporting, Senior Legal Officer, Senior Risk Management Officer, Operational Due Diligence  
• An Audit Committee of the RSIC Commission was established in June of 2011 
• Formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was established between PEBA and RSIC 
(October 2011) and updated (January 2014) 
• Adopted new Performance Incentive Compensation (PIC) Plan (May 2012) 
• Created and implemented placement agent policy  (September 2012) 
• An Internal Audit and Compliance Department was established (September 2012) 
• Completed year long search for new Investment Consultant (September 2012) 
• Formal initial due diligence guidelines were adopted and implemented (November 2012) 
• Formal management representation letter provided to PEBA and external auditor annually  
(November 2012) 
• Formal on-going due diligence guidelines were adopted and implemented, including semi-
annual and audited financial statement review (January 2013) 
• A research management/contact management database program was purchased and 
implemented (February 2013) 
• Formal Joint Valuation policies were adopted between PEBA and RSIC (March 2013) 
• An operational due diligence program was established and implemented, which requires 
review of operations of all new investments (April 2013) 
• Revised Governance Policies were adopted by the Commission ( May 2013) 
• Implemented formal legal sufficiency letter to accompany every new investment funding 
(June 2013) 
• Implemented annual compliance questionnaire and certification from external managers  
(July 2013) 
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• Implemented a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with the STO (September 2013) 
• Implemented a technology solution to provide for document sharing with the Treasurer’s 
staff and Commissioners (September 2013) 
• Improved fee validation procedures and collection process by moving to quarterly process - 
(October 2013) 
o Disclosed investment fees by manager in the 2012 CAFR 
o All fees were published in the 2013 audited financial statement 
• Employee Compliance Policies have been established, including Code of Ethics 
Acknowledgement, Personal Trading Policy, Gifts and Conflict of Interest Policy and 
Whistleblower Policy (December 2013) 
 
In process improvements: 
• Risk RFP in final stages. 
• Administrator selected after RFP process. Implementation to commence immediately with 
target completion of July 1, 2014. 
• Development of Enterprise Risk Management Function, with direct reporting to Audit 
Committee, approved by Commission at March 2014 Commission meeting. 
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• There are four basic public pension fund governance models employed by U.S. state public pension plans, with variations on each. 
• The South Carolina RSIC is an example of one of the eleven funds utilizing the Investment Board Model (although currently as a 
variation with COO and CIO direct reports). 
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• Eight of the 11 investment board funds have a structure similar to South Carolina, with the trustee board overseeing an independent 
investment staff. 
• Three have the CIO and investment staff reporting to the Treasurer as an Investment Department. 
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• Even among the eight comparable investment boards there are differences in board composition, custodian selection, use of 
advisory boards, and executive reporting relationships. 
• RSIC is unique among this group in two respects: 
─ Two operating executives reporting to the Board  
─ The Treasurer selects the custodial bank. 
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The peer investment boards generally reflect one of two models: 
1. Expert Advisory Board:  An ex officio lay board with an expert advisory board 
2. Lay Oversight Board:  A board with several expert members combined with active member and retiree representation 
The current RSIC model is somewhat unique in that it is an expert oversight board. 
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Appendix D List of Documents Reviewed 
 
 Investment management contracts: 98 files from 7 investments 
 Investment agreement review master checklist compliance: 29 files from 7 investments 
 Investment reports and correspondence: 18 files 
 Quarterly reviews of the investment program: 11 files 
 Internal RSIC meeting minutes: 55 files 
 Documents relating to hiring external managers for past 2 years: 42 files 
 Strategic partnership and manager termination memos: 14 files 
 External manager monitoring documents: 5 files 
 Management fee and valuation and due diligence document testing: 265 files from 5 
investments 
 PEBA Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports: 4 files 
 RSIC internal policy, procedure and charter documents: 45 files 
 Special external reviews: 13 files 
 General consultant reports: 8 files 
 Internal audit reports: 4 files 
 State Auditor reports: 1 file 
 RSIC legal structure: 1 file 
 Actuarial reports: 1 file 
 Compliance documents and reports: 8 files 
 Risk reports: 8 files 
 External provider RFPs and contracts: 14 files 
 Attorney general approval documents: 8 files 
 Human resources and training documents: 20 files 
 RSIC plans and proposals: 15 files 
 Information technology documents: 3 files 
 Litigation-related documents: 4 files 
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Appendix E Interviews Conducted by FAS for Fiduciary Performance Audit 
 
Retirement System Investment Commission 
 All seven current Commissioners and one former Commissioner 
Investment Staff 
 Chief Investment Officer 
 Deputy Chief Investment Officer 
 Manager Research Managing Director 
 Strategic Partnerships Director 
 Internal Asset Management Managing Director 
 Senior Investment Officer 
 Senior Risk Management Officer 
 Senior Risk Management Officer 
Operations Staff 
 Chief Operating Officer 
 Director of Operations and Operational Due Diligence  
 Director of IT 
 Chief Legal Officer 
 Director of Investment Reporting and Performance 
 Administrative Manager 
 Public Information Officer 
 Legal and Policy Counsel 
 Senior Legal Counsel 
Internal Audit and Compliance Staff 
 Director of Internal Audit & Compliance 
 Internal Audit & Compliance Officer  
 
Public Employee Benefit Authority Staff 
 Interim Executive Director 
 Director of Retirement Systems Finance 
 Investment Accounting Manager 
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State Treasurer’s Office Staff 
 Chief of Staff 
 General Counsel 
External Investment Managers 
 Apollo Global Management 
 Blackrock 
 Bridgewater Associates 
 Brookfield Asset Management 
 GMO 
 Goldman Sachs Asset Management 
 Golub Capital 
 Industry Ventures 
 Johnston Asset Management 
 Lighthouse Partners 
 Oaktree Capital Management 
 Putnam Investments 
 Russell Investments 
 SJC Direct Lending 
 Strategos Capital Management 
 TA Associates 
 Warburg Pincus 
 
Other External Service Providers 
 Custodial Bank:  Bank of New York Mellon 
 PEBA External Auditor:  CliftonLarsonAllen 
 PEBA Actuary:  Gabriel Roeder Smith 
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Appendix F CEM Report Executive Summary, Methodology, Quality Control and Contracting Process 
 
This benchmarking report compares your 2012 calendar year-end cost 
and return performance to CEM's extensive pension database. 
• 196 U.S. pension funds participate The 
median U.S. fund had assets of $5.7 bill ion and 
the average U.S. fund had assets of $16.5 
billion. Total participating U.S. assets were $3.2 
trillion. 
• 87 Canadian funds participate with assets 
totaling $875 billion. 
• 79 European funds participate with aggregate 
assets of $1.9 trillion. Included are funds from 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Ireland, Denmark and the UK 
• 11 Asia-Pacific funds participate with 
aggregate assets of $700 billion. Included are 
funds from Australia, New Zealand, China and 
South Korea. 
Tile most meaningful comparisons for your 
returns and value added are to the U.S. Public 














• United States 
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 
South Carolina Retirement Systems 
® 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 1 
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The most valuable comparisons for cost performance are to your custom 











Custom Peer Group for 
South Carolina Retirement Systems for Calendar Year 2012 
• 21 U.S. public sponsors from $14 billion to $58 billion 
• Median size of $27 billion versus your $27 billion 
1111111 
To preserve client oonfidenti.ll:ity. given potential access to docum ents as permitted by the Freedom of Information Act we do not disd ose )'OUr 
peers' names in this document. 
0 20 13 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Execu€\oe SuTtm:try • Page 2 
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What gets measured gets managed, so it is critical that you measure and 
compare the right things: 
1. Policy Return 




How did the impact of your policy mix decision compare 
to other funds? 
Are your implementation decisions (i.e., the amount of 
active versus passive management) adding value? 
Are your costs reasonable? Costs matter and can be 
managed. 
Net implementation value added versus excess cost. 
Does paying more get you more? 
® 2013 CEM Ben chmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 3 
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Your 5-year net return of 2.5% was equal to the U.S. Public median of 
2.5%. 
Returns, by themselves, provide little insight 
into the reasons behind relative performance. 
Therefore, we separate total return into its more 
meaningful components policy return, cost and 
value added. 
Net Total Fund Return 
- Policy Return 





This approach enables you to understand the 
contribution from both policy mix decisions 
(which tend to be the board's responsibility) and 
implementation decisions (which tend to be 
management's responsibility) 
The median 5-year net return of your peers was 
2.5%. 
U.S. Public Net Returns -quartile rankings 












~L:::~m median 25m 
• you:rvalue 
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-20% m;n;mum ~ 
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® 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 4 
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1. Policy Return 
Your 5-year policy return of 1.3% was below the U.S. Public 
median of 2.6% 
Your policy return is the return you could have 
earned passively by indexing your investments 
according to your policy mix. 
Having a higher or lower relative policy return is 
not necessarily good or bad . Your policy return 
reflects your investment policy, which should 
reflect your: 
Long term capital market expectations 
• Liabili ties 
• Appetite for risk 
Each of these three factors is different across 
funds. Therefore, it is not surprising that policy 
returns often vary widely between funds. 
The median 5-year policy return of your peers 
was 2.8%. 














~:'!:~m 75th median 25th minimum 
e yo~~ value 
- pHrmed 
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
To enable fairer oompansonolllroughoulthia endre repon. the policy returns of all 
paltic:ipanls on the U.S. Public unlveroe were edjonled to reftect you- benchmar1<s lor 
private eq10ty. ln 2012. 111e edjuotm<!nl reduced the average U.S. Public poicyretum by . 
0.86%. 
0 2013 CEM Benclvnarl<ing Inc. 
Executive SUnvnary. Page 5 
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Differences in policy returns are caused by differences in benchmarks and policy 
mix. The two best performing asset classes for the 5 years ending 2012 were high 
yield bonds and long bonds. 











Barcla)'S Barcla)'S Barcla)'S 
High Yoeld Long TIPS 
Bond 



















1. The private equity and hedge lund benchmark returns reftect the average benchmark of all U.S. participants. 
® 2013 CEM Eenchmarking Inc. 
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Your 5-year policy return was below the U.S. Public median primarily 
because of: 
• The negative impact of yoUir higher weight 
in one of the poorer performing asset 
classes of the past 5 years: Cash (your 7% 
5-year average weight versrus a U.S. 
average of 1 o/o ) . 
• The negative impact of the timing of 
changes in your policy mix. For example 
your 41.8% weight to stocks in 2008 when 
they performed poorly was 1reduced to 30% 
in 2009 when stocks rebounded. 
5-Year Average Policy Mix 
Your Peer U.S. Public 
Fund Avg Avg. 
U.S. Stock 16% 27% 28% 
EAFE Stock 1 Oo/o 6% 7% 
Emerging Market Stock 7% 1% 2% 
ACWixUS Stock Oo/o 11 o/o 9% 
Other Stock Oo/o 4% 6% 
Total Stock 32% 50% 52% 
U.S. Bonds 12% 21 o/o 21 o/o 
High Yield Bonds 3% 2% 2% 
Fixed Income - Emerging 4% 1% Oo/o 
Global Bonds 6% 2% 2% 
Cash 7% 1% 1% 
Other Fixed Income Oo/o 4% 3% 
Total Fixed Income 32% 30% 29% 
Global TAA 9% 1% 1% 
Hedge Funds' 5% 3% 3% 
Commodities 2% Oo/o 1% 
Other Real Assets2 4% 8% 8% 
Private Equity 14% 8% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
• Does not include Absolute Return hedge fund investments used in Portable 
Alpha implementation. 
' Real assets includes natural resources and infrastructure. 
@ 2013 CEM Benchmar1ting Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 7 
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Your policy asset mix has changed over the past 5 years. At the end of 2012 
your policy mix compared to your peers and the U.S. Public as follows: 
Policy Mix 2008 2012 
Your Your Peer U.S. Public 
Asset Class Fund Fund Avg. Avg 
U.S. Stock 23% 14% 24% 25% 
EAFE Stock 15% 8% 6% 7% 
Emerging Market Stock 4% 8% 2% 2% 
ACWixUS Stock Oo/o Oo/o 11 o/o 9% 
Other Stock Oo/o Oo/o 6% 7% 
Total Stock 42% 30% 49% 49% 
U.S. Bonds 19% 12% 20% 19% 
High Yield Bonds 2% 6% 2% 2% 
Fixed Income - Emerging 3% 6% 1% 1% 
Global Bonds 17% 1% 1% 2% 
Cash Oo/o 7% 1% 1% 
Other Fixed lncomje Oo/o Oo/o 3% 3% 
Tulal Fixeu lm:urne 41 o/o 32% 29% 28% 
Global TAA 7% 1 Oo/o 1% 1% 
Hedge Funds' 6% 5% 3% 4% 
Commodities Oo/o 3% 1% 1% 
Other Real Assets2 Oo/o 3% 9% 9% 
Private Equity 4% 17% 9% 8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
' Does not include Absolute Return hedge fund investments used in Portable Alpha implementation. 
:: Real assets includes natural resources and infrastructure. 
®2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive SUmmary - Page 8 
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2. Net Value 
Added 
Net value added is the component of total return from 
active management. Your 5-year net value added was 
1.2%. 
Net value added equals total return minus 
policy return minus costs. 
South Carolina Retirement Systems 
Net Policy Net Value 
Year Return Return Added 
2012 12.4% 10.7% 1.7% 
2011 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 
2010 12.5% 10.2% 2.3% 
2009 24.3% 17.3% 7.0% 
2008 (28.7)% (25.8)% (2.9)% 
5-year 2.5% 1.3% 1.2% 
Your net value added was impacted by your 
above-average benchmark return for private 
equity (your 5 Oo/o versus a 5-year U.S. Public 
average of 3.9%). If you had used the U.S. 
Public average benchmark, your 5-year net 
value added would have been approximately 
0.4% higher. 
U.S. Public Net Value Added -quartile rankings 
5yrs 
@ 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
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You had positive 5-year net va ue added in Stock, Hedge F nds, Global 
TAA and Private Equity. 
!] ... yea.:ll' Aveliillge Net V:alue Added by· Maj oJr Asset CJI.ass for Calendar Yearrs 200.8-2012 









StoCk FIXEd Rea1 EsJi.a'tE Heqge Glbbal TAA Pmcate Income Fund~ Eqta~ 
• Your·find l ..D=ta -0.2% -2.0% 5.8% 3..3% IJI~~ 
. u.s. aYEtage 1]1_3,.1:! 0_5.% -5.6% .J(].l%. -0..3% 1]1..8% 
1L ~~~~[!I nd w.~ the tther~ 1:1~ ~g-:m.. T:J l'!fl:Jtefaer~  IXC'IW'JD~S. ittle p:t~~ 
lbm:tlrl:Bs Dl' l& [JB'tl~~ 2tlb ~ ~lblDfrrl.'fts. ltr!l 2litsa tmetU 't:l oa-,n•~ ~ ~..ll'lS. 'l'CU' 5-jlezr~ !:..5':A b 
p:t~ r:QI!'J H :li ~~lfie'U.S.. o:r~ d~ 
2. r:t ~idi:je:tiflli~~ numtbe litbJWt."b;r.j Mlt::lrmUiool:emu!ic me~ llf~tlliiiJd ~ 1311be: a• tL:dJ''IZied. llimi>J be I!: uzfUI m  I:Dl1 :rm.. 'l'cu' 511'91' rmm · 2.~ fDrtheDt;l~ 1'l.n:t:l Mm::i ·~ IItle: UI.S.<W~ r:t L~ 
Cl 2:1lri3CEJ.;l ~ ll1c:. 
Emlm~ ~ -~ 101 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
173 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
  
[3. Costs 
Your total investment management of $263.5 million per 
this report reconcile to· your annual report as follows: 
South Carolina Retirement Systems 
Investment cost per annual report - June 2013 
- Costs according to CEM definitions - Dec 2012 
= Difference to be reconciled 
CEM adds costs for 
Private equity fund of funds: embedded fees' 
Hedge funds fund of funds embedded fees' 
Difference between contractual fee and actual fees• 
Total costs added 
CEM excludes: 
Private asset and hedge fund performance fees• 
Partnership operating expenses 














1.To allow costs comparisons between the different styles of hedge funds and private assets, CEM 
adds the manager fees of the underlying managers in fund of funds arrangements. 
2. In order to avoid the inconsistent treatment of rebates by different funds, CEM compares private 
equity costs based on the management fees implied in each limited partnership contract. 
3. CEM excludes private asset and hedge fund performance fees from benchmart<ing because only a 
limited number of participants are currently able to provide this data. 
@ 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 11 
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Your total cost of 103.0 bps was above the U.S. Public median of 57.1 
bps. 
Differences in totll cost are ;ten caused by tw;> fac1ors. 1hat 
are oft outside af rnam.gemenfs omtrol: 
• asset mix and 
size.. 
Asset mix is set b:.' policy and may - assets thai: are 
er cost traditional inve&ments, SIJch as private 
real est:atE or hedge funds. The 't1 cost of fees wiD be 
- er 'than peers wi a poJicy asset mix t doecs not include 
er cost assets. "ore, asset m1x is ill major 
· a of~ cost. 
f und size is also a major - r • cost becaus€ funds Wth ill 
er size are oftm able to nego1iate lol'lef cost.s.... 
A tot cost con-parisen to peB"S ¥lhich - not adjust_ fer 
asset mix and fund size may not be approj:lia"le measure 
because of these iaatDrs... Used out of conte·xt a tot3J cost 
comparison rould be mi~ding. 
In order 1D prnvX!e sponSO'lS w:th aarurate feed baa); 
regarding reasooability • costs, CEM nwst tak_e P"Cficy asset 
mix overall fund size into ccn - :im. :-a-li:', 1D 
asse-ss wlhether IXJ61:s are high or kn1 given your ique 
asset mix and size. OEM ca!culates a bencfunark. cost :-or · 
fund and provides an asse.ssm t of 'the reasonability • yow 
costs for yo given cy asset mix and ave fmc! size. 
This ·s is sh on page. 
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Benchmark cost analysis suggests that, after adjusting for fund size and 
asset mix, your fund was normal cost in 2012. 
Your benchmark cost is an estimate of what your 
cost would be given your actual asset mix and the 
median costs that your peers pay for similar 
services. It represents the cost your peers would 
incur if they had your actual asset mix. 
Your total cost of 103.0 bp was close to your 
benchmark cost of 103.5 bp. Thus, your cost 
savings was 0.5 bp. 
Your actual cost 
Your benchmark cost 
Your excess cost 
@ 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
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Your ,fund was normal cost because your higher cost implementation 
style was offset by paying less for similar services. 
Explanation of Your Cost Status for C.alend.ar Year 2012 
E.:xcess Cos1:1 
(Sa,vin~) 
1. Hrg e r = s imp!emne nian(ln s~re 
2. Paying more or 1( ss) ttum yDtJr peers 
for siim11ar 




1( 1 ,27· (0.5 
These re ason:s are exam1n:ed in detaiJI in 1he fui1DWing pages. 
C 21!<13 CEM Ber.ttm:!l"tt:G In:.. 
E.l!!cut ...e-.Eurr'o111)' - Pi3ge 1!: 
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D ilferenoes in cost performance are often caused by dif\fer~ences in 
implementation sty I e. 
lmplementa'lio.n style is d'efiDed as 1be W31J in 
which your fund implements ~ a llcca1io.n. 
I - d udes intern extemall, active, passi¥-e 
.artd fund of fun_ds 51t')'tes~ 
Implementation Style~ for Calendar Year Xl112 
The rgreatest rrost impadt is !li:SiliBIIy caused by 
differ~ in the use rei: 
• External acf.i\~ management because -
tem:fs to be IITIIC.'h n»re expensive than 
irt~ernal or pa.ssr.'IE management You used 
R1Cire externa1 ar:tiv:e management ~ 
your peers (yoor {I[J..% verstJJS. 71J% for )'OUr 
peers). 
• Within external ac:ti've holdings. fundi oi 
furu:fs usage because it is IT'IOre expensive 
'than dfJect f undi inv:esmen: You lhad m.oJe 
in fund funds _ You r 31% of hedge fulds, 
r:ea'l esr.a~e end proo~ate ecp.Jity - fmd of 












. ln1Emal ~·'e 
o ln'IEmaJ actl'-ie 
o Er .emal passne 
• Et:Efllal acttvE' 
C ~~-carl Bwldm•W~ l~~re. 
Euulh• · - Pig• 18 
y r F11.1!1d IPEE!ti 
0% 3 1)'~ 15'% 
5% 90:.';. B% 
5% 1·3%. 190:.';. 
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Differences in implementation style cost you 2.7 bp relative to your peers. 
Cost Impact of Differences in Implementation Style fo.- C.alend.a.- Yea.- 2012 
Youli avt~ DM ExtemaJI kfive Cos:U 
lho]cfjngs Peer MOrel Cost,.: I[Saving5] 
A:s:sE·t class in $mils You aveliage (less FJI'emium in $ODDs 
.S . stool- Eroadrli!J 
Slrd: - EAFE 
1.9UI 11JOJJ%. 53.5'% ~6.5% 45J5 bp 4.042 
14 1 1[] :JJ% .53.8% ~£2%. 3a.J bp 24fi. 
strd - EnterQJn.Q 1,61.>3 93.5% IID.B'% 12..7% 5J.2 b~ 1.1.35 
2.5J7 93.4~~ lfi6 .4% 27J)% 1J J3 bp !:t-~ lfll(E.Id co me - U.S. 
lfll[E.Id co me - EIDE!f.gj D] 
lfll[E.Id oome - Oba1 
Sli7 7J_6% !;5 ,~ [21.5%) 2d.J bp (34&) 
1.Je.J 11JOJJ% 1 D•J .D~~ DJJ~~ 
lfll(E.Id klrorre - H eJd 1 [) 11J % 99. 1% D.9E.~~ Ills ct 
Global Til.~ 2.5e... 11J :JJ% 1 •J.IJI).'(_, DJJ E.I 
elfge it'll!llls 5.118 11J():JJ% 1 J .IJI)~ DJJ~S 
c1 I .nl rl I u~n~:M:'±. 65..9~'(_, 42 .3~ 23. &% 
CDrrrnoll es 11J 1 •J.IJI).'; DJJ . ~ 
89..91)'2 !:16. 8% ('!i ~'(_, l 
1[]001% 38.0% 6:2..n.% 
J • .231 81..9 -:.. 98.9% [1 J)%) 
2L 4 ~ .Z1.7% [D.JE.I~ ) 
2,842 99$% 98.9% 0.7E.I 
IJ.O% :Z1.7% 21.1% 
Total 89_6% 69.7% 1 !!t !i<% 
Extemal acttv~: :&t:Jl11: pact bps. 
sty~~: mpact r.:Jated to ru d or ruoos. ~& 
of dl:l\'erenee& 1h1: IU&e • JIJ.Ilei iOOst .aty!Es.ll 
coot aom 'f1)11Jr I~l\er tEe 01 Jl) Stet oveita: IS 








1. 'ilti!· l:I!'.t~Ri= :m r11e oD::!t":cn3 ~~ llf~3 t:rtYe I'I'Till"'~~ m I'Jleo~ cf~ ozt 
r-•ment:tlm ~e!o- ll":temlll!JD!Z rJenlll xtve :r.d·Ber. !='~·. 
2:. illt. ~IJI'!r. ~ ~ 1~de':" and~ F.ho!l EM . .' !!~ lll1 r:ocugh PHFdm I:Dco:V:ri~Ulennor::h':-1 
3. ~·~ ~~ n the ru~cf Dllt:f'cmt ~'tS' ·Q'~ ~!'!!£ na~ !f':U ~.:.1:~ uz 
r.tl!!m31 ~ :m:~ mm-.aJ ~ :e· 
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Title s1yle impact of differences in the, use of overlays cost you 0.8 bp~s. 
r====Style impact of using morelr(fe-wer) overlays fur Calendar Year 2:012 
'four OY.en ay notional amounts a.s ~i'all COS;tJ 
avg total a % o1 a,~ total flo1dings ca5t as ISiiYingsl 
lhold'ings iour 'eeli M011el a % of ~mpad 
(.$milS] Fiund Average not ional in $OOOs 
:tern I O~ay.s 
Pass me !Beta - Hedge 25,587 []_8- IC; ll .D~ (0_(1%) 2..4 bp (2) 
DIJraj" 
- Hadge 25,587 []_8- IC; ll.1% (0_1%) []_8 1bp (2) 
Ex1BITB! Overlays 
Curency - edge 25,5S7 0 - ll. -% 2..6 bp t36) i' iCi 
CuTency - Discretionary .25,5S7 [] - ll. % 162 bp t 148) i' iCi 
Passive Beta - Hedge 2S,5S7 'i5.5% 1 .. ~% 6.1 bp 2,212 
~IJ.~'Short ·-~ .25,587 [] ICj ll.2% .7 bp 23 
Net " pact []..8 bp 2,00(] 
0 21!13 DEN l3er: ~ In:. 
Em:llt'd!· Smt-~ - R3ge 11! 
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The net impact of d ifferences in external investment management costs 
saved 2.4 bps. 
Impact of Pa-ying More/(Less) for Extemallnvesbnent Mana-gE!I1'Tient for 
Calendar Year 2012 
Your a Cost in 
llilolding;s Your Peer 
U.S. Stoa\- Brood!AJI - A.cfiue 
Stock · EAFE - Aotil.re 
Stook- E~ng-Pa~e 
i n $mils Fumd medi_.an 
1,QHl 55. ~-7 ......__-=-" 
Stock- E nQl- AOOI.re 
need n OOf"T"ie - . S. · afive 
Ft ed noome - Ernergng - Pa:ss'Ne 
Ft ed noome - Erneqjng - Active 
Ft ed noome - Global - Acfiue. 
ed noome - lti - A.ctlilJe 
Glooal TAA - AciiYe 
Hedge Funds-~ 
Funds- 1of Fund 
CcmmOOities - Aefve 
Real ES'!a~.e- e-:x-::t~rrs -umr.E-diPar.nersl}!~ 
• e~ Rrivate 6 - AD1ive 
OWe ·- Priwte 6~ - Fi of Fund 
Private Debt Urn ed Pa:rtnef"51tl:ls · Artl\!e 
'14l 1 67.3 ..m.3 
111 4 .4 1 u~ 
1,577 .4JQ. 65. 
,370 19. 16. 
150 1 · .9 lnli~em 
417 .7 3.2 
1,38 · 27.6 21.5 
1,000 63. ·*1.2 
2,f6A ·414.8 84.7" 
1, 74l6 :204..9 1 >;3.8 
3 37 :2.1 :2_6 2 16.3 
136 1 98..3 1 2.5 
1, 124..9 11 9.4 
2,079 14l5. 165.0 
ffi6 2--.4 230. 
2.~ 129.0 165.0 
No:fionaf 
Oleriva1ivesl'O'-'Effa: - PassNe Beta 3,QT · 3.6 
Total external inYe:S'bllent manaQement impact 
c :21!13! am 13er.d"m:I"U"G Inc... 
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The net impact of differences in inte rna I and co-investment management 
costs rounds to 0.4 bps. 
Impact of Pa-ying Morel(Less) fo.-lnterna.llnvestment Management fo.-
Cale nda.r Yea.- 2012 
Your avg Cosf in bps 
ho'ld'ings Your ~eeF Morel 
in $mils 11und median (less' 
oo Income - D.S.. - ActiJe 16/ 3..~ 2.Q 
IReaJ E9t3te ex-RBT s - Oo-rnrestments 152 1.5 :!ll..:2 
r t.·EiEin:!d Pr't!fa:_e. Equ:tty - CIHIT'felitrnl!llts 5B 3:, 
12 1.n t 3.. 1 
c 21!13rOEJ.II9er. ~ In:. 
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Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
183 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
  
The n e1 impact of d ifferenoes in ove·rs i g ht, custodia I .& other costs rounds 
to 0.3 bps. 
Impact of D ifferences in Oversigh1;. Custodial & Othe.r Costs for Calendar 
Year2012. 
Oversight~ 
Custodial J 1:rustee 




OUI!' .dViJI COIS lin ~ 
holdings · our Peer MOtre 
in $mils Rmd mediiain [less · 
2!1,587 o. o .8 (0.4} 
25,587 11 1 0.2 (0.1} 
25,581 11:2 0.4 (02 } 
25,587 0.2 o.o o. t 
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In summary, your fund was normal cost because your hi,gher cost 
i mp'l ementat1o n style was offset by paying I ess for simi I ar services. 
Explanation of You.- Cost Status for Calendar Year 20r12 
1_ High er cost jm:plemenfafio lil s ltyle 
• Greater U SE of fundi 0 - run:ds 
• M ore extrem al ae1ive ma.nag em ent andl less 
owe;r cos passive and int e:m 
m anagement 
[gher use o • DViNla)'s 
• Other style differences 
2_ Paying m ore o r (less~ UwaJn your; peers ifb1r 
s im ilar services 
• Externa l mvesm-Jent mana{!emen cost s 
• In em a1 im,·est ment m anagement c:DSts. 
• Overs ight , ou srod ial & other c:osts 
Total excess costlfsavings~ 
c 21li13rCEJ.il l3a"4m:DQIIn:. 
E:m:ut~ - Pillge ~ 
Ex.cess Costr 
(SaVings 
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Your fund had 2012 net value added of 1.7% and cost 
savings of 0.5 bps. 
2012 Net Value Added versus Excess Cost 
(Your 2012: net value added 1.7%, cost savings0.5 bps*) 

















ou.s. 0 0 
OYour Peers 






-40bp -20bp Obp 
Excess Cost 
® 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 23 
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In summary: 
1. Policy Return 




Your 5-year policy return was 1.3%. This compares to the U.S. 
Public median of 2.6% and the peer median of 2.8%. 
Your 5-year net value added was 1.2%. This was above the U.S. 
Public median of -0.3% and above the peer median of -0.2%. 
Your actual cost of 103.0 bps was close to your benchmark cost 
of 103.5 bps. This suggests that your fund was normal cost. 
Your fund was normal cost because your higher cost 
implementation style was offset by paying less for similar 
services. 
Your fund had 2012 net value added of 1.7% and cost savings of 
0.5 bps on the cost effectiveness chart 
@ 2013 CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
Executive Summary - Page 24 
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CEM Benchmarking:  Proved Methodology and Quality Data. 
 
CEM Benchmarking has over 20 years’ experience in benchmarking pension costs. Over this time CEM has developed a methodology 
that effectively identifies and quantifies factors that drive total costs and compares costs and cost components across peers and 
universes. Strategies and approaches vary from fund to fund for good underlying reasons such as different liabilities and risk 
appetites. The CEM report contains quantitative analysis that aims to break out factors in order to help management gain a better 
understanding of their costs and whether those costs appear reasonable given the fund’s approach and the peer group and universe 
data.  
The CEM database is known as the leading global database for quality cost information of large funds. Academics often use the data 
(under strict confidentiality restrictions) because of the size, length, detail and quality of the database. CEM collects data from funds 
via an annual voluntary survey, evaluates the data, accepts or rejects the responses, performs tolerance checks, applies CEM 
methodology to ensure consistency, and makes a decision if the data will be used in the CEM database and in a CEM report. All 
responses are handled by qualified analysts who work with survey participants to ensure quality.  
Data quality is important to CEM as our clients need to trust the message the analysis is providing. Where funds cannot provide all 
data requested, CEM may offer to apply certain default numbers as proxies. These are calculated using the verified data in the 
database and the appropriate peers or universe. These are footnoted in the report. CEM methodology is outlined in detail 
throughout the report. 
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One of the major challenges in cost collection and comparison in the industry is the lack of standardization in measuring and 
disclosing costs in private asset classes. CEM’s methodology is based on 20 years of collaboration with funds around the world to 
collect as much quality cost data as is available from funds. CEM methodology is aimed at providing the greatest level of detailed 
analysis based on consistent quality data in the database. Where the industry or many in the industry do not provide quality data or 




CEM Benchmarking Inc. 
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Answers to Questions Raised by the State Treasurer’s Office about the CEM Methodology 
 
On March 27, 2014 the State Treasurer’s Office raised the following questions: 
Q1.      The policy allocation rate and the policy benchmark rates of return are components of the policy return.  On page 7, CEM presents the 
average 5 year allocation policy allocation rate for the RSIC along with the average policy allocation rate for the peer group CEM used in this 
report and the U.S. public average policy allocation rate.  Please provide the 5 year average rate of return for each policy asset class benchmark 
presented on page 12 for 
 
a.      the custom peer group that CEM used for this report, and 
 
b.      the U.S. public average. 
A1. CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added – page 15 provides this information 
Q2.      Please provide the 5 year actual average allocations by market values and by exposure for the custom peer group and for the U.S. public 
average by the same asset classes listed on page 8 for both the custom peer group and the U.S. public average. 
 
A2. CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added - page 12 provides the five-year average market value of actual holdings for RSIC, 
peers and the U.S public average.  CEM’s survey does not collect this information by exposure.    
Note that CEM collects information based on actual positions because it is actual positions that tend to drive investment costs.  
Q3.      The RSIC stays within policy benchmark ranges by means of classifying investments through exposure rather than by market value.  For 
example, at 06/30/13, the RSIC held physical equity with a market value of $3.5 billion, or about 13.4% of the total portfolio but through 
derivatives (and perhaps hedge funds); HEK reported the public allocation as 28% in the FY 2013 CAFR.  Please explain whether the 5 year actual 
average allocations provided in response to #2 are by way of exposure or market value. 
A3. The five-year asset allocations provided in response to question 2 are based on market value. 
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Q4.      On page 3, CEM asks, "How did the impact of your policy mix decision compare to other funds?" 
 
a.      What is CEM's answer to that question? 
A4. CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added – page 7 indicates that the 1.3% return of RSIC’s policy mix for the five-year period 
was the lowest in its peer group.  However, the Executive Summary – page 5 states “Having a higher or lower relative policy return is 
not necessarily good or bad.  Your policy return reflects your investment policy, which should reflect your: long-term capital market 
expectations; liabilities; appetite for risk. Each of these three factors is different across funds.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
policy returns often vary widely between funds.” 
Q5.      According to CEM, the U.S. public median 5 year policy return of 2.6% was double RSIC's 5 year policy return of 1.3%.  Are these rates the 
annualized 5 year rates?  That is, is the difference 1.3% a year for each of the five years? 
A5. The 2.6% U.S. public median return and 1.3% policy return are not the sum of the one-year returns divided by five. They are an 
average annual geometric return which takes into account the compounding effect of investment returns over time.    
If you started with the beginning asset value at January 1, 2008 and multiplied that by 1.3% each year, you would get to the end of 
2012 total market value ONLY if we took into account contributions and withdrawals to the fund and any compounding effects. 
Q6.      CEM presents the difference (1.2%) between the policy benchmark (1.3%) from the RSIC's return rate (2.5%) as "net value 
added".  However, value was added only if the asset class benchmarks that make up the RSIC's policy benchmark were appropriate.  How did 
CEM determine that the asset class benchmarks were appropriate? 
A6. CEM does not determine whether a fund’s benchmarks are appropriate.   That is determined by the benchmark setting process 
the survey participants use.  For RSIC, it is the Commission in consultation with HEK. 
RSIC’s 2012 benchmarks and benchmark returns for each asset class are shown on CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added- page 
17. CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added –page 15 shows the average five-year benchmark returns for each RSIC asset class 
compared to peers’.  CEM Section 4, Implementation Value Added– pp. 18-23 shows the most frequently used benchmarks by asset 
type in 2012 for the peer group and the universe of U.S. pension funds.  In each asset class, a variety of different market indices or 
custom benchmarks are used, which may reflect differences in the types of investments survey participants have within a particular 
asset type (particularly for an asset class like hedge funds). 
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Q7.      Does the result of CEM's Net Value Added Calculation represent an endorsement of the appropriateness of the asset class benchmarks 
that make up the RSIC's policy benchmark? 
A7. No 
 
Q8.      On pages 5, CEM cites the U.S. public median 5 year policy return as 2.6%.  On page 4, CEM cites the average median U.S. public 5 year 
net return as 2.5.  Does this mean that during the period of time that the RSIC added 1.2% in value each year, the median fund added -0.1% each 
year? 
A8. This does not work because medians are not additive.  The median fund of the policy return data set is not the same fund as the 
median fund of the net return data set and neither is likely to be the same fund as the median fund of the net value added data set. 
 
Q9.      Do the difference between the median net added value and the RSIC's net added value suggest that the RSIC's management made much 
better implementation decisions than the median fund? 
A9. Not necessarily. Having a higher net value added simply means that RSIC outperformed its weighted average benchmark more 
than the median fund did during this period.  Evaluating implementation decisions needs to take into account risk, liabilities, 
allowable investment universe, investment style, location and other intangibles. 
Q10.   On page  19 9, CEM states the following: 
 
Your net value added was impacted by your above-average benchmark return for private equity (your 5.0% versus a 5-year U.S. Public average of 
3.9%). If you had used the U.S. Public average benchmark, your 5-year net value added would have been approximately 0.4% higher. 
 
On page 28 of HEK's 12/31/12 performance report, HEK places the private equity 5 year rate of return at 6.8% and private equity's benchmark 
rate of return at 3.8%.   On page 6 of the CEM draft report, CEM indicates the private equity average benchmark for all U.S participants is 
4.3%.  The U.S. public average benchmark is higher than the policy benchmark, so how could the net value added be higher if the RSIC had used 
the average benchmark. 
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A10. In CEM Executive Summary - page 6, the benchmark return of 4.3% for PE is for all US participants.  The benchmark return of 
3.9% on page 9 is for public US participants. 
 
Q11.   The 5 year U.S. public average benchmark return for private equity is cited as 3.9% on page 9 and as 4.3% on page 6.  Please explain this 
difference. 
A11. In CEM Executive Summary - page 6, the private equity benchmark return of 4.3% for PE is for all US participants.  The 
benchmark return of 3.9% on page 9 is for public US participants. 
 
Q12.   Are the high cash allocation and the negative impact of timing changes in the policy mix the two biggest reasons that the RSIC's lagged the 
U.S. Public Average policy mix by 1.3%? 
A12. CEM Implementation Value Added – Page 7 shows that the median policy return for the U.S. Public Universe was 2.6% compared 
to 1.3% for RSIC. Executive Summary – Page 7 states that RSIC’s five-year policy return was lower primarily because of the two factors 
cited in the question. 
 
Q13.   Rather than totally excluding performance fees "because only a limited number of participants are currently able to provide this data", 
why didn't CEM compare RSIC costs with plans that did provide the data? Or impute performance or carried interest fees to the other plans. 
A13. Not enough of RSIC’s peers provided performance fees/carried interest on private market and estimating these is difficult.  
RSIC’s size-based public funds peer group was chosen to get good cost comparisons across all asset classes and styles. 
 
Q14.   Why does CEM exclude $38 million in "partnership operating expenses?" 
A14. CEM excluded those costs because it didn’t have sufficient comparable peer data to benchmark them. 
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Q15.   CEM presents its adjusted fee amounts for each asset class on page 12.  The only fee rate that appears is the rate for the total 
portfolio.  Please state the AUM by the asset classes listed on page 12 so that the rates by asset class can be calculated. 
 
A15. The AUM for each asset class shown on CEM Executive Summary– page 17 is found in CEM Appendix pp. 4 and 5. CEM will add a 
cost in basis points column to this page. 
Q16.   Some of the tables and graphs have clearly stated beginning and ending dates.  Please label all graphs and tables with the dates. 
A16. CEM will include additional labels. 
Q17.   On page 13, CEM states that "Fund size is also a major driver of costs because funds with a larger size are often able to negotiate lower 
costs."  How does the RSIC's fund size compare rank in comparison to other public plans?  Does the size of the fund prevent the RSIC from being 
able to  
A17. CEM’s U.S. Public Fund universe has 65 funds in it.  The average size is $32.990 billion.  The median size is $14.01 billion. CEM 
cannot comment on RSIC’s ability to negotiate lower fees as CEM  only collects costs at the asset class level not by mandate. 
Q18.   Please state the components of the CEM's calculated 31% (page 18 16) total for hedge funds, real estate, and private equity? 
A18. CEM Implementation Value Added –p. 12 provides this breakdown: 
Real Estate         3.5% 
Hedge Funds       6.9% 
Hedge Funds Fund of Funds        11.0% 
Diversified Private Equity    7.2% 
Diversified PE Fund of Funds    1.6% 
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Q19.   What plans were used as peers for the RSIC in CEM's report? 
A19. CEM, Executive Summary–page 2 states “To preserve client confidentiality, given potential access to documents as permitted by 
the Freedom of Information Act, we do not disclose your peers’ names in this document."    As stated on that page, the 21 funds in 
the peer group are all U.S. public funds ranging in size from $14 billion to $58 billion.  Half are larger and half are smaller than RSIC at 
$27 billion. 
 
Q20.   Does CEM use the same U.S. public median rates of return for comparison in all reports that CEM has issued for the 5 year period ending 
December 31, 2012? 
A20. No.  The universe of funds (and thus the medians) is based on amount of data collected at the time the report was run.  Thus, 
RSIC’s CEM 2012 universe of funds is larger than for a report run earlier in the year.  Not all funds use the public universe, some 
include corporate, use an international universe or a North American Universe. 
 
Q21.  Why was a calendar year used instead of a fiscal year? 
A21. Other clients report their information to CEM on a calendar year basis. 
 
Q22.  Please insure that all tables, grafts, conclusions, etc., that are based on exposure or actual asset class are identified as to which. 
A22. CEM will label that graphs throughout the report are based on market values or policy weights 
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On April 4, 2014 the State Treasurer’s Office raised a second set of questions regarding CEM.  Below are those response to 
those questions. 
 
Q1.    Please explain CEM's fee adjustments on page 11. 
A1.   Page 11 of the Executive Summary identifies the difference between the $427.5 million of total costs reported in 
the FY 2013 CAFR and the $263.5 million of RSIC costs that CEM benchmarked for calendar year 2012 (the latest 
period for which CEM has peer data). Some of the difference is due to difference in time periods. The largest 
difference is the exclusion of private asset and hedge fund performance fees which RSIC reports but peers do not. 
CEM adds costs to amounts reported by RSIC and other participants to improve the consistency of reporting for 
private equity and hedge funds. 
Q2.   It appears that CEM is adding "embedded fees", which are referenced in footnote 1 as "the manager fees of the underlying fund 
of funds arrangements."  Doesn't the RSIC claim to have reported these fees? 
A2.   CEM includes fees paid to the fund of fund manager and fees paid to the underlying partnerships in fund of 
fund arrangements. CEM used the manager fees reported by RSIC and a proxy for the underlying fees.  That is 
described in Note  1 in the Executive Summary - Page 12.   CEM indicates that it always counts both fees levels in its 
report.  
 
Q3.   Has CEM calculated the difference between the RSIC's contractual fees and actual fees for private equity? 
A3.  Yes, the difference between RSIC's contractual fees and actual fees for partnerships is shown on page 11 of the 
Executive Summary.  RSIC provided the actual fee data, but CEM prefers to use contractual fees for consistency in 
comparisons among the peer group. The differences by type are private equity $9.285 mil, real estate $1.527 mil and 
private debt $5.89 mil.  Only the sum is shown on page 11.     
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Q4. The following statement is from page 5 of the CEM report: 
"To enable fairer comparisons throughout this entire report, the policy returns of all participants in the U.S. Public universe were 
adjusted to reflect your benchmarks for private equity. In 2012, the adjustment reduced the average U.S. Public policy return by -
0.86%." 
If CEM had not made this adjustment, would the U.S. median policy be 3.46%?  (2.6% + 0.86%) 
A. 4.   The adjusted U.S. Public policy return median for 2012 was 12.16%.  The raw U.S. Public policy return median 
was 13.02%.  This adjustment can go either way depending on whether the client’s benchmarks are higher or lower 
than the typical fund's private equity benchmark: 
In 2011, the adjustment increased the average U.S. Public policy return by 0.28% 
In 2010, the adjustment reduced the average U.S. Public policy return by 0.07%. 
In 2009, the adjustment reduced the average U.S. Public policy return by 1.02%. 
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CEM Quality Control 
 
1. CEM survey data is self-reported, however, participants complete a standard worksheet that includes detailed instructions and 
definitions of what to report and how to categorize it.   CEM collects and evaluates the data, accepts or rejects the responses, 
performs tolerance checks, applies the CEM methodology to ensure consistency, and makes a decision if the data will be used in 
the CEM database and in a CEM report. All responses are handled by qualified analysts who work with survey participants to 
ensure quality. 
 
2. Having reported thousands of numbers to a thousand funds, CEM reports that the feedback from clients and participants is that 
it is the most accurate and expansive cost database they have seen. This alone suggests the data quality is solid.   The analyst 
who worked on the South Carolina data is a Senior Analyst with CEM, he has been with CEM since August 2006 and is a qualified 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA). 
 
3. Data quality is very important to CEM as its clients need to trust the message the analysis is providing. Where funds cannot 
provide all data requested, CEM may offer to apply certain default numbers as proxies. These are calculated using the verified 
data in the database and the appropriate peers or universe. These are footnoted in the report.  The CEM methodology is 
outlined in detail throughout the report.   
 
4. For example, for RSIC and other participants, CEM added a standard cost factor for embedded fees for private market and hedge 
fund of fund arrangements to provide more meaningful cost comparisons. For direct investments in private equity partnerships,  
 
RSIC provided actual cost information but CEM chose to re-calculate costs based the terms of the individual contracts.   The 
contractual fee is CEM’s standard basis for benchmarking partnership costs. 
 
5. Data evaluation and tolerance checks:  The CEM database contains performance and cost information on more than 1,000 
pension and sovereign wealth funds from around the globe (over the history of 22 years). These funds invest globally and, in 
most cases, the same markets. CEM conducts tolerance checks and data evaluation to compare any survey results to what is 
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considered reasonable given the cost numbers CEM has for the same asset classes (or sub asset classes) in the same country over 
the same time period. 
 
6. Where there are numbers that do not look right the CEM analyst will ask for an explanation. If that explanation is solid and 
justifies the numbers (against CEM’s experience and the database numbers) CEM will accept the numbers (for example a low 
volatility hedge fund that is the only hedge fund.  As one example, CEM originally questioned whether RSIC’s reported custody 
cost number was accurate because it was quite low compared to the rest of the peer group.   The process for South Carolina 
involved a lot of time and discussion to arrive at the treatment of certain costs. The discussion is consistent with CEM 
methodology and all cost inclusions and exclusions have been reconciled as per CEM methodology and noted in the report. In 
the experience of FAS team members who have themselves been involved in completing the CEM survey, and our observation of 
other funds, it is common, particularly for a first time participant, to go through several iterations of the worksheet before the 
CEM report is considered final. 
 
7. On page 11 of the Executive Summary, CEM does a comparison of RSIC’s costs reported in FY 2013 CAFR with the costs 
benchmarked in its report to account for the difference between the two. 
 
8. While the CEM report describes RSIC’s overall costs as “normal”, it also identifies a number of areas in which RSIC is more reliant 
on active external management than its peers, at greater cost (Executive Summary-page 17).   The report further identifies 
several asset classes for which RSIC appears to be paying higher management fees than its peers (Executive Summary-page 19).   
These are described in the FAS report as potential areas for RSIC to pursue cost savings. 
 
9. Some funds have a formally documented procedure as to how the CEM survey is to be completed and reconciliation performed 
between the CAFR and the survey.  RSIC might consider doing the same.  FAS can provide an example procedure from another 
fund we recently benchmarked. 
 
Although not a part of CEM’s quality control process, FAS did compare HEK’s 2013 management fee report to CEM’s.   Overall, both 
reach the same basic conclusion:  RSIC’s management fees are about average.   By asset class, both reports conclude that RSIC’s 
GTAA fees are low, fixed income average, private debt low, real assets a bit high, direct private equity low, hedge funds higher than 
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average and emerging market stocks low to average.  HEK concluded that RSIC’s US stock fees are average, CEM found them to be a 
bit above the median.     
CEM’s report drills further into the component parts of each asset class than did HEK’s February 2013 report, and HEK’s data was 
taken from multiple different sources while CEM’s is all taken from the same peer group.    From CEM’s report it is easier to see the 
cost impact of paying fees for a particular asset type that are higher or lower than the peer average.    Hedge fund costs stand out as 
an area where RSIC appears to be paying more.  
 
CEM’s Independence and the Contracting Process 
 
The CEM study was commissioned by the State Inspector General’s Office to address public controversy about the Commission’s 
fiduciary oversight role regarding fund’s performance and fees. FAS was asked by SIG to subcontract with CEM to complete the 
study as part of the fiduciary performance audit.  The CEM study, like the FAS study would be paid from the Retirement System’s 
funds. The State Treasurer’s Office has subsequently raised questions about the independence of CEM if it is paid by the RSIC. 
An email from STO on 3/25/2014 stated:  “RSIC paid approximately $30,000 for the CEM report.  Can Funston share the reasoning or 
history for the subsidy?  Was the CEM report not a part of the fiduciary audit?  Is it odd for entity being the audited to pay for an 
independent report?”  This question may suggest that CEM’s independence is somehow compromised by the fact that the funds are 
ultimately coming from RSIC even though they only provided data and verified its accuracy. 
Our response is shown below: 
“This view is contrary to the entire notion of external audit. The overwhelming majority of organizations who retain independent 
advisors and auditors pay them directly without compromising the integrity of their reports.  The fact that this review was under the 
auspices of the SIG creates an even greater degree of independence.  As with the Fiduciary Performance Review, which is paid for by 
the retirement trust fund, the CEM report is being paid through the trust fund and you have made it abundantly clear to us and CEM 
that SIG not the RSIC, STO or PEBA is the client. 
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CEM, as a premier provider of independent performance and cost studies, is typically engaged directly by its pension fund clients, 
who rely upon their reports as one form of independent reassurance. As noted above, in this case, their independence is even 
greater as they were engaged by FAS through SIG. Our credibility and that of CEM as independent providers of benchmarking and 
audit services demand the highest levels of integrity and independence. 
Similarly, on other fiduciary audit engagements, FAS is typically engaged directly by our pension fund clients. This is our first 
experience being engaged by an Inspector General or any other oversight body and we have appreciated your efforts to prevent the 
stakeholders from attempting to exert undue influence. The $30,000 CEM fee is the standard annual fee for participation in its 
investment benchmarking survey. (Note: a separate invoice will be submitted by FAS for the final CEM report and there is no mark-
up by FAS for coordinating this report.)” 
The question may further suggest that Funston Advisory Services somehow received a “subsidy” from RSIC which again might be 
interpreted as reducing our independence. Again, our response is shown below: “…, the CEM study was identified as one option 
among a number of other options in the original FAS response to your request for proposal which included a flat, all inclusive fee 
requirement to address all matters within scope. As part of the negotiations process, we agreed to take out a number of options and 
related fees to focus exclusively on the matters within scope to bring our total cost to within the $700,000 budget.  These included, 
for example, the elimination of an expert advisory panel, a study of the asset/liability matching process and a significant reduction of 
the review of IT systems given the RSIC’s current stage of development as well as the elimination of the CEM study. This reduction in 
our fees from our initial proposal did not anticipate our subsequent involvement in the CEM study.   
Subsequently, we understand the SIG decided, given the controversy surrounding performance and fees, to commission the CEM 
report through FAS rather than directly with CEM. Thus, CEM is under contract to FAS for the RSIC Investment Cost Effectiveness 
Analysis.  The CEM study was always identified by FAS as an option.  We could have completed our core responsibilities for the 
Fiduciary Performance Audit without it.  Our involvement in coordinating the collection of data has involved a considerable amount 
of extra, unbudgeted effort. 
By agreeing to coordinate CEM’s work without additional compensation, we (FAS) have, in effect, subsidized the RSIC.” 
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Appendix G Powers Reserved Analysis  
 
In a prior assignment for the Oregon Investment Council in early 2012, FAS performed a benchmarking analysis of legislation and 
policies affecting powers reserved. We compared 66 authorities and organized them into 9 major areas of responsibility: 
1. Set mission 
2. Set /approve board governance 
3. Set / approve fund policies and processes 
4. Select, evaluate, compensate, terminate executive management 
5. Set enterprise strategy and budgets 
6. Set investment strategies and enterprise risk policy framework 
7. Promote effective stakeholder relations and advocate for beneficial change 
8. Oversee ongoing investment performance  
9. Oversee effectiveness of enterprise risk management including ethics and enterprise policy compliance 
The benchmarking study included seven participants.  
 Three sole fiduciaries (Connecticut, Michigan and North Carolina). 
 Four investment boards (Alberta Investment Management Company (AIMCo), Oregon Investment Council (OIC), Washington 
State Investment Board (WSIB), and State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB). 
For this analysis of the RSIC we have included three of the four investment boards for comparison (AIMCo, WSIB and SWIB). Oregon 
does not have a comparable structure, as the Treasury Department Investment Management Division manages the pension fund 
(legislation is currently pending to change this). AIMCo is an interesting comparison because they made a transition from sole 
fiduciary to investment board structure, similar to South Carolina, in 2008. 
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2. Set / approve board governance Peer investment boards typically have some responsibilities which the Commission does not 
have: 
 The South Carolina legislature retains responsibility for  approving the commissioner election calendar and approving 
regulations relating to agency 
 The governor is responsible for board disciplinary actions. 
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3. Set / approve fund policies and procedures. In contrast to all three peer funds, the RSIC is not responsible for its own external audit. 
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4. Select, evaluate, compensate, and terminate executive management. RSIC’s authorities are consistent with the peer 
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5. Set Enterprise Strategy and Budgets.  RSIC’s authorities are consistent with the peer investment boards with a critical exception 
than the legislature retains budget and resource allocation authority; two of the three peer investment boards have the authority to 
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6. Set investment strategies and enterprise risk management framework.  The South Carolina legislature sets the expected rate of 
return; this is delegated to the board at two of the three peers. The Commission delegates asset class strategies and construction to 
the CIO; the peer fund boards retain this responsibility. Benchmarks are recommended by the CIO and the general consultant but 
are approved by the Commission. 
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7. Promote effective stakeholder relations and advocate for beneficial change, the South Carolina RSIC responsibilities are 
consistent with the peer investment boards. The Commission is less involved in legislative policies than the other investment boards. 
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8. Oversee ongoing investment performance.  RSIC’s authorities are consistent with the peer investment boards. 
 
8.1 Oversee investment performance Board Board/CEO Board/CIO Commission& CIO 
8.2 Oversee fund liquidity management, including ensuring that 
the fund has sufficient liquid assets to respond to market Board CEO CIO CIO 
conditions and meet investment obligations (e.g. capital calls, 
collateral calls). 
8.3 Oversee financial soundness of the overall system, including 
annual review of unfunded liability, overall pension soundness PERF Board State Actuary PERF Board PE BA Trustees & 
and sustainabi lity, healt h programs, and any other programs Legislature 
offered 
8.4 Conduct selection and oversee performance of board 
consultants who provide investment-related expertise to the Board Board/CEO Board Commission 
board 
8.5 Oversee selection process and performance of investment 
partners, managers and consu ltants, including addressing Board Board/CEO Board/CIO Commission/ CIO 
diversity policies and objectives 
8.6 Approve major investment-related litigation Board Board Board Commission& State AG 
8.7 Oversee cost effectiveness of the investment program Board CEO Board/CIO Commission 
8.8 Oversee operations and cost effectiveness Board CEO Board/CEO CIOandCOO 
8.9 Oversee cash management to ensure sufficient cash is Board CEO CIO/ 
available to pay benefits and operating expenses PERF Board PEBA w ith CIO 
8.10 Oversee interaction of cash management and liquidity Board CEO CIO CIO 
management processes 
8.11 Oversee Investment Office risk management processes, CIO/ Risk Team & including investment risk management, investment policy Board CEO Board Compliance compliance monitoring, and operating r isk management 
8.12 Oversee investment office risk assessment and control Board CEO N/A CIO environment 
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9.  Oversee effectiveness of enterprise risk management including ethics and enterprise policy compliance.  RSIC’s authorities are 
consistent with the peer investment boards, although the Commission has delegated somewhat more to staff than the peer funds. 
RSIC does not have a diversity program or an ESG program for its investments.
 
9.1 Oversee all enterprise diversity programs Board NA CEO NA 
9.2 Oversee enterprise program and policy compliance Board CEO Board Internal Audit & Compliance 
9.3 Oversee privacy and security compliance Board CEO CEO Lega l & IT/COO 
9.4 Oversee review of alleged breaches of Code of Ethics CEO/ Internal and Government Commission w / 
by board or executives Board External Auditors Accountability Legal/Others Board 
9.5 Oversee service provider compliance (includ ing Board CEO/COO CEO COOandCIO harmonizing conflict of interest policies) 
9.6 Oversee business continuity and disaster recovery Board CEO/COO Board Commission/ IT/ coo 
9. 7 Approve contracting policies and oversee effective Board CEO/COO Board mmission/COO/ 
management of service provider contracts CIO 
9.8 Approve and oversee compliance with investment Board CEO/COO Board/CIO Consultant,lnt policies dit& Compi,CIO 
9.9 Oversee environmental, social and governance (ESG) Board CEO Board NA program 
9.10 Oversee whistleblower and hotline processes Board CEO/ Internal Internal Auditor lntAudit& Compl, Auditor Audit Comm,IG 
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Appendix H Fiduciary Duty and Governance Structure Analysis 
 
Number of Fiduciaries Blurs Authority and Accountability 
 
The South Carolina Retirement System has four separate named fiduciaries with overlapping 
authority.  The sources of these overlapping authorities are the following statutory provisions.   
 Budget and Control Board ("BCB")/ Department of Administration or State Fiscal Accountability 
Authority (effective July 2015)  
o Named Trustee (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1310) 
o Fiduciary status as Trustee 
 Treasurer 
o Custodian of the funds (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1320) 
 "Other fiduciary" in role as custodian (S.C. AG Op. November 16, 2011) 
 However, the custodian has a ministerial role only, with no investment authority 
(S.C. AG Op. November 16, 2011) 
o Commissioner on RSIC (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-315) 
o Member of BCB (S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-10) 
 Retirement System Investment Commission (RSIC) 
o Vested with exclusive investment authority (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-20) 
 Public Employee Benefit Authority (PEBA) 
o Named Trustee (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1310) 
o Executive Director is non-voting Commissioner on RSIC (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-315) 
In addition, the legislature has reserved certain fiduciary powers for itself that result in a 
mismatch between RSIC's statutorily designated fiduciary duties and the authority needed to implement 
those responsibilities.  For example, the legislature's authority to control budget and staffing for the 
RSIC (see, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. §2-7-60) and set the assumed rate of return for retirement system 
investments (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-335) are key powers that affect implementation of RSIC's investment 
duties. 
Other State entities that exercise powers oversight powers in regard to implementation of 
RSIC's investment authority include the Attorney General (retention of outside legal counsel); 
Comptroller General (accounts payable and payroll audits); State Auditor (external audit); and Inspector 
General (annual fiduciary performance review).  While these are not identified as fiduciaries, they do 
exercise monitoring and oversight functions that influence implementation of RSIC's responsibilities. 
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Multiple Fiduciary Roles and Statutory Ambiguity Creates Potential for Conflict 
 
These authority and responsibility mismatches, as well as the overlaps and ambiguity around 
duties statutorily allocated amongst the Retirement System's fiduciaries, create the potential for 
conflicts and uncertainty as to which fiduciary has what authority and responsibility under what 
circumstances. The overlaps transcend personalities of current incumbents and present inherent issues 
in regard to who has accountability for shared responsibilities.  This potential for conflicts is 
demonstrated most acutely by the multiple statutory roles assigned to the South Carolina State 
Treasurer. 
                Custodian. The South Carolina State Treasurer is statutorily designated as the custodian of 
Retirement System Funds.  (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1320 provides, "The State Treasurer shall be the 
custodian of the funds of the System.").  The South Carolina Attorney General has opined that the 
Treasurer's duties as custodian are purely ministerial and, as such, the Treasurer has no authority 
regarding the investment of retirement funds.  (S.C. AG Op. November 16, 2011 at 12.)  
All of the Treasurer's previous authority for investment of retirement funds in fixed income 
investments was transferred to the RSIC when it was created. (S.C. Code Ann § 9-16-315(G) says, "All of 
the powers and duties of the State Budget and Control Board as investor in equity securities and the 
State Treasurer's function of investing in fixed income instruments are transferred to and devolved upon 
the Retirement System Investment Commission.")  The Attorney General noted that the Treasurer plays 
a role in investment functions only as a member of the Commission, not as Treasurer.  (S.C. AG Op. 
November 16, 2011 at 12.) Consequently, the Treasurer, as custodian, appears to have only ministerial 
functions regarding the Retirement System assets, and his duties "encompass disbursement of the funds 
upon instruction and protection of those funds as a bailee."  (Id. at 12.) 
                Nevertheless, the Attorney General also noted that, when the Treasurer is acting as custodian, 
he is acting in a fiduciary capacity.14  (2011 WL 6120331) In the opinion, the Attorney General "deem[s] 
the Treasurer, as custodian of the retirement funds, even though he acts in a ministerial capacity, to be 
an "other fiduciary" as described in section 9-16-40(3), with the fiduciary duties appertaining thereto." 
(S.C. AG Op. November 16, 2011.) However, this conclusion seems to be at odds with prevailing 
authority elsewhere.  There is a line of recent cases holding that a custodian which has ministerial 
responsibilities for custody, record keeping, disbursement of funds and reporting is not a fiduciary 
unless granted additional discretion and control over the assets.15   Furthermore, where a custodian is 
granted such additional discretionary authority and becomes a fiduciary, its fiduciary status is limited to 
                                                     
14
 In the opinion, the Attorney General cites to a few dated cases for the position that the custodian is also a 
fiduciary.  (See e.g., County Comm'rs. v. Winnsboro Nat. Bank, 7 S.C. 78 (1876);  Whitebeck v. Estate of Ramsay, 74 
Ill. App. 524 (1896); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.E.2d 326 (S.C. 1960).)  While these cases 
may remain good law, there have been recent decisions in this area.  (La. Municipal Police Employees' Retirement 
System v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2013 WL 3357173 at 13 (S.D.N.Y.); see also Matkin v. Fidelity National Bank, 2002 
WL 32060182 (D.S.C.); Burwell v. S.C. National Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786 (S.C. 1986)). 
15
 See, e.g., In re Mushroom Transportation Company, Inc., 382 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 2004);  Beddall v. State Street 
Bank and Trust Company, 137 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998);  La. Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2013 WL 3357173 at 13 (S.D.N.Y.); Matkin v. Fidelity National Bank, 2002 WL 32060182 
(D.S.C.); Burwell v. S.C. National Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786 (S.C. 1986). 
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the scope of that discretionary authority and does not convert the custodian into a general fiduciary for 
all of its duties.   
For example,  the Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals held in In re Mushroom Transportation 
Company, Inc. (382 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 2004)) that "ERISA does not consider as a fiduciary an entity such 
as a bank when it does no more than receive deposits from a benefit fund on which the fund can draw 
checks.'" (Pages 346 – 347.)  Accordingly, because Continental Bank (which was custodian for Mushroom 
Transportation, Inc.'s pension fund assets) did nothing more than "serve as holder of assets placed 
there," it was not a fiduciary. (Page 347.)  Though the Mushroom case concerned fiduciary duties under 
ERISA, its guidance is instructive here because the fiduciary duty standards written into the South 
Carolina Statutes are patterned after those in ERISA, which governs private pension funds. 
In a similar case, Beddall v. State Street Bank and Trust Company ( 137 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998)), 
the Court found that a custodial bank did not become a pension fund fiduciary under ERISA by virtue of 
being authorized to "perform administrative and ministerial functions in respect to those investments 
which, like real estate, are held within a so-called Investment Manager Account.  Without more, 
mechanical administrative responsibilities (such as retaining the assets and keeping a record of their 
value) are insufficient to ground a claim of fiduciary status."  (Par. 45.)  In addition, "such details as 
checking whether [the investment manager's] instructions are in a writing signed by an authorized 
person and issuing periodic reports to [the plan's administrative committee] about the fund's status . . 
.  does not transform the bank into a fiduciary vis-à-vis the affected assets."  (Par. 48.)   The Court also 
held, "Because one's fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is directly and solely attributable to his 
possession or exercise of discretionary authority, fiduciary liability arises in specific increments 
correlated to the vesting or performance of particular fiduciary functions in service of the plan, not in 
broad, general terms."  (Par. 23.) 
While this analysis is not intended to be a legal opinion on whether the Treasurer (as custodian 
for the retirement funds) serves in that capacity as a fiduciary, it is difficult to reconcile the recent line of 
legal authority referenced above with the Attorney General's application of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century court decisions relating to a completely different scope of custodial relationship than 
what exists today.  The resulting confusion over roles and responsibilities held by the Treasurer as 
custodian, and how that authority relates to responsibilities of other statutorily designated fiduciaries, is 
an inherent source for potential conflict and disagreement.  Lack of role clarity also creates increased 
risks of fiduciary liability exposure when conflicts of interpretation arise.   
Fiduciary Duty Standard.  This analysis cannot resolve questions around interpretation of South 
Carolina's statutory governance scheme for fiduciary responsibilities relating to the retirement 
systems.  That can only be resolved by the courts or legislature.  One thing that is clear is the statutory 
fiduciary duty standard in section 9-16-40 of the South Carolina Code, which applies to all Retirement 
System fiduciaries: 
"A trustee, commission member, or other fiduciary shall discharge duties with respect to 
a retirement system:  
(1) solely in the interest of the retirement systems, participants, and beneficiaries;  
(2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and 
paying reasonable expenses of administering the system;  
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(3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing which a 
prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the 
conduct of an activity of like character and purpose;  
(4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests of participants and 
beneficiaries;  
(5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and  
(6) in accordance with a good faith interpretation of this chapter." 
Given the Attorney General's advice that the Treasurer is a fiduciary when acting as custodian, it 
followed that the Treasurer is not only responsible for safekeeping of the retirement funds but also has 
a duty to preserve the funds and resist disbursements of the funds that have no basis in law. Exactly 
how this separate fiduciary duty interacts with the RSIC's exclusive authority to make investment 
decisions in unclear.  This has been a source of confusion and conflict between the RSIC and 
Treasurer.   What might have been viewed as separation of powers has created a fragmentation of 
authority situation, with confusion over what authority the Treasurer, as custodian, holds in relation to 
the exclusive investment powers granted to the RSIC.   
                Treasurer's Duties as a Commissioner.  As noted above, the Treasurer is also a member of the 
RSIC and, as such, shares investment authority over the Retirement System funds with the other 
Commissioners.  (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-315(A)).  As a Commissioner, the Treasurer is subject to the 
fiduciary standard of care described above.  The Treasurer is faced with the challenge of resolving 
potentially conflicting fiduciary duties between his role as one of several Commissioners on the RSIC and 
his separate fiduciary obligations as Treasurer.  While the Treasurer is obligated to implement duly-
adopted investment decisions of the RSIC, under the Attorney General's opinion, he might also have the 
potential to block them when exercising separate fiduciary duties as Treasurer.  The existence of such 
separate veto power appears to be inconsistent with the exclusive statutory grant of investment 
authority to RSIC.  (See the further discussion below of this apparent veto authority.) 
Duty of Loyalty.  Pursuant to the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary is strictly prohibited from entering 
into transactions that involve or create a conflict between those fiduciary duties and personal interests 
of the fiduciary or that place a fiduciary in a position in which it is reasonably foreseeable that a conflict 
of fiduciary and personal interests may arise in the future.  (See the Restatement Third of Trusts 
§ 78.)  The Treasurer, as an elected official with separate duties from his role as a Commissioner on the 
RSIC, has duties to all citizens of South Carolina.   This creates a potential conflict with his duty of loyalty 
to retirement system beneficiaries, which presents fundamental challenges.    
                Furthermore, case law suggests that a fiduciary could unintentionally violate the duty of loyalty 
even while subjectively acting in good faith, based on his individual view of what fiduciary 
responsibilities required.  (See e.g., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 837.60 (2010 Ed.); 
In Re Mony Group, Inc. Shareholder Lit., 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004); Esophs Creek Value Lp v. Hauf, 
913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006)).  For example, the Delaware Court of the Chancery has noted that the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty imposes an affirmative obligation to protect and advance the interests of the 
corporation and that a fiduciary may not engage in conduct that is adverse to the interests of the 
corporation.  (Shocking Technologies, Inc. v. Michael, 2010 WL 4482838 (Del. Ch. 2012)).  Though this 
Delaware case concerns fiduciaries of a corporation rather than a retirement system, the facts of the 
case are fairly analogous.   A single fiduciary acted on his own to interfere with the actions of the Board 
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and the interests of the corporation. Thus, the issue before the Delaware Court was whether a fiduciary 
could violate his fiduciary duty of loyalty by subverting the decisions of the board as a whole, even 
though acting in good faith.   
The Delaware Court ultimately held that, while an aspect of good faith is encompassed in the 
duty of loyalty, it would be difficult to reconcile disloyal conduct with its likely "foreseeable (and 
intended)" consequences of causing serious harm to the corporation with the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty.  That is, fiduciaries can unintentionally violate the duty of loyalty even while claiming to act in 
subjective good faith.   
                Consequently, it could be that even when the Treasurer is acting in good faith, pursuant to the 
Treasurer's fiduciary duties as custodian or a member of the BCB, the Treasurer could unintentionally 
violate the duty of loyalty to Retirement System beneficiaries in his role as an RSIC Commissioner.  It 
seems that the increased risks of fiduciary liability that result from the Treasurer being placed in 
multiple fiduciary roles with potentially conflicting obligations merit further consideration by 
policymakers. 
Apparent Veto Authority.   Pursuant to the common law of trusts, where the terms of the trust 
(or, in this instance, the statute) provide that, in administration of the trust, a trustee must take certain 
actions if so directed by another person, it is ordinarily the trustee's duty to comply with the direction; 
the trustee would ordinarily be liable for a loss resulting from failure to do so.   (See the Restatement 
3rd Trusts § 75.)  When the statutes vest exclusive investment authority in the RSIC, this seems to 
preclude subsequent exercise of a de facto veto by one of the Commissioners, regardless of the role in 
which that fiduciary is acting. However, the Attorney General's opinion muddies the waters by advising 
that the Treasurer, as custodian of the retirement funds, is also an "other fiduciary," with the fiduciary 
duties appertaining thereto.      
This apparent dual fiduciary status of the Treasurer is confusing and problematic.  By having the 
ability to refuse to fund investments the Treasurer objects to (in good faith) in his role as custodian, the 
Treasurer could be seen as exercising veto power over investment decisions already made with his 
participation as a fiduciary Commissioner at the RSIC.  The existence of such veto authority is inherently 
inconsistent with the statutory grant of exclusive investment authority to the RSIC.   Use of such a veto 
could create risk that the Treasurer might be found to be in breach of his duties as a fiduciary at the 
RSIC, if losses were incurred as a result of his good faith exercise of separate statutorily-created fiduciary 
duties as custodian.  Increased liability risk is the natural result of such multiple overlapping and 
ambiguous statutory fiduciary duties.   
Master and Servant. Case law in South Carolina sets forth the rule that a public officer cannot 
hold the "dual position of master and servant" because such a dual role would lead to "constant conflict 
between self-interest and integrity".  See e.g. McMahan v. Jones, 77 S.E. 1022, 1023 (S.C. 1913). As 
clarified by the Attorney General, where one office is subordinate to another and subject in some 
degree to the other's supervisory power, a conflict of interest may exist that prevents an individual from 
holding dual office.  See e.g., S.C. AG Op. October 22, 2007.  The Treasurer is likely a public officer 
because the office of Treasurer is established by the constitution.  See Sanders v. Belue, 58 S.E.2d 762 
(S.C. 1907).  Therefore, allegations could be made that the Treasurer cannot be both master and 
servant, as this dual status could lead to a conflict of interest.  Because the Treasurer is a Commissioner 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
216 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
on the RSIC (the "master") and the RSIC instructs the Treasurer in his role as custodian (the "servant") to 
release funds, there is potential that the Treasurer could be found to have been improperly required to 
serve as both master and servant.  (The Treasurer's membership on the BCB could also be seen as 
raising similar questions.) 
                Budget and Control Board.  The Treasurer's third fiduciary role for the retirement system is as a 
member of the BCB.  As further discussed below, the BCB appears to hold legal title to the retirement 
system's funds and appears to have both statutory and common law fiduciary responsibilities as a 
Trustee.  For example, under common law trust principles, trustees are obligated to administer the trust 
in good faith, with prudence, and in accordance with their other fiduciary duties. (See e.g., Restatement 
Third of Trusts § 70). The duty of prudence requires a trustee to exercise reasonable care, which, in turn, 
includes a duty to monitor the trust and fellow trustees.  (See e.g., Restatement Third of Trusts 
§ 77).  Failure to monitor the trust and fellow trustees can, in some instances, lead to co-fiduciary 
liability. (See generally, Restatement Third of Trusts § 81).   Consequently, as a member of the BCB, the 
common law of trusts appears to give the Treasurer and BCB some degree of ambiguous monitoring for 
the retirement system, which could expose the Treasurer and/or BCB to liability.   
Adding to the potential for conflict is the confusion surrounding the role of BCB (whose powers 
are soon to be transferred to the Department of Administration and State Fiscal Accountability 
Authority) as co-trustee.  The BCB, or its successor, is statutorily designated as a co-trustee of the 
retirement system.  (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1310 now provides, "The South Carolina Public Employee 
Benefit Authority and the State Budget and Control Board, or its successor, are co-trustees of the 
retirement system . . . in performing the functions imposed on them by law in the governance of the 
Retirement System.").  The BCB, however, has very limited statutorily-identified duties for the 
Retirement System.[1]  Rather, nearly all duties were divided between the RSIC and the PEBA when they 
were created. ( S.C. Code § 9-16-315 (G)  says, "All of the powers and duties of the State Budget and 
Control Board as investor in equity securities and the State Treasurer's function of investing in fixed 
income instruments are transferred to and devolved upon the Retirement System Investment 
Commission."  Furthermore,  S.C. Code Ann. § 9-4-10(H) provides that, "Effective July 1, 2012, the 
following offices, divisions, or components of the State Budget and Control Board are transferred to, and 
incorporated into, an administrative agency of state government to be known as the South Carolina 
Public Employee Benefit Authority: (1) Employee Insurance Program; and (2) the Retirement Division.")    
                                                     
[1]
 In addition to retaining a designation as trustee, it appears as though the BCB also retains approval authority 
over all policy determinations of the PEBA.  (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-4-45 says, "(A) Policy determinations made by the 
South Carolina Public Benefit Authority are subject to approval by the State Budget and Control Board or its 
successor, evidenced by a majority vote of the board. (B) For purposes of this section, policy determination means 
a determination by law required to be made by the South Carolina Public Benefit Authority in its administration of 
the Employee Insurance Program relating to coverage changes and premium increases and in its administration of 
the Retirement Division, actuarial assumptions governing the retirement system and adjustments in employer and 
employee contributions.")  The statute refers to policy determinations of the "Public Benefit Authority" rather than 
the PEBA, but it seems that these are the same entity.  For example, the statute specifically references policy 
determinations with regard to the Employee Insurance Program and the Retirement Division, which are the two 
divisions specifically transferred from the BCB to the PEBA. Consequently, it appears that the BCB retains some 
statutory authority related to the Retirement Systems and the RSIC in that the BCB must approve any PEBA policy 
determination with regard to actuarial assumptions, which may impact the RSIC's investment strategy.  
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Nevertheless, case law suggests that the BCB, as a named trustee, holds legal title to retirement 
fund assets.  See Hamiter v. Retirement System of the South Carolina Budget & Control Board, 484 SE.2d 
586 (S.C. 1997). While Hamiter was decided prior to the formation of the PEBA, the case may still be 
good law, as the court held that the BCB holds legal title to the assets because the BCB was statutorily 
designated as a trustee, which designation still remains.  This further confuses the extent of authority 
and responsibility held by the BCB as a co-trustee. 
Transfer of BCB Functions.  Recent South Carolina legislation (Act 121) eliminates the BCB 
effective July 2015 and transfers its Retirement System oversight functions to the Department of 
Administration or State Fiscal Accountability Authority. However, the statute designating BCB as co-
trustee (S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1310) was not amended as part of this bill.[2] Section 2A and 18A of Act 121 
contain ambiguous and potentially conflicting language on allocation of BCB powers to the Department 
of Administration and State Fiscal Accountability Authority.  These two Sections of the Act could be read 
as contradictory and become the source of future conflict regarding the exercise of Retirement System 
oversight functions.  If the overlapping co-trustee structure is maintained, we recommend that clarity be 
provided on whether the SFAA or DOA will become co-trustee of the Retirement System when the BCB 
is abolished.      
PEBA Relationship to RSIC.  A final level of ambiguity exists in the allocation of retirement 
system management and administration responsibilities between the PEBA and the RSIC.  For example, 
the RSIC and the PEBA have agreed to assign responsibility for the accounting and audit functions of the 
Retirement System to the PEBA.  (See Article II of the Memorandum of Understanding dated January 15, 
2014.) However, it is not clear that PEBA has been statutorily granted this authority, as the RSIC has 
exclusive authority over the management of the Retirement System assets.  (See  S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-
20.)  On the other hand, accounting and audit functions may be more akin to administration of the 
Retirement System, which is the statutory responsibility of the PEBA under S.C. Code Ann. § 9-4-30.   
Either way, RSIC and PEBA have worked out a resolution of this ambiguity through the 
Memorandum of Understanding.   If PEBA does not have clear statutory responsibility for accounting 
and audit functions, RSIC does have the ability to delegate this responsibility to PEBA under RSIC's 
delegation authority in S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-30.  Nevertheless, this illustrates another level of 
ambiguity in assignment of fiduciary authority and responsibility amongst the various entities with 
fiduciary duties.  If personalities and agendas were to change at the two agencies, this ambiguity in 
assignment of authority and responsibility could also generate conflicts. 
Conclusion 
The statutory allocation of fiduciary authority and responsibilities amongst designated trustees and 
other entities with fiduciary duties is duplicative and confusing.  The current structure presents inherent 
                                                     
[2]
  Section 2.A of Act 121, on July 1, 2015, transfers all functions, powers, duties, responsibilities, and authority of 
the BCB related to executive functions, except as otherwise provided by law, to the Department of Administration. 
However, Section 18.A of the Act (which establishes the State Fiscal Accountability Authority) also gives the SFAA 
authority to decide any matters that would have previously been referred to the BCB for decision, where the 
procedure for the decision is not specifically provided for by general law. While we were advised that legislative 
intent was to transfer BCB Retirement System functions to the SFAA, these two Act Sections could be read as 
contradictory and become the source of future conflict regarding the exercise of Retirement System oversight 
functions.   
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implementation challenges and increased liability risks.  It has resulted in conflicts between fiduciaries 
and has arguably added to retirement system costs, resulted in foregone investment opportunities and 
added to enterprise-level risk exposures (which are discussed in the body of this report).  Legislative 
review and rationalization of the statutory structure for allocation of fiduciary authority and 
responsibilities is needed to resolve these issues.  
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Appendix I Policy Review 
 
SECURITIES LITIGATION 












litigation.  No 
stated dollar 
threshold.   
Substantially the 
same position.  
Loss threshold is 
$10 million. 
May move for 
lead plaintiff 
status if losses 
exceed $5 million 
or other 
opportunities to 
enhance value or 
deter conduct. 
Monitoring done 
by Fund 5 
counsel, which 
may hire a 
support service to 
aid in such 
monitoring.  Loss 
threshold is $10 
million.  
Substantially the 
same position.  
Loss threshold is 
$20 million.  
Substantially the 
same position.  
Loss threshold 












evaluate.  Staff 
recommendation 
is reviewed by 
executive director.  
If seeking lead 
plaintiff status is 
appropriate, the 
case is referred to 
outside counsel 




submit a report 
and 
recommendation 
to allow sufficient 
time to take legal 
action.  
If after approved 









certain staff or 
Board.  Board 
approval 
required to 




















An informal group 





Not addressed. Not addressed. Committee 
reviews 
evaluation 
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SECURITIES LITIGATION 
Issue RSIC Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 5 Fund 8 Fund 12 






of the state 
retirement 




litigation.  Not 
binding on fund.  
determine 














lacks clarity as 
to final approval 









Not addressed. If determination is 
made to seek 
lead plaintiff 
status, fund will 






which must be 
approved by state 
agencies. 
Not addressed. May retain the 
law firm who 
notified the Fund 
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PLACEMENT AGENT 
Issue RSIC Fund 2 Fund 5 Fund 8 Fund 11 Fund 12 
General policy 
Does not prohibit, but 
requires disclosure of 




agents must agree to 
comply with the policy. 
External managers 
cannot cause the 
Board to bear any 
placement agent fee 
or expense.   
Cannot use 
placement agents to 
find investments, but 





decisions must be 
made solely on the 
basis of the 




working with an 
outside investment 
manager that is 
using the services of 
a placement agent. 




letter with due 
diligence report from 
direct and indirect 

















parties must provide 
written disclosure of 










CIO and internal staff 
review disclosure 
letters and determine 
if sufficient, referring 
questions to legal; 
prohibits voting before 
receipt of letter, 
unless exigent 
circumstances. 
Not addressed. Not addressed. 
Institutional controls 
in place to ensure 
full reporting of 
potential conflicts of 




process in place to 
review letters, 
notification of a 
party acting as 
placement agent in 
an investment 
transaction; includes 
internal controls at 




Not addressed Not addressed. 
Includes a remedies 
process. 
Not addressed. Not addressed. 
Option to terminate 
if fails to comply, or 
misstatement or 
omission. 
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PLACEMENT AGENT 
Issue RSIC Fund 2 Fund 5 Fund 8 Fund 11 Fund 12 
Notification process 
Provides that the 
Investment Manager 
will be notified of the 
policy as soon as 
practicable after begin 
due diligence review. 
Not addressed. Not addressed. Not addressed. Not addressed. 




*Policies include a list of items to include in the disclosure letter. 
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BOARD ETHICS 
Issue RSIC Fund 2 Fund 9 Fund 10 Fund 11 Fund 12 
Application of Policy 
Within Governance 
Manual.  Applies to 
Commissioners. 
Applies to Board 
members and staff 
Not Addressed 
Applies to 






Applies to all 
employees of 
the system. 
The Policy applies to 
















conflicts of interest 
and requires 
disclosure of same. 
Included. Included.  





reference to statutory 
requirement. 
Included based on 
statutory 
requirements. 








Not Addressed Not Addressed Not Addressed Not addressed. 





Not addressed. Not Addressed Generally included. Not Addressed Included. 
Includes rules and 
requirements 
applicable to 
reviewing books and 
records, audits, and 
internet publications. 
Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty and Enforcement 
Provides a process 
for enforcement and 
indemnification. 
Not Addressed Not Addressed Included. Included. 
Provides a process 
for enforcing fiduciary 
obligations. 
Gifts and Benefits 
Governed by statute; 
addressed in policy 
and Staff Gifts Policy. 
Not Addressed 
Includes guidelines 
on allowable gifts. 
Included. Included. 
Not Addressed; 








Includes a prohibition 
on writing or making 
any statement to the 
media purporting to 
represent the fund's 
Not Addressed Included. Not Addressed Not Addressed 
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BOARD ETHICS 
Issue RSIC Fund 2 Fund 9 Fund 10 Fund 11 Fund 12 
spokesperson. position. 
Nepotism 
Addressed by Ethics 
Act & Regulations 
Not Addressed Not Addressed Not Addressed 
Includes a policy 
on nepotism. 
Not Addressed 





Not Addressed Not Addressed Not Addressed 
Includes a 
prohibition on 
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EMPLOYEE ETHICS 
Issue RSIC Fund 2 Fund 9 Fund 10 Fund 11 Fund 12 
Application of Policy Code of Ethics and 
accompanying policies 
apply to RSIC Staff. 
Applies to Board 
members and staff 
Not Addressed Applies to 






Applies to all 
employees of the 
system. 
The Policy applies to 
the Comptroller, the 
officers and 
employees of the 







requirements with regard 
to conflicts of interest; 
does not detail all 
statutory requirements. 
Includes an explanation 
that staff cannot receive 
consideration or favors. 
Includes a 
description of 









Not directly addressed; 
generally restricted by 
statute. 
Included based on 
statutory requirements. 





Includes description of 
forms and reporting 
process. 
Not Addressed Generally 
included. 
Not Addressed Included. Included. 
Gifts and Benefits Includes guidelines on 
allowable gifts. 
Not Addressed Includes 
guidelines on 
allowable gifts. 
Included. Included. Not Addressed; 
covered by Public 
Officers Law 
Media Relations Not addressed herein. 
Covered in separate 
communications policy. 
Includes a prohibition 
on writing or making 
any statement to the 
media purporting to 
represent the fund's 
position. 
Not Addressed Included. Not Addressed Not Addressed 
Personal use of 
resources 
Generally addressed; 
also covered in Employee 
Handbook. 
Not Addressed Not Addressed Not Addressed Includes a 
prohibition on use 
of fund resources 
and personnel 
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INSIDER TRADING 
Issue RSIC Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 3 Fund 4 Fund 6 Fund 9 Fund 11 Fund 12 
Applicability This Policy 
applies to 
RSIC staff. 
The Policy applies 




and activities, as 


























































































and assets are 

































the Fund.  The 
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WHISTLEBLOWER POLICY 
Issue RSIC Fund 5 Fund 6 Fund 8 Fund 9 Fund 12 
General Whistleblower 
policy applicable to 
RSIC employees, 
pursuant to Audit 
Committee charter. 
Fund 5 is subject 
to a statutory 
whistleblower 
policy applicable 
to all state 
employees.  
Includes a 
statement of the 
policy's purpose and 
Fund's commitment 
to integrity. 
Fund 8 is subject 
to a statutory 
whistleblower 
policy applicable 
to all state 
employees.  
Fund 9 is subject to a 
statutory whistleblower 
policy applicable to all 






contained in directives 
















for how employees 
shall report improper 




allegations and who 












lies with an auditor.  
The statute requires 
that the auditor examine 









report on the findings 
of such investigations. 
Protection Employees making 
reports in good 












employees who file 
a report shall be 
protected as 
required by statute. 
Prohibits 
retaliatory action 





Identity of whistleblower 
shall remain confidential 
unless whistleblower 
consents to disclosure. 
Officers and 
employees acting in 
good faith are not 
subject to retaliatory 
dismissal, discipline or 
other adverse 
personnel action. 




wrongdoing via a 
supervisor, Audit 
Committee or OIG. 
Not included. Notes that 
allegations shall be 




action against an 
employee who 
knowingly makes 
false statements.  
Employees must make 
a reasonable attempt to 
ascertain the 
correctness of 
information supplied.  
Employees may be 
subject to penalties for 
knowingly supplying 
false information. 
Employee that is 
subject to 
investigation notified, 
who then has a right 
to representation.  
Final findings reported 
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COMMITTEE CHARTERS 















purpose of the 
committee and the 
authority of the 








authority of the 
committee and the 
matters for which 
the committee is 
responsible. 
Fund 5 has a single 
policy defining the 
role of each 
committee and its 
reporting 
responsibilities.  
The policy restricts 
the power of the 
Board to delegate 
certain duties.   
Each charter 
provides a broad 
statement of the 
purpose of the 




restricted in their 





the committee.  
This section 
generally defines 
the role of the 
committee, who it 
will report to and 
the extent of its 
authority.   
Composition Defines the 
members and/or 






included in the 
Governance 
Manual. 
Not addressed The charters define 
the number of 
members on the 
committees.  
Several policies 
also define how 
members are 
appointed to the 
committee. 
The policy does not 
define the 
composition of 
each committee.  
Rather, discretion 
is given to the 
Board chairman as 
to composition of 
each committee. 
Not addressed The policies 
provide a position 
description for the 
chair of the 
committee but do 
not otherwise 
discuss the 
makeup of the 
committee. 
Defines the size 
of the committee 
and the 
qualifications of 
those on the 
committee.   
Meetings Provides how often 
and in what 
manner the 
committees will 
meet.   
Not addressed The charters 
provide for how 
often committees 
are to meet and 
whether meetings 
can be called at the 
discretion of the 
committee chair or 
the Board chair. 




meetings of the 
committees. 
Provides how 




Minutes Requires regular 
reports to the 
Commission, but 
does not require 
the committees, 
particularly the IIC, 
to share minutes of 
meetings with the 
Commission.  
Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Requires 
committees to 
keep minutes to 
record all actions 
taken.   
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
229 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
COMMITTEE CHARTERS 
Issue RSIC Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 5 Fund 9 Fund 10 Fund 12 












regards to making 
recommendations 
and reports to the 
Board. 








The policy defines 
the responsibilities 
of each committee 
and the areas in 
which the 




provide a detailed 
list of duties and 
responsibilities of 
each committee.  
The charters 
generally require 
the committees to 
report findings to 
the Board.  
The policy defines 
the responsibilities 
of each committee 
and the areas in 
which the 






committees are to 
perform various 
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Appendix J Investment Manager Agreement Compliance Summary  
 
 Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E Fund F 
Part I:   Due diligence/Required approvals       
1. Commissioner/staff sourcing disclosure forms (governed by S.C. 
Code § 9-16-360) 
X X X X X NA 
2. RSIC staff due diligence report & recommendation   X X X X X X 
a. Required documents checklist X NA NA X X NA 
b. New investment procedural checklist X NA NA X X NA 
c. STO required information checklist X NA NA X X NA 
3. Investment consultant report X X X X X X 
4. Internal Investment Committee recommendation (IIC minutes) X X X X X X 
5. Internal Audit & Compliance completeness review X NA NA X X NA 
6. Certification of legal sufficiency X X X X X X 
7. Closing certification of RSIC Counsel & compliance with 30-day 
Commissioner review period? 
NA NA NA X X X 
8. Voucher and funding directive?  NA NA NA X X X 
9. Fully executed investment agreements (IMA/LPA/LLC Operating 
Agreement/Subscription Agreement/ Side letter, as applicable)? 
X X X X X X 
Part II:   Key Documentation       
10. Ethics/standards of conduct compliance X X X X X X 
11. Most favored nations clause X X X X X X 
12. Recognition of fiduciary status X X X N
16
 X X 
13. Valuation policies and reporting by manager  X X X X X NA 
14. Manager to provide information such that RSIC can comply with 
ongoing due diligence requirements (Quarterly, Semi-annual and 
Annual reporting) 
X X X X X X 
15. Custody of assets (identification of service provider) X X NA X X X 
                                                     
16 Not specifically addressed, but General Partner is a fiduciary under Delaware law.  
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 Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E Fund F 
16. Notice of future wrongdoing/investigations by governmental 
authorities/lawsuits 
X X X X X X 
17. Transfers (GP will not unreasonably withhold consent to a 
transfer to an affiliate) 
X X X X X X 
18. RSIC is subject to the SC FOIA X X X X X X 
19. Sovereign immunity X X X X X X 
20. Venue/jurisdiction (limited to SC)/no waiver of jury trial X X X X X X 
21. Indemnification (limited by SC law) X X X X X X 
22. Placement Agent Disclosure Letter compliance X X X X X NA 
23. Web-based reporting (side letter controls to the extent web end-
use agreements conflict with confidentiality) 
X NA NA X X NA 
24. No political contributions X X X X X N
17
 
25. Compliance with fee reporting X X X X X NA 
26. Compliance with anti-money laundering laws and Patriot act X X X X X X 
27. Compliance with Sudan divestment policy (Note: SC Code § 9-16-
55(A)(6) exempts certain structures, e.g., limited partnerships 
and commingled funds.) 
NA NA NA NA NA X 
Part III:  Consistency of documents with Commission approval       
28. Correct fund X X X X X X 
29. Management fees/Carried interest X X X X X X 
30. Distribution waterfall (Preferred return/Hurdle rate) X X X X X NA 
31. Investment strategy/guidelines X X X X X X 
32. Personnel (e.g., key persons) X X X X X X 
33. Investment period X X X X X NA 
34. Term of agreement X X X X X NA 
35. Commitment amount not in excess of that authorized by 
Commission 
X X X X X NA 
 
                                                     
17 Not specifically addressed, but IMA requires Manager to comply with the Investment Advisors Act and other applicable law, and, thus is broadly covered.  
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Appendix K Scope of Work 
 
1. Governance 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s governance in terms of 
fiduciary and staff roles, responsibilities, policies, procedures, and statutory requirements, which will 
address, at a minimum, the following specific issues: 
A. Review of applicable laws, policies and procedures (to include Investment Commission 
governance manuals, policies and procedures)  
B. Investment Commission charter – roles and responsibilities of commissioners; identification of 
fiduciaries and/or the existence of “de facto” fiduciaries; fiduciary education; meeting protocols; 
and strategic planning and implementation process  
C. Role of the internal audit department and adequacy of audit plans  
D. Role of Audit Committee in policy compliance, and scope of Audit Committee charter  
E. Role of the Investment Commission in the annual external financial audit for the Retirement 
System  
F. Indemnification/use of fiduciary liability insurance  
G. Board, COO, and CIO evaluation processes and criteria, and level of delegation of authority to 
COO and CIO (roles and responsibilities)  
H. Investment Commission communication policy  
I. Review the investment decision-making process (Internal Investment Committee and 
Investment Commission)  
 
2. Policy review and Development 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s existing policies and 
policy development to determine whether RSIC’s policies, procedures, practices and functionalities were 
properly documented, implemented, and reflective of the Investment Commission’s established 
investment goals, risk tolerances and governance. The review will address, at a minimum, the following 
specific issues:  
A. Ethics Policy and enforcement for identifying, disclosing, reporting, and mitigating conflicts of 
interest (to include, travel/gift policy, and expense reimbursement policy)  
B. Investment policy (Annual Investment Plan and Statement of Investment Objectives and Policy)  
C. Investment funding process  
D. Staff compensation policy  
E. Securities litigation policy  
F. Risk Management Policy  
G. Whistleblower Policy  
H. Procurement policy  
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3. Organizational Structure 
 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s current organizational 
structure as it relates to roles of the commissioners, staff and other fiduciaries over the investments and 
operations of RSIC’s responsibility to the Retirement System. The review also focused on ascertaining 
whether there is a need for clarification and/or additional specification of the respective roles and 
responsibilities of the Investment Commission and RSIC staff. The review will address, at a minimum, the 
following specific issues:  
 
A. Roles and responsibilities of key staff, including PEBA investment accounting relationship for the 
investment portfolio  
B. Staff position description review  
C. Staffing by functional area compared to peers 
D. Type, skill sets, and credentials of staff  
E. Training of staff and education policies  
F. Standard operating procedures manual  
G. Reporting lines, spans of control, and segregation of duties, including cash movement 
procedures  
H. Adequacy of reporting and disclosure from staff to IC and other stakeholders to facilitate 
oversight  
 
4. Investment Administration 
 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s key investment 
administration functions; investment management structure; asset allocation strategy and process; due 
diligence, and internal controls in RSIC’s investment of Retirement System funds. The review will 
address, at a minimum, the following specific issues:  
A. Process for setting asset allocation in light of plan liabilities and resources used; use of various 
asset classes, sub-asset classes, and use of alternative investments in the portfolio  
B. Implementation strategies (active versus passive, and internal versus external management)  
C. Methodology used to determine acceptable level of risk, portfolio risk and risk budgeting  
D. Process for portfolio rebalancing  
E. Due diligence process used to select investment managers, frequency and quality of manager 
monitoring, and investment manager contracts (general terms and conditions), to include 
internal controls identified as less than adequate in prior audits  
F. Investment manager contracts 
G. Investment cost management strategies 
H. Process for reviewing reasonableness of investment manager fees by asset class, individual 
investment, and/or peer comparisons  
I. Internal control structure for investments 
J. Use of investment consultants  
K. Investment consultant reports (usefulness, timeliness, accuracy, etc.)  
L. Process and criteria to evaluate the investment consultant’s effectiveness  
M. Process to establish performance metrics, benchmarks for each asset class/style, use of peer 
comparisons  
N. Independence, accuracy, and usefulness of return calculations and reporting  
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O. Custodian bank contracts (service levels, fees, fiduciary provisions, etc.)  
P. Custodian bank securities lending capabilities and programs, including fee splits, adequacy of 
collateral in lending programs, and third party securities lending agents  
Q. Reasonableness of custodian bank fees 
R. Methods for monitoring and evaluating custodian bank services  
S. Commissioners access to information  
T. Adequacy of tools and resources, other than IT related  
U. Process used to ensure adherence to investment decision making process  
 
5. Legal Compliance 
 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s legal compliance with 
existing laws and statutes governing the RSIC and the Retirement System. The review will address, at a 
minimum, the following specific issues:  
A. Use of internal legal counsel  
B. Role of legal counsel, in investment and due diligence processes  
C. Board and staff compliance with plan documents  
D. Compliance with “prohibited transactions” requirement  
 
6. IT Systems 
 
The review will include an evaluation for reasonableness and adequacy of RSIC’s information technology 
systems and availability of tools and resources for RSIC commissioners, staff and fiduciaries to effectively 
administer the assets and funds of the Retirement System. The review will address, at a minimum, the 
following specific issues:  
A. Adequacy of investment, risk management, accounting and compliance systems, tools and 
resources 
B. Investment systems 
C. Risk management systems 
D. Accounting systems 
E. Compliance systems 
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Appendix L Fiduciary Audit Team 
 
The Funston Advisory Services (FAS) team brings a combination of experience and expertise 
which will apply an external perspective of leading and prevailing practices and identify 
improvement opportunities for the RSIC. 
• The team includes recognized experts in public pension governance, investments, 
operations and accounting. 
• The legal team from Reinhart Law has applied its significant experience assisting major 
public pension funds in governance and fiduciary policies and issues. 
• Information technology expertise was provided by Cutter Associates, a leading IT and 
operations consultant to asset managers. 
• CEM, the pension industry standard for cost and returns benchmarking, has compared 
RSIC’s costs and returns to their peer database to establish the best “fact set” on RSIC 
performance and costs. 
• A custom benchmarking survey covering a range of topics was completed for this review 
with a peer group of all public pension investment boards in the U.S. with their own 
investment staff managing at least $10 billion. 
FAS has completed four similar assignments for other major public pension funds (CalPERS, 
Oregon Investment Council, New York State Common Retirement Fund, School Employees’ 
Retirement System of Ohio) over the past three years and has utilized its extensive database of 
leading and prevailing practices in public pension fund governance, policies and operations. 
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Appendix M Glossary of Terms 
 
AC  Audit Committee 
AG  Attorney General 
AIP  Annual Investment Plan 
BCB  Budget and Control Board 
BNYM Bank of New York Mellon 
bps  Basis points 
CAFR Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
CEM Cost Effectiveness Management Inc. 
CIO  Chief Investment Officer 
COO Chief Operating Officer 
FAS   Funston Advisory Services LLC 
GPM Governance Policy Manual 
HEK Hewitt EnnisKnupp  
IACD Internal Audit and Compliance Department 
IIC  Internal Investment Committee  
ISBI  Illinois State Board of Investment 
NMERB New Mexico Educational Retirement Board 
PRIM  Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Mgmt. Board 
OSIG  Office of the State Inspector General  
PEBA  Public Employees Benefits Administration 
PIC  Performance Incentive Compensation 
PIO  Public Information Officer 
RSIC  Retirement System Investment Commission 
SBA State Board of Administration of Florida  
SBI   Minnesota State Board of Investment (SBI) 
SIOP  Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies 
STO State Treasurer’s Office 
SWIB  State of Wisconsin Investment Board  
WSIB  Washington State Investment Board 
WVMB West Virginia Investment Management Board  
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Appendix N  Response from Retirement System Investment Commission 
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April ll, 2014 
Mr. Pab;ck J. Maley, Inspector General 
South Carolina Office of the Inspe-ctor Gene.ral 
111 Executive Center Drive, Suite 204 
Colwnbia, SC292 10 




J{u;!.ltUIIA ... u. )1. O;<. 
<:ouu ll<' l$l)ll.." o (lo o u .. ut 
\\'(; .... ~~ ....... . 
C.uu o .. ~ .. u-.. o.. .... . 
Re: Fiduciary Performance Audit o f the South Carolina Retit'ement System 
Investment ColllUlission (Funston Ad,risory Set1.rices, LLC) 
Oe.a.r Mr .. Maley: 
We collllllend the Office of the Inspector General ("'OIG") for the professionalism, civility and 
efficiency with u·bich OIG and Funston Ad,risory Services, l.LC \f'ASj have conducted this 
fiduciary performance audit The OIG and F AS h ave done an admirable job of quickly grasping 
a. gre_a.t deal of complicated investment, legal and other infonna.tion. They showed respect and 
courtesy towards fhe members o f the Commission and Ret:irement System Investment Cou:unission 
("RSICj staff dwing this entire process.. We a.t-e deeply appreciative of yow· efforts, and think 
OIG and F AS have pro1.rided a thoughtful road map for how we m ay aU "move fotward. •• 
We believe that this t-epot1t-eempbasizes to our stakeholders both the importance o f fhe work that 
the Cou:unission does and the dedication u<ith \\tbich the Commission and its professional staff 
ca.ny out theU· responsibilities to the SCRS trust funds. 
We are pleased that yet another independent expert has determined that no indicators of 
tnalfeasance or misfeasance elrist with regard to fhe CoDWlission 's C'lUlU t policies and practices. 
We also are very patified u<ith fhe finding by PAS that, «Investment fee transparency, policies 
and conb·ols have improved significantly; disclosure o f total external management fees is the most 
complete in the indusby." We tl'ust that the r ecord on these two mattet'S is now clear and final. 
F AS • report also serves as yet anofhet· remindet· that fhe u·otking t-ela.tionship bem·een RSIC and 
STO must improve. We t-eitetate our commitment and willingness to tackle this issue. We hope 
that the Trea.sw·er and staff of the STO will join us in this effort. 
We appreciate the observations and recommendations made by F AS t-egarcling areas for potential 
improvement. Like others before it -- the OIG in 20 13 and the Senate Finance ColllDlittee•s 
PHONE 803.7l7.6885 I FAX 803.737.7070 
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Special SubcolllUlittee to Review the Investment of State Retirement Funds on April l , 2014 --
F AS noted that ~IC has ah eady implemented many improvement initiatives over the past h\•o 
years"' and listed 13 examples of such initiatives in its Executive Sw:nmaty . The Commission 
values this acknowledgment by an independent industry expert of the significant progress that we 
have made in r eeent years regarding processes and procedures, including the documentation of 
due diligence and validation of fees. We realize that further improvements and enhancements need 
to be m ade. 
It is also important for us to provide all stakeholders of the South Carolina Retirement System trust 
funds with RSIC management's candid perspective on some of the eballenges that must be faced 
along the way. Full implementation of the recommendations made by FAS u<ill only be possible 
if there is both a significant commitment of time and r esources by the Commissionet"S and RSIC 
staff. and a similarly significant commitment o n the part o f the Legislative and Executive 
Branches. There are a number of t'ee:ODWlendations made by FAS which the Commission is able 
to - and \\till - address with existing delegations o f authority and resow-c:es. Thet-e are, however, 
a good number of instances u•here the Legislative: and Exeeutive Branches alone hold the power 
to implement F AS' recommended solutions by changing existing delegations of authoti ty and/or 
pennitting the expenditw·e of additional bwt funds by the Commission. 
The FAS report serves as a useful reminder that the CoDltll.ission is still a young, evolving 
organiz.ation in a very dynamic, ever-changing bus.iness. As such, we intend to continue to review 
important operational aspects of our business and S'eek wotthwbile process improvements. Indeed, 
the Coaunis:sion has o -eated an Ad Hoc Planning Committee u·hose charge includes a review of 
F AS • recommendations. The Planning Committee has already held an initial m M:ting and will 
continue to wotk wi th RSIC senior man.age ment to review, ptioritize and implement 
t'ee:ODWlendations made by F AS along with o ther strategic initiatives detetmined by the 
Commission. 
On behalf of the entire Coaunis:sion and its staff. p lease accept our thanks for a job well done. 
Sineet-ely, 
W . Greg Ryberg 
Chief Operating Officer 
PHONE 803.737.6885 I FAX 803.737.7070 
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Appendix O Responses from State Treasurer’s Office 
At the request of the Treasurer’s Office we are also including STO response from March 10 to 
the March 3, 2014 Status Report as well as the response to the Draft Final Report. 
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THE HONORABLE CURTIS M. LOFTIS, JR. 
Mr. Rick funston 
Managing Partner 
Funston Advisory Services LLC 
591 Rudgatc Road 
Bloomfield Hills, Ml 48304 
Dear Mr. Funston: 
Sratc "hc:aswcr 
March IS, 2014 
This letter is in response to the request for an opinion of the State Treasurer's Office (STO) 
regarding the March 3, 2014 draft of the "Fiduciary Performance Audit of the South Carolina 
Retirement System Investment Cemmission." The fiduciary audit of the Retirement System 
Investment Commission (RSIC) is being conducted by Funston Advisory Services, LLC, 
pursuant to State law. 
STO reDden its opinion based on specific factors and related laws and statutes. The following 
facto.s should also serve as the foundation of the recommendations of the fiduciary audit RSIC 
is responsible for inveslment decisions alfectiog the South Carolina Retirement Systclllll (SCRS), 
wbich include five defined benefit public pension plans. In addition to RSIC and its Chief 
Investment Officer, the fiduciaries to SCRS and its plan panicipants and beneficiaries are the 
State Treasurer, the Budget and Centrol Board, and the Public Employee Benefit Authority. 
By law, the State Treasurer is a fiduciary to SCRS in three roles: as statutory custodian of all 
ofSCRS' funds, as a voting memberofRSIC, and as a voting member of the Budget and Centrol 
Board.' The STO has focused its review of the "Fiduciary Performance Audit of !he South 
Carolina Retirement System Investment Cemmission" primarily on the portions of the draft 
report that address the three fiduciary roles that the State Treasurer has regarding SCRS. 
1 1'he State Treasurer his 1 un)que role regJrdi"'8 the SCRS.. Rrst. the State Treasurer serves as cu.slodlan or the 
funds In the SCRS. S.C. Code Ann.. §9--1·1320. In this rol~. he seNe:S IS an •other fiduciary"' with respect to the 
SCRS pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §9-16-40. Op. Att'y Gen. p. 12 (Nov. 16, 2011). Second. tht State Treuurtr se!W's 
ex-officio as a member of the s~en-member RSIC illnd Is therefore a fiduciary to SCRS. S.C. Code Ann. t9-1&-
31S(A)(2). The RSIC Is r~Jpons:lbte for Investing the assets of the SCRS. hlrtng staff, and euabll.shlns Investment 
objectives. SeeS. C. COde Ann.§§ !H&-50, 9·16-315(G), 9-16-330(A). As a member of the RSIC, the State 
Treasurer is also a fldudary. S.C. Code Ann.§ 9-16·10(4)(c). Third, the Stilte Treasurer Mtrves as a mtmber of tt'le 
Budget and Control Board which Is o trustee of SCRS. 
(803) 73+2101 Fu (803) -3+2690 
.... w. U'C2SU.ttt..tC-fP" 
Paot Office Boo It .,..8 
Columb.., SC 292t I 
Uo.k H.omp<oD Bw.din&. 1200 Saurc Sa= 
Colwnb,._ SC 29201 
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STO asks that the foUowing amendments be made to the March 3, 2014 draft repon before it 
is issued in itS final form. Many of these items in Ibis memo were shilled during the interview 
Funston oonductccl with two STO staff. Amendments arc !iSied below. Detailed notes clarifying 
each amendment follow the list. 
STO recommends the foUowing revisions or additions: 
I. Funston should either remove references to the Treasurer's uconflicting fiduciary duties" 
or make a clear finding of such a oonnict, providing a full and detailed expl8118tion of any 
named oonflicL 
2. Funston shoul<l not recouunend that RSIC or PEBA be named custodian or be named in 
charge of the custodial activities. Naming RSIC or PEBA as custodian or bead of 
custodial activities violates the integrity of the control environment by creating a lack of 
segregation of duties. Alternatively, if Funston docs not alter its draft recommendations 
on custodial activities, it should choose to add a fifth alternative undeT which lhe STO 
remains the s!atutorycustodian ofSCRS' funds. 
3. Funston should not recommend that RSIC or PEBA take over custodial duties because 
recommending such a change in lhe fiduciary structure violates the principles of 
segregation of duties and greatly increases the risk to the Stete, its taxpayers who may be 
called upon to make up for uny shortfall or losses, and the plan's panicipants and 
beneficiaries. 
4. Funston should name which eotity holds responsibility for investment valuations or 
clariJY if and where any joint responsibility exists. Funston should abo spocify to the type 
of audit to which it is refening. 
5. Funston's report should clearly state that RSIC directly caused much oflhe lack of trust 
and confidence between STO and RSIC because i.hc RSIC refused, and in some cases, 
continues to refuse, access to information tequired by the STO. Such trust and confidence 
can be rebuilt only when RSlC has consistently demonstrated that it has reversed course 
from the causes of the lack of trust and confidence. 
6. Funston should not recommend that RSIC should be exempted from procurement and 
budgetary restrainls, given that the fund oversight is critical and that RSIC lacks 
investment "back office" professionals wii.h procurement experience in specialized 
systems. 
7. Funston should revise page 68. "RSlC indicates that negotiations for the new BNYM 
custody agreement did not meet its needs and because of ctissatisfaction with the 
contracting process, RSIC was foreed to issue an RFP". RSlC and PEBA were both 
involved in the drafting ofSTO's RFP for custodial and securities lending services, 
which ouyjned services and needs for all partjes, 
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8. Funston ~bould revise pages 69 and 71 based on detailed notes on pages 10 and II. 
Improved communication and proper sharing of information, make options 1-4 
llllllCCeSSIU}' and in compliance with existing law and proper separation of duties. 
9. The report should reflect tlult, outside of daily work process! ng, RSJC has been 
unresponsive to BNYM. In addition, with respect to the statement, uBNYM will not take 
corrections of BNYM records from statement directly from PEBA. Corrections must be 
sent to RSIC to forward onto BNYM." 
10. Funston should clarify the roles regarding securities lending. State law docs not give 
RSIC the authority to enter into Securities Lending Agreements2• 
II. FU!!ston should amend lhc SUitcmmt, "The inltiBI direaion was to rapidly diversify what 
bad been a traditional stocks and bonds portfolio to improve long-term Jeturng," as it does 
not reflect tho fact that a legislative mandate to rapidly diversify without proper "back 
office" operations never existed. 
12. Funston should amend the smtement, "RSIC lacks automated systems in a number of key 
areas" to rcOect the fact that RSJC has bad numerous opponunities and resources to 
secure automated systems and has failed to do so. Funston should also amend, "The 
RSJC custodial relationship with the Treasurer and BNYM is cumbersome, strained .. . ", 
as the statement above does not include efforts by both STO and BNYM to accommodate 
RSIC. In addition, Funston should add "the deliberate decision to not malce use of 
available funds wben critical services were needed should be added to the repon". 
13. Funston should remove the statement(s) 3.2. "whereas overall, STO is hindering the 
operations of RSIC," as it is false and offers no proof of hindrance. The report should be 
corrected a.s the signature process has not resulted in the loss of interest earnings. 
Funston should clearly state that signed fax directives are a requirement or BNYM (not 
STO) and should be noted in the report. 
14. The STO is concerned about the reasonableness of the peer size mentioned in the report. 
In order to appropriately comment, the STO had hoped to respond based on a review of 
the CEM report. On March 3, 2014, the STO requested Funston provide the rcpon. 
Funston agreed to provide the CE.\i report, but stated it is still being reviewed and is not 
ready for distribution. 1Dc STO stands ready to provide a respon...<e as soon as tbe CEM is 
received. Sampling of peers is not the optimal way to detennine best practices. Many 
l .. ,, is Important to note that S.C. Code Ann. § 11·9-660(8} expressly grants the State Trusurer (and ONLY the 
State Treasurer) 1uthortty to •contract to lend securities Invested pursu~t to this section• which covers •all funch 
of the S~te.• See also S.C. Code Ann. § 9·1·1320 which rMkes the State Trelturer custoc:Uan of the funds in the 
SCRS. State law does not grant RSIC any authority to enter Into s~rities lendln& arranaements: 
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March 18, 2014 
Page4 
plans "evolved" to their pn:sent structure and would no doubt be organized differently if 
allow~:<!. 
15. The STO has questions regarding the manager fees mentioned in the report. In order to 
appropriately comment, the STO had hop<:d to respond based on a review of the CEM 
report. On March 3, 2014, the STO requested Funston provide the report. Funston llg)'eed 
to provide the C:EM report, but stated it u still being reviewl:d and is not ready for 
distribution. The STO stands ready to provide a response as soon as the CEM is received. 
16. Funston should include specific implementation dates in the report as they are an 
important part of accurately reflecting when changes or improvements take place. 
Detailed notes expliuting above amendments are u foUo,.s: 
1. Preliminary Overall Recommendation•, Conflicting Fiduciary Dullea. page 26 
Under the recorrunendation to "[a]lign fiduciary duties and responsibilities," Funston 
notes, "Tbe Legislature should resolve the Treasurer's conflicting fiduciary duties." 
Funston lw not provided evidence to conclude that the State Treasurer's fiduciary duties 
conflict, how they conflict, or to what extent they conflict. Funston should either remove 
references to the Treasurer's "conflicting fiduciary duties" or make a clear finding of 
such a conflict and provide a full explanation of any such conflict. Proper segregation of 
duties entails separating the following three functions: authorizing investments and cash 
disbursements (performed by RSJC and to some degree PEBA), performing the 
aro>unting for SCRS (done by PEBA), and having custody of the as~ts ofSCRS (done 
by STO). The Treasurer's fiduciary duties are entrusted to him as an elected 
representative of the people, including retirees. This representation explains his triple 
fiduciary responsibilities. The people's presence, in the person of the State Treasurer, 
creates no eonfliet. 
2. Preliminary Overall Recommendations, Imnroving the Custodian Bellttiorubip!. 
uge27 
Funston provides four alternatives "to improve the RSIC relationship with the custodial 
bank which are based on peer investment board policies and procedures." STO lw 
several comments about this recommendation. 
a. The main goal should not be "to improve RSIC's relationship." The goal should 
be to achieve what is best for the plan's participants and beneficiaries by 
improving the overall control environment surrounding SCRS. I laving STO as 
the custodian of SCRS' assets provides a needed control by ensuring proper 
segregation of duties. 
RSIC is an important part of SCRS because sound inveslment decisions are 
crucial, but RSIC is only one p:ut of SCRS. Making RSIC operations easier is a 
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valid goal. but ease of operations should not deter the implementation of good 
segregation of duties in functions that require the highest level of proper oversight 
and regulation. Again. proper segregation of duties divides the following three 
fun<:tions: authorizing investments and cash disbursements (performed by RSIC 
and to some deg"'e PEBA), performing the accounting for SCRS (done by 
PEBA), and having custody of the assets ofSCRS (done by STO) is critical. 
The SEC has recognized the in~ risk incurred when an investment adviser 
(e.g., RSIC) also has custody of the assets that it manages. In response to such 
frauds perpeU'8tA:d by Madoff and others, the SEC extended rules relatod to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to impose additional controls on investment 
advisers who also have custody of clients' assets. Here, custody includes anyone 
who has control of the assets or can authorize that the assets be disbursed or 
otherwise transferred to another. Therefore, ifRSIC is given custody, as more 
than one of the recommendations slates, the assets of the SCRS would be in a 
position of high risk, as recognized by the SEC, because its investment adviser 
would also have custody of its assets. Therefore, RSIC should not have custody 
ofSCRS' assets because it also authorizes SCRS' investment transactions. 
Even theugh the SEC imposed additional controls on private investment advisers, 
those controls do not prevent fraud from occurring and are not applicable to 
public pension plans. STO believes that the control environment for a public 
pension plan should be even stronger than the controls the SEC has imposed on 
private investment advisers and acoordingly, that SCRS should have a separate 
custodian. 
Under each of the four alternatives, either RSIC or PEBA would be the custodian 
or be in charge of custodial activities. STO does not believe a recnm..,...,tlotion 
that RSIC or PEBA be the custodian or in charge of the custodial activities is 
prudent because this actually harms the control environment by creating a lack of 
segregation of duties. Should the four alternatives remain as recommendations, a 
fifth alternative should be includod whereby the STO remains the statutory 
custodian of SCRS' funds. 
It is indisputable that the involvement of the State Treasurer, and STO as n whole, 
serving as a custodian of SCRS' !ISsets and as a member of RSIC has "'sultod in 
RSIC making many needed and significant improvements to its operations and 
control environment. With this level of success, it is unconscionable to remove 
the State Treasurer as custodian of SCRS funds. 
b. STO believes that the alternatives should not be selectA:d merely because another 
public pension plan operates in a certain manner. Just because another public 
pension is working with a custodial bank in a certain manner does not mean that 
the practice provides the proper level of safekeeping of pension assets or proper 
segregation of duties. 
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c. In addition to segregation of duties problem, Alternative # I is flawed because it 
suggests that STO, who is tbe stat11tory custodian, should abdicate all of its 
custOdial responsibilities and give all of its custodial responsibility to RSIC. First, 
this is not the will of the General Assembly pursuant to Section 9-1-1320. 
Second, as a fiduciary, STO cann01 abdicate its responsibilities. 
d. In addition to being obstacles to the segregation of duties. Alternatives 112 and 3 
are flawed because they suggest that the General Assembly shall give all custodial 
responsibilities to RSlC but make STO or PEBA the custodian of record. STO 
believes that appointing STO or PEBA as custodian of record while allowing 
RSIC to contract with its own cus!Odial bank and manage its own custodial 
banking relationship provides no tenefit or protection to SCRS or its plan 
participents or beneficiaries au..J aui:;.n~pr~Ls the custodial relationship. 
e. Alternative N 4 is flawed because it clearly violates the principles of segregation 
of duties. Here, RSIC would authorize investment transactions while olso 
maintaining custody of the SCRS' assets. A person or entity serving in both 
capa<:ities creates high risk. The puticipants and beneficiaries of a public pension 
plan deserve a better internal contr:>l environmenL 
The STO is dedicated to creating a seamless custodial relationship with RSlC and PEBA, 
while also ensuring that proper controls are in place to protect the assets of SCRS. The 
STO has recenlly hired a full time, well qualified individual to serve as its Custody 
Officer. Tbe Custody Officer will act as the STO's liaison to the custodial bank in order 
to ensure that RSlC, PEBA, and STO are provided the quality of services. The Custody 
Officer's duties include, but are not limited to, developing and maintaining effective 
relationships with all internal and external stakeholders, with focused coordination of 
functions among the State Treasurer, RSIC, PEBA, and the custodial bank; overseeing 
service provider relationships and holding service providers accountable for agreed upon 
service levels; and ensuring that proper in~m~al con1r0ls are created and maintained and 
that all applicable parties comply with applicable state and federal regulations and 
contractual obligations. The addition of a Custody Officer further demonstrates the 
STO's commitment to improve the custodial relationship for RSIC, PBBA, and STO. 
3. Fiduciary Dulles and Autborlties, Con!!jctlng Fiduciary Duties. pacg 58-6(). and 63 
STO disagrees with the Funston conclusion that the "existing fiduciary structure is 
unduly complex and misaligned in regard to the roles, responsibilities Wld authorities of 
the various fiduciaries." Any perceived problems with the fiduciary structure were 
caused by RSIC's failun:, and continued failure, to share information with a co-fiduciary 
and RSlC's failure to ma.lr.e needed improvements to its operational controls in a timely 
manner. Again, if the Slate Treasurer had not asked tough questions and dutifully 
continued to seek necessary infonnation, RSIC would not have made the significant and 
overdue recent improvements that Funstor. has noted during the audit. These questions 
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and re<[Uests are being transformed into an allegation of problems with the fiduciary 
S1rU<:t\ft, when in fact the curront fiducillty otructwc allowed- and demanded- Ow the 
Swe Treaswer ask these questions and l8jiiCS1 cenain information. 
Additionally, Funston has concluded that the State Treasurer has conflicting fiduciary 
roles. This is a false assumption. First, the State Treasurer is a fiduciary in three roles. 
In two of those roles - a memberofRSIC and a member of the Budget & Control Board 
-he is one of numerous voting members. He has no control over these two fiduciary 
boards and possesses only one vote on each board. Suclt an arrangement docs not create 
a conflict among his fiduciary roles. In fact, his overall perspective of SCRS by looking 
at it from three different pcupectives makes him more valuable to SCRS BDG its plan 
particirants and beneficiaries. Most impcnantly, be is the people's elected representation 
in these positions. 
Finally, changing the fiduciary structure by giving RS!C or PEBA custodial duties 
violates tlte principles of segregation of doties and greatly increases the risk to the State, 
and its taxpoyers who may be forced to make up any shortfall or losses and ue plan's 
partieil'&ntS and beneficiaries. 
4. Prtlimlnarv Overall Re<ommrpdations. Investment Ve!gatjons, nage 24 
Funston recommends that the "Commission should have an annual external audit of fund 
valuations .. .. " Funston should clariJY this recommendation. An external auditor 
already performs an armual financial audit ofSCRS, which includes invesbnent 
valuations. Although STO has expressed concerns about these valuations, and continues 
to have questions of whether ''mnnaeemont" hos complied with iti respoMibJitieo 
reganli1g lhcse investment valuations, STO believes that Funston should ma.<e clear 
whether it is referencing this financial audit or some other type of audiL If Funston is 
referencing some other type of audit, please specify. 
Also !.here is a conflict about who should take responsibility for the investment 
valuations. Funston's dral\ report implies that RSlC has responsibility for investment 
valuations because Funston bas !()COmmended that RSIC should have an aucLt of 
valuations. RSIC's responsibility of inv~lment valuations was also noted b) Oeloinc in 
one of ils reports to RSIC. Ho~ver, PEBA has taken the role of "management" of 
SCRS and, lberefore, has taken rcsponsibaity for SCRS' financial statemcnU, which 
includes invcshnent valuations. The STO believes that PBBA has taken lhis 
responsibility for the financial statements without proper altestatin-. hy RStr. leodersbip 
that the financial and investment infonnation convoyed to PEBA is "full and complete". 
Funston should make clear which entity has responsibility for invesbnent valuations or if 
joint responsibility exists. 
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S. lmoroy!pg A&.<ur>~nce & lndeMndrnt Reassurance to Build Trust and ConOdtnre, 
pagg 29.39 and 81 
Funston concludes that "[t)o be successful, the eocecutives and staff need the trust and 
support of the fiduciaries, the beneficiaries and other key stakeholders." This is an 
admirable goal, but the report does not clearly state the behaviors that led to the lack of 
o·u:.t wnl confidence in RSJC that certain fi~ucianes 1\ave experienced. Funston's report 
should clearly state that RSIC directly caused much of the lack of trust and confidence 
between STO and RSIC and that such trust and confidence can be rebuilt only when 
RSIC bas comistently demonsuated that it has reversed course from the causes of the 
lacl< of trust and confidence and provides requested infonnation in a timely manner. 
First, until September I 0, 2013, RSIC improperly imposed a cloak of secrecy on its 
activities by preventing the State Treasurer or the State Treasurer's Office staff from 
seeing various investment·related infom>ation. RSIC ol\en refused to provide requested 
infonnation to STO staff. Finally, the lnsp:ctor General apparently convinced RSIC that 
its poncy of secrecy was wrong. Shortly after the Inspector General's July 2013 report 
found that RSIC was, "inappropriately restricting infonnation access to the STO". It 
wasn't wttil September 10,2012, RSIC fuully allowed certain members ofSTO's staff to 
have access to documents. RSIC's cloak o: secrecy was the major cause of any lack of 
trust and confidence that exists between STO and RSIC. Second, RSIC bas known since 
about 2007 that it needed to implement many necessary internal controls, yet it failed to 
do so. STO does not believe that it is a coincidence that RSIC began to make some of the 
necessary improvements to its operations a.1d controls only after the current State 
Treasurer took office in 2011 and began to ask critical questions. Tbese questions and his 
requests were often met with resistance by RSIC. Nevertheless, overdue improvements 
were finally made in specific important arelS. RSIC's failure to provide documents in a 
timely manner. itS faih~ to make nec~saq improvementa to its systems that manage 
and monitor investments, and ilS negative response to the State Treasurer's questions and 
requests were major causes of any lack of t'llst and confidence. Even oow, RSIC 
continues to deny the State Treasurer infonnatioo, such as the standard and ordinary 
monthly reports from Russell, the Risk reports from Goldman Sachs, etc. The continued 
refusal to provide information should be noted in the report. 
Tbe South Carolina Attorney Oeneral stated in an April 12,2012 opinion that co-
fiduciaries have a duty to share information with each other and to keep eaeh other fully 
infonned. RSIC's failure to do so spurred alack of trust and confidence. The process 
will take time, but as RSIC shares information with STO and continues the process of 
implementing necessary operational contro:s, trust and confidence will be restored. 
6. Building Capabilities, Infra§!rueture plaaning, puaq Z4. 26. 40 42 and 54 
RSIC should not be exempted from procurement and budgetary requirements. 
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All expenditures by RSIC come out of the SCRS Trust and therefore reduce funds 
available to pay beneficiaries and ultimately increase the unfunded liability. The 
procwunent code of the Stale is structured to instill tranSparenCy and accountabiliry 10 
tbe spending of public funds, as is appropriate ,.;th trust funds. 
RSJC is already exempt from porticos of the S.C. procurement code when engaging 
investment managers through the c.xemption provided by the Budget and Control Board 
related to the hiring of investment managers. 
RSJC bad the abiliry 10 hire slaff and purchase systems but chose not to use available 
resources. RSIC bas a five or more year history ofoot using its full annual appropriation 
by an average of approximately $1,000,000 per year. Legislative approval played no pan 
in the shortfall of staffing or insufficient systems. The deliberate decjsjon not to maJce use 
ofayajlpblc funds when service' and staffing were crucja! js a critical issue and should be 
added to the reoort. Additionally, services RSIC expressed interest in are readily 
available through the custodial bank agreement without procurement delays. RSlC 
instead bas chosen to take a delayed approach for important services by issuing an RFP, 
and the results oftbe RFP may lack the synergistic effect that would occur if the same or 
similar tools were purchased form the custodial bank. PEBA (formally under the B&.CB) 
bas successfully managed wilh th.e same legislative budget oversight for years. 
RSJC is incortcct in stating the agreement did not meet its needs. RSIC and PEBA 
named representatives to serve on tbe procurement advisory panel. In facl, after the panel 
was set, RSJC's CIO, Hersbel Harper, asked also to be included on tbe panel, and STO 
agreed. Representatives from RStC and PEBA who served on the procurement advisory 
panel participated in the "Request for Proposal," "Reviewing of Proposal Responses," 
"Selection ofFirtnS for Site Visits," "Site Visits," and d1e "Scoring of Selected Firms." 
RSIC and PEBA were both involved in the drafting ofSTO's RFP for custodial and 
securities lending services wbjcb outlined services and needs for all parties. RSIC and 
PEBA representatives served on the procurement advisory panel and both had access to 
all of the bank's responses to the STO's RFP. Clearly, both RSIC and PEBA were 
deeply involved in the choice of a custodial bank as well as services needed. In the 
summer of20 12, the procurement advisory panel recommended thst STO retain the BNY 
as the StAte's custodial bank. 
Throughout the negotiating process, the STO contacted RSIC attorneys for specific items 
and corresponding language in the agreement. The custodian agreement was frnalized 
and sigoed December 30,2013. Communication with RSIC was inclusive during the 
entire BNYM agreentent negotiation process. 
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The report states that because of dissatisfaction with the contracting process, RSIC was 
forced to issue an RFP. This statement is incorrect M RSJC chose to ignore available 
funds for over five years thai should have been used to implement critical services. In 
September/October 2013, twO years after the STO issued an RFP for cus10dial services, 
RSIC created a RFP for an Admini•trator. The Administrator RFP was published during 
the same time period the custodian agreement was fmalized, but years after RSIC could 
have taken action. The contracting proccs.s htlld nothing to do with senicc.s RS1C 
neglected to seek, leaving the system at risk for many, many years. 
The report states there is an uab6cnce of a service level agreement or a dtfined process to 
manage the relationship between BNYM and RSIC". The STO bas recently bired a 
Custody Officer that will serve as the STO's liaison between RSIC, PEBA to ensure 
BNYM cootinues to provide quality services dictated in the custody agrecmen~ 
Performance evaluation is the responsibility of the RSIC. There is nothing contractually 
or by way of policy of the STO that would preclude the RSIC from initialing/requesting 
such governance tools. Tbc Custody Officer, however, will seek input from the STO, 
PEBA and RSIC regarding performance as it relates to service levels in the custody 
agreemenL 
The repo<1 should be amended to accurately reflect thai the agreement included RSIC's 
requested >eeds and services, u well as inclusion of the custody agreement negotiations 
when necessary. 
8. Treasurer'~ Role as Custodian. paces 69-71 
First, the State Treasurer serves as custodian of the funds of the Retirement System. See 
S.C. Code Ann. §9-16-1320 ("The Treasurer sball be custodian of the funds of the 
System {i.e., the Retirements System)") .... Second, State law provides t!Bt "[a]ll 
paymento from such funds sbnll be nu>dc by him [i.e>., the State Trcasw"r] uuly upon 
vouchers signed by twc persons designated by the Board"). 
"Authorizations" are clear, nnd the processes are consistent. STO's rcccr.Uy hired 
Custody Officer is addressing this review of authorization signers. In addition, the 
Custody Officer will be working with BNYM on a best practice review. Account level, 
transaction ilems, letters of direction, access to data, etc. are also being reviewed. Tbe 
Custody Officer will act u STO's liaison to the custodial bank in order to ensure that 
RSJC, PEBA, and STO are provided the quality of services as dictated in the custody 
agreement One of the focuses will be the coordination of functions among the Stale 
Treasurer, RSIC, PEBA, nnd the custodial bank; overseeing service provider 
relationships and holding BNYM accountable for agreed upon service levels; and 
ensuring that proper in1ernal controls are created and maintained and that all applicable 
parties comply with applicable state and federal regulations and contractual obligations. 
Tbe report notes signature approval process requirements to instruct the custodial bank to 
execute trmsaetions. Tbe request to execute transactions requires two sii!!JIIwes [rom 
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RSlC {not four). Funston should know that in 2007, the then State TR:8Suter abdicated 
his fiduciary responsibility as custodjan by allowing RSIC to deal directly with the 
custodial bank. In 2012, the current State Treasurer as a fiduciary and elected 
representative of the people, wan!ed to have more knowledge of the transactions going 
through the custodial account. The State Treasurer merely sought to have RSIC send its 
instructions to execute transactions to STO before the instructions went to the custodial 
bank. The change in 2012, added internal controls whereby the STO reviewed the 
instructions and then directed the custodial bank to execute the transactions. This was a 
major step in allowing !be State Treasurer to fulfill his fiduciary duties to preserve the 
trust and to safeguard SCRS' assets. 
Tbe repon states "electronic signatures are not pcnnitted" with respect to the BNYM at 
this time. While BNYM currently does not permit electronic si,gnatures, the State 
Treasurer's Office Custody Officer will be reviewing procedures/processes that arc 
currently in place while ensuring that internal conl!rols and compliance arc adhered to. 
Every opportunity to improve efficiencies will be reviewed. Again, open communication 
and contribution from both RSIC and PEBA arc imperative to a successful relationship. 
Improved communication and proper sharing of information makes options I - 4 
unnecessary and is in compliance with existing law and proper separation of duties. 
9. Cu1todial relationship ~straiged~. page 70 and 122 
The report should reflect that outside of daily work nrocessjng. RSJC has been 
unresponsive m BNYM. lf RSIC would engage in djnlogue with BNYM. the '\Urnined" 
relationship could be remed~ Example: The new Relationship E><ecutive has made 
multiple aUempts to meet with the RSIC since November. To date, !be RSIC has not 
agreed to such a meeting. 
STO is not aware of the relationship between PESA and BNYM as being "difficult" oor 
has STO put constraints on PEBA. PEBA works virtually every day with BNYM. By 
all known accounts, it is the opposite of difficult. Again, both RSJC and PEBA 
representatives participated on the procurement advisory panel that supported retaining 
BNYM as the State's custodial bank. 
Both PEBA and RSJC representatives also had full access to the BNYM's responses and 
to the BNYM's staff during visits in Columbia, New York, and Boston. With respect 10 
the statement. "B}IYM will oot take corrections of BNYM records from statement 
directly from PEBA. Corrections must be sent 10 RSIC to forward on to BNYM." Please 
refer to the previous statement in #3. Remember that changing !he fiduciary structure by 
giving RSJC or PEBA custodial duties violates the principles of segregation of duties and 
greatly increases the risk to the State, its taxpayers who may be forced to make up any 
shortfall or losses, and the plan's participants and beneficiaries. 
Tbe STO cannot enforce "happiness" concerning RS!C and the custody arrangements 
with BNYM. However, the STO can and does require that the important business of 
safekeeping the assets is professional, prudent and efficient. 
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10. Securities Lrnding. oagg 123 . 124 
The report states ~In the credit market collapseof2008.()9, many state pension funds 
inclU'l'ed lending losses. In South Carolina. such losses resulted in the STO filing a 
complaint in state court asserting claims against BNYM relating to the Securities Lending 
AgJeement, dated March 24, 2000, and BNYM's actions relating to funds in the 
Treasurer's Collateral Reinvestment Account" Sigoificantly, the South Carolina 
Attorney General became a party plaintiff in the litigation representing the interes1s of the 
State and actively pursued the litigation as the Chief Legal Officer of the State. 0:1 the 
other hand, RSIC knowingly and willfully declined to be a party plaintiff in the litigation. 
Dc!pite RSIC's unwillingness to join the litigation in name, RSIC was kept ableast of the 
litisation and the ensuing settlement negotiations from the outset, as evidenced by the 
ongoing efforts ofSTO's legal team, as well as RSIC's legal team, specifically, MI. Dori 
Dilly and Mr. Robert Feinstein of RSIC. Both continually assisted the STO's office 
throughout All depooitions, negotiation,, ar.d titigatio1.:;. lu fu~.:t, Ms. D itty was at every 
scheduled meeting regarding the litigation between the state and BNYM and played a 
crit:caJ role over the last 1.5 years. As the attorneys for RSIC were at every meetiog, 
F w:ston should remove these statements. 
RSIC has not sought approval to widen collateral reinvestment guidelines. In fact, 
Hershel Harper, RSIC's CIO, has been expressing doubt as to whether RSIC should 
engage in securities lending at all, as noted in the minutes of the Investment 
Commission's meeting$. The STO has llQ! been unresponsive, and the report should be 
conected. 
STO considen the establishment of collateral reinvestment guidelines to be an 
investment decision that is RSIC's alone!() make. Securities Lending is an investr.lent 
dec.sion. If at any time, STO receives a request from RSIC to change the collateral 
rei.nvutmcnt guidelines, including und~r the new SC~.:urilk~ lcmc.ling contract being 
finalized now, STO would review the request and work with the custodial bank to 
effectuate RSIC's investment decision. 
~RSIC has not been a party to th05e negotistions." The securities lending contnct with 
BNYM is in its final negotiating stages. Frst, RSIC is not a party to the cwrent or 
proposed securities lending contract because it is not authorized to be a party under State 
law. Section 11-9-660(8) expn:ssly grants the State Treasurer (and ONLY the Sta:e 
Treasurer) authority to "contract to lend se<>urities invested pursuant to this section" 
wWch covers "all funds of the State." The State law does not give RSIC the autl10rity to 
enter into securities arrangement. STO is merely negotiating a contJact based on terms 
and information from its RFP and BNYM's responses. As stated in #7, RSIC personnel 
participated in the procurement advisory panel, had input into the development of the 
RFP, noted services necessary to be included in the RFP, seleetion of firms, site visits, 
etc. 
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The contents of the contract will not be materially different from the terms and 
information that RSlC has bad access to sinee approximately 2000. BNYM has been and 
will continue to be in dialogue with both RSJC and STO regarding the future direetions 
of the lending program. 
The STO considers the recent disinformation disseminated by the RSlC concerning the 
BNYM settlement a breach of RSJC fiduciary responsibilities and evidence of why the 
STO should remain custodians of the funds. 
ll. Rapid p jvenlfication, page JJ.Jl 
The report notes "tapid diversification" but docs not mention the decision to deliberately 
neglect the office operations, putting its entire system at risk. There was never a 
legislative mandate to rapidly diversify without proper "back office" operations and this 
information should be added to the report. Diversification, along with the exercise of 
other fiduciary duties such as managing risk and income, the delegation of duties and the 
duty to monitor, etc., liflhe Comn1fssion, were to be exercised in a prudent fashion. The 
term "rapidly" (or any other synonym) was never used. The language used in the statute 
concerning diversification is ueut and paste" from the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, and 
is in multiple state statutes. 
The desire to rapidly diversify occurred in connection with adoption of Act I S3 of200S. 
The asset allocation mandate was approved in December 2006, reducing the Portfolio's 
long-only US equity exposure. The intention was to decrease the number of and/or reduce 
the allocation to long-only US equity managers and reallocate those assets to other 
investment alternatives. 
In 2007 and into 2008, at the time the portfolio was being rapidly tnmsitioned to broader 
asset classes, the STO was concerned that Commission resowus were not sufficient to 
adequately manage the risks of a dramatically more sophisticated portfolio. Significant 
reliance was placed on NEPC, the investment consultant, which described its role as 
investment policy development and review; portfolio structure development; asset 
allocation review; service provider searches; investment manager due diligence, and 
monthly and quarterly inves1ment performance analysis. Internal controls were at best 
oempromised, if not deficient, during this phase ofRSlC's history and have continued to 
be compromised until very recently. Audit and compliance functions were not 
established or well-developed. 
Under the administrations of Treasurers Ravenel and Chellis, the STO expressed 
concerns obout the pace of diversification, absence of documented plans of due diligence, 
risk implications of derivatives and alternative investments in the absence of a developed 
RSIC staff, and key man risk.. These concerns were largely ignored by RSlC, and the 
Treasurers did not perform the necessary follow-up. 
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The provisions of the Act addressing diversification remained relatively unchanged from 
prior enactments- a directive to diversify the investments of the retirement system unh:ss 
a reasonable detennination, because of special circumstances, is made that it is clearly 
prudent not tO do so. NEPC's letter dated November 7, 2007 and included in the 2007 
Annual investment Report stated that ~in order to achieve a more timely and efficient 
allocation across newly-approved asset classes, the Commission employed, at NEPC's 
recommendation, a beta overlay manager." This allowed the Commission to quickly 
implement portions of the newly approved asset allocation with the Russell Overlay 
Program. 
Accordingly, the Commission appeared to be following 11uidance of the CIO through the 
AlP process, developed at least in part in reliance on advice of lhe investment consultant, 
rather than express legislative intent We believe that this distinction is imponant 
The decision to nmidly diversify did not need tO be implemented immediately as the 
Portfolio's exposure to long-only US equity may be synthetically reallocated to new asset 
classes until such time as new managers are identified with the use of Russell "Overlay 
Program. Funston should remove the statement, "The initial direction WitS to rapidly 
diversify what had been a traditional stocks and bonds portfolio to improve long-term 
returns," as it is false. 
Unquestionably, a number of factors contributed to the decline in the funded ratio, and 
this phenomenon has been of panicular significance to the Office of State Treasurer since 
it has potential implications on the State's AAA credit rating. lbroughout the last decade, 
the funded ratio has declined continuously. prompting inclusion of that fact in all of the 
State's rating reports. and particularly by comparison to its AAA rated peers. 
Act 278 enacted a number of pension reforms to promote slllbili1y to the retirement 
systems funds. The rating services continue to express interest in the progress of these 
reforms, improvement in the funded status, and the concentration of the ponfolio in 
alternative investments, which has been described recently by one analyst as "quite high" 
RSIC has changed the definition of alternative iqv~ent, 1111d this unique definition has 
"reduced significantly" the amount of investment considered to be alternative. 
12. lnfral!!Juclllre and Cu•todian, page 43,64 and 70 
The rcpon states RSIC lacks automated systems in a number ofkey areas. RSlC has had 
ample opportunities to research and implement systems in all areas. Again, RSIC has n 
long history of not using its full annual appropriation by an average of approximately 
$1,000,000 per year. The deliberate decision to not make use of available funds when 
critical services were needed should be added to the report. 
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Page IS 
The report SillieS QED is out of date. The report should add that neither PEBA nor RSIC 
have ever expressed dissatisfaction with QED to the STO. The annual contract, in which 
all three organizations participate, was recently renewed. The STO will coordinate with 
PEBA and RSJC to determine what needs or improvements can be implemented. The 
report should be corrected as it incorrectly states "QED is provided by BNYM". QED is 
a stand-alone system and under a sep11r11te contract. It is neither associated with, nor 
provided by, the BNYM. Funston should remove or revise this statement. 
The report states, "The RSIC custodial relationship with the Treasurer and BNYM is 
cumbersome, stiained and inefficient, and bas caused the RSIC to look elsewhere for 
related services". This is not an ll<X:Ur8te assessment of the relationship and evidenced by 
the record. 
BNYM has made available to RSIC automated products such as "Private i" providing 
much needed look-through capabilities and many others. RSIC, until recently, repeatedly 
expressed interest in Private i, and other servjces. It important to note, services included 
in the agreement were based on input from RSJC during the RFP and site visit process. 
The services RSIC expressed interest in are readily available through the BNYM 
agreement without need of an RFP processed sbould be noted in the Funston repolt. 
More importantly, RSIC waited for years, disregarding the recommendations of 
consultants and external auditors, before detennining critical services were needed and 
just recently started looking elsewhere for services. RSIC is doing so to distance 
themselves from the Treasurer's dealings with BNYM. RSJC's desire to be its own 
custodian and thereby shedding prudent safeguards consistent with the STO as statuary 
cusiOdian, is the primary reason for RSIC cfi»tance themselves from the Treasurer's 
dealings with BNYM 
The report also states BNYM bas not responded to the need for additional services. 
BNYM sen.ior management has reached out to RSJC senior management on multiple 
occasions; however RSIC bas not responded. BNYM wori<s with both PEBA and RSIC 
on vi.rtually a daily basis. Neither BNYM nor STO is aware of any frustration for 
additional services by RSIC and would welcome the opportunity to clarify any 
misunderstandings. Funston should rephrase <>r eliminate this statement. 
Funston should also reword the statement, "RSIC lacks auiOmated systemS in a number 
of key areas" to include RSIC's inability or WI willingness to proeure by choice. 
13. Hindering Oeerations and Signature, page 101 
STO bas never intentionally hindered operations, refused 10 move money, or restricted 
any authorization signatures or their levels. The STO only requires two signatures from 
RSIC, a practice consistent with the movement of money by many investment managers. 
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The STO is unaware of any loss of RSIC interest earnings. This was discussed at an 
Investment Commission meeting and it was noted that at no time has the signature 
protocol ever caused a failure in processing. The report should be corrected as the process 
has not resulu:d in the IO$S of interest eamiJlis. 
The STO is unaware of any requested changes to authorization levels since the 
procedures were put in place. The report should reflect the STO bas not received 
authorization level cbanges from RSlC since the procedural change. 
The report incorreetly states "STO bas refused to allow requested changes to 
authorization signatures." STO has an established protocol for adding authorized 
signatures. STO has established a form that is completed and submitted to STO. Upon 
STO's review, STO then forwards the request to BNYM, and the authorization is 
completed. BNYM is not authorized to add/delete signature authorizations without the 
approval of the holder of the custodial agreement: STO. RSJC has been made aware of 
the procedure/protocol. STO has been extremely accommodating in ensuring that 
requests follow the established protocol. Last fall, RSlC anernpled to add Mr. Ryberg as 
an authorized signature. Tbe initial letter did not follow protocol, but Ms. Clarissa 
Adams (current STO chief-of-staff) responded stating, "In the interest of time, we have 
drafted the letter for you following the format outlined on March 15, 2013." The loner 
adding Mr. Ryberg to the signature list with maximum authority bas yet to be returned. 
As soon as Mr. Ryberg signs and submits the letter to the STO, signature authorization 
will be executed. Clearly, STO was not impeding the process. Instead, STO was aiding 
RSIC by expediting the process. 
Signed fax diRctives are a requirement of BNYM (not STO) and should be noted in the 
report. 
Funston should remove the entire section of 3.2, whereas overall, "STO is hindering the 
operations ofRSIC." as it is false or requires clarification. 
14. Peer sample s!u, na•el45 and page 160 
The STO has questions regarding the peer sample size. Sampling of peers is not the 
optimal way to determine a best practice. iMany plans "evolved" to their present 
structures and would no doubt be organized differently if allowed to be reviewed and 
restructured. 
In order to appropriately comment, the STO had hoped to respond based on a review of 
lhe CEM report. On March 3, 2014, the STO requested Funston provide the report. 
FUnston agreed to provide the CEM report, but stated it is still being reviewed and is not 
ready for distribution. The STO stands ready to provide a response as soon as the CEM is 
received. 
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15. Manager fees. pnge 22. 35. 37 and oagc 15§ 
Tile STO has questiOn$ regiUding the manager fees mentioned in the report as fee. paid 
b)" RSIC are the IUghesttn tile country. A comparison of fees should also include a 
comparison of returns due to the relationship between fees and earnings. 
In order to appropriately comment, the STO had hoped to respond based on a review of 
the CEM report. On March 3, 2014, the STO requested Funston provide the repon. 
Funston agreed to provide the CEM repor', but stated it is still being reviewed and is not 
ready for distribution. The STO stands ready to provide a response as soon as the C!lM is 
received. 
16. Implemenllltion dates. page 23 
Chanm or impmygnents are noted throwhout the rcoon but implementation dates are 
net provided. Oates are on imPOrtant partofaro,mtely reflecting when chanm m 
in:provemmts took place. A few examples include: 
• " ... strategies that should result in lower costs" (page 23). Funston should note in 
the report, when changes were made to lower costS. 
• "A review by H!lK of each new investment was recently added to the deci1i0n· 
making process" (page 97). The date the review was added should be noted. 
• "The use of live streaming video, vidoo recordings on website is leading practice" 
(page 98). The date the live video as well as the date video recordings were 
placed on the website should be noted. 
• "External manager ncporting has evolved" (page 114). The time line of del3iled 
reporting should be listed. 
• " ... more focus on fee negotiations• (page II S). Tbe date fee negotiations should 
be noted. 
• "HEK now review every new potential underlying investmenf' (page 117). ·!be 
date HEK began reviewing new underlying investments should be noted. 
STO'.<opinion< reeorrline the Marc.b 3, 2014 &aft of the "Fiduciary Performonce AucLt of the 
South Carolina Retirement System inve~1ment Commission" as detailed above arc based on the 
laws and statutes that have been put in place to safeguard the llSsets of the State retirees as well 
as the citizens of South Carolina. These laws were adopted al\cr much consideration of 
maintaining the segregation of duties and the inte;pity of a con1rol environment. They should 
not be cbulged carelessly or frivolously simply because one entity futds them laborious or 
inconvenient. Please consider the importance oflhe laws and the consequences of changing 
them wben making your final recommendations. 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
257 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
  
Mr. funston 
Mareh 18, 2014 
Page 18 
If the audit team would need further clarification please contact me directly at 803· 734-2016 
or Clarissa Adams at 803-734-2522. Thank you for the opportunity to respond. 
Cwtis M. Loftis, Jr. 
State Treasurer 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
258 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
The Treasurer’s Office response from April 12, 2014 to the April 3, 2014 Draft Final Report is 
included below.  The FAS responses to the Treasurer’s letter follow separately.  
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THE HONORABLE CURTIS M. LOFTIS, JR. 
Mr. Rick Funston 
Managing Partner 
Funston Advisory Services LLC 
591 Rudgate Road 
Bloomfield Hills, Ml 48304 
Dear Mr. Funston: 
Sra[e Tra..,urer 
April 14,2014 
1his letter is in response to the request for an opinion oftbe State Treasurer's Office (STO) 
regarding the March 26, 2014 draft final repol'l of the "Fiduciary Perfonnanec Audit of tl1e South 
Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission." The fiduciary audit of the Retirement 
System Investment Commission (RSIC) is being conducted by Funston Advisory Services, LLC, 
pursuant to State Jaw. 
Again, STO n:-emphasizcs that its opinions are based on specific factors that are gJOunded in 
State laws and staMes. These la'"'S and staMes sbould serve as the foundation of the 
recommendations of any fiduciary audit, but they are regrettably not the basis for this report. 
Instead, Funston bas recommended a change to current law and one that could potentially put the 
system at risk. Under current laws and statutes, South Carolina is one of few states thai hold a 
AAA credit rating. The system of checks and balances that was carefully molded, debated, and 
implemented by the state legislature has been critical to malntaining the highest rating and 
should not be ignored. 
By law, the State Treasurer is a fiduciary to SCRS in three roles: as statutory custodian of all 
ofSCRS' funds, as a voting memberofRSIC, and as a voting member of the Budget and ConlrOI 
Board.' The STO bas foe: used its review of the "Fiduciary Perfonnance Audit of the South 
1
• As lhe elected r•esenattYe of th~ people. d\e Treasurer serves In th..rft capacities. Arst. the State Treawrer is 
custodian of the funch: 1n lhe SCRS. S.C. Code Ann. §9..1·U20. In {hi$ rofto. he serves as an •ott~er ftduaar("' with 
respect to the SCIIS pursuont to S.C. Code Ann. §9·16-40. Op. Arty Gen. p. 12 (Nov. 16, 2011) Second, the State 
Treasurer Is an ex-ofRclo member of the seven-member RStC Jnd Is ther-efore 1 fidudary to SCRS. S.C. Code Ann. 
§9-16--31S.(A)(2). The RSIC Is responsible for investi"6 the a5Stts of the SCRS, hirins staff, and esubltshfng 
investment obj~es. SeeS. C. Code Ann.§§ 9·16·50, 9·16·31S(G), 9•16-330(A}. A$ a member of the ASIC. the 
State Treasurer Is also a fldudary. S.C. Code Ann.§ 9· 16·10(4){c). Third, the State Treasurer serves as a member of 
the Bucf8et and Control Baird whldl is a trustee of SCRS. 
(803) "34-2101 Fax (803) • 34-2690 
111-wW".~ 
~Of£o: Box 11~8 
C.,lumbu, sc 29211 
W..!, Hm>ptoo BuUdJnc. t200 Sc=e Sa= 
Colwnboa. sc 2920t 
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Mr. Funston 
March 10, 2014 
Page2 
Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission" primarily on the portions of the draft 
report that address the three fiduciary roles that the State Treasurer has regarding SCRS. 
STO respectfully asks that the following amendments be made 10 the March 26,2014 dnaft 
final report before it is issued in it$ fmal fonn. Many of these items in this memo were 
previously shared during the interview Funston conducted with twO STO ~ in Emails from 
the Slate Treasurer, in a letter dated March 18, 2014, and in a conference call requested by 
Funston with STO on March 20, 2014. Amendments are listed below. Detailed notes clarifying 
each amendment follow the list. 
STO recommends reyisjons or addition• in the following areao: 
I. Executive Summary; 
2. Governance; 
3. Policy Review and Development; 
4. Organizational Structure; 
5. Investment Administmtion; 
6. Legal Complliu>ce; and 
7. Information Technology. 
Detailed notes explicating above amendments by section ore as follows: 
I. E:s:ecutive Summary 
Overall Conclusions 112 pg 8 The report states " ... disclosure of external mllllllgement 
fees is the most complete in the industry." The sentence is not accurate as other funds 
such as Texas Teachers Retirement System ofTexas and Washington State Department 
of Retirement Systems have provided documentation indicating all expenses for these 
retirement funds were disclosed. The sentence should state " . .. diselosure of extemal 
management fees is one of the most complete in the industry." 
CEM Report The audit should reflect that the CEM report is flawed. The audit should 
also include this information within the Executive Summary because of the significance 
of the inaccurate conclusions. CEM's conclusion that the RSIC has added value by 
paying reduced fees comes only after CEM firs t reduces the RSIC's fees by $168 million 
or 38%. By reducing or simply carving out n material portion of the fees, any 
comparisons or outcomes are skewed. Even after the reduction, CEM's adjusted expense 
rate for the RSIC is 80% higher than CEM's modian rate for U.S. plans. [I] Most plans 
paid significantly less in tOtal fees and yet perfonned significandy higher. CEM never 
idemifies the rc4SOOS thAt the RSIC pays the highest fee rates even though those reasons 
are easily idemifiable in the report: namely, the RSIC's high allocations to expensive 
asset classes sucb u Hedge Fund of Funds and Private Debt Limited Paltllel'Ships. The 
excess fees paid by the RSIC represeot assets that could have been compounding interest 
over time. 
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Conflict of lnttnst pg. 11 The STO requests !hat this pan!graph be revised to reflect 
and include the :>etua/ Language set forth in the SC Stale Ethics Commission Order, dated 
February 6, 2014. The present wording dismisses the fact that while there was "no 
evidence of an ectuaJ violation" or wrongdoing. "an appearance of impropriety does 
exisL~ The present wording not only gives a cursory explanation of !he fi.nd.ing, it also 
makes light of the ruling by essentially stating tho order is the result of a "spate of 
continuing public confrontations" between the STO and RSIC. Such a trivialization is 
m.islcadins. and minimi7~ the Ethics Commission's ruling. Therefore, we roqucot that 
the report reference the actual language of the ruling and remove any reference to "public 
confrontations.' ~ 
Limited Resources pg. 131be report states, "Due to limited resources, the 
Commissioners became very involved in investing operations such as due diligence." 
The sentence is false since sufficient resources were available, yet Commissioners made 
tbe decision to iilJlore due diligence and back office procedures. This has been 
substantiated in a number of audit reports as audit findings. The STO requests !hot the 
sentence instead read, "Commissioners chose to ignore back office o:x:rations and due 
diligeocc even while investing $8 Billion in one year." 
2. Governance 
Gl: Fiduciary Authority Fiduciary responsibilities currently reside wilh B&.CB. Fiduciary 
responsibilities could be with the future State Fiscal Accountability Authority or 
Department of Administration; SFAA is not mentioned in the report. 
G3: Selection of the custodial brulk by !he Treasurer never resulted in significant delays, 
costs or duplication of effort, nor were there delays dut to "lack of management" by 
BNYM. As previously stated, services such as Private i were availai:Je to RCIS and 
oould have been pun:based. Funds were readily available. More imJ))nantly, RSlC 
waited for years, disregarding !he recommendations of consultants aJld external auditors, 
before determining critical services needed. RSIC recently made !he decision to issue an 
RFP and not use BNYM resources !hat are readily available. As a reminder, BNYM 
works with both RSIC and PEBA daily and is unaware of any dissatisfaction or "lack of 
management." 
3. Policy Reyjew and Development 
P3.3: The report states, "Instruct the custodial bank to accept signaully changes based 
upon a letter fto:n !he Commission Chair or the RSlC COO and CIO {or CEO if !he CEO 
position is created). 
By law, the Sta~ Treasurer is a fiduciary to SCRS in three roles: as surtu!ory custodian of 
all of SCRS' funds, as a voting member ofRSIC, and as a voting member of the Budget 
and Conuol Boord. As such the State Treasurer is ultimately responsible for the custodial 
bank: oveneeln& service provider relationships and holding service providers 
accountable for agreed upon service levels; ensuring that proper internal controls are 
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created and maintained; and ensuring that all applicable parties comply with applicable 
state and federal regulations and contractual obligations. 
STO has an established protocol for adding authorized signarures aod has cs1ablishcd a 
form that is completed and submitted to STO. Upon STO's review, STO then forwards 
the request to BNYM, and the authorization is completed. First, BNYM is no! authorized 
to add/delete signature authorizations without the approval of the holder of the custodial 
agreement: STO. Second, RSJC ha.• been made and is fully aware of the 
procedure/protocol. 1he procedure is simple and straightforward. Failure to follow the 
procedure can only be attributed to an wv.illingness to work within the established 
protocol. 
Currently the Custody officer is reviewing all signatures and levels required for both STO 
and RSlC. If RSIC believes that inappropriate individuals are currently in place to 
execute transactions on behalf of RSIC, RSIC should communicate and correspond with 
the STO through the proper protocol that has beeu eslablished. Failure to follow the 
procedures can only be due to an wwillingness to work within established protocol. 
P3.4: The repon states, "Develop the capabilities to allow electronic signatures with the 
custodial bank to authorize c:ash transfers" with respect to the BNYM a1 this time. 
BNYM does not permit electronic signatures at this time. However, the State Treasurer's 
Office Custody Officer will be reviewing procedures/processes for improvements while 
ensuring that internal controls and compliance directives are being adhered to. 
Every opponunity to improve efficiencies will be reviewed, such as the opponunity to 
streamline this process via workbench. Note, it is imperative thB1 internal controls and 
compliance issues are addressed prior to any implementation. Again, open 
communication and contribution from both RSIC and PEBA are crucial to a successful 
relationship. 
The STO is dedicated to creating a seamless custodial relationship with RSIC and PEBA, 
while also ensuring that proper oonll'Ois are in place to protect the assets of SCRS. 
4. Onzanizatloaal SIJUrture 
NIA 
S. Inyqtment Administratioo 
1'ho STO has a number ofissu.es with CEM's methods and conclusions. 
RSIC's investment performance has been poor in comparison to other plans, and RSIC's 
fee rates are higher than any other large plan. RBiher than addressing these issues and 
offering solutions or suggestions, CE.M concluded thai thB1 the RSIC has "added value," 
both through investment perfonnanee and by paying less in fees than it could have paid. 
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However, the RSIC's fee rate is more than double the average fee rate. No plan of$10 
billion or more has a higher fee nue than RSlC. The performance of RSIC ofTen no 
jwtilicalion for the fees paid. 
The main reason for RSIC's outrageous fee rate is easily identifiable: RSIC's high 
alternative allocation is composed of asset classes that charge high fees. Data presented 
in the oppendix of the CEM report indicates that RSJC's allocation to both Hedge Funds 
and Hedge Fund ofFunds are far beyond the median of both CEM's peer group and 
CEM's U.S. Universe'· Acrording to CEM, RSIC's II% allocation to Hedge Fund of 
Funds is the highest in its peer group'. Not only is the RSIC's Hedge Fund of Funds the 
highest allocation in its peer group, bot 8CC<lrding to CEM, the RSIC bas highest 
allocation to Hedge Fund of Funds in dollars in CEM's entire U.S. universe'. CEM's 
universe includes funds many times the size ofRS1C. 
CEM did not include the perfonnance fees of hedge funds in its peer cost analysis 
because "only a limited number of participants arc cl!rrently able to provide this data."' 
A table in the Appendix explains why only a limited nwnber of participants cum:ndy 
provide this data: for both peer group and the CEM's U.S. Universe, the median 
allocation to both Hedge Funds and Hedge Fund of Funds is ?&!!!·' 
Rather than identifying the Hedge Fund of Fund allocation as a cause of RSlC's higher 
fees, CEM cites RS!C's fees to Hedge Fund ofFunda as a source of what CEM claims to 
be "added value." This was because the RSIC's Hodge !Fund of Funds fee rnte of212.6 
bps was lower than the median funds fee rate of216.3 bps. RSIC's excessive Hedge 
Fund of Funds allocation ~ulted in more added value through CEM's calculation of 
"added value"'· 
CEM data also indicates that RSIC has lower allocations of asset classes that have lower 
fees. For example, RSIC has the very lowest allocation of equity boldings in its peer 
group. In CBM's U.S. universe, the allocation percentage is less than half the 25th 
percentile allocation'. According to CEM data, tbe net value added by equity was much 
greater than net value added by hedge funds between 1991 and 2012. Hedge funds bad 
negative value added during that period. 
RSIC's high fee rate is a primmy reason for RSIC's below average investment 
pcrfonnance. Moreover, the contract for invesunent fees provides no discount for 
economy of scale or the significant amount of funds invested. 
~Appendix to CEM Report1 pa.ges 10, 15, and 24. 
s Appendix to CEM Report, page 24. 
4 Appendix to CEM Report. page 24. 
s CEM Exeeutive: SUmmiry, p.a.;ae u . 
'Aaotdirc to pqo 2• of !he Appendix. tho RSIC held $3371.3 million In tteqe Fund of Fun<!> ofJd the U.S, 
Unlve<se ovtr>Ct Hed&e Fund of Funds altoc:atlon w., $196.9 mlllon. 
7 CEM Exe<:uUve Summary, pace 19. 
1 CEM Report, Section 2, page S 
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RSIC's P"r ran1cings contrast with the CEM conclusion that RSIC bas added 1.2% in 
value because RSlC outpcrfonned the policy benchmark. According to CEM, the policy 
beochnwk return ofRSIC wu one of the lowest, and that in itself indicale$ a problem, 
namely a problem with the asset allocation mix. 
The CBM report also includes data that stro.ngly suggests that RSIC policy benchmark is 
not valid. The CBM average hedge fund benchmark of2.4% is more than 5.00/o higher 
than the RSIC policy benchmlllk of -2.90%. RSIC's S year hedge fund return rate of 
~.4% W!IS positive in comparison to its hedge fund policy benchmark. RSIC hedge fund 
performance wu not positive in comparison to CEM's "average benchmark for all U.S. 
participanu." 
6. l&&al Compliance 
L3.1 : STO agrees that shortening the review period may be beneficial, but Jlllb(j! the 
Investment Commission can rely on an appropriately documented Legal Sufficiency 
Certificate verifying that the material terms presented to the Commission Ole accurately 
set forth in the agreements. First, it is impo.rtant to note that these reviews have proven 
useful, as materials errors have been identified. Second, there is no substitute for 
occountability. Requiring a licensed attorney to attest, in writing, that the 14 terms listed 
on the in\ICSiment swnmary chan presented to the Commission are aecwately reneeted in 
the agreements and comply with the governing guidelines provides not only 
accountability, but also the active oversight the investments warrant Lastly, irrespective 
of the foregoing, we believe the current 30-day review period should remain in place 
until at least December 31,2014, which would allow time for the IC legal stall"and the 
STO to become acquainted with the newly enacted protocols. 
7. Information Ted!nology/Polky Review and Devtlopmtnl 
IT 4.l/PS: The report states RSIC is not exempt from investment support systems and 
outlines a perceived inconvenitnce by RSIC when services and funds to purchase them 
bave been available for many years. Most recently, the RSIC issued an Administrator 
RFP in mid-December 2013 and issued the contract wilb a vendor on March 2014 with 
an annual fee of$1.2 million for five years. The targeted conversion date is July I, 2014. 
Again, we state that the Legislalive approval and procurement rules played no pan in the 
shortfall of !l!llfling or insufficieat systtms. The de!jbqate decision to i!!!IOre avaj!ab!e 
fimds for crucial services and $1Jlffing oresents a critical problem. The table shows 
estimated quarterly expenditures, outlining a projected lapse of almost $2 million for the 
current liscal year. 
Sou1ll Carolina ROll,.._. Syslem 
Polce-Syo-
General A01ombiy ROIIremont System 
Jul'13 Sep '13 Jan'14 Mar-14 
2,&n,.17.75 2.58t .18225 2.57a.095.oo 1.n1,862.oo 
o00e,51UO 393.424 25 406,531.00 281.784 25 
3,907.25 3.78tBl 3.45225 2.323.00 
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March 10, 2014 
Page? 
Judges & Scllcllr:wo Reclremont System 
NationaiGuoni-Syslsm 
Estimeted FY13--14 Expenditures 














In closing, it is the STO opinion that the recommendations of the fmal report should reflect 
thoughtful considerotion of the importance and ultimate purpose of laws cwrently in place, as 
well as the possible detrimental consequences of changing them. Current laws and statutes were 
put in place to safeguard the assets of the State retirees, as well as the citi2ens of South Carolina. 
These laws were adopted afler much consideration of how best to maintain the segn:gation of 
duties and the intearity of a control environment; therefore, they should not be chaoged 
carelessly or frivolously or simply because one entity finds them laborious or inconvenient. 
The STO appreciates the opportunity to respond to the report. This is the second document 
s:ubmiu~d as: n rcaponsc. The STO would appreciate if both letter~ from the STO wctt; included 
as an exhibit to the final report (today and March 18,2014 incorporated 13 major bullet points of 
concern). 
If the audit team requires further cl 
Clarissa Adams at 803-734-2522. 
CMLjr!afw 
· •catio.;,please contact me dinectly 81803-734-2016 or 
you for the opportunity to respond. 
Curtis M. Loftis, Jr. 
State Treasurer 
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April 12. 2014 
 
Mr. Rick Funston 
Managing Partner 
Funston Advisory Services LLC 
591 Rudgate Road 
Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 
 
Dear Mr. Funston: 
 
     This letter is in response to the request for an opinion of the State Treasurer’s Office (STO) 
regarding the March 26, 2014 draft final report of the “Fiduciary Performance Audit of the South 
Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission.”  The fiduciary audit of the Retirement 
System Investment Commission (RSIC) is being conducted by Funston Advisory Services, LLC, 
pursuant to State law.  
 
    Again, STO re-emphasizes that its opinions are based on specific factors that are grounded in 
State laws and statutes.  These laws and statutes should serve as the foundation of the 
recommendations of any fiduciary audit, but they are regrettably not the basis for this report. 
Instead, Funston has recommended a change to current law and one that could potentially put the 
system at risk.  Under current laws and statutes, South Carolina is one of few states that hold a 
AAA credit rating.  The system of checks and balances that was carefully molded, debated, and 
implemented by the state legislature has been critical to maintaining the highest rating and 
should not be ignored.   
 
FAS Response: 
While it would be possible to perform a fiduciary audit starting from the presumption that 
current law is the best possible and immutable, that was not the charge to Funston Advisory 
Services LLC by the State Inspector General. Instead, we were specifically asked to review the 
current legal framework, as well as the policies and procedures, so as to provide an expert, 
outside focus on issues that can only be resolved by the State Legislature.   
We agree that the ultimate decision with regard to the legal framework is and should be the 
State Legislature. We trust that the Legislature will seriously consider the issues raised and 
then make an informed decision as to which, if any, changes to make to the legal framework. 
We also note that the State Legislature has twice legislated major changes in the way the 
State of South Carolina manages its pension funds in recent memory.  
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We appreciate the valuable input provided by the STO throughout the process of our 
fiduciary performance audit even though we may not always agree.  
 
     By law, the State Treasurer is a fiduciary to SCRS in three roles: as statutory custodian of all 
of SCRS’ funds, as a voting member of RSIC, and as a voting member of the Budget and Control 
Board.
18
  The STO has focused its review of the “Fiduciary Performance Audit of the South 
Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission” primarily on the portions of the draft 
report that address the three fiduciary roles that the State Treasurer has regarding SCRS. 
 
STO respectfully asks that the following amendments be made to the March 26, 2014 draft 
final report before it is issued in its final form.  Many of these items in this memo were 
previously shared during the interview Funston conducted with two STO staff, in Emails from 
the State Treasurer, in a letter dated March 18, 2014, and in a conference call requested by 
Funston with STO on March 20, 2014.  Amendments are listed below.  Detailed notes clarifying 
each amendment follow the list.   
 
STO recommends revisions or additions in the following areas: 
1. Executive Summary; 
2. Governance; 
3. Policy Review and Development; 
4. Organizational Structure; 
5. Investment Administration; 
6. Legal Compliance; and 
7. Information Technology. 
 
Detailed notes explicating above amendments by section are as follows: 
 
1. Executive Summary 
 
Overall Conclusions #2 pg 8   The report states “…disclosure of external management fees is 
the most complete in the industry.”  The sentence is not accurate as other funds such as Texas 
Teachers Retirement System of Texas and Washington State Department of Retirement Systems 
have provided documentation indicating all expenses for these retirement funds were disclosed.  
The sentence should state “…disclosure of external management fees is one of the most 
complete in the industry.”   
 
 
                                                     
18
. As the elected representative of the people, the Treasurer serves in three capacities. First, the State Treasurer is 
custodian of the funds in the SCRS. S.C. Code Ann.  §9-1-1320.  In this role, he serves as an “other fiduciary” with 
respect to the SCRS pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §9-16-40. Op. Att’y Gen, p. 12 (Nov. 16, 2011).  Second, the State 
Treasurer is an ex-officio member of the seven-member RSIC and is therefore a fiduciary to SCRS. S.C. Code Ann. 
§9-16-315(A)(2).  The RSIC is responsible for investing the assets of the SCRS, hiring staff, and establishing 
investment objectives.  See S. C. Code Ann. §§ 9-16-50, 9-16-315(G), 9-16-330(A).  As a member of the RSIC, the 
State Treasurer is also a fiduciary. S.C. Code Ann.§ 9-16-10(4)(c).  Third, the State Treasurer serves as a member of 
the Budget and Control Board which is a trustee of SCRS.  
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FAS Response: 
Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS) discloses performance fees and carried interest by 
manager in its annual CAFR.  However, TRS does not disclose pass-through expenses in its 
limited partnerships; for RSIC, these expenses totaled $39 million in FY2013, or 9% of 
reported manager fees. 
In direct communication between FAS and Washington State Investment Board (WSIB) staff, 
WSIB indicated that they do not disclose performance fees, carried interest, or pass-through 
fees for alternative investments and that it would require at least 6 additional staff to do so.  
They also expressed a point of view that WSIB does not consider carried interest or 
performance fees to be “external manager fees,” but rather a form of profit sharing. 
Finally, RSIC's disclosure goes further than either TRS or WSIB by breaking out the fee to each 
manager into billed vs. netted amounts.  
We applaud STO’s recognition of the completeness of RSIC’s manager fee disclosure, and it is 
our sincere hope that it will no longer be used against the RSIC when drawing comparisons to 
the level of fees paid by other funds. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely given the following 
request from STO regarding the CEM report and again regarding Investment Administration. 
 
 
CEM Report   The audit should reflect that the CEM report is flawed.  The audit should also 
include this information within the Executive Summary because of the significance of the 
inaccurate conclusions.  CEM’s conclusion that the RSIC has added value by paying reduced 
fees comes only after CEM first reduces the RSIC’s fees by $168 million or 38%.  By reducing 
or simply carving out a material portion of the fees, any comparisons or outcomes are skewed.  
Even after the reduction, CEM’s adjusted expense rate for the RSIC is 80% higher than CEM’s 
median rate for U.S. plans. [1] Most plans paid significantly less in total fees and yet performed 
significantly higher. CEM never identifies the reasons that the RSIC pays the highest fee rates 
even though those reasons are easily identifiable in the report:  namely, the RSIC’s high 
allocations to expensive asset classes such as Hedge Fund of Funds and Private Debt Limited 
Partnerships.  The excess fees paid by the RSIC represent assets that could have been 
compounding interest over time. 
 
FAS Response: 
Two basic sets of decisions determine the costs that RSIC and its peers pay.  The first, and 
most important, is asset allocation—the mix of public market and alternative assets a Fund 
chooses to invest in.   We agree that the RSIC pays higher costs because of its higher asset 
allocation to alternatives.  This issue has never been in dispute.  
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CEM does not evaluate whether a fund chose a “better” or “worse” asset allocation than its 
peers because that choice depends on the time frame under consideration and each fund’s 
market expectations, liabilities and risk tolerance.     
The second set of decisions is how a fund implements its chosen asset allocation (external 
versus internal management, active versus passive management and the fees negotiated for 
each type of management).    CEM concludes that RSIC pays about the same overall 
management costs as peers of similar size pay for the same asset mix.  (Note:  CEM’s report 
makes it clear that this conclusion excludes private equity carried interest and hedge fund 
performance fees because only a limited number of survey participants are currently able to 
provide this data for benchmarking). 
In other words, “apples to apples” RSIC is not overpaying for its asset allocation.  Whether 
the asset allocation is appropriate is the responsibility of the RSIC.  This was the decision of 
Legislature when it conferred all investment authority in the Commission. 
(Note:  The STO comment that CEM found RSIC added value only after CEM excluded $168 
million in fees is incorrect. CEM concluded that RSIC added value by earning a five-year return 
of 2.5% compared to the 1.3% return it would have earned by passively investing in the policy 
asset allocation approved by the Commission.  No fees were excluded.  The 2.5% return is net 
of all fees (management and performance) RSIC paid.)     
 
Conflict of Interest pg. 11   The STO requests that this paragraph be revised to reflect and 
include the actual language set forth in the SC State Ethics Commission Order, dated February 6, 
2014.  The present wording dismisses the fact that while there was “no evidence of an actual 
violation” or wrongdoing, “an appearance of impropriety does exist.”  The present wording not 
only gives a cursory explanation of the finding, it also makes light of the ruling by essentially 
stating the order is the result of a “spate of continuing public confrontations” between the STO 
and RSIC.  Such a trivialization is misleading, and minimizes the Ethics Commission’s 
ruling.  Therefore, we request that the report reference the actual language of the ruling and 
remove any reference to “public confrontations.” 
 
FAS Response: 
We agree that it is critical that the Commission should avoid even the perception of 
impropriety. We have strengthened our recommendations accordingly. However, public 
confrontations between the RSIC and STO are a fact and are not confined to allegations of 
impropriety.  The report reads “Such allegations, in addition to the spate of continuing public 
confrontations, only serve to erode the RSIC’s reputation.” 
 
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
270 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  
Limited Resources pg. 13 The report states, “Due to limited resources, the Commissioners 
became very involved in investing operations such as due diligence.”  The sentence is false since 
sufficient resources were available, yet Commissioners made the decision to ignore due diligence 
and back office procedures.  This has been substantiated in a number of audit reports as audit 
findings.  The STO requests that the sentence instead read, “Commissioners chose to ignore back 
office operations and due diligence even while investing $8 Billion in one year.”   
 
FAS Response: 
STO has taken this statement is taken out of context.  The entire paragraph is shown below: 
“Accordingly, the initial strategy adopted by the Commissioners, in consultation with their 
general investment consultant, CIO and external managers, was to diversify a traditional 
stocks and bonds portfolio to improve long-term returns and better manage total fund risk.  
They also chose to do so rapidly.  
Numerous past practices were examined in this fiduciary performance audit to better 
understand the context, evolution and maturation of the RSIC.  Unfortunately, infrastructure 
did not keep pace with investment strategies (e.g., private equity, strategic partnerships, etc.) 
as initial back office and risk management procedures and support systems were often weak, 
manual and ad hoc.  Due to limited resources, the Commissioners also became very involved 
in investment operations such as due diligence.  Many of these legacy weaknesses have since 
been identified and have been or are being addressed by the Commission.  During the past 
two years, RSIC’s processes have evolved to become much more robust and systematic.” pp. 
7-8 FAS Final Report.” 
In addition, we recognize these weaknesses as shown below from p. 11 Executive Summary: 
“For the past three years, the Treasurer has raised legitimate concerns about the 
effectiveness of the strategy and its costs as well as the lack of infrastructure to support such 
a strategy.  He has also raised legitimate questions about the RSIC’s sense of urgency in 
improving staffing, systems and controls, and the RSIC has responded with many 
improvements, especially in the last two years as noted above.  See also Appendix B RSIC 
Improvements Timeline.” 
 
2. Governance  
 
G1: Fiduciary Authority  Fiduciary responsibilities currently reside with B&CB.  Fiduciary 
responsibilities could be with the future State Fiscal Accountability Authority or Department of 
Administration; SFAA is not mentioned in the report.  
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FAS Response: 
We agree.  The role of the State Fiscal Accountability Authority has now been addressed 
throughout the main body of our report. 
 
 
G3: Selection of the custodial bank by the Treasurer never resulted in significant delays, costs or 
duplication of effort, nor were there delays due to “lack of management” by BNYM.  As 
previously stated, services such as Private i were available to RCIS and could have been 
purchased.  Funds were readily available. More importantly, RSIC waited for years, disregarding 
the recommendations of consultants and external auditors, before determining critical services 
needed.  RSIC recently made the decision to issue an RFP and not use BNYM resources that are 
readily available. As a reminder, BNYM works with both RSIC and PEBA daily and is unaware 




We respectfully disagree. In our opinion, the principal impediment to an effective 
relationship with the Custodial Bank has been the involvement of the STO. See our report.  Of 
course, a fiduciary performance audit can only review what existed at the time of the review. 
We note that the STO has stated that it is now “dedicated to creating a seamless custodial 
relationship with RSIC and PEBA, while also ensuring that proper controls are in place to 
protect the assets of SCRS”.  We also note that at least one positive change, ceasing to 
require signatures to allow money to be deposited into the SCRS accounts, has occurred since 
we asked questions about it during our field work. 
 
 
3. Policy Review and Development 
 
P3.3: The report states, “Instruct the custodial bank to accept signatory changes based upon a 
letter from the Commission Chair or the RSIC COO and CIO (or CEO if the CEO position is 
created). 
 
By law, the State Treasurer is a fiduciary to SCRS in three roles: as statutory custodian of all of 
SCRS’ funds, as a voting member of RSIC, and as a voting member of the Budget and Control 
Board.  As such the State Treasurer is ultimately responsible for the custodial bank: overseeing 
service provider relationships and holding service providers accountable for agreed upon service 
levels; ensuring that proper internal controls are created and maintained; and ensuring that all 
applicable parties comply with applicable state and federal regulations and contractual 
obligations.   
 
STO has an established protocol for adding authorized signatures and has established a form that 
is completed and submitted to STO.  Upon STO’s review, STO then forwards the request to 
BNYM, and the authorization is completed.  First, BNYM is not authorized to add/delete 
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signature authorizations without the approval of the holder of the custodial agreement: STO.  
Second, RSIC has been made and is fully aware of the procedure/protocol.  The procedure is 
simple and straightforward. Failure to follow the procedure can only be attributed to an 
unwillingness to work within the established protocol.   
 
Currently the Custody officer is reviewing all signatures and levels required for both STO and 
RSIC.  If RSIC believes that inappropriate individuals are currently in place to execute 
transactions on behalf of RSIC, RSIC should communicate and correspond with the STO through 
the proper protocol that has been established. Failure to follow the procedures can only be due to 
an unwillingness to work within established protocol.   
 
 
P3.4: The report states, “Develop the capabilities to allow electronic signatures with the 
custodial bank to authorize cash transfers” with respect to the BNYM at this time.   
 
BNYM does not permit electronic signatures at this time.  However, the State Treasurer’s Office 
Custody Officer will be reviewing procedures/processes for improvements while ensuring that 
internal controls and compliance directives are being adhered to.   
 
Every opportunity to improve efficiencies will be reviewed, such as the opportunity to streamline 
this process via workbench.  Note, it is imperative that internal controls and compliance issues 
are addressed prior to any implementation.  Again, open communication and contribution from 
both RSIC and PEBA are crucial to a successful relationship.   
 
The STO is dedicated to creating a seamless custodial relationship with RSIC and PEBA, while 
also ensuring that proper controls are in place to protect the assets of SCRS.   
 
FAS Response: 
We respectfully disagree regarding both points. 
The Treasurer, in his role as Custodian, has the ability to delegate authorities to other 
appropriate parties.  It is entirely within his authority to instruct the custodial bank to accept 
signatory changes based upon a letter from the Commission Chair or the RSIC COO and CIO. 
BNY Mellon has indicated that an electronic authorization process already exists and is in use 
by RSIC for payment of management fees.  The process has existed for nearly a decade and is 
used to authorize payment of capital calls by many other clients.  We do note that there 
could be a semantic issue: BNY Mellon calls the mechanism electronic authorizations rather 
than electronic signatures.  
 
4. Organizational Structure  
N/A  
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5. Investment Administration  
 
The STO has a number of issues with CEM’s methods and conclusions. 
 
RSIC’s investment performance has been poor in comparison to other plans, and RSIC’s fee 
rates are higher than any other large plan. Rather than addressing these issues and offering 
solutions or suggestions, CEM concluded that that the RSIC has “added value,” both through 
investment performance and by paying less in fees than it could have paid. 
However, the RSIC’s fee rate is more than double the average fee rate.  No plan of $10 billion or 
more has a higher fee rate than RSIC.  The performance of RSIC offers no justification for the 
fees paid. 
 
The main reason for RSIC’s outrageous fee rate is easily identifiable:  RSIC’s high alternative 
allocation is composed of asset classes that charge high fees.  Data presented in the appendix of 
the CEM report indicates that RSIC’s allocation to both Hedge Funds and Hedge Fund of Funds 
are far beyond the median of both CEM’s peer group and CEM’s U.S. Universe19.  According to 
CEM, RSIC’s 11% allocation to Hedge Fund of Funds is the highest in its peer group20.  Not 
only is the RSIC’s Hedge Fund of Funds the highest allocation in its peer group, but according to 
CEM, the RSIC has highest allocation to Hedge Fund of Funds in dollars in CEM’s entire U.S. 
universe
21.  CEM’s universe includes funds many times the size of RSIC. 
 
CEM did not include the performance fees of hedge funds in its peer cost analysis because “only 
a limited number of participants are currently able to provide this data.”22  A table in the 
Appendix explains why only a limited number of participants currently provide this data:  for 
both peer group and the CEM’s U.S. Universe, the median allocation to both Hedge Funds and 




Rather than identifying the Hedge Fund of Fund allocation as a cause of RSIC’s higher fees, 
CEM cites RSIC’s fees to Hedge Fund of Funds as a source of what CEM claims to be “added 
value.”  This was because the RSIC’s Hedge Fund of Funds fee rate of 212.6 bps was lower than 
the median funds fee rate of 216.3 bps.  RSIC’s excessive Hedge Fund of Funds allocation 
resulted in more added value through CEM’s calculation of “added value”24. 
 
CEM data also indicates that RSIC has lower allocations of asset classes that have lower fees.  
For example, RSIC has the very lowest allocation of equity holdings in its peer group.  In CEM’s 
U.S. universe, the allocation percentage is less than half the 25th percentile allocation
25.  
According to CEM data, the net value added by equity was much greater than net value added by 
hedge funds between 1991 and 2012.  Hedge funds had negative value added during that period. 
                                                     
19 Appendix to CEM Report, pages 10, 15, and 24. 
20
 Appendix to CEM Report, page 24. 
21
 Appendix to CEM Report, page 24. 
22
 CEM Executive Summary, page 11. 
23
 According to page 24 of the Appendix, the RSIC held $3371.3 million in Hedge Fund of Funds and the U.S. 
Universe average Hedge Fund of Funds allocation was $196.9 million. 
24
 CEM Executive Summary, page 19. 
25
 CEM Report, Section 2, page 5 
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RSIC’s high fee rate is a primary reason for RSIC’s below average investment performance.  
Moreover, the contract for investment fees provides no discount for economy of scale or the 
significant amount of funds invested.   
RSIC’s peer rankings contrast with the CEM conclusion that RSIC has added 1.2% in value 
because RSIC outperformed the policy benchmark.  According to CEM, the policy benchmark 
return of RSIC was one of the lowest, and that in itself indicates a problem, namely a problem 
with the asset allocation mix. 
 
The CEM report also includes data that strongly suggests that RSIC policy benchmark is not 
valid.  The CEM average hedge fund benchmark of 2.4%  is more than 5.0% higher than the 
RSIC policy benchmark of -2.90%.  RSIC’s 5 year hedge fund return rate of 2.4% was positive 
in comparison to its hedge fund policy benchmark.  RSIC hedge fund performance was not 
positive in comparison to CEM’s “average benchmark for all U.S. participants.” 
 
FAS Response: 
A number of the comments under this point once again relate to RSIC’s high cost asset 
allocation and the low return it produced over the last five years, which is noted in CEM’s 
report and the FAS report.  There is no disagreement about that.  The purpose of CEM’s 
report was not to evaluate whether the Commission should be more invested in lower cost 
asset classes, but rather to determine how the costs it pays for each asset class compares to 
the costs its peers pay for those same types of assets.   
Please also see our responses to cost analysis issues in our response to the comments under 
1. Executive Summary, in the main FAS report as well as in the CEM and FAS responses to the 
twenty-six questions raised by STO contained in the Appendices. 
What the Commission needs to decide, in conjunction with its asset allocation consultant, is 
whether its higher cost asset allocation is likely to produce risk adjusted net returns in the 
future that are likely to meet the fund’s liabilities. This decision is within the exclusive 
authority of the Commission. 
 
6.  Legal Compliance  
 
L3.1:  STO agrees that shortening the review period may be beneficial, but only if the 
Investment Commission can rely on an appropriately documented Legal Sufficiency Certificate 
verifying that the material terms presented to the Commission are accurately set forth in the 
agreements.  First, it is important to note that these reviews have proven useful, as materials 
errors have been identified.  Second, there is no substitute for accountability.  Requiring a 
licensed attorney to attest, in writing, that the 14 terms listed on the investment summary chart 
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presented to the Commission are accurately reflected in the agreements and comply with the 
governing guidelines provides not only accountability, but also the active oversight the 
investments warrant.  Lastly, irrespective of the foregoing, we believe the current 30-day review 
period should remain in place until at least December 31, 2014, which would allow time for the 




7. Information Technology/Policy Review and Development  
 
IT 4.1/P5:   The report states RSIC is not exempt from investment support systems and outlines 
a perceived inconvenience by RSIC when services and funds to purchase them have been 
available for many years.  Most recently, the RSIC issued an Administrator RFP in mid-
December 2013 and issued the contract with a vendor on March 2014 with an annual fee of $1.2 
million for five years. The targeted conversion date is July 1, 2014.    
Again, we state that the Legislative approval and procurement rules played no part in the 
shortfall of staffing or insufficient systems. The deliberate decision to ignore available funds for 
crucial services and staffing presents a critical problem.  The table shows estimated quarterly 
expenditures, outlining a projected lapse of almost $2 million for the current fiscal year. 
 
Jul '13 Sep '13 Jan '14 Mar-14 
South Carolina Retirement System 
      
2,677,417.75  
   
2,591,182.25  
   
2,578,095.00  
   
1,771,862.00  
Police Retirement System 
         
406,517.50  
      
393,424.25  
      
406,531.00  
      
281,784.25  
General Assembly Retirement System 
              
3,907.25  
           
3,781.50  
           
3,452.25  
           
2,323.00  
Judges & Solicitors Retirement System 
           
15,335.75  
         
14,841.75  
         
14,934.75  
         
10,290.75  
National Guard Retirement System 
              
2,165.25  
           
2,095.50  
           
2,312.00  
           
1,625.25  
  
      
3,105,343.50  
   
3,005,325.25  
   
3,005,325.00  
   
2,067,885.25  
 Estimated FY13-14 Expenditures  
   
11,183,879.00  
   
2014 Approved Authorization 
   
13,021,374.00  
   
Estimated Lapsed Funds 
     
1,837,495.00  
    
 
FAS Response: 
We agree there may have been delays attributable to RSIC.  Recommendation G5.2 
specifically addresses this issue.  
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   In closing, it is the STO opinion that the recommendations of the final report should reflect 
thoughtful consideration of the importance and ultimate purpose of laws currently in place, as 
well as the possible detrimental consequences of changing them.  Current laws and statutes were 
put in place to safeguard the assets of the State retirees, as well as the citizens of South Carolina.  
These laws were adopted after much consideration of how best to maintain the segregation of 
duties and the integrity of a control environment; therefore, they should not be changed 




We agree. None of the report’s recommendations were made frivolously. As noted above, it 
was the SIG’s mandate to retain an independent auditor to make recommendations in the 
best interests of the plan beneficiaries and the citizens of the State of South Carolina 
including recommendations for legislative reform. Where the laws blur authority, 
responsibility and accountability, we have noted that fact, provided explanations and legal 
analysis, and made thoughtful recommendations.  Now, it is up to the Legislature to 
determine how best to safeguard the assets of the State retirees and the citizens of South 
Carolina.   
The fiduciary performance audit report also makes more than 120 recommendations for 
improvement that involve the Commission, RSIC operations, the State Treasurer’s Office, the 
Budget and Control Board and its successor organizations and the Legislature.  The STO’s 
comments in this letter acknowledge its focus mainly on the areas of the report that affect 
the three fiduciary roles of Treasurer.  The limited focus of the STO’s response does not 
acknowledge the totality of the fiduciary performance audit’s findings, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
   The STO appreciates the opportunity to respond to the report.  This is the second document 
submitted as a response.  The STO would appreciate if both letters from the STO were included 
as an exhibit to the final report (today and March 18, 2014 incorporated 13 major bullet points of 




We have included both letters from the STO including our responses to those letters in 
Appendices F and O respectively. 
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     If the audit team requires further clarification, please contact me directly at 803-734-2016 or 
Clarissa Adams at 803-734-2522.  Thank you for the opportunity to respond. 
 




      Curtis M. Loftis, Jr. 
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Appendix P Response from the Public Employee Benefit Authority 
 
South Carolina 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BENEFIT AUTHORITY 
Aprilll, i014 
Rick Funston 
Funston Advisory Services. LLC 
Dear Mr. Funston: 
PEBA 
Tl'll\"iJ J. Tum~r. CPA 
btni111 fxfeuli~ Dius;l~ 
Retire•n¢11t BeBCfil$ 
We appreciate the opportunity to review and provide comments to the draft final report on the 
Fiduciary Performance Audit of the South Carolina Retrrement System ln\'estment Commission 
(RSIC). 
Funston's review of t he RSIC's operations and relationships w ith other fiduciaries of the 
Retirement Systems appears to have been extremely thorough and we were impressed with 
the experience and judgment utilized to form your assessments. The recommendations 
provided in the draft final report are extensive and each will need to be closely evaluated by all 
parties Impacted and prioritized with the ultimate best interest of effici encies and effectiveness 
of administering the trust fund in mind. 
We feel that many weaknesses were appropriately recognized and while some of the 
recommendations may be fairly easily implemented, others will require support and action by 
the state legislature will be much more difficult to achieve. Again, Funston' s efforts are greatly 
appreciated and a quality wortc product has been provided. Thank you for allowing the SC 
Public Employee Benefrt Authority to be a part of your engagement and we look forward to 
continuing to implement improvements for the Retirement Systems. 
Sincerely, 
:$.t~ 
lntertm Exe~uuve Dfr~tQr 
Strc:~t Addrc:»: 
:202 Arbor l.~ke Orivt 
Columbia, SQuth Carolina 29223 
www.rcil'reme.nl .sc.gov 
803-737-6800 
800-868-9002 (within S.C. only) 
M.alna Addn~:u: 
Post Office Box. 11960 
Columbia, Soulh Carolina 292 11·1960 
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Appendix Q Recommendations ranked in order of Priority, Difficulty and Responsibility 
 














needed If yes, who? 
G1 
The Legislature should better align Retirement System governance authority with 
assignment of obligations and clarify what fiduciary responsibilities, if any, still reside 
with the BCB and, subsequently, the Department of Administration and the State 
Fiscal Accountability Authority. 
Critical   Difficult N Y Legislature 
G2 
The Legislature should resolve the Treasurer’s conflicting fiduciary duties (alternatives 
are discussed in I17). 
Critical   Difficult N Y Legislature 
G3 
The Legislature should delegate selection of the custodial bank and management of 
the relationship to the RSIC (alternatives are further discussed in I17). 
Critical   Difficult N Y Legislature 
G5,1 
The Legislature should delegate authority for operating budget, staffing and all 
compensation approval to the Commission. 
Critical   Difficult N Y Legislature 
G13.2 
Develop and implement an Enterprise Risk Program, as called for in the Governance 
Policy Manual and approved at the March 13, 2014 Commission meeting, and ensure 
the necessary tools are acquired to support effective risk management and oversight. Critical Difficult N N 
  
G10.2 
In addition to an annual review of the asset allocation, throughout the year the 
Commission should review and discuss asset class strategies with the investment staff 
and provide oversight. Critical Medium Y N 
  
G10.1 
The Commission should work with its general investment consultant and develop a 
set of investment beliefs to provide a basis for strategic management of the 
investment portfolio. 
Critical Medium Y Y HEK 
G13.4 
An independent third party expert firm should regularly benchmark fund returns and 
costs (see Recommendations G18.4 and I11.2). 
Critical Medium N N   
G4 
The Legislature should revise legislation to allow the Commission to designate a single 
direct operating report with the title of either Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or 
Executive Director, and not require that the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) report 
directly to the Commission. 
Critical Medium Y Y Legislature 
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needed If yes, who? 
G8.2 
The Legislature should consider adding one or three additional voting members to the 
Commission to increase diversity, increase beneficiary representation and reduce the 
potential for tie votes (making the PEBA representative a voting Commissioner could 
be an option, but would require an exemption from the prohibition for a state 
employee). 
Critical Medium N Y Legislature 
G8.1 
The Legislature should revise the Commissioner’s qualification requirements to 
achieve a more diverse composition of members, including some commissioners with 
a broader business experience beyond investments which is not as reliant on 
professional certifications when there is significant practical experience. 
Critical Medium N Y Legislature 
G16.4 
The CIO should consider whether to mandate annual plans by asset class and/or 
functional area.  If so, the plans should be presented to the IIC to facilitate 
dissemination and cross-silo knowledge sharing. 
Critical Medium N N   
G10.3 
The Commission should shift its emphasis from a focus on advising on specific 
investments and participating in due diligence to providing oversight and strategic 
guidance to staff.  This would include eliminating the assignment of asset classes to 
individual Commissioners and, as a general rule, preclude Commissioner’s 
involvement in investment due diligence except as observers for either overseeing 
staff processes or for Commissioners’ education and training purposes. Critical Easy Y N 
  
G13.3 
Add responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management to the Audit Committee charter; 




N   
G15.1 
As part of a shift in emphasis by the Commission to enterprise oversight, the 
Compensation Committee charter should be expanded to include oversight of human 
resources and infrastructure and to provide guidance to staff on human resources 
and capability development. 
Critical Easy Y N   
G5.2 
 RSIC should review its annual budget planning process to ensure that it is using 
existing allocations to full advantage and that requests for increased resources are 
based on a realistic assessment of staff and systems the organization can assimilate 
during the next budget period.  The Commission should conduct a mid-year review of 
year-to-date and projected expenses compared to budgeted amounts. 
Critical Easy N N   
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needed If yes, who? 
G6 
The Commission should have an annual external financial audit or an agreed upon 
procedures review of fund valuations, procedures and/or controls, consistent with 
other investment boards; either the Commission or a state agency (e.g., the State 
Auditor) could select the external firm. 







RSIC should develop a communications plan which identifies each key stakeholder 
group, considers what information is important for each stakeholder to know, and 
identifies responsibility for maintaining stakeholder communications. 
Important Medium N N   
G18.4 
RSIC should conduct a periodic benchmarking of its returns and costs by an 
independent expert to provide added assurance to stakeholders about the facts of its 
performance compared to peers (see Recommendation G13.4).  
Important Medium N N   
G7 
Decision-making within strategic partnerships should be assessed in the context of 
how all RSIC investment decisions are made and adjusted accordingly, if appropriate 
(see Recommendation I12.1). 
Important Easy N N   
G16.3 
The CIO should routinely invite other investment, operations and legal staff to attend 
IIC meetings as visitors so as to facilitate dissemination of information across 
functional silos. 
Important Easy N N   
G12.1 
The Commission should plan more frequent meetings, at least bi-monthly, and 
develop standing agenda items annually and for each meeting (e.g., asset allocation, 
investment beliefs, specific asset class reviews, infrastructure business plan review, 
etc.) (see also Recommendation I6.1). 
Important Easy Y N   
G15.2 
The Compensation Committee should change its name to Human Resources and 
Compensation to reflect the new focus. 
Important Easy Y N   
G16.1 The role of the Internal Investment Committee (IIC) should be clarified. Important Easy N N   
G12.2 
The revised protocol for the agenda setting process should be formally adopted by 
the Commission and incorporated into the Governance Manual. 
Important  Easy Y N   
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G18.3 
In the communications plan, RSIC should consider an initiative to draw greater 
national attention to the need for all public pension funds to disclose costs in a 
consistent way and for investment managers to provide the level of reporting 
necessary to accomplish that objective. 
Necessary Difficult N N   
G12.3 
Improve the effectiveness of Commission self-assessments by providing evaluations 
of individual Commissioners, utilizing peer-to-peer and upward evaluations (from RSIC 
staff), and providing individualized feedback and personalized improvement goals. 
Necessary Medium Y N   
G19 
RISC should confer with PEBA to determine whether legislative action is needed to 
ensure that a funding mechanism is in place for the State's indemnity and defense 
obligations that are not covered by insurance.  
Necessary Medium N Y PEBA 
G9 The Legislature should consider imposing term limits for Commissioners. Necessary Medium N Y Legislature 
G13.1 The Audit Committee should review and approve the Internal Audit Charter. Necessary Easy 
Y (Audit 
Committee) 
N   
G14 
The Commission should adopt a mid-year review process for its direct reports to 
provide guidance and interim feedback. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
G16.2 
If the named member of the IIC is not available (due either to being out of the office, 
on vacation, or the position being vacant), the next ranking staffer with similar 
responsibilities should attend IIC meetings to ensure appropriate participation. 
Necessary Easy N N   
G18.1 
RSIC’s communications policy should be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to 
address who is responsible for proactively speaking out on behalf of the RSIC and any 
policies which might be necessary to develop key messages. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
G12.4 
Develop an overall continuing education plan for Commissioners, including an on-
going education budget for the Commission and plans for individual Commissioners. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
I17 
The Legislature should consider four potential options to significantly improve the 
ability of the RSIC to obtain services from and work with its custodial bank (see 
Recommendations G2 and G3). 
Critical Difficult Y Y Legislature 
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I4.1 
The overall RSIC infrastructure development plan should fully consider and 
incorporate the staffing, systems and policy requirements to significantly increase 
internal asset management and manage risk prior to significantly expanding the 
current limited amount and types of assets managed internally. 




RSIC will need to develop new policies and practices if it chooses to continue 
securities lending through BNYM or another third party; a new policy should include a 
statement of lending objectives, risk tolerance and guidelines approved by the 
Commission. 
Critical Medium Y N   
I2 
The Commission should spend more time discussing its underlying investment beliefs 
and ensure that the asset allocation strategy remains consistent with those beliefs 
(see Recommendation G10.1). 
Critical Medium Y N   
I3.2 
RSIC should create a Risk Management/Investment working group to design the 
functionality of risk reporting. 
Critical Medium N N   
I3.4 
Risk Management should produce an annual plan which is reviewed and approved at 
the IIC; this should improve risk discipline, provide a benchmark for performance 
evaluation, create an opportunity for other investment officers to understand Risk 
Management capabilities, and improve communication. 
Critical Medium N N   
I6.3 
The Commission should seek alternate means of assuring and reassuring itself as to 
the quality of the legal review, thereby enabling it to eliminate the 30-day review 
period before funding.  
Critical Medium Y N   
I9.1 
RSIC staff should update the 2012 plan for expanded internal management and 
include a full business plan which considers all requirements (see Recommendation 
I4.1). 
Critical Medium N N   
I9.2 
RSIC should continue to pursue reductions in fees where it pays greater costs than its 
peers, taking into account potential net return and risk. 
Critical Medium N N   
I1 
If the Legislature continues to set the expected rate of return, it should regularly 
review the process and its assumptions on a periodic basis. Ideally, that cycle should 
be set to take advantage of the information available from the every five year PEBA 
experience study and RSIC’s asset liability study. 
Critical Medium N Y Legislature 
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I11.2 
The RSIC should contract with CEM, or a similar service from another provider, on an 
annual basis to develop a source of “apples-to-apples” benchmarks of investment 
management costs for each asset class and for the entire fund, as well as to provide 
an additional source for returns performance benchmarking (see Recommendations 
G13.4 and G18.4). 
Critical Medium N N   
I3.1 
As part of an overall infrastructure development plan, the RSIC should continue to 
prioritize a new risk management system and capability as a top priority. 
Critical Easy N N   
I3.3 Investment Risk Management should be a participating member at all IIC meetings.  Critical Easy N N   
I10.1 
RSIC fee reporting for alternative investments should be restructured to improve 
transparency and comparability with peer funds; management fees should be broken 
down into invoiced and non-invoiced management fees, performance fees and 
carried interest, and pass-through fees. 
Critical Easy N Y PEBA 
I10.2 
Investments in strategic partnerships should be allocated to the appropriate asset 
classes for performance and fee reporting in the PEBA CAFR. 
Critical Easy N Y PEBA 
I5.1 
The policy of Commissioner Involvement in due diligence should be changed to limit 
participation to no more than occasional involvement as an observer for educational 
or reassurance purposes only; Commissioners could be invited to all manager 
meetings held in Columbia (see Recommendations G10.3 and P1.3). 
Critical Easy N N   
I18.1 
The Commission should determine the future of securities lending based on 
assessment of the potential investment benefits and risks of different approaches to 
participating in the lending market. 
Important Medium Y N   
I18.5 
If RSIC decides to significantly grow securities lending, it should implement enhanced 
and more automated compliance functions, including compliance reporting from the 
lender(s) and periodic review by RSIC's compliance officer. 
Important Medium N N   
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I6.1 
RSIC should re-assess its due diligence practices towards identifying opportunities to 
streamline and reduce the cycle time of activities without impacting the thoroughness 
or effectiveness of the overall process.  Among the possible improvements would be: 
weekly management report of due diligence progress at the IIC, addition of a 
paralegal to co-ordinate legal reviews and with outside counsel (see Recommendation 
L1.2), and more frequent Commission meetings (see Recommendation G12.1).  
Important Medium N N   
I3.5 
The RSIC should explore whether the secondary market in LP interests could help it 
rationalize its private equity portfolio, while keeping in mind the variable 
inefficiencies of that secondary market.  
Important Medium N N   
I5.2 
Ideally operations should perform on-site reviews of all potential new managers. If 
staffing makes that impractical, the RSIC should adopt a formal operational due 
diligence calendar so as to a) minimize the number of managers hired without such an 
on-site visit, and b) prioritize an on-site operational visit as soon as possible following 
selection. 
Important Medium N N   
I7.1 
RSIC should consider establishing a formal policy for frequency of site visits to 
external managers as part of the monitoring process.  Leading practice is to make the 
periodicity annual, but given staff constraints and the existing semi-annual contact 
requirement, a biannual periodicity could be considered.  
Important Medium N N   
I19 
RSIC should ensure that its policy pertaining to Commissioner requests for 
information from the RSIC staff is followed.  This would include timely fulfillment of 
routine requests, a transparent process for determining the priority of requests which 
require approval at Commission meetings, and all responses being made available to 
all Commissioners through the portal. 
Important Easy    
I6.2 
RSIC legal staff should work with outside counsel to standardize contracting practices 
where possible.  This should reduce delays in the contracting process (see 
Recommendation L2.1). 
Important  Medium N N   
I14.1 
RSIC should explore alternate transition management programs, such as manager-to-
manager transitions (cherry picking) with the remaining securities sold, or principal 
bids.  RSIC should educate itself about when each technique is most appropriate. 
Necessary Medium N N   
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I14.2 
RSIC should determine if it wants to independently measure transition management 
costs, at least on a spot check basis. 
Necessary Medium N N   
I7.2 
RSIC should consider how it wants to gain assurance that managerial trading is 
efficient.  It could suggest that its external managers trading in public securities 
provide independent trade execution measurements, or engage a trade execution 
management vendor itself to “spot check” external managers. 
Necessary Medium N N   
I9.3 
RSIC should consider whether the use of a pool of asset-class specialist consultants to 
perform due diligence on co-investment opportunities would be beneficial and 
consistent with current asset allocation plans. 
Necessary Medium N N   
I12.1 
The RSIC should formalize its policies with respect to oversight of the strategic 
partnerships and controls over underlying investments within RSIC, e.g., use of the IIC 
to vet investments, two RSIC staff participating in meetings, etc. (see 
Recommendation G7). 
Important Easy N N   
I12.2 
RSIC should develop a guideline, rather than current situational decision making, for 
when and how much long-only, traditional assets should be in strategic partnerships. 
Important Easy N N   
I12.3 
RSIC should develop a guideline regarding the appropriate level of cash to remain 
within strategic partnerships and for the return of any cash in excess of partnership 
needs. 
Important Easy N N   
I13 
Rebalancing policies should be revised to require a quarterly rebalancing review to be 
scheduled on the annual meeting calendar of the IIC or Wednesday markets meeting 
to ensure compliance with SIOP; in the event the CIO and staff review balancing in the 
interim due to market movements or otherwise, that should be reflected in the IIC 
minutes to demonstrate compliance. 
Important Easy N N   
I18.3 
The RSIC securities lending agent should be required to provide quarterly reporting to 
management and the Commission regarding program activity, including amounts on 
loan, borrower concentration, return and risk. 
Important Easy N N   
I18.4 
RSIC should obtain an annual benchmarking of its activities against lending activity 
across the industry. 
Important Easy N N   
I4.2 The RSIC should adopt a formal counterparty risk policy (see Recommendation P2.1). Important Easy N N   
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I4.3 
RSIC should review its broker/dealer selection policy with an eye towards increasing 
its robustness by creating objective measures for acceptability and setting a time 
period for reaffirmation of the acceptable broker/dealers (see Recommendation 
P2.2). 
Important Easy N N   
I5.4 
RSIC should clarify the level of authority operations has on manager hiring and 
retention.  Two potential options would be to give a veto to operations or,  
alternately, to mandate that should the CIO decide to recommend an investment 
despite operational concerns, an operations memorandum should go to the 
Commission along with the CIO's recommendations  explaining why the investment 
should be made notwithstanding operation’s concerns. 
Important Easy N N   
I11.1 
Given the controversy the decision to disclose all external manager fees has 
engendered, the Commission should more clearly articulate its policy decision. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
I12.4 
The Commission should take increased advantage of the information, insights and 
experience resident in the RSIC’s strategic partners.  In-person education programs in 
Columbia would be one possibility, either in conjunction with regularly scheduled 
Commission meetings or, as in the past, at special educational or strategic planning 
retreats in-state.  
Necessary Easy N N   
I16 
RSIC should complete development of an annual assessment process for the 
Commission to evaluate the performance of its general investment consultant and 
the Commission should adopt and implement the process. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
I5.3 
Operational due diligence recommendations to the IIC should require a sign off from 
the head of RSIC operations.  
Necessary Easy N N   
L4.4 
The Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program planning should be completed and 
the new function launched as soon as practical.  (See also Recommendation G13.2). 
Critical Difficult N N   
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L3.1 
RSIC should consider eliminating the 30-day review period and instead rely on an 
appropriately documented Legal Sufficiency Certificate to confirm that all legal 
compliance and due diligence is complete.   Alternatively, RSIC could shorten the 
Commission review period and add a provision to the Governance Policy Manual 
clarifying the purpose for this review period and confirming that it does not delegate 
Commission authority to individual Commissioners or revoke authority otherwise 
delegated to the CIO or COO. 
Critical Easy Y N   
L5.2 
The process for approval of outside counsel by the Attorney General could be 
streamlined through development of a pre-approved pool of qualified investment 
counsel, with agreed engagement contract form and budget standards, and 
requirements for regular reporting to the Attorney General and Commissioners. 
Important Difficult Y Y AG 
L5.3 
Consideration should be given to engagement of qualified, independent fiduciary 
counsel. 
Important Difficult N Y AG 
L1.1 
RSIC's procedure for use of legal counsel should be revised to  assign inside or outside 
counsel to each investment transaction during the final due diligence process prior to 
approval of the Commissioners, as needed.   
Important Medium N N   
L1.2 
RSIC should add a paralegal to the legal staff to provide administrative support and 
assist in document control (see Recommendation I6.1). 
Important Medium N N   
L3.3 
The Legal Sufficiency Certificate should include confirmation that documentation for 
each investment is consistent with material terms approved by the Commission and 
with authority delegated to staff by the Commissioners in the Statement of 
Investment Objectives and Policies. 
Important Medium N N   
L3.2 
RSIC could require more frequent Commission meetings to consider investments.  
(See also Recommendation G12.1).  Alternatively, the Commission could consider 
delegating greater authority for approval of alternative investments to the CIO or 
Internal Investment Committee.   
Important Easy  Y N   
L4.2 
Consideration should be given to extending coverage of the Sourcing and Conflict 
Disclosure Form to Commission approval of consultants and professional service 
providers exempted from State procurement processes. 
Important Easy  Y N   
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L4.3 
The Sudan divestment policy should be completed and approved by the Commission 
(See also Recommendation P2.7). 
Important Easy  Y N   
L2.1 
RSIC should establish a standard side letter and contract clauses to improve 
bargaining leverage and increase contract consistency, and internal counsel should 
work with investment staff and outside lawyers on prioritization of the “asks” (see 
Recommendation I6.2). 
Important Easy N N   
L2.2 
RSIC should identify investment terms that are deal-breakers and provide those terms 
to investment counterparties early in the investment due diligence process. 
Important Easy N N   
L5.1 
Outside counsel should be refreshed, since it has been more than six years since the 
last RFP market test. 
Necessary Medium N Y AG 
L4.1 
The Audit Committee should approach the State Ethics Commission to establish a 
process for regular confirmation that RSIC Statements of Economic Interests have 
been audited.   
Necessary Easy N N   
O3.3 
RSIC should implement more thorough compensation planning and evaluations to 
enable recruitment and retention of highly skilled and experienced staff (see 
Recommendation P4.1). 
Critical Difficult N N   
O2 
The RSIC should develop an enterprise-wide capabilities and resources assessment 
and determine:  
1) What are the overall support needs and priorities? 
2) Where are the major resource gaps? 
3) Should the gaps be filled through internal and/or external resources? 
Critical Medium N N   
O3.1 
A senior human resources professional position should be created and filled to lead 
development of an overall HR strategy to support the organization’s business plan. 
Critical Medium Y N   
O3.2 
Policies and processes should be developed which ensure that the HR implications of 
proposed new initiatives are recognized and addressed before launch. 
Critical Medium Y N   
O3.6 
The Human Resources function should provide leadership for development of a multi-
year (3-5 year time horizon) infrastructure business plan which considers the needs 
Critical  Medium N N   
Fiduciary Audit of the Retirement System Investment Commission 
FINAL REPORT 
290 
Funston Advisory Services LLC  














needed If yes, who? 
and priorities of the organization. 
O1.1 
RSIC should consider creating the position of chief executive officer who would be 
accountable to the Commissioners for managing the entire organization. 
Critical Easy Y N   
O1.2 
Given the delay in the migration to internal management, the CIO (hopefully in 
conjunction with the new senior HR professional) ought to examine the way the 
investment team is organized today to determine if staffing is aligned with AUM, 
complexity and risk. 
Critical Easy N N   
O3.7 
RSIC should develop an internal governance process to plan and manage capability 
and infrastructure development. 
Critical Easy N N   
O4 
RSIC should adopt a standard process for documenting, approving and updating 
operational procedures and should continue its effort to provide on-line access to 
them as they are completed. 
Important Easy N N   
O3.4 
More formalized staff training and development plans and programs should be 
developed. 
Necessary Medium N N   
O3.5 
RSIC should utilize succession planning, including cross-training and other actions, to 
develop staff for broader responsibilities. 
Necessary Medium N N   
P4.2 
The Commission should engage an independent consultant to conduct a new peer 
compensation study at least every three years to assess the current level of RSIC staff 
compensation and make revisions to the target ranges, as appropriate. 
Critical Medium Y N   
P5 
To facilitate timely acquisition and implementation of information systems, RSIC 
should develop a proposed modified procurement process for approval by the BCB or 
the Legislature which would allow acceptable transparency and objectivity, improve 
the ability to evaluate, select and implement new systems, as needed, and include 
documentation to allow oversight on a post-purchase audit basis (rather than 
imposing pre-purchase restrictions). 
Critical Medium N Y BCB 
P1.2 
When the Commission’s investment beliefs have been articulated, they should be 
included in the Statement of Investment Objectives and Policies (see 
Recommendation G10.1). 
Critical Easy Y N   
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P3.2 
Review the positions required to sign to release cash transfers with the custodial bank 
and revise the requirements to allow two appropriate RSIC signatories, one from 
investments and the other from operations. 
Critical Easy N Y STO 
P3.3 
Instruct the custodial bank to accept signatory changes based upon a letter from the 
Commission Chair or the RSIC COO and CIO (or CEO if a CEO position is created). 
Critical Easy N Y STO 
P4.1 
The Compensation Committee should conduct an annual review of RSIC’s 




N   
P1.1 
The Commission should, as a general rule, preclude Commissioners’ involvement in 
investment due diligence except as an observer for occasional educational purposes 
(see also Recommendations G10.3 and I5.1). 
Critical Easy Y N   
P1.3 
The Governance Policy Manual should be revised to describe the potential role of a 
Commissioner in due diligence activities as an observer for educational and quality 
assurance purposes only, and that as a general rule Commissioners are not involved in 
due diligence activities (see also Recommendations G10.3 and I5.1). 
Critical Easy Y N   
P2.9 
RSIC should develop a referral tracking and reporting mechanism, like the sourcing 
and conflict disclosure process used for investments, to cover service provider 
referrals. 
Critical  Easy Y N   
P2.1 
A counterparty acceptance and monitoring policy should be developed and 
implemented. 
Important Easy N N   
P2.2 
The broker selection policy should be strengthened and require periodic reaffirmation 
by the fixed income team. 
Important Easy N N   
P2.7 The Sudan divestment policy should be finalized (see Recommendation L4.2). Important Easy N N BCB, PEBA, AG 
P2.4 
Policies which describe responsibilities for securities litigation activities should be 
refined to clarify approval roles of RSIC Legal, the Commission and Attorney General. 
Necessary Medium Y Y   
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P2.3 
RSIC should finalize the proxy voting rules that are in development, require that 
investment managers vote in the best interests of plan participants, monitor how 
managers are voting proxies and include a field to track voting in Tamale. 
Necessary Easy N N   
P2.5 
The staff conflict of interest policies should be modified to include more guidance on 
what is covered by the statutory standards of conduct. 
Necessary Easy N N   
P2.6 
RSIC should consider developing and implementing a policy which requires 
Commissioners and senior investment staff to disclose personal financial or legal 
distress. 
Necessary Easy Y N   
P2.8 
RSIC should consider developing a flowchart which describes the investment review 
and approval process, including responsibilities and timelines. 
Necessary Easy N N   
P3.1 
Continue to allow standing instructions for the custodial bank to receive incoming 
funds and allow sweeping of cash to maximize income. 
Necessary Easy N Y STO 
P3.4 
STO should revise its policies to allow electronic payment authorization for release of 
funds to cover capital calls using the existing technology offered by BYN Mellon.  
Necessary Easy N Y STO 
IT1.1 
IT1.1: Guided by an overall business and IT plan, RSIC should complete the acquisition 
of systems to: 
-Track commitments and provide return calculations for private market investments 
-provide security-based risk management that includes position level transparency 
and risk and performance analytics 
-monitor compliance of investment policies and contracts 
-automate trade order management 
-warehouse data for the whole investment portfolio in ordre to seamlessly feed other 
systems for analysis 




Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should seek the number 
and types of additional IT staff needed to adequately support its expanding systems 
infrastructure (see Recommendation O3.6). 
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IT3.1 
Guided by a business plan for the whole organization, RSIC should develop a strategic 
IT plan with clearly defined objectives, a full assessment of the current state of its 
systems and a timetable for completing needed improvements (see Recommendation 
O3.6).    
Critical Difficult N N   
IT4.1 
RSIC should be authorized to procure investment systems under a modified 
procurement process that includes appropriate accountability (See Recommendation 
P5). 
Critical Medium Y Y BCB 
IT4.2 RSIC should continue to pursue the eventual move of IT support from PEBA to RSIC. Important Difficult N Y PEBA 
IT1.2 
The QED internal accounting system provided by vendor contract with the State 
Treasurer’s Office should be upgraded or replaced. 
Important Medium N N   
IT3.2 
RSIC should establish a project governance process with representation from across 
the organization to determine IT priorities and monitor progress of initiatives, and to 
assure resources are appropriately targeted and that issues are addressed promptly.  
See also Recommendation O3.7 
Important Easy N N   
 
